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SYMPOSIUM: AFTER THE TEMPEST: How THE LEGAL
COMMUNITY RECOVERS FROM DISASTERS
INTRODUCTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN A DISASTER-
PRONE WORLD
DANIEL A. FARBER*
The Symposium is a welcome opportunity for lawyers and legal aca-
demics to explore disaster issues in depth. In the past, disasters have rarely
received more than passing attention in law reviews. Consequently, issues in
disaster law have not received in-depth analysis of the kind they need. Nova
Law Review is performing an important public service by providing a forum
for analysis and debate about the challenges facing lawyers in a disaster-
prone world.
This Symposium discusses the broader impact that natural disasters can
have on the legal community and how it may affect lawyers' offices, their
work, their clients, and their perception by the community at large.' Hurri-
cane Katrina revealed how severe these impacts can be along a broad swath
of the Gulf Coast, but most dramatically in New Orleans. Disasters directly
affect lawyers, as they do others, by destroying homes and offices, ruining
records, and causing serious business interruptions. But in the long run, the
most important question is how lawyers relate to the broader social and legal
issues posed by disasters.
For anyone who doubts the seriousness of these issues, a good lesson
can be learned with a tour of New Orleans today. Block after block of ruined
houses stretch out, representing hundreds of thousands of dislocated lives.
Boarded-up and gutted homes go on for miles, in neighborhoods where only
sporadic signs can be seen of current human occupation. Some of the devas-
tation on the Gulf Coast was even more dramatic, though fortunately fewer
people were directly impacted. The legal profession cannot afford to ignore
a social problem of this magnitude, and it is foolhardy to wait until after the
fact to begin thinking through the issues.
* Sho Sato Professor of Law and Faculty Director, California Center for Environmental
Law and Policy, University of California, Berkeley,
1. A wide array of materials relating to disaster issues and the legal system can be found
at: Disasters and the Law: Katrina and Beyond, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/disas-
ters.html (last visited May 29, 2007).
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One of the key roles that lawyers can play is to help clarify and reform
disaster law, a generally neglected subject.2 This field of law is ripe for re-
examination. Disaster law sometimes seems like an unrelated collection of
legal rules of various kinds that happen to come into play when communities
have suffered severe physical damage. But at a deeper level, disaster law is
about assembling the best portfolio of legal rules to deal with catastrophic
risks, a portfolio that includes strategies for prevention, emergency response,
compensation and insurance, and rebuilding. Our current strategies for each
of these tasks are, at best, passable.
Moreover, the individual strategies often fail to mesh effectively. The
reality is that the issues addressed by these legal strategies are interrelated.
To determine how much to invest in prevention, we need to consider the
extent to which a strong emergency response can limit damages. We also
need to be sure that precautions like higher levees do not backfire by causing
more people to move into high-risk areas-the extent to which this happens
will be influenced by land use policies and insurance availability. Poor land
use policies and subsidized insurance can actually be counterproductive,
encouraging people to move into areas that are vulnerable. In turn, preven-
tive measures help shape plans for emergency response. To plan the emer-
gency response we need to take into the forecast which areas are vulnerable,
and where precautions may fail. We also need to design the emergency re-
sponse so as to set the stage for rebuilding, rather than responding in ways
that will make reconstruction more difficult. And rebuilding, of course, be-
gins a new round of the cycle; for what we rebuild will itself be subject to
disaster risks. If we do not rebuild better than what we had, we are likely to
find ourselves in precisely the same vulnerable position, with another disas-
ter being only a matter of time.
Because it involves these interlinked issues, disaster law calls upon the
skills of a wide range of lawyers. Land use lawyers help determine what will
be built-or rebuilt-and where, and hence, what will be at risk. 3 Torts law-
yers may bring actions for compensation; insurance lawyers help determine
the extent to which victims are able to receive compensation in order to re-
2. It is notable that the first law school text on the subject was not published until 2006.
See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & JIM CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND
BEYOND (2006).
3. For example, land use lawyers must grapple with claims that restrictions on building
in vulnerable areas constitute unconstitutional takings under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032 (1992). In Lucas, the United States Supreme Court held that a
complete ban on the use of beachfront property was a per se taking, unless use of the property
was a common law nuisance or fell within some other "background" restriction of state law.
Id. at 1030-32.
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build. Practitioners of administrative law can provide needed guidance to
disaster planning efforts. 4 After the disaster takes place, family law practi-
tioners must deal with families divided by the disaster; bankruptcy lawyers
must assist the financially devastated; criminal lawyers must try to function
in what may be the wreckage of the criminal justice system, and so forth.
Every field of law is, somehow or another, involved at some stage of the
process, from disaster preparation to emergency response to reconstruction.
Lawyers may make a particular contribution in terms of victim compen-
sation. Our current system of laws is poorly designed to compensate disaster
victims.5 America is, among other things, the "promised land" for trial law-
yers. Tort recovery, however, is faced with some serious obstacles, even if it
can be shown that the government or private contractors were at fault in
causing the damage. The federal government is almost completely immune
from suit for flood damage.6 Private firms, such as the contractors who build
levees, may lack deep pockets. Even apart from these barriers, given the
complex dynamics of major disasters, problems of causation may be severe,
for it may be hard to show that a particular harm was caused by an absence
of due care by a defendant. In the case of a levee failure, for example, the
plaintiff would have to show that his injury was caused by that specific fail-
ure and would not have occurred anyway due to other breaches, overtopping,
wind, or other causes.
For these reasons, recovery under the current tort system looks like a
long shot. Other possible routes to compensation do exist. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides grants and loans to dis-
aster victims to help with recovery-assistance that may be slow to arrive
but does provide a route to rebuilding. Moreover, many victims have insur-
ance of one kind or another. But private insurance is often limited to wind
damage as opposed to flood damage. After a major hurricane there may be
thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of disputes on the wind versus flood
issue, as well as other insurance issues such as coverage and valuation.
Moreover, after floods, FEMA typically requires localities to upgrade their
4. On the need for reform in this area, see FARBER & CHEN, supra note 2, at 93-108.
5. The Litigation Section of the American Bar Association is currently embarking on a
project to reassess disaster compensation rules. This project was prompted by an awareness of
the need to reconsider existing legal rules in this area. See Kim J. Askew, The Rule of Law:
Still the Cornerstone, LITIGATION, June 2006, at 2-3, available at http://www.abanet.org/
litigation/journal/opening~statements/06summeropeningstatement.pdf.
6. See United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 611-12 (1986) (construing the Flood Con-
trol Act broadly to eliminate federal liability). In some states such as California, however, the
state government may be liable for inadequate design or maintenance of levees. See Paterno
v. State, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 879-80 (Ct. App. 2003) (applying reasonableness test to assess
government liability).
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building codes for rebuilding-but the added expenses are not covered by the
typical insurance policy, even if the policy covers "replacement cost." An
additional problem is that insurance companies tend to withdraw from the
market after catastrophes-so people may be very vulnerable if another big
hurricane hits in the next few years. Federal flood insurance picks up some
of the slack, but is not purchased universally and has other problems of its
own. 7
None of these alternatives to the tort system provides compensation for
those who die or are injured due to disasters. Some families may benefit
from life insurance or social security survivors' payments. But for many,
these forms of compensation will prove inadequate. The 9/11 Victim Com-
pensation Fund is one model of an alternative to conventional tort recovery.8
So far, however, even though the federal government clearly has the moral
responsibility for hundreds of deaths after Hurricane Katrina, it has not seen
fit to offer any form of recompense.
Lawyers play a crucial role in resolving disputed claims for private in-
surance and public compensation such as flood insurance. Rebuilding also
requires major contributions by lawyers. Rebuilding is not just a matter of
mortar and bricks. It also involves restoring critical social infrastructure,
such as the criminal justice system, family structures, and business relation-
ships. Lawyers need to restore their own organizations, whether they are
private law firms or public sector institutions. They need to resolve the cus-
tody issues of disrupted families. When changes in land use or infrastructure
are needed, lawyers are inevitably involved. Business arrangements that
were ruptured by disaster need to be resolved. In short, when winds die
down and flood waters recede, lawyers become key players in restoring the
community.
Environmental lawyers also have a particularly important role to play.
First, disaster decisions involve assessing and managing a special kind of
risk-small probabilities of very serious harm. This kind of problem is fa-
miliar to environmental lawyers because of their work on the regulation of
toxic substances. Thus, they are intimately aware of the analytical methods
and controversies surrounding such decision-making. Second, one of the
lessons of Hurricane Katrina is that wetlands and other buffer zones can be
critical in mitigating the harmful effects of disasters. Protecting these wet-
lands is a core focus of environmental law. Third, disaster prevention can
involve complex decisions about infrastructure and land use planning. Major
7. For discussion of these and other insurance issues, see FARBER & CHEN, supra note 2,
at 178-200.
8. For a description of the Fund, see Robert L. Rabin, The Quest for Fairness in Com-
pensating Victims of September 11, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 573, 576-77 (2001).
[Vol. 31
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infrastructure investments will require in-depth environmental assessments.
Fourth, disaster can also cause environmental harm such as toxic substance
releases, and again, environmental lawyers are on the forefront. It is not
surprising that one of the first comprehensive reports on Katrina was issued
by a group of environmental law professors.
9
It might seem initially surprising that lawyers should play such an im-
portant part in disaster issues. On further reflection, however, the issues are
especially well-fitted for the legal profession. In planning transactions, law-
yers are used to envisioning future contingencies and planning against even
unlikely events; as litigators, they are all too familiar with how carelessness
and organizational failures can lead to major harm. If first-year torts students
learn nothing else from their classes, they should learn that accidents can
always happen and that it pays to wear a seatbelt. Much of lawyering is ei-
ther about getting clients to "wear their seatbelts"-at least metaphorically-
or sorting out liability when they have failed to do so.
Lawyers are also in the business of solving problems---often unexpected
ones-and disasters trigger an avalanche of personal, family, institutional,
and economic problems. Individuals are injured or lose their jobs or homes;
custodial parents are separated from their children; courts close down or lose
their records; and companies suffer crippling business interruptions and loss
of inventory. If lawyers are to perform their roles effectively under the
heightened pressure of disaster conditions, they need to be educated about
disaster law in law school courses, and later through continuing legal educa-
tion. At all levels of the profession-law students, law professors, practitio-
ners, judges-we need to work now to devise solutions for future disasters,
which assuredly will come someday.
Indeed, the role of lawyers in disasters is likely to grow even more im-
portant in the future for the simple, if unfortunate, reason that the disasters
themselves are likely to become more frequent and more severe. There
seems to be no end to the flow of people into vulnerable coastal areas, drawn
there by scenery and good weather. Thus, many more people and properties
become subject to hurricane and flooding risks.
There are also good reasons to fear that hurricanes like Katrina may be
growing in likelihood. There has been a dramatic rise in powerful tropical
storms during the past three decades. It is plausible to connect this increase
with global warming. Tropical storms feed off of warm ocean waters, and
global warming is expected to increase ocean temperatures. Some experts
9. CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, AN UNNATURAL DISASTER: THE AFTERMATH OF
HURRICANE KATRINA (Sept. 2005), http://www.progressivereform.org/UnnaturalDisaster_
512.pdf.
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think there is a link between increased storm intensity and global warming.
However, we do not have very good historical records about storms, and the
records we do have suggest there may be a natural, decades-long cycle. That
cycle could be the cause of the recent increase, not global warming. Whether
the cause is climate change or a natural cycle, however, the implication is
still that we are likely to see many more mega-storms in the near future than
we saw in the past few decades.'
0
It is time to take counsel about the enormous problems arising from
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma across the Gulf Coast region. And it is
time to start making plans so that next time the legal system will be better
prepared. This Symposium reflects a healthy awakening of interest in these
issues by academics, judges, and lawyers. Hopefully, we can begin assem-
bling the intellectual capital now that we will need to weather future storms.
10. For discussion of the potential linkage between hurricanes and climate change, see
JOHN MCQUAID & MARK SCHLEIFSTEIN, PATH OF DESTRUCTION: THE DEVASTATION OF NEW
ORLEANS AND THE COMING AGE OF SUPERSTORMS 347-56 (2006).
[Vol. 31
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I. INTRODUCTION
Once an optional addition to a contract, force majeure' clauses are be-
coming a staple in travel and event planning. A contract with a force ma-
jeure clause can excuse nonperformance when circumstances occur that ex-
ceed the control of the parties and precludes performance.2  These clauses
can be found in travel and event contracts worldwide, in companies both
large and small, as a proactive measure to protect both the hospitality pro-
vider and the client. 3 With the ominous threat of hurricanes, tornados, earth-
+ Robert Bums, To a Mouse, on Turning Her up in Her Nest with the Plough, in THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF ROBERT BURNS, ROBERT BURNS COUNTRY, available at
http://www.robertbums.org/works/75.shtml.
* J.D., Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, B.A., St. Leo Col-
lege. The author is a judicial clerk for the Honorable Melanie G. May, Fourth District Court
of Appeal, West Palm Beach, Florida. She would like to thank Judge May for her guidance
during the past year and Nova Law Review Editor-in-Chief, Joanne Charles for her assistance
with the publication of this article. The author also wishes to acknowledge the love and sup-
port of her husband, Martin Corrada, daughter, Eva Corrada, parents Paul T. and Hazel Uritza
Grieshop, and the Uritza, Grieshop, Melvin, Bozeman, Cacho, and Corrada families.
1. The term force majeure "is French for 'overpowering force' or 'coercive power.'
Paul Grimes, Practical Traveler: When a Tour's Promises Can't Be Met, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6,
1981, at A3.
2. See L'Oreal USA, Inc. v. PM Hotel Assoc., L.P., No. 56315CV2005 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.,
N.Y. County Mar. 13, 2006).
3. This article will focus on travel and event planning contracts in the United States,
rather than individual states or international countries. See Hyatt Corp. v. Personal Commc'n
Indus. Assoc., No. 04-C-4656, 2004 WL 2931288, at *5 (N.D. I11. Dec. 15, 2004) (holding
that the laws of different states rendered the force majeure clauses in an event contract non-
identical). The application of civil law, as opposed to common law, in fault situations, is
9
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quakes, snowstorms, and typhoons, as well as terrorism and disease-related
conditions, a contract is not safe without a well-written force majeure clause.
II. FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSES IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Aerospace Forecast for the
Fiscal Years of 2007-2020 predicts that 768 million passengers will be fly-
ing during the 2007 fiscal year, over 1 billion passengers by 2015, and 1.2
billion by 2020.' This forecast also predicts that there will be approximately
62.5 million take-offs and landings in the larger airports of the United
States.5 Simultaneously, consumer complaints skyrocketed with the De-
partment of Transportation as passengers voiced their unhappiness regarding
their airline travel experience.6 An overwhelming majority of travel delays
were caused by a combination of inclement weather and air traffic control
systems that are antiquated and ill-equipped to handle the volume of modem
transportation. 7 In the future, the situation will become worse unless a sys-
tem is implemented that can meet the needs of the traveling public while
anticipating the unexpected conditions of a force majeure.'
different in both domestic and international contracts. UGO DRAETrA, RALPH B. LAKE, & VED
P. NANDA, Transnational Contract Law, in THE LAW OF TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS § 4:49 (Ved P. Nanda & Ralph B. Lake eds., 2006); see also Mark B. Baker,
"A Hard Rain's A-Gonna Fall"-Terrorism and Excused Contractual Performance in a Post
September 11th World, 17 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 1 (2004). Force majeure "situations exempt
tour operators from obligations to provide refunds or alternate travel arrangements" in On-
tario, "Quebec and B.C., while the rest of Canada has no such regulations in place." Douglas
McArthur, Resort Refugees, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), Oct. 29, 2005, at T2, available at
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20051029.DISASTER29/TPStory/
Travel.
4. Press Release, Federal Aviation Administration, FAA Forecasts Steady Growth in
Air Travel Demand: Secretary Peters Cautions that Growing Delays Will Continue Without
Changes (Mar. 15, 2007), http://www.faa.gov/news/pressreleases/news-story.cfin?newsld=
8358 [hereinafter FAA Forecasts Steady Growth].
5. Id
6. Linda Burbank, When You Get Bad News at the Airport, What Are Your Rights?
USA TODAY, Sept. 27, 2006, at E5.
7. Anita Dunham-Potter, What Are My Rights When Air-Traffic Control or Other De-
lays That Are "Out of the Airlines Control" Affect My Travel Plans? ANITAVACATION.COM,
http://www.Anitavacation.com/askanita/QA/airtravelqaWhat200l0201.shtml (last visited
June 1, 2007) [hereinafter Dunham-Potter, What Are My Rights]. "It is anticipated that airport
congestion will get worse before it improves." Margaret P. Fogg, Air Rage: Is It a Global
Problem? What Proactive Measures Can Be Taken to Reduce Air Rage, and Whether the
Tokyo Convention Should Be Amended to Ensure Prosecution ofAir Rage Offenders? 7 ILSA
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 511, 518 (2001).
8. Id. "Delays last year reached an all time high and now cost the nation's economy
over $10 billion annually." FAA Forecasts Steady Growth, supra note 4. The proposed solu-
[Vol. 31
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The airline industry has utilized force majeure clauses for years; how-
ever, with the changes in our world and the influx of issues beyond an air-
line's control, gone are the days of free hotel rooms and vouchers as com-
pensation for travel delays. 9 "An airline reservation is a legal contract"' ° and
the force majeure clauses in these contracts are becoming "watertight." 1 In
the event of a force majeure, an airline passenger's rights are detailed in the
airline's "contract of carriage."' 2 The contract of carriage is usually posted
on the airline's website and available, upon request, at the airport.' 3 Buried
in the fine print and legalese is a force majeure clause which generally in-
cludes a multitude of items that are beyond the control of the airline. 14 Items
listed begin with inclement weather, but also include: labor disputes, fuel
shortages, labor shortages, government regulations, civil unrest, wars, politi-
cal unrest, embargos, unsettled international conditions, riots, air traffic con-
trol issues, and any other occurrence not reasonably anticipated, foreseen or
predicted by the airline. 5
"[A]irlines do not guarantee their schedules, and they are not required to
assist or compensate passengers for flights delayed or canceled by bad
weather or other causes [deemed] beyond their control, collectively known as
tion to this problem entails, "Replacing our dated air traffic control architecture with a 21st
Century satellite-based system [which] will return freedom, convenience and reliability to the
skies." Id. (quoting Mary E. Peters, U.S. Secretary of Transportation).
9. When Your Trip Goes South: How "Contract of Carriage" Changes Affect Fliers'
Rights, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 5, 2006, at A2 [hereinafter Trip Goes South].
10. Ed Perkins, Travel Plans Ruined? Consider Taking Those Guilty to Court, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 1, 2006, at 3.
11. Christopher Elliott, American Errlines, CHRISCROSSINGS, July 29, 1999,
http://www.elliott.org/ask/1999/craa.htm [hereinafter Elliott, American Errlines].
12. Cindy Loose, When the Skies Are Unfriendly: How Contract of Carriage Changes
Affect Fliers' Rights, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2006, at P05. The contract of carriage is also
referred to as a "conditions of carriage" or "general rules tariff." See Elliott, American Errli-
nes, supra note 11; Al Anolik, Rule 240: Don't Leave Home Without It! MY TRAVEL
RIGHTS.COM, http://www.mytravelrights.com/travellaw.cfin?ai=3 (last visited June 1, 2007);
Jane Engle, Sometimes Those Flight Vouchers Are Like a Lump of Coal, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 25,
2005, at lF.
13. Susan Stellin, Practical Traveler: Those Uncertain Air Connections, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 10, 2002, at 5.4.
14. Trip Goes South, supra note 9. Airlines generally "take responsibility for their own
labor problems-but not the labor problems of other companies that might affect them."
Loose, supra note 12. The majority of the major airlines take responsibility for their mechani-
cal difficulties; however, some airlines categorize mechanical problems as a force majeure.
Id.
15. Chris Davis, Planning and Managing Meetings, Bus. TRAVEL NEWS, Apr. 25, 2005,
at 44; Loose, supra note 12; Dunham-Potter, What Are my Rights, supra note 7.
11
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force majeure."' 6 The only time that a passenger can expect compensation is
for a flight delay resulting from the airline's action and not from the actions
of others or an act of God.17 In the event of a force majeure, the airline's
only obligation is to book the passenger on the next available flight or refund
the airfare for the unused portion of the ticket.' 8 Since there are no federal
requirements regarding how an airline handles passenger delays, the passen-
ger is left to the mercy of the airline and can only wait for an elevation in the
delay, or seek other options. 19
When booking travel for an event or conference, most airlines will al-
low the contractor to negotiate a lower group-rated airfare; however, the
terms of the force majeure clause are generally nonnegotiable. 20 Addition-
ally, in a force majeure situation, the airline is not under an obligation to
refund to the client the cost of a hardship incurred if the delay affects the
remainder of the travel itinerary. 2' Absent an insurance policy which covers
16. David Bear, Snow Snafu Suggestions, PITrSBURGH POST-GAzETrE, Feb. 19, 2006, at
E2. A force majeure is defined as "an [a]ct of God (bad weather, etc.) that absolves an airline
from compensating passengers after a delay or cancellation." Bill McGee, Learning the Lan-
guage of the Travel Industry, USA TODAY.COM, July 19, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/travel/coluniist/mcgee/2005-07-19-mcgee x.htm. The term force
majeure should not be confused with "force maneure," which is defined as "an act of airline
management that is later denied by that airline." Id.
17. Bear, supra note 16. "The term 'act of God' has been widely defined as: Any acci-
dent, due directly and exclusively to natural causes without human intervention, which by no
amount of foresight, pains, or care, reasonably to have been expected could have been pre-
vented." James E. Mercante, That Sinking Feeling-A Boat Owner's Liability in the After-
math of a Hurricane, 17 NOVA L. REV. 1053, 1055 (1993) (citing IA C.J.S. Act of God § 757
(1985)). An act of God is also defined as, "[a] disturbance... of such unanticipated force and
severity as would fairly preclude charging a [defendant] with responsibility for damage occa-
sioned by [the defendant's] failure to guard against it in the protection of property committed
to its custody." Id. (quoting Compania de Vapores INSCO S.A. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., Co.,
232 F.2d 657, 660 (5th Cir. 1956)).
18. Anita Dunham-Potter, How Travel Companies Handle Events That Are Beyond Their
Control, ANITAVACATION.COM, Sept. 2001, http://www.Anitavacation.com/articles/misc/
How2001091 l.shtml [hereinafter Dunham-Potter, How Travel Companies Handle Events].
Airlines may offer phone cards or recommend nearby hotels that the airline has a negotiated
rate with. Bear, supra note 16; Trip Goes South, supra note 9; Stellin, supra note 13.
19. Dunham-Potter, What Are My Rights, supra note 7. Rule 240 is a written outline
detailing the passenger's rights and it is issued by individual airlines. See id. Specifically, it
details airline procedure if an incident occurs, for example a scheduling or booking conflict
that is within the airlines control. Id. Rule 240 does not cover force majeures. Id. If a pas-
senger chooses to accept a refund for the portion of the flight that was delayed and seek alter-
native transportation, they are urged to verify that their return trip itinerary or the remaining
portion of their booking is not accidentally canceled during the refund process. Stellin, supra
note 13.
20. See Davis, supra note 15, at 42.
21. See Perkins, supra note 10.
[Vol. 31
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the airfare, the passenger or group is left with little or no recourse if a force
majeure situation occurs. 2
III. FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSES AND EVENT PLANNING
Although the allure of idyllic weather and a picturesque location may
influence many to contract events in different locales, with the introduction
of stricter force majeure clauses in air travel, it may be safer and more reli-
able to plan the event closer to home. Unlike the one-sided force majeure
clauses offered in an airline's contract of carriage,23 a hotel or convention
facility will generally negotiate the terms of the contract with the client or
24event sponsor. Absent the unpredictability of transporting a large group via
airlines, an event planned closer to home may prove to be profitable in
goodwill while saving the planner the stress of a multi-tasked itinerary.
A. Negotiating the Event Contract
Whether the event is scheduled at home or away, a multitude of details
such as attrition, cancellation, force majeure, and dispute resolution should
be accounted for in the contract. 25 It is necessary for the individual or corpo-
rate attorney to negotiate the specifics of the contract and ensure that the
clearly defined requisites of the event have been addressed.2 6  "A poorly
negotiated contract can cost a corporation thousands of dollars in unneces-
sary expenses, while a well-staged event can engender incalculable levels of
goodwill" for the event sponsor. 7
22. David Bear, Stranded at the Airport, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 24, 2006, at
F2.
23. Susan Carey, Fliers Assail "Imprisonment" on Grounded Planes Thousands
Stranded on Runways up to 11 Hours, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 19, 1999, at IA. While each
airline forms their specific rate plan, generally they will issue special offers to clients for
group travel or large blocks of tickets purchased for a special event at a pre-determined desti-
nation. See Davis, supra note 15, at 43. These offers may include percentage rate discounts,
special fares, additional frequent flyer miles, free freight, upgrades, and free bonus tickets or
productivity tickets to the client or sponsor of the event. Id.
24. Id. at 43-44.
25. Id. at 44. The details of an event contract should also include: dates and times, con-
tact names and information, function space specifics, food and beverage, liability and insur-
ance, presence of other groups or events, ADA compliance, equipment requests and inventory,
labor charges, parking, and if applicable, accommodations and guest specifics. Id.
26. See Davis, supra note 15, at 44.
27. Id. at 39.
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Prepare ahead of time by researching the facility that the client wishes
to contract with. 28 Find out what other facilities offer, then weigh these as
viable alternatives to add clarity to the property that is being considered.29
"During the site selection and negotiation process, ask to see a facility's
standard contract, especially the fine print on [the] deposit, payment, attrition
and termination and cancellation policies. 30 Clarify any ambiguities in the
facilities standard contract and utilize this contract as a base for negotiations
and discussions.31 If the facility offers acceptable provisions, "save your
negotiating currency for something that isn't covered elsewhere. 32 Reiterate
the specific goals of the client's event, what is expected of the facility, the
transaction that will be occurring, and the law that will apply thereto.33 Ne-
gotiate a final agreement that incorporates the facility's standard language,
the client's specific language, and the best interests of both parties into the
negotiated contract. 34  All discussions and agreements should be solidified
and included in this contractual writing.35 The writing should detail all of the
relevant and important technical issues, in addition to the mundane, in an
effort to avoid confusion and misunderstandings. 36 Once the contract is re-
duced to writing, it should be reviewed for content as well as scrivener's
errors and other seemingly harmless but potentially litigious errors.37
28. J. Kent Newsome, Ten Rules for Ethical and Effective Negotiating, 531 P.L.I. REAL
EST. L. 1117 (2006). Advanced preparation and knowledge of the market rates can enable the
client to assess the event facilities' price-to-value ratio, thereby resulting in a balanced and
cost-effective outcome. See Davis, supra note 15, at 42. This advanced research is far more
advantageous to the client than expert negotiation skills. Id.
29. Newsome, supra note 28, at 1119.
30. Davis, supra note 15, at 44.
31. See id. at 43-44. It is important to know the contract that you are negotiating. See
Newsome, supra note 28, at 1119-21.
32. Newsome, supra note 28, at 1120.
33. See id at 1120-21. The event contract should cement what is expected of the client
and the facility, thereby incorporating the purpose for the gathering, the client's goals for the
event and, if applicable, the meeting's content. See Davis, supra note 15, at 44.
34. See Davis, supra note 15, at 44.
35. Id.
36. See id.; Andrea M. Teichman, Drafting and Negotiating Contracts, 3 MASS. BASIC
PRAC. MANUAL ch. 12 (2007).
37. See Davis, supra note 15, at 44. When reviewing and evaluating the contract, ensure
that the products and services offered by the facility have been accurately described and the
expectations of the client have been clearly delineated. See Teichman, supra note 36.
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B. The Force Majeure or "Eyeore" Clause3
8
The traditional law of contracts provides that, if there is no wording in
the contract stating otherwise, one or both parties to the contract may termi-
nate the contractual performance if the party's performance is made imprac-
ticable, impossible, or is frustrated by supervening events which would ren-
der the significance of the performance valueless to that party. 39 This fun-
damental legal principal is a default provision which is effectuated when a
supervening act or occurrence has an effect on the event, and the parties did
not assign the risk and consequences in the contractual agreement.4 ° If the
parties to the contract do not want the peril of unintended consequences from
future acts that transpire beyond their control, then the contractual agreement
should thoroughly "address what [principles] will apply and what the conse-
quences will be.",
41
Successful event planning begins with the contractual language between
the facility and client.42 One of the most important provisions that should be
included in the event contract is the force majeure clause. Force majeure
clauses, also referred to as "Acts of God and War"43 or "Vis Major,"'  are
applicable when the execution of an event is prevented due to forces beyond
the control of the facility or group, such as inclement weather, large-scale
disasters, labor disputes, or civil unrest.45 In a standard force majeure clause,
no penalties are assessed to either party when the event must be terminated;
however, "these clauses are susceptible to very different interpretations"
based upon the specific language or the ambiguity of the writing.46
38. See Rohn K. Robbins, Force Majeure: Insurance for the Forces of Nature, VAIL
DAILY, Oct. 2, 2006, available at http://www.vaildaily.com/article/20061002/
colums/l 10020039&SearchlD=7377558000220. Insurance for a force majeure "is insurance
for that particle of Christopher Robin's pal, Eyeore, that dwells in a dark place in each of us.
Gloom and doom insurance, if you will." Id.
39. John S. Foster, Migurus: Force Majeure Clauses (May 17, 2006),
http://vnutravel.typepad.com/migurus/2006/05/forcemajeurec.html.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Davis, supra note 15, at 44.
44. Robbins, supra note 38. "Vis major means a greater or superior force." Id.
45. Davis, supra note 15, at 44.
46. Id.
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"Force Majeure clauses are not just boilerplate anymore."47 In the wake
of recent events and catastrophes that have occurred worldwide, it has be-
come evident that some clauses are better constructed than others.4" A true
force majeure can cause a materially adverse ripple effect, particularly in the
travel and hospitality industry.49 Contingency planning is now a reality that
clients and facilities must consider when scheduling an event.5" Therefore, a
fully contemplated force majeure clause has become a necessity in all viable
event contracts. 5
In a world where timing is everything, when a catastrophe occurs and
an unevaluated force majeure clause comes into effect, litigation can and will
ensue. Ambiguity is a common cause for litigating a force majeure clause.5"
When "a written instrument lends itself to more than one reasonable interpre-
tation, it is ambiguous. 53 In many cases an extensive list of potential force
majeure events is a party's best defense against a claim of ambiguity.54 A
well structured clause should specifically include the conditions that will
inhibit or prevent a party's performance.55 This detailed clause will force the
47. William A. Tanenbaum & Kaye Scholer, Force Majeure Is Not Just for Boilerplate
Anymore: Why Combining Force Majeure and Disaster Recovery Provisions Makes Sense,
880 P.L.I. PAT. 85, 89 (2006). "A traditional force majeure clause would excuse the vendor
from performing and would provide an unwarranted 'get out of jail free card."' Id.
48. Jed Mandel, A New Appreciation for Force Majeure Clauses, MEETINGSNET.COM,
Mar. 19, 2003, http://meetingsnet.com/news/meetingsnew appreciationforce/ [hereinafter
Mandel, A New Appreciation].
49. Inn at the Center, LLC v. Seattle, No. 52241-8-I, 2004 WL 418021, at *2 (Wash. Ct.
App. Mar. 8, 2004); Judy DeHaven, Jersey Firms Cope with Storms Rita and Katrina Affected
Plenty of Companies with Gulf Coast Operations, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Sept. 27,
2005, at 31. Hurricane Katrina affected New York based travel and real estate company Cen-
dant's daily business and bottom line. Id.
50. Foster, supra note 39; see L'Oreal USA, Inc. v. PM Hotel Assoc., L.P., No.
56315CV2005 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Mar. 13, 2006) (noting that the contract presented to the court
did not contain a force majeure clause listing examples as an excuse for nonperformance).
51. Foster, supra note 39; see generally N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Pelican Point Harbor, Inc.,
19 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D722 (N.D. Fla. 2006) (holding that summary judgment is denied
because disputed issues of material facts existed regarding the force majeure clause); Tire
Kingdom, Inc. v. Waterbed City, Inc., 654 So. 2d 1005, 1006 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
("[T]he trial court in the case sub judice may rightly interpret the [florce [m]ajeure clause at
issue here as a matter of law.").
52. See Cartan Tours, Inc. v. ESA Servs., Inc., 833 So. 2d 873, 874-75 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2003) (finding the phrase "affecting the ability of the Olympic Games to be held" was
ambiguous because it could have more then one meaning).
53. Yardum v. Scalese, 799 So. 2d 382, 383 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
54. See St. Joe Paper Co. v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Regulation, 371 So. 2d 178, 179-81 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
55. Avila v. Travel Dynamics, Inc., Index No. 005631/2001, 2002 WL 31056702, at *1-2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 5, 2002). The defense of force majeure "lies 'only if the force majeure
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parties to recognize and contemplate the potential of a force majeure, while
preventing the clause from appearing vague and standardized. 6 The more
negotiated the terms in this provision appear, rather than "boilerplate," the
more a court will accept the clause as unambiguous and controlling.1
7
One of the most critical issues for the parties is determining what time
interval between the scheduled event and the potential force majeure occur-
rence will justify the termination of a contract.5 8 The decision to not perform
in a contract under the protection of a force majeure clause must be ap-
proached carefully. The mere threat of a force majeure will not relieve a
party of its contractual obligations.5 9 This is because "'fear doesn't amount
to force majeure."' 6 If the parties choose to make a provision for a threat of
a force majeure, they must state in the contract that based upon a specific
viable threat, such as a warning from the Department of Homeland Security,
either party has the ability to terminate the contract.6 '
Contractual wording becomes paramount when addressing the repercus-
sions of a force majeure on an event. 62 For example, unless the contractual
agreement states otherwise, parties are still under an obligation to perform
despite a lack of attendance or interest in the event.63 Equally, if adverse
economic conditions are a derivative result of a force majeure, payment
would not be excused simply because it became economically impractical or
inadvisable. 64 "In fact, 'the unforeseen cost increase that would excuse per-
formance must be more than merely onerous or expensive. It must be posi-
clause specifically includes the event that actually prevents a party's performance."' Id.
(quoting Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295, 296 (N.Y. 1987)).
56. See St. Joe Paper Co., 371 So. 2d at 180-81.
57. Teichman, supra note 36.
58. Jed R. Mandel, Making Force Majeure Work for You, MEETINGSNET.COM, Nov. 1,
2003, http://meetingsnet.com/financialinsurancemeetings/insurance-makingforce majeure/
[hereinafter Mandel, Making Force Majeure Work].
59. See id.
60. Corrie Dosh, MeetingWorld. Hotels Wait for High-Revenue Groups, Bus. TRAVEL
NEWS, Aug. 15, 2005, at 55.
61. See Foster, supra note 39.
62. See id.
63. Id.; Christopher Elliott, Practical Traveler: With Threat of Avian Flu, Go or Stay
Home? N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, at 5.6. An outbreak of a virus is considered a force ma-
jeure event and is beyond the control of the travel or event planner; however, if the trip or
event is still scheduled and can be executed, then the planner is under no obligation to offer
you a refund. Id.
64. Wizard v. Clipper Cruise Lines, No. 06-Civ.2074, 2007 WL 29232, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 3, 2007) (citing OWBR LLC v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, 266 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1222
(D. Haw. 2003)).
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tively unjust to hold the parties bound."' 65 Neither a shift in the market nor
financial inability as a result of a force majeure will discharge the contract
unless the contractual language states otherwise.66 If parties seek to protect
themselves in the event of a force majeure, their intentions must be clearly
stated in the clause and not implied.67 Relying upon common law doctrines
as a default is equally discouraged.6 s
"The party who relies on a force majeure clause to excuse performance
bears the burden of proving that the event was beyond the party's control and
without its fault or negligence." Proof or even general knowledge of the
force majeure event does not absolve this burden.70 Rather, sufficient evi-
dence must be presented to show that the circumstances pertaining to the
force majeure rendered the performance of the contract so unreasonable and
extreme that it is necessary to excuse the performance and the parties under
the agreement.7'
It is important to note that once the contractual agreement is terminated
due to a force majeure, the parties' obligations to each other are also termi-
nated.72 This termination applies even if the force majeure resolves itself,
disappears, or comes to an end.73 Once the termination has occurred neither
party is under any obligation to "undo" the termination or enter into new
contract for the event. 7
C. Attrition and Event Insurance
After a force majeure, an event planner may decide to persist with the
event despite a contractual clause making it possible to cancel without a pen-
alty; however, deciding that "the show must go on" does not necessarily
65. OWBR LLC, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 1222 (quoting La. Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny
Ludlum Indus., 517 F. Supp. 1319, 1325 (E.D. La. 1981)); Butler v. Nepple, 354 P.2d 239,
244-45 (Cal. 1960). "[M]ere increase in expense does not excuse performance [under a force
majeure provision] unless there exists 'extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, [or]
injury."' Butler, 354 P.2d at 245 (quoting Oosten v. Hay Haulers Dairy Emp. & Helpers
Union, 291 P.2d 17, 20 (Cal. 1955)) (emphasis added).
66. OWBR LLC, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 1222 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 261 (1981)).
67. See Foster, supra note 39.
68. See Butler, 354 P.2d at 244-45.
69. OWBR LLC, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 1222 (citing Stand Energy Corp. v. Cinergy Servs.,
760 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001)).
70. Id. at 1224.
71. Id. at 1225.
72. Mandel, Making Force Majeure Work, supra note 58.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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mean that people will choose to attend the event.75 Many event contracts
impose fees on the client if a predetermined percentage of people fail to at-
tend. 76 Thus, clients who choose not to cancel the event are faced with sub-
stantial attrition fees.77 Although some event facilities have more relaxed
attrition and cancellation policies than others, it is never a good business
decision to wait until a force majeure to discover the details of a facility's
policy.
78
Event "contracts should be written with language that links attrition and
force majeure events, and automatically voids (or substantially modifies) the
attrition provision if a force majeure event occurs."79  With this type of
clause, the client can make an informed business decision to proceed with the
event absent an attrition fee, or at a minimum, a fee that is substantially
modified. 8 This agreement would allow clients the freedom to hold the
event without an attrition penalty for an act that was beyond their control.8'
Facilities would also receive the benefit of continued revenue where absent
this modified attrition policy they would face terminations and a loss in prof-
its.8 2  Additionally, a combined attrition and force majeure provision can
exemplify a facility's contractual goodwill and showcase itself as an addi-
tional advantage to clients when they are comparing and selecting event loca-
tions.
Event cancellation insurance is a growing trend in the wake of recent
global force majeures. This type of insurance coverage "responds to the fi-
nancial consequences of a force majeure event (beyond the control of the
business) as defined in the insurance contract, which has an impact on the
75. See Mandel, A New Appreciation, supra note 48. "Additionally, meeting sponsors
are required by law not to subject their attendees to unreasonable risks of harm." Foster,
supra note 39.
76. Mandel, A New Appreciation, supra note 48.
77. Id. Attrition is often referred to as "slippage" in the food and beverage industry.
Davis, supra note 15, at 44.
78. See Mandel, A New Appreciation, supra note 48. In the aftermath of September 1I,
2001, Hilton Hotels issued a statement that cancellation fees or penalties would not be im-
posed upon events between September 11, and October 31, 2001. Dunham-Potter, How
Travel Companies Handle Events, supra note 18. The hotel chain stated that it is committed
to flexibility and working cooperatively with its customers and guests during this tenuous
period of time. Id.
79. Mandel, A New Appreciation, supra note 48.
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. See id. After a force majeure, facility owners should ask themselves what they can
do to promote recovery and recapture lost business. Stephen Barth & San San Lee, Trends in
Management Contract Law, LODGING HOSPITALITY, Mar. 15, 2003, at 14.
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corporate bottom line." 3  Event insurance is available to both clients and
event facilities.8 4 The insurance coverage can prove to be quite costly, but if
the bulk of a client's or facility's annual income is linked to an event or a
trade show, insurance becomes a crucial necessity. 5 In the aftermath of a
force majeure, the expense of the insurance will prove to be money well
spent. 6
IV. CONSTRUCTING A FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE
Successful event planning begins with the contract language in the cli-
ent and facility agreement.87 While each contract may be as different as the
events that they pertain to, a well-structured force majeure clause should be a
standard that both parties strive for.
The facility's standard event contract will determine what additional
terms will need to be added to the force majeure clause. The agreement
should specify the type of event, dates, times, event attendance, and the pos-
sibility of a force majeure.88 Caution should be taken not to state that the
facility's booking is contingent upon the occurrence of a larger event such as
the Olympic Games or the World Cup. 89 If the large scale event takes place,
despite the force majeure, the client may find itself locked into the contract
with no recourse or relief. 90
The contract should contain a clear, specific, and inclusive force ma-
jeure clause designed to cover known and unknown occurrences that could
affect either party's performance. 9' Clear intentions in a contract will super-
sede and are considered controlling.92 Acts that are foreseeable, such as
83. Miller Insurance Services Limited, Commercial Contingency - Force Majeure,
http://www.miller-insurance.com/Specialist-areas/Commercial-contingency--05Force-maj-
eure.aspx (last visited June 1, 2007); see Lou Kalosc, Planners Add Terrorism, SARS to
Travel Insurance, ST. Louis Bus. J., May 16, 2003, at 31.
84. Foster, supra note 39.
85. See Mandel, A New Appreciation, supra note 48.
86. "[Florce majeure insurance is insurance gauged to cover us from the unimaginable,
rather than the imaginable catastrophes." Robbins, supra note 38.
87. Foster, supra note 39.
88. Id. After Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, groups with event insurance were able
to collect on their policies; however, many groups did not purchase insurance because of the
post September 11, 2001, rate increases. David Jonas et al., Katrina Roils Industry, Bus.
TRAVEL NEWS, Sept. 5, 2005, at 1.
89. See Cartan Tours, Inc. v. ESA Servs., 833 So. 2d 873, 874-75 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2003).
90. See id.
91. Foster, supra note 39.
92. Id.
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power outages, must be listed in the force majeure clause in order for a party
to terminate the contract without penalty. 93 "On occasion, some jurisdictions
have held that failure to provide for a foreseeable event in the contract means
the parties accepted the risk from such event and waived the right to use the
occurrence of that event as a valid reason to terminate their performance.,
94
Lists of potentially adverse acts or occurrences should be listed with the
preface "including but not limited to."95
The clause should be written with a broad scope allowing for total or
partial termination of the contract based upon a viable threat or the actual
occurrence of a force majeure. 96 Additionally, the contract should connect
attrition with the force majeure event and modify or void the provision if this
occurs. 97 Parties should define vague or ambiguous words such as "inadvis-
able" in the contract, as well as terms or words that could have multiple
meanings. 98 In the event of a dispute over part, or all of the force majeure
clause, the parties should agree and document whether they will submit the
dispute to arbitration or costly litigation. The application of these criteria
should yield an effective force majeure clause that is comprehensive and fair
to both parties.
V. CONCLUSION
In the realm of contract law, contemplating the unforeseen is worthy of
careful planning. Proper contract drafting will assist both parties in avoiding
disputes and supports a healthy business relationship. The force majeure
clause should be a permanent part of this process particularly in travel and
event contracts. The time taken to carefully draft this clause will promote a
positive experience for both parties knowing that all contingencies have been
considered and planned for, and will prove to be invaluable in the aftermath
of unforeseen circumstances.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Foster, supra note 39.
97. Mandel, A New Appreciation, supra note 48.
98. OWBR LLC v. Clear Channel Commc'n, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1221 n.6 (D.
Haw. 2003).
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HURRICANE KATRINA: A DEADLY WARNING MANDATING
IMPROVEMENT TO THE NATIONAL RESPONSE TO
DISASTERS
AILEEN M. MARTY, M.D., FACP*+
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Department of Agriculture, National Laboratories of the De-
partment of Energy, and the Department of Defense. She
teaches "Scientific, Domestic, and International Policy Chal-
lenges of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terror" at the
National Defense University. The editors of the Law Review
solicited Dr. Marty's contribution to this symposium on disas-
ters, in part because of her expertise in the subject, but also
because we wanted to highlight the need for a multi-
disciplinary approach to disaster preparedness in the hopes of
stimulating further collaboration among the professions in this
vital area. In this article, Dr. Marty, a medical doctor, puts
into context the Federal Response to catastrophes and disas-
ters, explores some of the lessons learned from Hurricane
Katrina focusing primarily on the health issues, and then ex-
plains some of the remaining policy challenges that continue
to face the nation regarding disasters. - Law Review Eds.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal government's role in disaster management has evolved
from simply providing tax relief to that of an active participant in prevention,
response, and recovery.' Experience with massive catastrophes that cause
1. See infra Table 1.
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multiple casualties 2 in the United States is limited; only ten large disasters
are recorded in which there were over 1000 fatalities.3 Prior to the 2006
Hurricane Season, experts agreed that there would be more category four and
five hurricanes. 4 In addition, the risk from large-scale deliberate disasters is
increasing; particularly as acquiring nuclear weapons is considered a potent
political, military, and social tool. 5 Since the 9/11 attacks, the federal gov-
ernment has recognized the urgent need for an improved, integrated National
Plan for Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. The response to the 2005
hurricanes demonstrated the need for even more changes. This article first
examines the changes initiated by 9/11. The article then reveals the man-
dated improvements, such as further integration between federal, state/tribal,
and local government and the private sector capabilities that were made ob-
vious by the lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, focusing par-
ticularly on some of the health care issues that arose. Finally, the article
raises some very significant issues that continue to require multi-disciplinary
and creative solutions and that must be addressed in disaster preparedness.
In February 2003, the White House produced Homeland Security Presi-
dential Directive-5 (HSPD-5) on the Management of Domestic Incidents,6
2. The term "casualty" is often ill-defined. In some texts, the term casualty means
death, whereas in others it implies a patient with a treatable injury or illness. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 231 (8th ed. 2004). In this article, the term "casualty" is used to encompass
both those with potentially treatable conditions and the dead. The absolute number of patients
needed to define an event as producing "mass casualties" is less important than the functional
impact to the existing support system. An incident that overwhelms the resources of a given
system at a specific point in time is considered a mass casualty event. High impact events
may or may not cause large numbers of directly impacted persons, but may nonetheless cause
a large impact on the support system, because of the numbers of persons who fear that they
may have been impacted. Thus, if one considers the "psychological casualties" and the fact
that the effects of major natural catastrophes or of a terrorist event can be far-reaching, then
even events with limited numbers of directly impacted persons can be "mass casualties"
events.
3. See infra Table 2.
4. National Weather Service, NOAA, Climate Prediction Center: Atlantic Hurricane
Outlook - Background Information, http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/prod-
ucts/outlooks/background information.shtml#NOAADEF (last visited June 21, 2007).
5. George P. Shultz et al., A World Free of Nuclear Weapons, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2007,
at Al 5; see U.N. Security Council Votes to Impose Tougher Iran Sanctions, WALL ST. J., Mar.
25, 2007.
6. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5-Management of Domestic Inci-
dents, 1 PUB. PAPERS 229 (Feb. 28, 2003) [hereinafter HSPD-5].
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and in December 2003, the White House issued Homeland Security Presi-
dential Directive-8 (HSPD-8) on National Preparedness.
7
HSPD-5 called for a transition from a Federal Response Plan (FRP) to a
National Response Plan (NRP)8 coupled with a National Incident Manage-
ment System (NIMS). 9 The hope was that the NIMS would provide a con-
sistent nationwide approach for federal, state, tribal, and local governments
to work together effectively and efficiently to prepare, respond, and recover
from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. The back-
bone of the NIMS is the Incident Command System (ICS), 1° expanded so
that NIMS would provide for interoperability and compatibility among fed-
eral, state, tribal, and local capabilities. The NIMS included a core set of
concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies covering the incident
command system, multi-agency coordination systems, unified command,
training, identification and management of resources, qualifications and cer-
tification, as well as the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident infor-
mation and incident resources.
HSPD-8 had the goal of establishing policies to strengthen the prepar-
edness of the United States to prevent and respond to emergencies under a
national, domestic, all-hazards preparedness goal. The NRP, modeled on the
FRP, 11 incorporated the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Assistance and Emer-
gency Relief Act, 12 and presented an all-hazards approach. The NRP, using
the NIMS, was designed to provide the structure and mechanisms for na-
tional level policy and operational direction for federal support to state and
local incident managers and for exercising direct federal authorities and re-
7. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8-National Preparedness, 2 PuB.
PAPERS 1822 (Dec. 17, 2003) [hereinafter HSPD-8]. For a complete list of Presidential Direc-
tives, see http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/direct.htm.
8. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN (2004), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRPbaseplan.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN].
9. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (2004),
available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/nims doc full.pdf.
10. The ICS was developed in the early 1970s to deal with differences among agencies
and unspecified incident objectives in certain disasters. Occupational Safety & Health
Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Incident Command System: What is an Incident Command
System? http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/ics/what-is ics.html (last visited June 21, 2007).
ICS is "a standardized on-scene incident management concept designed specifically to allow
responders to adopt an integrated organizational structure equal to the complexity and de-
mands of any single incident or multiple incidents without being hindered by jurisdictional
boundaries." Id.
11. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN: BASIC PLAN (2003), avail-
able at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/frp/frpbasic.pdf.
12. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Assistance and Emergency Relief Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-707, 102 Stat. 4689 ((codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5121 (2000 & Supp.)).
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sponsibilities, as appropriate. 13 The NRP attempted to capture protocols for
operating under different threats or threat levels and it incorporated, as much
as possible, the existing federal emergency and incident management plans,
along with rigorous requirements for continuous improvements from testing,
exercising, and experience. The hope was that the NRP would provide a
consistent approach to reporting incidents, providing assessments, and mak-
ing recommendations to the President, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
and the Homeland Security Council. HSPD-8 also called for a National Pre-
paredness Goal that established measurable priorities, targets, and a common
approach to developing needed capabilities. 14 This National Preparedness
Goal uses a Capabilities-Based Planning approach to determine how pre-
pared we are, how prepared we should be, and how to prioritize our efforts to
close the gaps. It required the development of a target capabilities list that
identified the capabilities of federal, state, local, and tribal entities.
Hurricane Katrina revealed many gaps and issues with the National
Preparedness Goal and its target capabilities list, as well as issues with the
NRP and the NIMS. The lessons learned have led to major revisions in all of
these documents' 5 and to the development of an NRP/NIMS review proc-
ess. 16
13. See infra Figure 1.
14. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: Strengthening National Preparedness:
Capabilities-Based Planning, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/CBP_041305.pdf (last vis-
ited June 21, 2007); see also HSPD-8, supra note 7.
15. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NOTICE OF CHANGE TO THE NATIONAL
RESPONSE PLAN (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRPNotice-of
Change_5-22-06.pdf [hereinafter NOTICE OF CHANGE TO THE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN];
FEMA, NIMS BASIC: ONGOING MANAGEMENT AND MAINTENANCE, (Mar. 23, 2006),
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/nims/NIMS_basic_ongoing management and maintenance.pdf;
Memorandum from Al Fluman, Acting Dir., NIMS Integration Ctr., FEMA, DHS to the NIMS
Stakeholders (Mar. 26, 2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nims-upgrade-
revision-v2-032707.pdf;U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., National Response Plan and National
Incident Management System Review and Revision Process, Stakeholder Meeting, National
Incident Management System (NIMS) Key Revision Issues - Background (Oct. 25, 2006),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ assets/nrp-nims-upgrade-bullets-102406.pdf [hereinafter NIMS
Key Revision Issues - Background]; U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., National Response Plan
and National Incident Management System Review and Revision Process, Stakeholders Meet-
ing, NIMS Upgrade Summary (Oct. 25, 2006), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nrp-nims-
upgrade-paper-102406.pdf [hereinafter NIMS Upgrade Summary]; U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SEC., HURRICANE KATRINA IMPACT ON THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL AND TARGET
CAPABILITIES LIST, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/KatrinaslmpactontheGoalandTCL.pdf
(last visited June 21, 2007).
16. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., The NRP/NIMS Review Process Coordination Struc-
ture, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nrp-nims-coord-structure.pdf (last visited June 21,
2007).
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II. HURRICANE KATRINA
Hurricane Katrina collided with South Florida, picked up strength, and
slammed into the Gulf Coast ravaging Mississippi, Louisiana, and Alabama
in late August 2005.17
On August 29, 2005, at approximately 6:10 a.m. CDT (7:10 a.m. EST),
Hurricane Katrina's eye made landfall at Buras, on the Louisiana coast, be-
tween Grand Isle and the mouth of the Mississippi River. An hour and a half
before the storm made landfall, the levees near the CSX railroad and Indus-
trial canal were breached and the flooding of residential areas in greater New
Orleans began. The storm surge overtopped the levees on the east bank of
the river, "crossed" the river, overtopped the levees on the west bank, and
sent additional water into neighborhoods in Plaquemines Parish. The center
of Hurricane Katrina moved ashore into southeast Louisiana just east of
Grand Isle. Catastrophic flooding manifested in New Orleans from massive
overtopping of levees in east Orleans and St. Bernard Parish, overtopping
and breaking of the Industrial Canal levees, and breaks in the 17th Street and
London Avenue Canal flood walls. Though the flooding was first reported
locally at 8:21 a.m. CDT (9:21 a.m. EST) on Monday, the Homeland Secu-
rity Operations Center (HSOC) merely reported a "levee issue" at 9:50 a.m.
CDT (10:50 a.m. EST) on Monday. Sadly, by Monday morning the disaster
zone encompassed an area of 93,000 square miles, and thirteen states were in
17. SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO
HURRICANE KATRINA, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 1-27 (2006), available at
http:/ikatrina.house.gov/full-katrinareport.htm [hereinafter A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE];
FRANCES F. TOWNSEND, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED
1 (2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-leamed.pdf; COMM. ON
HOMELAND SEC. & GOV'T AFFAIRS, HURRICANE KATRINA: A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, S.
REP. No. 109-322 (2006), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/Katrina/FullReport.pdf;
Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness, Response,
and Recovery: Hearing Before the S. Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs Comm., 109th Cong. 2
(2006) (statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06442t.pdf [hereinafter Walker Statement]; U.S. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS AND SPECIAL
REVIEWS, A PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF FEMA's DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES IN
RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 1 (Mar. 31, 2006), http://www.dhs.gov/
xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG 06-32_MarO6.pdf [hereinafter FEMA PERFORMANCE REVIEW];
U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS: ENHANCED LEADERSHIP,
CAPABILITIES, AND ACCOUNTABILITY CONTROLS WILL IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
NATION'S PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY SYSTEM, GAO-06-618 (Sept. 6, 2006),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06618.pdf [hereinafter CATASTROPHIC
DISASTERS]; U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONWIDE PLAN REVIEW PHASE 2 REPORT
(2006), available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Prep _NationwidePlanReview.pdf;
see infra Table 4.
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a "state of emergency." The storm had caused repeated surges of water
many reaching twenty-seven feet above normal in the Biloxi Mississippi
area, and damaged 169 miles of levees in Louisiana. It was not until Tues-
day, August 30, at 6:00 a.m. EST that the HSOC finally provided a con-
firmed report of a breach. Inexplicably, Secretary of Homeland Security
Michael Chertoff held off declaring Hurricane Katrina an "Incident of Na-
tional Significance"' 18 until Tuesday evening, August 30, at 7:30 p.m. EST. 19
The impact from these events were felt not only by the thousands of
people caught in the path of the storms, but also by the entire nation as we
struggled to provide shelter, food, medical resources, and law enforcement to
those in and from the affected communities, and to deal with the economic
consequences of the damaged infrastructure caused by these storms. The
hurricanes, coupled with the subsequent flooding, caused the same sort of
devastation to many local health care facilities, research centers, waste facili-
ties, chemical facilities, and cemeteries, as it did to other types of buildings
in the region, compounding the medical threats to the community. It dam-
aged jails and law offices, compounding the security and law enforcement
issues as well.
Countless foreign nations, from the poorest to the wealthiest, offered
cash and in-kind donations, including foreign military donations to the
United States. In-kind donations included food, clothing, medical supplies,
and equipment. FEMA and other government agencies, however, did not
have plans, policies, or procedures to ensure the proper acceptance and dis-
tribution of either cash or in-kind assistance donated by foreign countries and
militaries. FEMA and other agencies established ad hoc procedures, but no
agency tracked and confirmed that the assistance arrived at their destinations.
18. NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN, supra note 8, at 4. The response to the hurricanes of
2005 was based on the NRP of December 2004. In the NRP of December 2004, an "Incident
of National Significance" was defined as being based on criteria established in paragraph 4 of
HSPD-5, and was considered an actual or potential high-impact event that required a "coordi-
nated and effective response by an appropriate combination of federal, state, local, tribal,
nongovernmental, and/or private-sector entities in order to save lives, minimize damage, and
provided the basis for long-term community recovery and mitigation activities." Id. at 3.
Paragraph 4 of HSPD-5 states:
The Secretary shall coordinate the Federal Government's resources utilized in response to or
recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies if and when any one of
the following four conditions applies: (1) a Federal department or agency acting under its own
authority has requested the assistance of the Secretary; (2) the resources of State and local au-
thorities are overwhelmed and Federal assistance has been requested by the appropriate State
and local authorities; (3) more than one Federal department or agency has become substan-
tially involved in responding to the incident; or (4) the Secretary has been directed to assume
responsibility for managing the domestic incident by the President.
HSPD-5, supra note 6, at 230.
19. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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Lack of procedures, inadequate data about the donations, and poor coordina-
tion resulted in the United States government agreeing to receive food and
medical items that could not be used in the United States and led to storage
costs of about $80,000.20
III. KEY FACTORS THAT LED TO FAILURES
(1) Long-term warnings went unheeded and government officials ne-
glected their duties to prepare for a forewarned catastrophe. 2'
(2) Government officials took insufficient actions or made poor deci-
sions in the days immediately before and after landfall.22
(3) Some important definitions and triggers in the NRP were not clearly
defined.
(4) The Catastrophic Incident Annex could not be activated without the
declaration of an Incident of National Significance or the specific request of
the affected state.
(4) There were inconsistencies between the NRP and NIMS.
(5) There was ignorance concerning the NRP, NIMS, and the lessons
learned from the Hurricane Pam exercise by key persons at all levels of re-
sponse.
(6) Funding was cut to the Hurricane Pam exercise before it was com-
pleted, thus while problems were identified, key planning decisions for man-
aging the problems were not yet made (plans for medical care for victims
were not finalized, communication issues were not addressed, and key trans-
portation decisions were left "to be determined").
(7) The systems which officials relied on to support their response ef-
forts failed.
(8) Government officials at all levels failed to provide effective leader-
ship and were confused regarding their relative responsibilities.23
(9) There were problems with communication and situational aware-
ness.
(10) Our plan failed to recognize that local police, fire, and medical per-
sonnel might be incapacitated.
20. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HURRICANE KATRINA: COMPREHENSIVE
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE APPROPRIATE USE OF AND
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE, GAO-06-460, at 1 (Apr. 6, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06460.pdf.
21. S. REP. 109-322.
22. Id.
23. See supra note 17; see also Ben Depoorter, Horizontal Political Externalities: The
Supply and Demand of Disaster Management, 56 DuKE L.J. 101 (2006).
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(11) There was a need but no plan in effect that utilized a modem,
flexible, transparent logistic system between federal, state, local, and indus-
try agencies.
(12) Confusion arose regarding the roles of the Principle Federal Offi-
cial and the Federal Coordinating Officer.
(13) We were unprepared to manage and accept the unprecedented tide
of foreign assistance on this scale.24
(14) Issues arose between the roles of the Military and the National
Guard, and their deployment was delayed.
(15) There was confusion between the roles of the HSOC, Interagency
Incident Management Group (IIMG), and other operation centers and delays
in activating the IIMG.
IV. ADJUSTMENTS TO NRP, NIMS, AND THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS
GOAL AND ITS TARGET CAPABILITIES
A. Adjustments to National Response Plan
The NRP applies to all incidents requiring a coordinated federal re-
sponse and is an all-hazards plan built on the template of the NIMS, which
provides the structure and mechanism for national-level policy and opera-
tional direction for managing a domestic incident. Its flexibility is intended
to enable effective interaction among various federal, state, local, tribal, pri-
vate-sector, and other nongovernmental entities. The specific changes to the
NRP following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita are:
(1) The NRP is always in effect.25
(2) When incidents impact the entire nation, multiple states, or locali-
ties, multiple Joint Field Offices (JFO) 26 may be established regionally.
(3) The Secretary will consider the four criteria set forth in HSPD-5
when making the determination to declare an Incident of National Signifi-
24. See generally U.S. Dep't of State, Freedom of Information Act - Document Collec-
tion: Hurricane Katrina-Relief Assistance, http://foia.state.gov/SearchColls/CollsSearch.asp
(select "Hurricane Katrina"; click "Search") (last visited June 21, 2007).
25. In the December 2004 NRP, which was not always in effect, the NRP could be par-
tially or fully implemented in the context of a threat, anticipation of a significant event, or in
response to a significant event. Selective implementation through the activation of one or
more of the system's components was supposed to allow for maximum flexibility in meeting
the unique operational and information-sharing requirements of the situation at hand and
enabling effective interaction between various federal and non-federal entities.
26. A JFO is a temporary federal facility established locally to serve as a central point for
federal, state, local, and tribal executives who have responsibility for incident oversight, direc-
tion, and/or assistance to effectively coordinate protection, prevention, preparedness, re-
sponse, and recovery actions.
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cance, but he is no longer bound to them; he is not limited to those thresh-
olds, and he may base his decision on other applicable factors.
(4) The declaration of an Incident of National Significance is no longer
critical to the decision to implement certain elements of the NRP.
(5) Catastrophic Incident Annex: While the basic premise still applies
that incidents are generally handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible,
the revised NRP says the CI Annex is primarily designed to address no-
notice or short-notice catastrophic incidents where the need for federal assis-
tance is obvious and immediate. This allows the federal government to act in
support of projected needs in anticipation of requests from state and local
authorities.
(6) Department of Defense (DoD) provides Defense Support of Civil
Authorities (DSCA) in response to requests for assistance during domestic
incidents. The supported DoD combatant commander may use a Joint Task
Force (JTF) to command federal Title X military activities in support of the
incident. Command and Control of the JTF is collocated with the Principal
Federal Official (PFO)27 at the JFO to ensure coordination and unity of ef-
forts.
(7) The Secretary of Homeland Security is now permitted to combine
the roles of the PFO and that of the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) 28 in
a single individual for any disaster that is not an incident resulting from ter-
rorism.
(8) To ensure coordination of effort, whenever possible, from opera-
tional entities such as DoD JTF; headquarters will collocate at the Joint Field
Office.
(9) To better coordinate the NIMS with the NRP elements of Emer-
gency Support Functions (ESF), they now organizationally fall within the
Operations, Planning, and Logistics and Finance/Administration sections of
the Joint Field Office, and other sections as required.
(10) The Domestic Readiness Group, which serves as a permanent
standing interagency planning/operations staff housed within the National
Operations Center, was created.
(11) The HSOC was replaced with the National Operations Center.
27. The PFO is the federal official designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security to
act as his or her local representative to oversee, coordinate, and execute the Secretary's inci-
dent management responsibilities under HSPD-5 for Incidents of National Significance.
28. The FCO is someone appointed to manage federal resource support activities related
to Stafford Act disasters and emergencies. The FCO is responsible for coordinating timely
delivery of federal disaster assistance resources and programs to the affected state and local
governments, individual victims, and the private sector.
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(12) The Interagency Incident Management Group was replaced with an
incident advisory group and adjudication body for the Secretary of Home-
land Security.
B. Adjustments to National Incident Management System
The NIMS provides a structural framework for incident management at
all jurisdictional levels regardless of the cause, size, or complexity of an
event. The basic components of NIMS are now Preparedness, Communica-
tions and Information Management, Resource Management, and the Com-
mand and Management component-headed by the Incident Commander.
2 9
These four NIMS components work together as a system to provide the na-
tional framework for incident management. Each organization-e.g., fire,
police, emergency medical services, hospitals, etc.-needs some type of an
Incident Management System (IMS) with an Incident Command System
(ICS). The Command and Management oversees four sections-Operations,
Planning, Logistics, and Finance. 30 When more than one entity works to-
gether, a "joint command" is used. The Command is responsible for overall
operations and liaisons with other agencies. The Operations Section houses
the "doers"; the Planning Section looks ahead and addresses the "what if'
scenarios; the Logistics Section gets "stuff' to keep operations going; and the
Finance Section tracks and authorizes expenses and personnel. The ICS pro-
vides a flexible infrastructure that can expand and contract as time evolves,
depending on the size and complexity of the event. All personnel need to
have clearly defined roles and responsibilities, based on previously described
functions rather than on specific individuals.
As of March 26, 2007, the NIMS working group has produced a draft
NIMS Upgrade V2. 31 The working group continues to study, obtain, and
review comments and revise NIMS accordingly to include: improving the
guidance to clarify roles and responsibilities within the NIMS framework;
the incorporation of concept preparedness into NIMS; and making NIMS
easier for stakeholders to use. The revised NIMS will provide clearer identi-
fication of the relationships between the NIMS, HSPD-8, the NRP, and other
federal response efforts.32 In addition, the revised NIMS will emphasize
29. Memorandum from Al Fluman, supra note 15.
30. See Figure 2.
31. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., NRP & NIMS Review-NIMS Working Group.
http://www.dhs.gov/xprepresp/programs/gcl168637749890.shtm (last visited June 21,
2007).
32. Id.
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NIMS training for emergency management, response personnel, disaster
workers, private sector, and nongovernmental agencies.
C. Adjustments to National Preparedness Goal and Its Target Capabilities
The impact of the 2005 hurricanes required changes to our National
Preparedness Goal (NPG).3 3  A new national priority was added:
"Strengthen Emergency operations planning and citizen protection capabili-
ties." This new priority is now a capability-specific priority to the NPG.
Emergency planning is now a "National Security Priority."
The NPG is now more strongly viewed as one with an "All-Hazard" ap-
proach and less of a counter-terrorism approach. The specific capabilities in
environmental health, fatality management, citizen protection (evacuation or
in-place protection), public safety and security response, on-site incident
management and emergency operations center management (such that gov-
ernment officials are better prepared to handle their role in managing a major
event), and urban search and rescue (to emphasize search of evacuated areas
in addition to structural collapse extrication) have been modified or re-
written. There are also plans to rewrite or modify mass care, short-term re-
covery, critical resource logistics and distribution, citizen preparedness and
participation, and water rescue.
V. PUBLIC HEALTH ASPECTS
A. Lessons Learned from Katrina Regarding Public Health in a
Catastrophe
(1) Shelter in place: Hospitals had to support thousands of extra peo-
ple--evacuees, families of staff and patients, policemen, firefighters, Na-
tional Guardsmen, and United States Marshals. Extra beds, toiletries, and
food needed to be found and distributed at the same time that patient care
was being provided.
(2) Loss of access to drugs and vaccines.
(3) Separating acute treatment needs from pre-existing conditions.
(4) Impact on Hospital staff: Many lost their homes, some lost medi-
cal practices by loss of patients.
(5) Need to improvise and disregard certain rules during event.
(6) Reorienting medical specialists toward providing primary care.
33. See generally U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL PREPAREDNEss GOAL
(2005), available at http://www.iaem.com/documents/FinalDraftNPG.pdf.
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(7) Location of generators-loss of power on health care (e.g. dialysis
equipment, ventilators, etc.).
(8) Coordination between FEMA & DHHS.
(9) Evacuating/accepting patients: Transportation issues.
(a) Need for better planning and coordination of transportation of
patients to/from hospitals, because following Katrina the nearest
centers got most patients and were overwhelmed.
(b) Need for better plans for the evacuation of handi-
capped/elderly.
(10) Heat, hygiene, and waste disposal.
(11) Immunizing workers who clean up debris.
(12) Complications caused by mold, allergies, petrochemicals, and in-
fectious agents.
(13) Security forces need to coordinate with health experts as per the
ICS.
(14) Hospitals in New Orleans failed to anticipate communication fail-
ures, and such failures lasted nearly twenty-one hours.
(15) The transfer of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) to
the Department of Homeland Security in 2003 had undermined NDMS effec-
tiveness. When Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, NDMS was unpre-
pared to properly respond,34 also there was confusion between HHS and
DHS about deploying NDMS personnel and assets.
B. Public Health Aspects of Multi-Disciplinary Coordination and
Communications
Disasters require non-traditional partnerships, and the partners must be
notified and must participate in coordination of the event. These include: 1)
local law enforcement and potentially the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI); 2) public health-populations of patients rather than simply individu-
als are involved; 3) the EMS agency; 4) city/county/state or tribal/federal
administration; 5) the Laboratory Response Network; 6) the media; 7) mor-
tuary affairs; and 8) faith-based leaders. Clear procedures must be in place
to maintain the "chain of evidence" and proper authorities must be notified,
such as public health and the FBI, when collecting samples. A 24/7 report-
ing system must be implemented so notifications can be readily made at all
hours during the emergency. Potential damage to physical communications
infrastructure necessitates appropriate redundancy planning and must con-
34. U.S. HOUSE OF REP. COMM. ON Gov'T REFORM, THE DECLINE OF THE NATIONAL
DISASTER MEDICAL SYSTEM 1-2 (2005),
http://oversight.house.gov/Documents/20051209095733-01279.pdf.
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sider alternate forms of communications and notification systems. In past
disasters, communications networks have been crippled significantly by mas-
sive simultaneous utilization by the affected population. The numbers of
persons attempting to access various telecommunication systems simultane-
ously affects the communication networks in such a way that no calls can get
through, even though the system remains physically intact.
C. Surge Capacity and Alternate Sites of Care
A strategy to improve system capacity-surge capacity-is critical to
optimize preparation and management of mass casualties. Even with an op-
timal IMS, if the health care system lacks the capacity to provide patient care
to large numbers of casualties, people will die. Our current health care sys-
tem has virtually no excess capacity. This is very cost-efficient under ordi-
nary circumstances, but problematic following any type of disaster or public
health emergency that produces large numbers of casualties. Even a small
increase in the number of patients stresses the current health care system.
Compounding the problem is the issue that hospital disaster plans cannot
count on a staff level that equals or exceeds their normal staffing. Some staff
members will go home-or not come in-so they can take care of their own
families, while others may be isolated because of road conditions or other
physical problems. Additionally, loss of power, phones, and cellphones can
make it difficult or impossible to respond. Hospitals need plans that are ca-
pable of functioning at scaled levels, based on the scope of the emergency
and the availability of the staff. An expert has proposed a model for improv-
ing surge capacity for hospitals that contains of three components: "Staff,"
"Stuff," and "Structure," with "Structure" consisting of both the management
infrastructure as well as the physical buildings required to provide patient
care. 3  Using this model; personnel, supplies, equipment, physical space,
and a management infrastructure, consistent with the needs of the event,
would be identified and provided.
Traditionally, hospitals have been thought of as the major or the only
places for medical care; but, hospital resources can easily be exceeded or the
hospital could become non-functional because of flooding, power-issues, or
35. Donna Barbisch, Regional Responses to Terrorism and Other Medical Disasters:
Developing Sustainable Surge Capacity, in COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE TO
TERRORISM: THE TERRORIST THREAT AND COMMUNITY RESPONSE 78-80 (James A. Johnson et
al. eds., 2005); Donna Barbisch, Surge Capacity: Seamless Emergency Medical Logistics
Expansion System: From Concept to Operational Capability 22, 25-27, 30-31 (Apr. 20,
2004) (presented at the 2004 Nat'l Disaster Med. Sys. Conf.), available at
http://www.ndms.chepinc.org/presentations/2004/142.pdf.
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contamination. One strategy for dealing with mass casualties is to use alter-
nate sites of care, referred to as "surge hospitals," such as veterinary hospi-
tals, shuttered retail stores, athletic arenas, airport hangers, and other facili-
ties. 36 Another strategy is to "surge" within existing hospitals by, for exam-
ple, adding additional beds, opening unused wards, and adding personnel.
The capability to emergently expand patient care capacity is required by the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)
standards. Thus, all hospital facilities must either designate appropriate al-
ternate sites of care or have an internal surge capacity. 37 The Medical Disas-
ter Response concept is one example of such an approach.3 8 The local ad-
ministrative jurisdiction (EMS or public health) should also be involved in
community and regional planning for alternate care sites.
Expanded hospitals and surge hospitals require additional staff. The re-
cruitment of properly licensed and credentialed health care volunteers pre-
sents significant challenges for public and private health entities. The exist-
ing methods for the deployment of voluntary health personnel in emergen-
cies are limited by issues with recruitment of qualified volunteers, effective
use of volunteers during emergencies, and verification of the identity and
qualifications of the volunteers by those seeking their assistance. 39 To ade-
quately staff this expanded capacity, decision-makers should consider inno-
vative concepts to provide emergency credentialing of personnel. One tech-
nique is to temporarily grant privileges to providers by honoring the creden-
tialing process of neighboring institutions. Another technique is to employ
the concept of a National Medical License for Disasters (NMLD). There
would be strict criteria for obtaining and maintaining the license, including
passing the United States Medical Licensing Exam (USMLE) and yearly
Continuing Medical Education (CME) credits, as well as yearly assessment
of the individual's role and responsibility in an incident. Such a license
would not be active until a disaster or catastrophe is declared. When it is the
36. JOINT COMM. ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., SURGE HOSPITALS:
PROVIDING SAFE CARE IN EMERGENCIES iv, 2 (2006), http://www.jointcommission.org/
NR/rdonlyres/802E9DA4-AE80-4584-A205-48989C5BD684/0/surgehospital.pdf [hereinaf-
ter SURGE HOSPITALS].
37. See JOINT COMM. ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., STANDING TOGETHER:
AN EMERGENCY PLANNING GUIDE FOR AMERICA'S COMMUNITIES 35 (2005),
http://www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/FE29E7D3-22AA-4DEB-94B2-
5E8D507F92D1/0/planningguide.pdf; SURGE HOSPITALS, supra note 36, at 10.
38. See Carl H. Schultz et al., A Medical Disaster Response to Reduce Immediate Mortal-
ity After an Earthquake, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 438,439-40,443 (1996).
39. James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., The Legal Framework for Meeting Surge Capacity
Through the Use of Volunteer Health Professionals During Public Health Emergencies and
Other Disasters, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 5, 21-22 (2005).
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activated practitioner, it is automatically "federalized" and thus, the practi-
tioner is insured as a federal practitioner. It replaces a registration system
and is more cost effective for the federal government and for the regions in
need of health care providers. It could allow for qualified foreign personnel
to assist in a domestic emergency if the foreign physicians can pass our tests
and maintain their national medical license for disaster.
D. Health Risk Communications During Disasters
Health care providers and the public may lack a basic understanding of
the true risks associated with certain types of disasters. This lack of knowl-
edge can reduce the effectiveness of mitigation measures which would oth-
erwise limit morbidity and mortality.
Clear and concise messages-ideally prepared in advance of an event-
delivered by a credible technical spokesperson can positively influence out-
comes. One of the challenges is that the scientific knowledge necessary to
support appropriate prevention and treatment recommendations may initially
be absent.
Public information is readily available at several locations, particularly
government websites such as:
http://www.ready.gov
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/
http://www.fema.gov/hazard/index.shtm
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/intro.shtml
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2002-139/default.html#toc
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/learning/preparedness.php
These sites may be invaluable for the continued dissemination of information
before and after a natural disaster or a deliberate attack. Additionally, by
providing information about when and where to seek treatment, how to rec-
ognize symptoms of particular diseases, techniques for sheltering, and meth-
ods of mitigation, we can potentially decrease the "surge" burden to emer-
gency response systems.
E. Delicate Legal Issues Regarding Public Health During Catastrophes
Certain laws and regulations can be problematic in the face of mass
casualties. For example, in situations where there is exposure to a conta-
gious agent, quarantine of exposed individuals and isolation of ill persons
may be necessary. Quarantine authority varies by jurisdiction and has not
been invoked for many years in the United States. It may become necessary
to involuntarily isolate exposed victims until lack of contagion can be as-
[Vol. 31
37
: Nova Law Review 31, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
HURRICANE KA TRINA: A DEADLY WARNING
sured. This will likely require close collaboration between hospital security,
local law enforcement, and public health authorities. Thus, "[t]he balance
between civil liberties and the protection of public health remains a chal-
lenge."4°
Complications can arise with application of the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act/Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act (COBRA/EMTALA), 41 which limits transfer of patients to specific pre-
defined circumstances and requires facilities with the capability and capacity
for a higher level of care to accept patients in transfer, and the Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)42 privacy regulations.
There is an emergency exception in the HIPAA regulations, 43 but case law is
lacking to determine whether this would be sufficient to allow appropriate
medical information to be transmitted in a mass casualty situation.
F. Triage
In the setting of mass casualties, the goal of triage shifts from doing the
best for an individual to "doing the most good for the most patients." There
are several systems available to manage a large influx of casualties. The
most common system used in the United States for initial triage is START
(Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment). 44 Of note, patients who are contami-
nated or those who are exposed to contagious agents must be triaged in a
manner that minimizes the possibility of transmitting the hazardous agent to
others.45
G. Securing Healthcare Facilities
During catastrophes a security plan must be in place that limits access to
the hospital or appropriate ward(s) so only patients, authorized personnel
40. Kristi L. Koenig, Christopher A. Kahn & Carl H. Schultz, Medical Strategies to
Handle Mass Casualties from the Use of Biological Weapons, U.C. POSTPRINTS 16 (2006),
http://repositories.cdlib.org/postprints/2100/ (click on "Download the Article") (last visited
June 21, 2007).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000 & Supp.); see also Special Responsibilities of Medicare
Hospitals in Emergency Cases, 42 CFR § 489.24 (2003).
42. Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); see also HIPAA,
http://www.hipaa.org/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
43. See id.
44. See generally Los ANGELES FIRE DEP'T, SIMPLE TRIAGE AND RAPID TREATMENT
(START) (Aug. 12, 2005), http://www.cert-la.com/triage/start.pdf.
45. David C. Cone & Kristi L. Koenig, Mass Casualty Triage in the Chemical, Biologi-
cal, Radiological, or Nuclear Environment, 12 EUR. J. EMERG. MED. 287, 287 (2005).
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and, if appropriate, patient visitors may enter. Logistical interventions, such
as shutting down the ventilation systems, may be needed to prevent rapid
spread if there is a contagious agent involved. "Reducing a building's vul-
nerability to an airborne chemical, biological, or radiological attack requires
a comprehensive [plan]. Decisions concerning which protective measures to
implement should be based on the threat profile and a security assessment of
the building and its occupants. [P]hysical security is the first layer of de-
fense."46 A building security assessment should be done to determine the
necessity of additional measures. Codes must be developed such that new
building systems adopt design features that are capable of incorporating the
currently rapidly evolving technology which offers a greater level of protec-
tion.
H. Personal Protective Equipment for Health Care Providers
Standard precautions should be used for all patient encounters. In addi-
tion, if patients are exposed to agents that are spread person-to-person, ap-
propriate respiratory personal protective equipment (PPE) may be needed to
decrease the risk from exposure to respiratory droplets. There is some con-
troversy regarding what types of masks would be protective if an agent is
unknown. For agents transmitted by respiratory droplets, an N-95 mask
would theoretically be adequate. In other situations, a HEPA filter mask
might be more appropriate. This issue is currently unresolved.
I. Stockpiling
Strategic planning for mass casualties requires appropriate stockpiling
of necessary medications, supplies, and equipment; especially since most
hospitals have a "just-in-time" strategy for providing pharmaceuticals and
equipment to their patients on a daily basis and lack the ability to rapidly
expand resources to meet the needs of a large influx of casualties. Threat
vulnerability analysis helps determine what should be in the stockpile by
providing data regarding events that pose the greatest threat for a given
place. Portable disposable ventilators and training staff in their use are ad-
vised. In addition, another sad lesson learned from Katrina is the need for
additional persons, such as family members, to receive training on an ad-hoc
basis on bag-valve-mask techniques to keep their relatives alive. If an event
unfolds quickly, such as an earthquake, storage of stockpiles must be close
by. Medications that arrive after six to twelve hours may have little impact.
46. CDC, NIOSH, GUIDANCE FOR PROTECTING BUILDING ENvIRoNMENTs FROM
AIRBORNE, CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, OR RADIOLOGICAL ATACKS 22 (May 2002).
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If, however, it takes several days for a disaster to fully develop, then there
may be time to request additional medications and other equipment from a
remote location. In general, a combination of local, regional, statewide, and
federal caches is ideal. Careful administration will prevent multiple entities
from being dependent on the same supplier. In between disasters, medica-
tions and other perishable items from the stockpile should be rotated into
local or regional usage to minimize losses from expiration. One problem that
arose during the medical management of victims of Katrina was the jurisdic-
tion of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Supplies from the SNS be-
long to the Federal Government until they are dispatched for use at which
time ownership is transferred to the state. In at least one site, the SNS was
delivered but not used, because all of the medical staff present at the scene
were from a federal group and they were not permitted to use the supplies
that were very much needed by the victims of the hurricane because of juris-
dictional issues.47 This issue is still unresolved.
J. Psychological Aspects of Public Health Aspects of Catastrophes
A key component of any response is the psychological care for victims,
involved emergency personnel, affected communities, and the country at
large. Close integration with health risk communicators may help to mitigate
some of the psychological trauma that is likely to follow an attack. 48 Con-
trary to popular mythology, very few people, if any, panic during disasters.49
Nonetheless fear will cause an increase in persons presenting for care and the
incremental effects of increased call volume, hazardous materials team re-
sponses, and concerned patients with unexplained medical symptoms visiting
the emergency departments which can prove to be highly detrimental to pub-
lic health and emergency response services.5°
47. E-mail from Raymond E. Swienton M.D., FACEP, Associate Professor of Emer-
gency Medicine, Co-Director EMS, Disaster Medicine & Homeland Security Section, Divi-
sion of Emergency Medicine, Southwestern Medical Center to author (May 22, 2006 11:00:10
PST) (on file with author).
48. See Simon Wessely et al., Psychological Implications of Chemical and Biological
Weapons, BRITISH MED. J. (INT. ED.), Oct. 20, 2001, at 878, available at
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/323/7318/878?ck=nck.
49. Bill Durodi6 & Simon Wessely, Resilience or Panic? The Public and Terrorist At-
tack, THE LANCET, Dec. 14, 2002, at 1901, available at http://www.sciencedirect.com (search
Title "Resilience or Panic? The Public and Terrorist Attack").
50. See G. James Rubin et al., Psychological and Behavioural Reactions to the Bombings
in London on 7 July 2005: Cross Sectional Survey of a Representative Sample of Londoners,
BRITISH MED. J. (INT. ED.), Aug. 26, 2005, at 1, available at
http://bmj.com/cgi/content/fill/7517/606#BIBL.
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K. Health Care Providers Impacted by the Catastrophe
A particular aspect of physical and psychological trauma is the impact
of a catastrophe on the people participating in response and recovery activi-
ties. Whether particular response persons are injured or concerned about the
effects on themselves and their families, the net effect is the same: loss of
personnel. This decrease in personnel can affect the efficiency and success
of the overall response effort-as was evident in the response to Hurricane
Katrina.51 Providing information and solutions to people prior to and during
the event helps-as does providing any needed personal protective equip-
ment and post exposure medications or vaccines. Helping staff take care of
their families and dependents is an essential effort to help secure the services
of those persons who may otherwise need to care for their families. Stress
debriefing and other psychological care services may help, but the efficacy
of certain techniques is unclear and may actually be detrimental.
L. Mortuary Affairs
Planning at local and regional levels must take into consideration safe
locations for the storage of possibly contagious or contaminated remains.
Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORT), 52 should be con-
tacted, but local officials should prepare in case the DMORT is not immedi-
ately available to assist. The needs of criminal investigations and public
health concerns, as well as the availability of mortuary services during a
surge of mortality, may conflict with families' wishes for rapid disposition of
remains and religious concerns regarding timing and method of disposition.
Confusion arose during Hurricane Katrina because the flood damaged some
local cemeteries and uprooted trees which exposed some human remains.
53
Inclusion of local religious leaders into ongoing planning/exercise events
involving mortuary affairs may help mitigate some concerns. Religion-
neutral, compassionately devised health risk communications may help alle-
viate public concern. Such measures will enhance the ability of law en-
forcement and public health agencies to carry out their duties while maintain-
ing appropriate respect and dignity for the deceased.
51. See A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 17.
52. Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team, DMORT Mass Fatality Assistance,
http://www.dmort.org/ (last visited June 21, 2007).
53. National Park Service - Task Force Responds to Hurricane Katrina: Hurricanes 2005
- National Park Service Status Report (Dec. 30, 2005), http://www.heritagepreservation.org/
PROGRAMS/KatrinaNPS.HTM.
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M. Special Populations
Specific populations are likely to be at higher risk of morbidity and
mortality during disasters. These include geriatric, pediatric, immunocom-
promised, and pregnant persons, as well as those with limited communica-
tions abilities due to physical (deafness, blindness), cognitive (mental ill-
ness), or language barriers. As revealed in the response to Hurricane
Katrina, persons who are homebound or who are reliant on home health nurs-
ing and materials, are also at higher risk, as are persons who are in high-
density populations, such as shelters, nursing homes, and prisons. Education
and surveillance in these populations is critical as are plans for early trans-
portation or sheltering in place, quarantine/isolation, and treatment as
needed.
VI. PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL SUPPORT CHANGES STIMULATED BY
THE 2005 HURRICANES AND SUBSEQUENT THREAT ASSESSMENTS
On December 19, 2006, the President signed into law the Pandemic and
All-Hazards Preparedness Act. 14 This law has:
(1) Transferred the National Disaster Medical System back from DHS
to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS);
(2) Created the office of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Re-
sponse within the HHS to consolidate the responsibilities for federal public
health and medical emergency preparedness and response activities;
(3) Required the Secretary of HHS to appoint an official to ensure that
the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) addresses the needs of at-risk popula-
tions, oversee development of curriculum for training programs on medical
management of at-risk individuals, and disseminate best practices for out-
reach to and care for at-risk individuals before, during, and following public
health emergencies;
(4) Beginning in 2009, HHS is required to prepare and submit the Na-
tional Health Security Strategy for coordinated public health preparedness
and response to Congress every four years. The strategy will evaluate and
measure progress in federal, state, local, and tribal preparedness.
(5) Provided for cooperative agreements (i.e., grants) to state and se-
lected local public health entities to improve health security, however, states
or a consortium of states must agree to supplement this with non-federal
funds. It also authorized grants to universities, laboratories, and hospitals for
54. Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120 Stat. 2831 (2004) (codified at various sections of 42
U.S.C.).
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tuition loans for persons willing to serve two years in local, state, or tribal
health departments.
(6) Required the development of a nationwide, near real-time elec-
tronic public health situational awareness capability.
(7) Strengthened federal support and structure for the Medical Reserve
Corps (MRC) program.
(8) Established the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development
Authority (BARDA) and a Biodefense Medical Countermeasure Develop-
ment Fund to allow BARDA to fund the development of products between
NIH-funded basic research and end-stage procurement by the BioShield pro-
gram.
(9) Established the National Biodefense Science Board.
(10) Set up limited anti-trust exemptions to help pharmaceutical com-
panies collaborate with each other and with the government in the develop-
ment of medical countermeasures and made other reforms to the Project
BioShield Act of 200455 to facilitate drug development.
Unresolved issues include:
(1) Issues with medical licensing and malpractice risk for volun-
teer health workers from out of the affected region.
(2) Better coordination of logistics and transparencies to coordi-
nate logistic actives between private and public entities.
(3) Improving interoperable communication systems, detection
systems, and warning systems.
(4) Improving education, exercising, and training for private citi-
zens.
(5) Preparing healthcare facilities and response agencies to triage
for a large numbers of patients and assuring that they have ready access
to current diagnostic and treatment information, while protecting the re-
sponding personnel from further harm is critical and complicated. This
problem is compounded because 90% of the United States health care
system is in private hands and these private entities struggle with the is-
sue of unfunded mandates.
VII. CONCLUSION
The management of disasters requires a carefully orchestrated multi-
disciplinary plan for federal, state, tribal, local, and private entities and re-
quires an interdisciplinary understanding of the threats and issues. Thus, a
55. Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
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crucial necessity for preparation, mitigation, response to, and recovery from
catastrophic events is the existence of pre-existing relationships between
medical, public health, policy, and law enforcement agencies at all levels of
government coupled with a coordinated national response plan operating
under a national incident management system. Public and private entities at
all levels have to drill, drill, and re-drill, while learning from those drills and
improve plans, and drilling them again so that we don't wait for another ca-
tastrophe to reveal weakness. Careful attention to education and training
efforts and to health risk communications planning can help mitigate physi-
cal and psychological casualties, minimize attrition among response person-
nel, and decrease damage to infrastructure. The Federal Government in co-
ordination with local, state, and private entities has made many efforts to
improve our response since the hurricanes of 2005 and has set in motion a
mechanism for continuous revision and improvement. We must be ever vigi-
lant, however, to ensure that this momentum is not halted or derailed and that
the ideas are tested and retested so that we will never again face the catastro-
phic human, economic, and social toll extracted by disasters with the magni-
tude of the hurricanes of 2005.
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Table 1: Evolution of Federal and National Response to Disasters and
Catastrophes
56
1803: Congressional Act of 1803: Provided assistance by waiving duties &
tariffs for merchants following fires in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
1900: Congress chartered American Red Cross as a charitable organization to
provide disaster relief This charter was dissolved for financial difficulties and a
new charter was created in 1905.
1932: Hoover's Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC): Lent money to
banks and institutions to stimulate economic activity & dispense federal dollars
after a disaster.
1934: Bureau of Public Roads given authority to finance reconstruction of
highways and roads after a disaster.
1944: Flood Control Act: Gave U.S. Army Corps of Engineers authority over
flood control and irrigation projects.
1950: Civil Defense Act: First comprehensive legislation on federal disaster
relief.
1952: President Truman's Executive Order 10427: Established federal disaster
assistance is a supplement.
1965: Establish HUD: Led to the establishment of the Federal Disaster Assis-
tance Administration.
1968: National Flood Insurance Act.
1973: President Nixon's Report: New approach to Federal Disaster, assistance
is a supplement.
56. See FEMA, FEMA History, http://www.fema.gov/about/history.shtm (last visited
June 21, 2007); THOMAS E. DRABEK, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: STRATEGIES FOR
MAINTAINING ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRITY (Springer-Verlag 1990); The National Archives,
Records of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), available at
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/311.html (last visited June 21,
2007); TOWNSEND, supra note 17, at 11-19; National Emergency Management Association
(NEMA): Emergency Management, http://em.nemaweb.org/?17 (last visited June 21, 2007);
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT (Thomas E.
Drabek & Gerard J. Hoetmer eds., Municipal Mgmt. 1991); The National Archives, Records
of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), available at
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/234.html (last visited June 21,
2007); Civil Defense and Emergency Management Organizational History: United States
1917-2001 (2003), http://www.richmond.edu/-wgreen/Ecdflow.pdf; KEVIN R. KOSAR, THE
CONGRESSIONAL CHARTER OF THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS: OVERVIEW, HISTORY,
AND ANALYSIS (Mar. 15, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33314.pdf;
All-Hazard Authorities of the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/flm/frm-acts.pdf; The American Presidency Project, Jimmy Carter:
Executive Order 12148-Federal Emergency Management, July 20, 1979, available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=32625.
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1974: Disaster Relief Act: Established process of presidential disaster declara-
tions.
1979: President Carter's Executive Order 12148: Created FEMA to coordinate
all disaster relief efforts at the federal level. FEMA absorbed HUD's: Federal
Insurance Administration, National Fire Prevention and Control Administration,
National Weather Service Community Preparedness Program, Federal Prepared-
ness Agency of the General Services Administration, Federal Disaster Assistance
Administration.
Also, FEMA charged to oversee the nation's Civil Defense (previously done by
DoD's Defense Civil Preparedness Agency).
1988: Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.
1993: President Clinton elevated FEMA to a cabinet level position.
2000: Disaster Mitigation Act (Stafford Act with revisions). 57
2002: Homeland Security Act: Incorporated FEMA into DHS (stood up March
2003). 58
2005: Hurricane Katrina and Rita.
2006: Notice of Change to the National Response Plan: Reorganized incident
management, created the Domestic Readiness Group, established the National
Operations center, changed and broadened the scope of the Catastrophic Incident
annex, and clarified the meaning of an "Incident of National Significance". 9
2006: Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006.60:
2007: Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007: Reorganiz-
ing DHS and the role of FEMA within DHS.
Table 2: Major U.S. Disasters (Deaths >1000)62
Year Event Deaths
1865 Steamship explosion 1547
1875 Forest fire (Wisconsin) 1182
57. Pub. L. No. 106-390 (2000).
58. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/bill/hsl-bill.pdf; see also The White House,
Analysis for the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/analysis/hsl-bill-analysis.pdf (last visited June
21, 2007).
59. NOTICE OF CHANGE TO NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN, supra note 15, at 9; NIMS Key
Revision Issues - Background, supra note 15.
60. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-90,
119 Stat. 2064.
61. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295,
120 Stat. 1355.
62. Table modified from Craig Goolsby et al., Disaster Planning, EMEDICINE.COM (May
25, 2006), at tbl. 1, http://www.emedicine.com/EMERG/topic718.htm (last visited June 21,
2007).
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1889 Flood (Pennsylvania) >2000
1900 Hurricane (Texas) 8000
1904 Steamship fire 1021
1906 San Francisco earthquake >3000
1928 Hurricane (Florida) 2000
1941 Pearl Harbor attack 2403
2001 September 11 attack 2819
2005 Hurricane (Gulf Coast) 1527
Figure 1: Organization of the NRP
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Table 3: Emergency Support Functions in the NRP63
# Function Primary Department or
I Agency
ESF 1 Transportation DOT
ESF 2 Communication DHS (IAIP/NCS)
ESF 3 Public Works & Engineering DoD (USACE), DHS
(FEMA)
ESF 4 Firefighting USDA (Forest Service)
ESF 5 Emergency Management DHS (FEMA)
ESF 6 Mass Care, Housing, Human Services DHS (FEMA), American
Red Cross
ESF 7 Resources Support GSA
ESF 8 Public Health & Medical Support HHS
ESF 9 Urban Search & Rescue DHS (FEMA)
ESF 10 Oil & Hazardous Material Response EPA, DHS (Coast Guard)
ESF 11 Agriculture & Natural Resources USDA, DOI
ESF 12 Energy DOE
ESF 13 Public Safety & Security DOJ
ESF 14 Long Term Community Recovery & USDA, DOC, DHS, HUD,
Mitigation Treasury, SBA
ESF 15 External Affairs DHS (FEMA)
63. This table is a modified version of the December 2004 NRP modified to include the
revisions specified in the Notice of Change to the National Response Plan dated May 25, 2006
version 5.0.
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Figure 2: Post-Hurricane Katrina Integration of ICS with ESF's
Planning Finandal 
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A d m i
Law Enforcement Respns ad Siuto nt Srie SpotTime Unit
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Table 4: Hurricane Katrina Key Events and Response 64
Time 65  Event Federal State & Local
Thursday, August 25, 2005
12:00 p.m. FEMA conducts first video
teleconference to help syn-
chronize federal, state, and
local responders and,
as a means of defining and
coordinating assistance and
support needs, these calls were
held each day at noon from
August 25 until well after land-
fall.
3:30 p.m.* Tropical FEMA delivers 100 truckloads
Storm of ice, 35 truckloads of food,
Katrina be- and 70 trucks of water to stag-
comes Hurri- ing areas in Georgia, and over
cane Katrina 400 truckloads of ice, over 500
(Category 1) truckloads of water, and nearly
200 truckloads of food at logis-
tics centers in Alabama, Lou-
isiana, Georgia, Texas, and
South Carolina.
6:30 p.m. Hurricane FEMA places Rapid Needs
Katrina Assessment and Emergency
slams into Response Teams - Advance
South Florida Elements (ERT-As) on alert.
at the Dade-
Broward
County line.
64. See generally supra note 17 and accompanying text.
65. To emphasize the view from Washington, D.C., the time used here is Eastern Stan-
dard Time (Louisiana is on Central Time). The time also reflects the view of the Homeland
Security Operations Center.
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Friday, August 26, 2005
1:00 a.m. Eye passes
over Miami,
Florida.
5:00 a.m. Katrina clears
from South
Florida.
11:30 a.m. Katrina be-
A comes a
Category 2
hurricane and
is predicted
to make sec-
ond landfall
near Florida
Panhandle as
Category 3.
1:00 p.m.* Louisiana Gover-
nor Kathleen
Blanco declares a
State of Emer-
gency and acti-
vates the National
Guard.
4:30 p.m. Mississippi Gov-
ernor Haley
Barbour declares
a State of Emer-
gency and acti-
vates the National
Guard.
5:00 p.m. National Hurricane Center
(NHC)changes prediction of
second landfall from the Flor-
ida Panhandle to eastern Lou-
isiana and Mississippi.
Saturday, August 27, 2005
5:00 a.m. NHC issues forecast stating
that Katrina is a Category 3
hurricane and predicts a direct
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hit on New Orleans, Louisiana.
7:00 a.m. FEMA NRCC activated at
Level 1 (24 hour operation);
FEMA NRCC ESFs 2, 6, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and
EMC activated.
8:30 a.m. National Weather Service Louisiana and
(NWS) informs Louisiana state Mississippi Emer-
and local officials that "prob- gency Operations
able path is right smack Center activated,
through metropolitan New Governors of
Orleans." Louisiana and
Mississippi de-
clare State of
Emergency.
10:00 a.m. FEMA ERT-As activated, pre-
staged at FEMA RRCC Region
IV in Atlanta, Georgia and
deployed to Alabama and
Mississippi.
12:00 p.m. FEMA Region IV at Level 1; Governor Blanco
all ESFs + Military Liaison requests declara-
Activated, Coast Guard Acti- tion of Federal
vated. State of Emer-
gency under Staf-
ford Act.
2:00 p.m. Press Conference:
New Orleans
Mayor Ray Nagin
and Governor
Blanco announce
issuance of Vol-
untary Evacuation
Order & Super-
dome will open at
8 a.m CDT on
Sunday as "Spe-
cial Needs Shel-
ter".
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5:00 p.m. Contra Flow acti-
vated on Missis-
sippi and Louisi-
ana Interstate
Highway.
7:44 - Emergency Declaration
8:00 p.m. FEMA-3212-#M-LA for Lou-
isiana; FCO- Lokey; NWS
advises New Orleans levees
could be overtopped.
Sunday, August 28, 2005
9:00 a.m. Superdome opens
as a Special Needs
Shelter (8:00 a.m.
CDT).
10:30 a.m. Mayor Nagin
orders a manda-
tory evacuation of
Orleans Parish.
11:00 - Emergency Declaration Governor of Ala-
11:15 a.m. FEMA-3212-#M-LA for Mis- bama declares
sissippi; FCO- William Lokey. State of Emer-
gency; Superdome
opened as "refuge
of last resort" for
general popula-
tion.
5:00 p.m. FEMA has pre-positioned ice, Contra Flow deac-
trailers, and MRE's in 16 re- tivated on Missis-
gional centers. sippi and Louisi-
ana Interstate
Highway.
6:30 p.m. Emergency Declaration
FEMA-3212-#M-LA for Ala-
bama; FCO- Ron Sharman.
Monday, August 29, 2005
7:10 a.m. Katrina
makes land-
fall in south-
eastern Lou-
[Vol. 31
53
: Nova Law Review 31, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
HURRICANE KA TRINA: A DEADLY WARNING
isiana as a
strong Cate-
gory 3 hurri-
cane.
9:21 a.m. First report of
Levee breaches;
Superdome begins
to leak.
10:50 a.m. HSOC reports "possible" levee
"issue".
2:00 p.m. Communica- Search and rescue efforts by Search and rescue
tions used by U.S. Coast Guard begin, efforts by New
first respond- Orleans Police
ers fail. and Fire Depart-
ments, Louisiana
National Guard,
and Louisiana
Department of
Wildlife and Fish-
eries.
9:00 p.m. FEMA Director Brown prom-
ises Governor Blanco 500
buses.
11:30 p.m. FEMA search and rescue teams
arrive and begin operations.
Tuesday, August 30, 2005
6:00 a.m. HSOC issues report of levee
breaches at Industrial Canal,
17th street, and Lake Poncha-
train.
11:30 a.m. Acting Deputy Secretary of Mayor Nagin
Defense orders NORTHCOM opens New Or-
to move all needed assets to leans Convention
Gulf Coast, gives blanket au- Center as refuge
thority for military assistance. for general popu-
lation.
7:30 p.m. Secretary Chertoff declares Governor Blanco
Katrina an "Incident of Na- directs Depart-
tional Significance" and desig- ment of Social
nates Mike Brown as PFO. Services to find a
shelter by 6 a.m.
Wednesday for at
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least 25,000 peo-
ple.
Wednesday, August 31, 2005
12:30 a.m. Midnight order by FEMA as-
signs DOT to send buses to
New Orleans.
Morning Secretary Mike Leavitt (HHS) Governor Blanco
declares a public health emer- issues an Execu-
gency for Louisiana, Missis- tive Order (No.
sippi, Alabama, and Florida. KBB 2005-31) to
commandeer
school buses;
Calls Governor
Perry of Texas to
request use of
Astrodome to
house New Or-
leans evacuees.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Hurricane Andrew, which devastated South Miami-Dade on August 24,
1992,' opened our eyes to the vulnerability of common interest ownership
housing communities (i.e., condominiums, cooperatives, and deed restricted
communities governed by a mandatory membership homeowners associa-
* Gary A. Poliakoff, J.D., is the President and founding principal of Becker & Polia-
koff, P.A., a law firm which for over 35 years has provided legal counsel to more than 6,000
Condominium, Cooperative, and Homeowners Associations. He is an adjunct professor at the
Shepard Broad School of Law, Nova Southeastern University and the author of a national
treatise, The Law of Condominium Operations, published by West Group, 1988.
1. National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Preparedness: Hurricane History,
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/history.shtml (last visited June 2, 2007).
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tion) to catastrophic events. The lessons learned from Andrew's 142 mile
per hour winds were accentuated by Hurricane Opal, which struck the Florida
Panhandle with twenty foot storm surges.2 These lessons were reinforced by
the events of 2004, when four major storm criss-crossed the state of Florida
leaving devastation in their paths.3
In the aftermath of these storms, the importance of developing and im-
plementing a disaster plan has become self-evident. This article is based
upon first hand experience gained in assisting the victims of Hurricanes An-
drew, Opal, Charley, Frances, Ivan, Jeanne, Katrina, and Wilma.
II. IDENTIFYING THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A DISASTER
Prior to September 11, 2001, the term "disaster" was generally associ-
ated with naturally occurring events such as fires, hurricanes, earthquakes,
mudslides, or floods. Now, acts of terrorism need to be factored into the
equation.
A. Dislocation Caused by the Total or Partial Destruction of the Premises
A properly prepared disaster plan will anticipate not only the possibility
of a total casualty loss, but also the need to relocate, temporarily or perma-
nently, due to the loss of both one's residence and, potentially, one's place of
work. While many individuals were able to clean up their storm debris and
return to their normal routines within a relatively short period of time, for
tens of thousands of others, life remained in turmoil for years after being
impacted by the devastation of recent storm events.
B. Economic Impact
The economic impact of a disaster is felt on many fronts. For example,
many Florida Panhandle residents owned condominium units which were
placed in rental pools and provided the respective owners a source of reve-
nue. This source of revenue was temporarily disrupted as a result of Hurri-
cane Opal.
Unit owners displaced from work may be unable to meet their financial
obligations to the association. Uninsured, underinsured, or non-covered
losses will necessitate special assessments, which could further stress the
already overtaxed unit owners. The higher cost of goods and services result-
ing from shortages further compounds the problem.
2. Id.
3. See id.
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III. DEVELOPING A DISASTER PLAN
A. Designation of a Disaster Coordinator
The ability of the community association to minimize damages and
speed up recovery, to a large extent, will be dependent upon the association's
ability to react quickly and decisively when a disaster strikes. The ability to
do so is dependent upon having a pre-designated person or committee in
place prior to the disaster with full power and authority to implement the
Disaster Plan.
B. Designation of an Information Facilitator
In times of crisis, people want to know-they need to know! A major
hurdle to recovery is rumor and misinformation. Left unchecked, both can
hamper the recovery efforts. This can be short-circuited through the use of
an "Information Facilitator." Today's computer technology provides the
ideal vehicle for this purpose. Every association should have its own web-
site. During normal times, it is the ideal resource for disseminating informa-
tion and staying in touch with the unit owners. At times of a disaster, it is the
vital link. The Information Facilitator should work in concert with the Disas-
ter Coordinator as a type of "Press Secretary."
IV. REMOVING THE BARRIERS TO RECOVERY
A. Reconstruction
State laws and document restrictions designed to insure owner access to
information and input in the decision-making process often impede disaster
recovery. For example, the use of reserve funds in an emergency is ham-
pered by laws requiring prior approval by a majority of the voting interests
present, in person or by proxy, at a meeting. If necessary, documents should
be reviewed and amended to remove barriers to recovery and provide boards
with emergency powers. Areas of concern include:
1. "Insurance Trustee" Provisions
Generally found within the insurance section of the documents, these
provisions require that the proceeds of insurance settlements be paid to a
third party for disbursement at the instruction of the association's engineer.
When such a provision exists, insurers will not pay proceeds to the associa-
tion until a trustee is designated. This can critically delay the receipt of
funds necessary for disaster response. It is preferable for the board to act as
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a trustee with disbursements being authorized only when approved in ad-
vance by an independent engineer or construction manager employed by the
association.
2. Access to Units
While the Condominium and Cooperative Acts grant associations an ir-
revocable right of access when necessary for the maintenance, repair, or re-
placement of the common elements or of any portion of a unit to be main-
tained by the association, or as necessary to prevent damage to the common
elements or to a unit, a gray area exists in relation to the repair or reconstruc-
tion of portions of the units maintained by the unit owners. To avoid
conflicts, all common interest ownership housing documents should be
amended to provide:
* Right of access to the units to repair or replace any portion of the
property insured by the association; and
* Association as agent: The association should be irrevocably ap-
pointed as agent for each unit owner, each owner of a mortgage or other
lien upon a unit, and each owner of any other interest in the property, in
order to adjust all claims arising under insurance policies purchased by
the association and to execute and deliver releases upon the payment of
claims.
It is of interest to note that in the aftermath of Hurricane Opal, Florida's
Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes affirmed
the right of an association to enter the unit to remove the carpet, cabinets, hot
water heater, and other appliances damaged by the storm.4
3. Powers of Board or Disaster Coordinator to Act in an Emergency
Members of the board (though less than a quorum) and/or a designated
disaster coordinator, who act in good faith without pecuniary gain, should be
indemnified from actions by members of the association and should have
emergency powers, including, but not limited to, the power to contract for:
1) emergency services; 2) security from vandalism; 3) removal of debris; and
4) engineering and other professional services to assist in disaster recovery.
4. See In re Petition for Arbitration Higdon v. Seaspray Condominium Ass'n, Inc., Case
No. 96-0430.
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B. Termination
1. Reconstruction vs. Termination
The unit owners at one South Miami-Dade County condominium de-
stroyed by Hurricane Andrew were shocked to learn of a provision in their
declaration of condominium which provided for automatic termination when
damage exceeded fifty (50%) percent or more of the condominium, unless a
majority of the total voting interests voted within sixty days to rebuild. Since
the unit owners had scattered all across the country, the association had to
seek court relief to prevent the activation of the provision. It is preferable for
the documents to require a vote of the owners to terminate the condominium,
not to rebuild it.
2. The "50% Rule"
Even if a condominium does not contain an "automatic termination"
provision, a regulation of the National Flood Insurance Program, as adopted
by most counties and cities, will significantly impact an association's ability
to reconstruct based upon the adequacy of insurance proceeds and other
funds.5 The "50% Rule" provides that if the condominium/home is below
the 100-year flood elevation, and if the condominium is "substantially dam-
aged" or "substantially improved," the condominium/home will be required
to be rebuilt based upon current building codes, which might necessitate tear-
ing it down, raising the elevation, and then reconstructing it.6
V. ACTIVATING THE DISASTER PLAN
A quick response in accordance with a preconceived plan will minimize
damage and promote a speedy recovery. After the disaster, associations
should take steps to:
. Account For Residents. Knowing the whereabouts of all resi-
dents greatly enhances emergency response time following a disaster. In
a situation such as a hurricane where there is advance warning, a com-
mittee should ascertain which residents are remaining in the community
and which are evacuating. A temporary destination address and phone
number should be obtained from those who are evacuating.
5. See FEMA, The National Flood Insurance Program,
http://www.fema.gov/about/programs/nfip/index.shtm (last visited June 2, 2007).
6. See FLA. STAT. § 215.555(4)(b)4, (4)(e)l (2006).
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* Attend to the injured. After disaster strikes, the board's first ac-
tion should be to direct emergency medical assistance to any residents in
need.
* Secure the community from acts of vandalism and looting. In
some cases, it may be necessary to hire security personnel to protect
against vandalism, theft, and other criminal activities.
" Remove storm debris.
* "Dry In"/"Shore Up" the building structures in order to miti-
gate against further damage. Depending upon the nature and extent of
the damage, it may be necessary to evacuate the premises or shore-up the
structure.
* "Dry Out." This is the removal, where necessary, of wet carpet,
wall board, cabinets, etc. when necessary to prevent the growth of mold.
* Survey the Property and Identify Areas Needing Priority At-
tention. In the case of widespread disaster, unit owners will not be able
to depend upon local law enforcement agencies whose attention might be
diverted to higher priority matters. Arrangements for security, debris
cleanup, and emergency repairs should be made as part of a disaster plan,
not after the fact, when it will be difficult, if not impossible, to find help.
* Activate the Plan. Following a disaster, the disaster coordinator
and information facilitator move into action. The information facilitator
opens lines of communications with the unit owners. The disaster coor-
dinator contacts emergency services and notifies the contractors and em-
ployees, advising them of their duties and needs. In some cases, it may
be necessary to suspend or cancel ongoing contracts such as lawn and
pool maintenance. Hopefully, a provision was made in the contract for
such right of suspension without penalty in situations such as a disaster
when the contracted services are no longer needed.
VI. HASTE MAKES WASTE IN RECONSTRUCTION
Within hours of any disaster, the affected community will be besieged
by companies and individuals looking for work and/or offering disaster re-
covery services. This group will consist of qualified professionals, ranging
from public adjusters to companies specializing in disaster recovery. The
larger of these companies will arrive decked out in color-coordinated uni-
forms, with large debris removing equipment and even helicopters. Inter-
spersed among the new arrivals will be the con men and profiteers who prey
upon the misfortune of others. While it is very tempting to sign the first con-
tract stuck in your face, when confronted with what initially will appear to be
an insurmountable task of reconstruction, experience has shown that these
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quick solutions are formulas for disasters of greater magnitude than those
already suffered. No greater application exists for the old adage that "haste
makes waste" than in these situations. The best advice is to "just say no" and
stick to your disaster plan which, hopefully, will include a plan that antici-
pates the five phases of reconstruction: 1) Project planning/scheduling; 2)
Construction bidding; 3) Contract negotiations; 4) Construc-
tion/rehabilitation; and 5) Project completion/close out.
There are intervening steps you should take which may require con-
tracts of short duration and for specific purposes. Even these contracts
should be reviewed to insure that proper precautions are taken.
A. Avoiding the Pitfalls of Disaster Recovery
The pitfalls of disaster include disputes between insurance carriers
(flood, windstorm, hazard) and the association over the nature and extent of
damage, cost of repair or replacement, and/or whether appropriate mitigation
was effectuated. With regard to claims made by unit owners against their
boards over the mismanagement of insurance proceeds, the association owes
a duty to the owners and their mortgagees to exercise reasonable care in the
management of the insurance proceeds and to hold the proceeds for the
benefit of the owners and mortgagees.7  Claims of contractors, sub-
contractors, materialmen, and suppliers that were not paid by the general
contractor will likely result in the association having to pay double because
of the failure to comply with Florida's Construction Lien Law.8 Suits
against contractors and subcontractors over poor quality repairs are also
common.
B. Restoration of the Property
Once conditions stabilize, the disaster recovery team will be in a posi-
tion to meet with professionals trained in disaster recovery, such as:
* Architect/Engineer: These professionals are responsible for as-
sessing the damage, preparing plans and specifications in accordance
with new building codes, assisting in the selection of a construction
manager, and defining other reconstruction requirements.
7. See Gill v. Surf Dweller Owners Ass'n, Inc, No. 97-0051 (Mar. 10, 1998) (Scheuer-
man, Arb.), reported in 2 DEP'T OF Bus. & PROF'L REGULATION: Div. OF FLA. LAND SALES,
CONDO. & MOBILE HOMES ARB. SECTION: REGULAR FINAL ORDER INDEX 27-28 (2001).
8. FLA. STAT. § 713.06 (2006); see, e.g., Adams v. McDonald, 356 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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e Construction Manager: The construction manager oversees the
selection of a general contractor, competitive bidding, and administra-
tors; directs and coordinates pay requisitions, change orders and all other
activities of the parties; and resolves disputes.
e General Contractor: Under the direction of the construction
manager, the general contractor employs and supervises laborers, sup-
plies materials, and builds project in accordance with archi-
tect's/engineer's plans and specifications.
D Attorney: The attorney reviews construction contracts to insure
adequate assurance of job performance and warranties, and compliance
with applicable lien laws.
* Public Adjuster: In some instances, the assistance of an inde-
pendent public adjuster may be beneficial when dealing with the nui-
sances of an ambiguous insurance policy. While most adjusters will
work for a fee based upon a percentage of the insurance proceeds, when
the scope of assistance required is limited to specific items, the fee
should be adjusted accordingly.
Review your governing documents; particularly, the "repair after casu-
alty" section of the insurance provision. It is common to find language such
as the following:
* Estimates of Costs. Immediately after deciding to rebuild or re-
pair damage to property for which the association is responsible, the as-
sociation shall obtain reliable and detailed estimates of the cost to rebuild
or repair.
* Construction Fund. The construction fund shall be disbursed in
payment of such costs in the manner required by the board of directors of
the association upon approval by an architect qualified to practice in
Florida and employed by the association to supervise the work.
When the aforesaid provisions exist in your documents, contracting for
reconstruction prior to obtaining a scope of work will be contrary to both the
association's best interest and the obligations set forth in the documents.
VII. SETTLING THE INSURANCE CLAIMS
In order to respond to an emergency, the association may need to obtain
a short-term loan. Without a restriction in the documents, not-for-profit com-
munity associations can borrow. However, they generally cannot pledge the
condominium property as security. Most banks with which the association
does business will approve a commercial line of credit secured by the asso-
ciation's accounts and/or assessment and lien rights. The association also
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may obtain a small business administration loan that is available to victims
of disaster, generally, at lower interest rates. Of course, reserve funds can
also be utilized if approved by a majority of the total voting interests.
On television, within minutes of a disaster, an insurance adjuster ap-
pears on the scene with checkbook in hand. In the space of a thirty second
commercial, all claims are resolved, and the victims shower praise on the
company's quick response and positive attitude. While this does occasion-
ally happen, it is an unlikely scenario. In a major disaster, it is rare, if not
impossible, to fully assess the damages within such a short timeframe. In
fact, the association should not seriously entertain a settlement until the full
scope of work is known and costs ascertained.
Immediately following the disaster, it will be necessary for the associa-
tion to secure the property to mitigate against further damage and clean-up
debris. Most insurers will offer advances for this purpose. As long as the
association doesn't sign any releases or settlements, there is nothing wrong
with accepting such advances.
Insurance policies need to be examined to ensure that "proof of loss"
forms are filed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Disasters do not respect geographic location or economic status and can
occur at any time. Their effects can last for years; however, pre-disaster
readiness coupled with a well-orchestrated and executed disaster plan will
minimize damages and promote a speedy recovery.
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EVALUATING KATRINA: A SNAPSHOT OF RENTERS'
RIGHTS FOLLOWING DISASTERS
ELOISA C. RODRiGUEZ-DOD* AND OLYMPIA DUHART**
I. INTRODUCTION
Two years after Hurricane Katrina laid waste to the Gulf Region,' it is
hard, if not impossible, for many people to return home. The powerful storm
decimated parts of Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana.2 It also displaced a
record number of men, women, and children with some estimates as high as
800,000. 3 Among those displaced, renters face additional difficulties. Rent-
ers, who comprise almost half of those displaced by Hurricane Katrina,4 are
often last in line for government benefits and other assistance. Moreover, the
hostility to renters' rights that continues to pervade the community after
Katrina created additional obstacles for low-income renters attempting to
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center;
B.B.A., University of Miami; M.B.A., Florida International University; J.D., University of
Miami. I express my gratitude to Warren Friedman for his assistance and contribution.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Cen-
ter; B.A. University of Miami; J.D., Nova Southeastern University. I thank Nicholas Seidule
for his excellent work on this project.
1. The hurricane made landfall in Louisiana on August 29, 2005. Elisabeth Bumiller, In
New Orleans, Bush Speaks With Optimism but Sees Little of Ruin, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2006,
at A12.
2. FEM4 's Manufactured Housing Program: Haste Makes Waste Before the Comm. on
S. Homeland Sec. and Gov'tal Affairs, 109th Congress (2006) (statement of Richard L. Skin-
ner, Inspector General, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec).
3. About 1.5 million people were directly affected by Hurricane Katrina, and more than
800,000 people were forced to live outside of their homes. Department of Homeland Security,
Hurricane Katrina: What Government is Doing,
http://www.dhs.gov/xprepresp/programs/gc_1 157649340100.shtm (last visited May 11, 2007)
[hereinafter What Government is Doing].
4. In New Orleans, 55 percent of the housing units affected were rental units. National
Low Income Housing Coalition, Preliminary Estimate 9-22-05, Hurricane Katrina's Impact
on Low Income Housing Units Estimated 302,000 Units Lost or Damaged, 71% Low Income,
http://nlihc.org/doc/05-02.pdf (last visited May 11, 2007) [hereinafter National Low Housing
Coalition]. Forty-seven percent of the housing units in the entire Katrina-affected area were
rental units. Id. By some estimates, almost 84,000 rental units were destroyed or heavily
damaged by Katrina and the ensuing flood. Susan Saulny & Gary Rivlin, Little Aid Coming to
Displaced New Orleans Renters; Homeowners are Seeing Lion's Share of Post-Katrina Help,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2006, at 1.14; see also The Road Home Program, The Small Rental
Property Program, http://www.road2la.org/rental/default.htm (last visited July 8, 2007) (stat-
ing that nearly 82,000 rental housing units received major damage or severe damage during
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita).
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resettle in the area.5 Further, even one-time homeowners have been forced
to turn to rental housing 6 as the long, slow recovery assistance process works
its way through the region.
The difficulties facing renters in the New Orleans region after the storm
are emblematic of the difficulties facing many "evacuees" who are forced to
find temporary housing following a disaster. The staggering increase in dis-
asters and catastrophes worldwide has led to a burgeoning transient popula-
tion. 7  "Hurricanes, tornados, forest fires, tsunamis, flooding, earthquakes
and even terrorist attacks are destroying homes and livelihoods and displac-
ing many families."'
Among the obstacles for renters in the New Orleans region are the scar-
city of land on the south shore of Lake Pontchartrain,' increases in labor and
material costs for repairs, 0 higher insurance," infrastructure uncertainty,1 2
rental property inflation,'3 uncertainty over flood protection,' 4 zoning restric-
5. See People's Hurricane Relief Fund and Oversight Coalition, Tenants Rights Work-
ing Group, www.peopleshurricane.org (last visited July 8, 2007). The group targets local and
federal officials to meet a list of tenant demands to protect the rights of renters impacted by
Hurricane Katrina. Id.
6. Eric Dash & David Leonhardt, Invasion of Reluctant Renters; So Many Evacuees
and, Luckily, So Many Apartments in Cities of Refuge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005, at Cl.
Immediately following the storm, federal officials estimated that between 400,000 to one
million people from the Gulf Region scattered across the nation in search of housing, "perhaps
the country's largest single migration since the Civil War." Id. In New Orleans, scores of
homeowners were forced to find temporary housing within the state while they waited for
their house to be repaired or for the flooding to abate. Id.
7. Warren Friedman, Denial of Housing to Renters Because of Criminal Background 1
(Nov. 8, 2006) (unpublished comment, on file with author).
8. Id.
9. THE ROAD HOME RENTAL HOUSING PROGRAM: CONSEQUENCES FOR NEW ORLEANS 11
(2006), http://www.bgr.org/Consequences for N.O._090516.pdf [hereinafter THE ROAD
HOME]. The City of New Orleans is located on subsiding swampland on the delta of the Mis-
sissippi River. See SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. To INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND
RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, 109TH CONG., A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 51 (2006),
http://www.katrina.house.gove/fullkatrina_report.htm [hereinafter A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE].
The city's average elevation is six feet below sea level. Id.
10. THE ROAD HOME, supra note 9, at 11.
11. HUD Approves $4.2 B for Louisiana's "Road Home" Rebuilding Program, USA
TODAY, July 11, 2006.
12. THE ROAD HOME, supra note 9, at 11.
13. ld "It is not uncommon for apartments in the French Quarter to rent at rates three
times higher than before Katrina." Darryl Lorenzo Wellington, New Orleans: A Right to
Return?, DISSENT, Fall 2006, http://www.dissentmagazine.org.article/?article=695&print=l.
14. THE ROAD HOME, supra note 9, at 11.
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tions,"5 and criminalization.' 6 Some of these problems can serve as a "snap-
shot" of sorts for the obstacles for renters who must find housing following a
temporary, unforeseen displacement.
Part II of this article' 7 discusses legislation and attempted legislation
impacting renters after Hurricane Katrina. Part III addresses the increase of
rent after disasters and a suggested control. Part IV discusses the manner in
which criminal backgrounds determine rental options following disasters.
Lastly, Part V concludes with a call for the need to focus on reforms to ad-
dress the housing crisis for renters during emergency situations.
II. RESTRICTIONS ON RENTERS: HITS AND MISSES
In the field of legislation concerning rental properties after Katrina,
there have been some near hits and misses. Remarkably, some local law-
makers erected barriers, rather than relief, for the already embattled renters.
One particularly egregious example of a legislative impediment to rental
repatriation is St. Bernard Parish Code #670-09-06.' s Passed by the St. Ber-
nard Parish Council in September 2006, the local ordinance placed a rental
restriction on single family residences that prohibited landlords from renting
to anyone other than blood relatives.19 The ordinance stated:
No person or entity shall rent, lease, loan, otherwise allow occupancy or
use of any single family residence located in an R- 1 zone by any person or
group of persons, other than a family members(s) related by blood within the
first, second or third direct ascending or descending generation(s), without
15. See discussion regarding Ordinance #670-09-06 infra section II and accompanying
notes.
16. See discussion regarding the impact of criminal convictions on rental housing infra
section IV and accompanying notes. Furthermore, the term "criminalization" in this paper is
being used in a slightly different connotation than its dictionary meaning. It is being used
expansively to refer to the criminal characterization of people who have either not gone
through the justice system, or who are saddled with ancient, minor infractions.
17. This article includes in part material for a chapter originally written for RE-
DEVELOPMENT AFTER A MAJOR DISASTER in the Law, Property, and Society book series of
Ashgate Publishing (series editor, Robin Paul Malloy).
18. ST. BERNARD PARISH COUNCIL, LA. ORDINANCE #670-09-06 (2006).
19. Id. The legislation did create an exception with Council approval. Id. In March
2006, the Parish originally approved an ordinance that placed a moratorium on single-family
homes becoming rental properties "until such time as the post Katrina real estate market in St.
Bernard Parish stabilizes." ST. BERNARD PARISH COUNCIL, LA. ORDINANCE #643-03-06
(2006). The ordinance under discussion here concerns an exception to the original morato-
rium.
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first obtaining a Permissive Use Permit from the St. Bernard Parish Coun-
cil.2"
The ordinance carried strict penalties. Violators were to be found guilty
of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine "of not less than $50.00 and not more
than $250.00 per day for each day of an un-permitted rental, lease, or occu-
pancy of each property in violation" of the ordinance.2
The parish of St. Bernard also reserved the right to pursue civil reme-
dies in the District Court of the parish against any person who allowed use of
any property in violation of the ordinance, or anyone who occupied or used
any property in violation of the ordinance.22 The St. Bernard Parish Council
asserted that the ordinance was needed to "maintain the integrity and stability
of established neighborhoods as centers of family values and activities...
1923
In its short, unhappy life, the ordinance quickly prompted a lawsuit
grounded in challenges based on the Fair Housing Act of 1968,24 42 U.S.C.
§1981, 42 U.S.C. §1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.25 The plain-
tiff, the Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center, Inc.,
("GNOFHAC") sought injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, and remedial
relief.26
20. ST. BERNARD PARISH COUNCIL, LA. ORDINANCE #670-09-06 (2006).
21. Id. Each day of un-permitted occupancy of each property constituted a separate
offense subject to a separate fine. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. The ordinance was adopted by vote on September 19, 2006. ST. BERNARD PARISH
COUNCIL, LA. ORDINANCE #670-09-06 (2006). Five members of the council voted in favor of
the ordinance; two members (including the chairman) voted against the ordinance. Id. Within
one month, by its October 3, 2006 council meeting, the Parish was requesting a District Attor-
ney opinion on the ordinance. See OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE PARISH OF
ST. BERNARD, STATE OF LOUISIANA, TAKEN AT A REGULAR MEETING HELD ON TUESDAY,
OCTOBER 3, 2006 1 (2006) http://www.sbpg.net/10-3-06minutes.doc [hereinafter October
Minutes].
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006). "The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to dis-
criminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwell-
ing, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or handicap." 15 Am. JuR. 2D Civil Rights
§ 392 (2007).
25. The Equal Protection Clause states: "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(emphasis added).
26. Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr., Inc. v. St. Bernard Parish, Docket No.
2:06-CV-07185 (E.D.La. Telephone Conference Order, July 26, 2007). The Greater New
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The basis for the civil rights complaint was rooted in the demographic
composition of St. Bernard Parish, a community that sits a few miles east of
downtown New Orleans.27 St. Bernard Parish is overwhelmingly white. 8
Specifically, St. Bernard's population of 67,000 prior to Hurricane Katrina
was nearly 90 percent white. 9 Among homeowners in the parish, there is a
greater gulf between the black and white residents. White residents own 93
percent of all owner-occupied units in the parish.3 ° Finally, minorities in the
parish are disproportionately reliant on rental properties in the region: before
the storm, nearly one in two black households in St. Bernard's and one in
three Hispanic households in the parish were renters. 3' By contrast, only one
in four white households in St. Bernard were renters before the storm.32 The
Orleans Fair Housing Action Center ("GNOFHAC") argued that the council's enactment of
the ordinance constituted "a practice and policy of housing discrimination on the basis of race
and national origin." Id. It asserted that its injuries included interference with the organiza-
tion's efforts to promote equal housing opportunity for its constituents, the depletion of re-
sources needed to counter unlawful housing practices, and interference with the constituent's
enjoyment of the benefit of living in an integrated community. Id. The GNOFHAC argued
that the Fair Housing Act is violated "even when seemingly neutral zoning policies have a
discriminatory effect on a particular protected class and cause harm to a community through
the perpetuation of segregation." See Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center, News
Release: Fair Housing Center Files Suit Against St. Bernard Parish; Announces News Con-
ference Regarding Lawsuit, Oct. 3, 2006, www.gnofairhousing.org (last visited July 8, 2007).
27. Louisiana Plans, Long Term Recovery Planning, St. Bernard Parish,
http://www.louisianaspeaks-parishplans.org/IndParishHomepage.cfm?EntID=13 (last visited
May 14, 2007). St. Bernard Parish is located between the Mississippi River and Lake Borgne.
Id. The Parish covers 465 square miles in land area. Id
28. Billy Sothern, A Question of Blood, THE NATION, Mar. 27, 2007,
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070409/sothern.
29. According to pre-Katrina statistics from the U.S. Census Bureau, the 2000 Full-count
Characteristics of St. Bernard Parish showed that the demographic break-down was 84.3 per-
cent white, 7.6 percent black, and 5.1 percent Hispanic. GREATER NEW ORLEANS COMMUNITY
DATA CENTER, ST. BERNARD PARISH: PEOPLE & HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS 2 (2006),
http://www.gnocdc.org/st-bemard/people.html [hereinafter PEOPLE & HOUSEHOLD
CHARACTERISTICS].
30. According to one report, "whites own virtually all single-family homes in the parish
(93 percent according to 2000 census data)." Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law, Press Release, St. Bernard Parish Agrees to Halt Discriminatory Zoning Rule,
http://www.lawyerscommittee.org/2005website/publications/press/pressl 11306.html (last
visited July 8, 2007).
31. Michelle Chen, Housing Watchdogs Call Post-Katrina Ordinance "'Racist", THE
NEW STANDARD, Oct. 6, 2006, http://newstandardnews.net/content/index.cfm/items/373 1.
32. Id.
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displacement caused by Hurricane Katrina in nearby New Orleans also
boosted the minority population in need of rental housing.
33
In their suit, the challengers argued that the ordinances passed by the
parish had the intent and effect of denying rental housing availability for
minorities. 4 The ordinance effectively restricted the bulk of the single-
family home rentals in the Parish to whites. 35 The challengers contended
that the zoning restrictions operated to discriminate against minorities in the
housing market.36 Interestingly, a member of the St. Bernard Parish Council
who had voted against the ordinance also asserted in a local column that the
restriction was intended to keep blacks from moving to the parish.37
Courts have long recognized defacto racial discrimination of legislation
by examining the discriminatory intent and impact of such laws. 38 Disparate
impact is measured by the discriminatory effect a challenged legislation will
have on a protected class. 39 Discriminatory intent examines the purpose for
which the challenged legislation was enacted. 40 Not only did the St. Bernard
Parish ordinance disproportionately limit the rental access of minorities, but
the stated reason for the. ordinance was to preserve the "integrity" of the
community, which was predominantly white.4'
Not surprisingly, the ordinance was met with a barrage of media criti-
cism and community complaints from both civic and watchdog groups.4 2
Because Katrina had effectively decimated St. Bernard Parish, the need for
33. "African Americans were more likely to be flooded, more likely to be displaced, less
likely to be able to return .... Gary Younge, New Orleans Forsaken, THE NATION, Sept. 18,
2006, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060918/younge.
34. Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr., Inc. v. St. Bernard Parish, Docket No.
2:06-CV-07185 (E.D.La. Telephone Conference Order, July 26, 2007).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. A journalist characterized council member Lynn Dean as "eccentric, outspoken and
white - like the rest of the members [of the council]." Sothern, supra note 28. Dean dis-
cussed the ignoble motives of the ordinance in his column in the St. Bernard Parish Voice. Id
38. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). In Yick Wo, the United State Supreme
Court reversed a Chinese challenger's conviction under a facially neutral San Francisco ordi-
nance as a violation of equal protection. Id.
39. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). The Court found no evidence in the
record to show that the challenged state action affected "blacks differently from whites." Id.
at 225.
40. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
41. ST. BERNARD PARISH CouNcIL, LA. ORDINANCE #670-09-06 (2006).
42. See, e.g., Fair Housing Centers Files Suit, supra note 26.
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affordable housing in the area was paramount. In addition, critics say the
ordinance was a thinly veiled pretext for discriminating against blacks.43
Council members from St. Bernard Parish defended the ordinance as an
effort to maintain owner-occupied houses and keep out speculators. 44 The
council members said their concern was that speculators would buy low-cost
damaged homes, make minimal repairs, and then rent them out, "which
could depress home values in traditionally! owner-occupied homes. 45
In a subsequent incarnation, the legislation re-emerged as Ordinance
#697-12-06.46 In its more diluted form, the new ordinance on the zoning
restrictions regarding the rental of single-family residences removed the con-
sanguinity restriction and instead imposed a Permissive Use Permit for any-
one who wishes to rent, lease, loan, or otherwise allow occupancy of any
single family residence in an identified zone.47
The newer ordinance retains the criminal sanctions, 48 as well as the civil
penalties 49 that could be imposed for violations. The ordinance also exempts
single family residences that were rental properties before the enactment of
the ordinance.5"
Another prospective piece of legislation, which would have actually
served the rights of renters trying to relocate after the storm, never got the
43. "This racist ordinance needs to be declared unconstitutional and the leaders closely
monitored until they repent or resign." Sothem, supra note 28 (quoting Letter to the Editor,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans).
44. St. Bernard Parish Government, Parish Council Proposing Major Changes to Rental
Property Ordinance, Steve Cannizaro, http://www.sbpg.net/dec0506f.html (last visited July 8,
2007).
45. Id.
46. The St. Bernard Parish amended the ordinance at its Council Meeting on Dec. 19,
2006. ST. BERNARD PARISH COUNCIL, LA. ORDINANCE #697-12-06 (2006); see also OFFICIAL
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE PARISH OF ST. BERNARD, STATE OF LOUISIANA, TAKEN
AT A REGULAR MEETING HELD ON TUESDAY, DECEMBER 19, 2006 9 (2006)
http://www.sbpg.net/I 2-19-06minutes.doc [hereinafter December Minutes].
47. ST. BERNARD PARISH COUNCIL, LA. ORDINANCE #697-12-06 (2006). The Permissive
Use Permit requirement also requires that landlords make a prior application to the St. Bernard
Parish Planning Commission for "review, evaluation and recommendation concerning the
matter." Id.
48. The violation of the ordinance constitutes a misdemeanor, and is subject to a fine of
not less than $50 a day and not more than $250 for each day of un-permitted rental, lease, or
occupancy. Id.
49. Civil penalties for tenants and landlords who violated the ordinance are not less than
$100 a day for each day of un-permitted occupancy, as well as administrative costs, court
costs, and attorney fees for investigation and prosecution of the civil matter. Id
50. Id. The council member who proposed the original legislation maintained the
changes demonstrated the parish's intent to protect property values by maintaining owner-
occupied neighborhoods than discrimination. Cannizaro, supra note 44.
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requisite support to transform into law. The Elimination of Barriers for
Katrina Act, H.R. 4213, would have provided a mechanism for people with
criminal backgrounds to avail themselves of government assistance.5 Gen-
erally, the blanket exclusion in place for people with criminal backgrounds
effectively denied affordable housing access for those with a prior criminal
record. 52 While landlords are vested with inherent authority to deny tenancy
to those with criminal backgrounds, the application of this practice to Katrina
evacuees proved especially problematic. 3
First, the use of the criminal background records for Katrina evacuees
are riddled with problems. Some evacuees have criminal records for ancient,
minor infractions.54 Others have inaccurate records, which attach criminal
records to the wrong renters.55 Further, the notorious time delays caused by
Katrina have all but stalled the criminal justice system in New Orleans.56
The result is that many people charged with crimes were left in a criminal
justice limbo that excluded them from rentals because of their arrests, but did
not grant them a speedy resolution to the criminal charges. 7 Unfortunately,
the proposed legislation died for lack of support.58
III. RENT CONTROL MEASURES
The destruction of rental housing in New Orleans brought with it not
only a rental housing shortage but also an increase in rents. As with a typical
supply and demand market, the reduced supply of affordable rental housing
51. Elimination of Barriers for Katrina Victims Act, H.R. 4213, 109th Cong. (2005-
2006). The proposed legislation would have suspended temporarily the application of laws
which would have denied federal benefits and entitlements to victims of Hurricane Katrina or
Hurricane Rita who would have been rendered ineligible because of convictions for certain
drug crimes. Id.
52. See discussion infra section IV and accompanying notes.
53. Kirsten D. Levingston, Help Storm Refugees Find Shelter, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Mar. 8, 2006, at 9.
54. Id. Those with outdated criminal backgrounds argue that the criminal backgrounds
are unrepresentative of the lives they live today. Id. Further, the criminal background exclu-
sion has a long reach, even impacting the family members of those convicted of crimes. Id.
One mother of three from New Orleans reported that her entire family was unable to obtain
housing in Texas because her husband had served time for possession of crack cocaine. Id.
55. The privatization of criminal background records has led many to question the verac-
ity of backgrounds. Levingston, supra note 53, at 9.
56. Leslie Eaton, Judge Steps in for Poor Inmates Without Justice Since Hurricane, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 23, 2006, at Al.
57. Id.
58. GovTrack.us, Independently Tracking the United States Congress,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-4213&page-command=print (last visited
July 8, 2007).
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has caused a demand for whatever units are available.5 9 This demand has
been followed by a hike in the rent charged for those units.60
After Hurricane Katrina, the price of a rental unit soared by an average
of about forty percent. 6' For example, unfurnished condominium units that
had been rented for $1,200 a month before the hurricane hit were being
rented within a few months thereafter at $2,000 per month, a sixty-six per-
cent rate hike.6 z Some rentals even increased up to threefold the amount
previously charged. 63
The skyrocketing rents have frustrated efforts to repopulate New Or-
leans and bring back the working class, especially minorities.' "[M]any
lower-income residents ... say they are unable to return [because they] have
been priced out."
65
Landlords have defended the need to charge higher rents by pointing
out the increase in costs to repair the damaged and destroyed rental units.66
The rising costs of insurance and labor have been passed off to tenants.67
Understandably, landlords must recover these costs in order to repair and
operate their rental units. However, some people have questioned whether
there also may exist some price gouging in that landlords are taking advan-
tage of the shortage in rental housing.6 8 Whatever the case may be, the need
and ability by landlords to increase rents have created a housing crisis for the
poor and lower-income working classes.
Louisiana, like the majority of states, does not have a rent control stat-
ute in place. 69 A landlord has a right to control and dispose of rental prop-
erty "for valid consideration."7  This right cannot be abridged except by
state law. 7' However, without any controls in place, New Orleans is finding
59. Gwen Filosa & Michelle Hunter, Rental Quandary: Scarce Units, Costly Repairs
and Surging Rents Hit Tenants and Landlords Hard, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 12, 2005, at 1.
60. See id; Greg Thomas, Local Rents Expected to Skyrocket, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 12,
2005, at C-12; Karen Brooks, Study: Katrina Hit Black Areas Hardest New Orleans Advised
to Work on Ways to Bring Minorities Home, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 27, 2006, at 3A.
61. Id.
62. See Thomas, supra note 60, at C-12.
63. Filosa & Hunter, supra note 59.
64. Brooks, supra note 60, at 3A
65. Id.
66. Filosa & Hunter, supra note 59; Thomas, supra note 60, at C-12.
67. Filosa & Hunter, supra note 59.
68. Id.
69. See Rent Control Laws by State, Nat'l Multi Housing Council, February 10, 2006,
http://www.nmhc.org/Content/ServeContent.cfmi?lssuelD=66&ContentltemD=l 162&siteAre
a=Topics (last visited July 8, 2007).
70. LA. REv. STAT. § 9:3258 (2006).
71. Id.
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itself gripped by surging prices in the midst of the housing crisis. Thus, Lou-
isiana should consider enacting a statute that would permit certain controls
on rent increases when exigent circumstances exist.
Florida is one example of a natural disaster-prone state that has such a
statute in place. Under Florida law, counties and municipalities may impose
rent controls as "are necessary and proper to eliminate an existing housing
emergency which is so grave as to constitute a serious menace to the general
public."72 Any such measure would expire within one year unless extended
or renewed by adoption of a new measure.7 3 Had a similar statute been in
place in Louisiana, the City of New Orleans could have effectively adopted
an ordinance that would have curbed the soaring rents.
However, a review of the Florida statutes also reveals certain deficien-
cies in solving any exigent housing crisis. First, the damage and destruction
that can occur from a natural disaster, such as Katrina, can render a city vir-
tually paralyzed, requiring quick and immediate solutions. Although Florida
law allows local governments to adopt and impose rent control measures
upon finding that a grave housing emergency exists, any such local law will
not be effective unless and until approved by the voters of the particular dis-
trict.74 When an emergency exists due to a natural disaster, it may be diffi-
cult to quickly organize and operate polling places to permit the residents to
vote. In addition, the local residents may be so scattered that they may not
be able to effectively vote.75
72. FLA. STAT. § 125.0103(2) (2006); FLA. STAT. § 166.043(2) (2006). In 1992, South
Florida experienced the devastation of Hurricane Andrew, then the "most costly disaster in
[U.S.] history." Mike Williams, Hurricane Andrew: One Year Later, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Aug. 22, 1993, at Al. "More than 80,000 homes were destroyed or damaged." John W.
Mashek, Bush Seeks $7.6bfor Storm Relief BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 9, 1992, at 1. The storm's
destruction created a housing shortage, making it difficult for displaced homeowners and
tenants to find available housing. Howard W. French, After the Storm: "House for Rent"
Becomes a Rarity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1992, at 34. The State Attorney General's Office
investigated thousand of complaints about price gouging, including high increases in rentals.
Mashek, supra note 72, at 1. Despite the complaints, and despite the ability to adopt rent
control measures during such a housing emergency, there is no evidence that Dade County or
any affected city adopted any ordinance controlling rent.
73. § 125.0103(3); § 166.043(3).
74. § 125.0103(5); § 166.043(5).
75. See Damian Williams, Note, Reconstructing Section 5: A Post-Katrina Proposal for
Voting Rights Act Reform, 116 YALE L.J. 1116, 1119-20 (2007) (describing the electoral prob-
lems encountered in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina); Jeff Crouere, Across State Lines:
Louisiana, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, Feb. 2006, at 30 (noting that, due to the hurricane, the
Louisiana Secretary of State postponed the February 2006 New Orleans' mayoral election
because it was logistically impossible to hold).
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Second, the Florida statutes provide that no rent controls may be im-
posed on rentals "used or offered for residential purposes as a seasonal or
tourist unit, as a second housing unit, or on rents for dwelling units located in
luxury apartment buildings. 76 Unfortunately for New Orleans, the majority
of the damage and destruction occurred to areas of the city where the more
affordable housing units were located." Residents have been forced to
search for housing advertised as "luxury" apartments. 78 Adopting the pro-
viso in the Florida statutes excepting luxury apartments would possibly serve
to continue the rental increase quandary. If "luxury" apartments are the only
form of available housing, and if the landlords of these units could, under the
statutes, easily increase rents to whatever rate the market will bear, then a
bad situation is simply made worse. Therefore, any such statute should per-
mit adoption of local rent control ordinances that could apply to all rental
housing, including luxury apartments.
Consequently, disaster-prone states, such as Louisiana, should consider
adopting statutes similar to those enacted in Florida. However, adopting the
Florida statute in toto may simply create a type of Gordian knot 79-although
local governments will have certain power to adopt rent control measures,
the voters may not approve the measures or the ordinance may not effec-
tively control soaring rents. Thus, the state legislature should take heed and
adopt a version that could immediately and effectively strike at the heart of
the matter-give local governments greater power to control skyrocketing
rents during exigent housing situations.
IV. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT-A LANDLORD'S WAY
Rental housing problems can exact a demanding toll on criminals and
alleged criminals. Individuals with past arrest or conviction records, and
particularly those who have served jail time, generally find it more difficult
than others to integrate into society because they cannot readily secure jobs
76. § 125.0103(4); § 166.043(4). These statutes define "luxury apartment building" as a
building "wherein on January 1, 1977, the aggregate rent due on a monthly basis from all
dwelling units as stated in leases or rent lists existing on that date divided by the number of
dwelling units exceeds $250." § 125.0103(4); § 166.043(4).
77. See Williams, supra note 75, at 1118; Filosa & Hunter, supra note 59.
78. Filosa & Hunter, supra note 59.
79. "The Gordian Knot is a legend associated with Alexander the Great. It is often used
as a metaphor for an intractable problem, solved by a bold stroke ('cutting the Gordian
knot')." Answers.corn, Gordian Knot, http://www.answers.com/topic/gordian-knot (last vis-
ited July 9, 2007).
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or affordable housing.80 This failure to obtain affordable housing generally
leads to homelessness 81 and may eventually lead to recidivism.82
Although some convicts may be able to live with their families, others
are not so fortunate. 83 These individuals typically must resort to public hous-
ing. 84 Under federal regulations currently in place, state public housing au-
thorities may require criminal background checks of prospective and current
tenants.85 Consequently, in a majority of states, the public housing authori-
ties consider a person's criminal background, including an arrest that did not
lead to conviction, in making individualized determinations as to an appli-
cant's eligibility for public housing.86 In addition, three states immediately
reject any applicant who has a criminal record.87 These federal regulations
allow the public housing authority not only to deny housing to the alleged
criminal but may also deny housing to the criminal's family if he or she were
to live with the family. 88
This problem regarding the lack of housing for persons with criminal
records is of particular concern in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina due
to various factors. The crime rate in New Orleans was incredibly high prior
to the hurricane; thus, a disproportionately large number of individuals could
or would have been denied public housing.89 However, both public and pri-
vate rental housing was already scarce before the hurricane,90 and, obviously,
80. Levingston, supra note 53, at 9; CORRINE CAREY, No SECOND CHANCE: PEOPLE WITH
CRIMINAL RECORDS DENIED ACCESS TO PUBLIC HOUSING 16 (Human Rights Watch 2004);
PAUL SAMUELS & DEBBIE MUKAMAL, AFTER PRISON: ROADBLOCKS TO REENTRY: A REPORT
ON STATE LEGAL BARRIERS FACING PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 10-16 (2004),
http://www.lac.org/lac/upload/lacreport/LACPrintReport.pdf.
81. See, e.g., Levingston, supra note 53, at 9; CAREY, supra note 80, at 16.
82. See CAREY, supra note 80, at 43. "[S]uccessful reentry into society is much more
difficult for people who have been arrested or convicted of crimes." SAMUELS & MUKAMAL,
supra note 80, at 8.
83. CAREY, supra note 80, at 16.
84. Id.
85. 24 C.F.R. § 960.203(c)(2)-(3) (2006); 24 CFR §§ 5.901-5.903 (2006).
86. See SAMUELS & MUKAMAL, supra note 80, at 8, 16.
87. Id. at 16.
88. CAREY, supra note 80, at 21 n.5 1.
89. See ACORN, REBUILDING AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA: ACORN PLANNING
PRINCIPLES 16 (2006), http://
www.acom.org/fileadmin/KatrinaRelief/report/PlanningPrinciples.pdf.
90. See Deon Roberts, Real Estate Expert: NO. Population Will Recover Slowly, NEW
ORLEANS CITYBUSINESS, Feb. 1, 2006, at 1; Marcia Johnson, Addressing Housing Needs in the
Post Katrina Gulf Coast, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 327, 328 (2006).
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worsened thereafter. 9' In addition, after Hurricane Katrina, the criminal sys-
tem radically disintegrated. There were increased incidents of arrests, many
of which were for misdemeanors. 92 Nonetheless, these arrests have created
criminal records for those particular individuals. And to make matters
worse, many pending criminal cases were brought to a standstill due to the
hurricane's physical destruction of court files and evidence. 93 This great
number of unresolved cases has added to the numbers of criminals and al-
leged criminals that cannot readily find public housing. As public housing is
not feasible for these individuals, they must turn to more costly private rent-
als in an attempt to find a place to live.94
A private landlord is generally free to choose to whom he or she rents
real property. The only limitations generally imposed are found under the
Fair Housing Act (FHA). 95 The FHA makes it unlawful for a landlord "[t]o
refuse to ... rent.., or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to
any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
origin. ' 96 Additionally, a landlord may not "discriminate in the.., rental, or
... otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any... renter because
of a handicap" of the renter or anyone who will reside with or is associated
with the renter. 97 Thus, as long as a private landlord does not discriminate
against one of these protected classes, the landlord may, in his or her discre-
tion, freely implement any selection criteria in renting to prospective tenants.
91. See Michelle Chen, New Orleans' Displaced Struggle for Housing, Jobs, Neighbor-
hoods, NEW STANDARD NEWS, Oct. 21, 2005,
http://newstandardnews.net/content/index.cfm/items/2514; Filosa & Hunter, supra note 59.
92. See Levingston, supra note 53, at 9.
93. See generally Christopher Drew, In New Orleans, Rust in the Wheels of Justice, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2006, at Al.
94. This discussion will focus on the concerns associated with rentals by private land-
lords to those with arrest or conviction records, with a look at the crisis which has unfolded in
New Orleans. For a more complete discussion of public housing issues, see generally James
C. Smith, Disaster Planning and Public Housing: Lessons Learned from Katrina, to be pub-
lished in RE-DEVELOPMENT AFTER A MAJOR DISASTER in the Law, Property, and Society book
series of Ashgate Publishing (series editor, Robin Paul Malloy); see also CAREY, supra note
80.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 3604. This is the only limitation for landlords that do not participate in
public housing programs, such as Section 8. As stated earlier in this article, some state and
local governments have enacted more restrictive statutes and ordinances limiting a landlord's
right to freely rent to prospective tenants. Much of this legislation has been subject to chal-
lenge. Most recently, the City of Hazleton, Pennsylvania was sued in federal court over its
enactment of an ordinance prohibiting private landlords from renting to illegal immigrants.
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, No. 3:06-cv-1586 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
97. § 3604(f).
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No known law exists preventing a landlord from conducting a criminal
background check before renting to a prospective tenant. Only one state
requires a landlord to conduct criminal background checks, but only under
limited circumstances. 98 Private landlords in Arkansas may be ordered to
perform a criminal background check of a prospective tenant if a municipal-
ity's criminal nuisance abatement board declares the premises to be a public
nuisance.9 9 Thus, the implementation of criminal background checks is
mostly the prerogative of a private landlord. Given the shortage of housing
after Hurricane Katrina's destruction of New Orleans, and given that crimi-
nal background checks are already an impediment to securing public hous-
ing, a private landlord's implementation of a criminal background check for
prospective tenants in New Orleans compounds an already existing housing
crisis for those with arrest records. 00
These criminal background checks serve no purpose to private landlords
other than permitting them to have some basis on which to exclude prospec-
tive tenants from renting the premises.' 0 Under the common law, landlords
are generally not liable to tenants for crimes committed against them by
other tenants. 10 2 However, liability may attach if the landlord 1) had actual
or constructive knowledge that would make the tenant's conduct reasonably
foreseeable and the landlord did not take reasonable precautions;' 3 2) had a
special relationship with the perpetrator or victim;"' 4 or 3) assumed an im-
98. ARK. STAT. § 14-54-1705 (2006).
99. Id.
100. As it is, many private landlords have been using consumer credit checks when
screening prospective tenants. This too serves as a deterrent to criminals, particularly those
who have served a sentence, in obtaining affordable rental housing as their crimes generally
affect their credit status. See CAREY, supra note 80, at 32 n.104. Credit checks generally
require an applicant's consent. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b; see also FLA. STAT. § 501.005 (2006)
(consumer may request a "security freeze" prohibiting release of consumer report information
without consumer's consent). However, in Florida, a consumer may not freeze information in
the consumer report if it concerns and is used solely for tenant screening. § 501.005(12)0).
101. See CAREY, supra note 80, at 19, 21. "Exclusions based on criminal records are
usually justified in terms of promoting the safety of... tenants." Id.
102. See 57A AM. JuR. 2D Negligence § 98 (2007).
103. See, e.g., T.W. v. Regal Trace, Ltd., 908 So. 2d 499, 506 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(landlord had duty to warn tenants of alleged sexual assault committed by one tenant on an-
other minor tenant); Thompson v. Tuggle, 183 S.W.3d 611 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (landlord did
not breach duty where it had no knowledge that tenant owned gun); Western Investments, Inc.
v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 549 (Tex. 2005) (question of fact as to whether landlord's knowl-
edge of other crimes in the area rendered tenant's assault by another tenant reasonably fore-
seeable by landlord); Johnson v. Slocum Realty Corp., 595 N.Y.S.2d 244, 245 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1993) (landlord has duty to protect tenants from "foreseeable criminal intrusions").
104. See, e.g., Foxworth v. Housing Auth. of Jefferson Parish, 590 So. 2d 1347, 1348-49
(La. Ct. App. 1991) (landlord has no duty to control actions of tenants unless some special
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plied or express obligation to provide security to the tenant and breached that
obligation.' 05 The latter two reflect the state of the law in Louisiana. '06
In the Louisiana case of Smith v. Howard, a tenant shot and killed an-
other tenant, whom she believed to be a burglar outside her window.' 07 The
victim's estate sued both the tenant and the landlord. 1 8 The complaint al-
leged that the landlord caused the victim's death by failing to
1) evict [the other tenant] after her neighbors reported to the [land-
lord] that she was a threat to their safety and to the safety of visi-
tors; 2) maintain a proper screening program so as to avoid renting
to tenants with a history of violent propensities; 3) maintain poli-
cies requiring tenants to state whether they have any dangerous
weapons; 4) have a program for following up reports of violent
conduct by tenants against other tenants or visitors; 5) insure the
safety and security of guests; and 6) warn tenants and guests on the
premises of the dangers posed by the tenant.109
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the com-
plaint.110 The court relied on the well settled law that, unless a special rela-
tionship exists, there is no duty to control the actions of a third person and
prevent him from causing harm to someone else.' The court further noted
that landlords do not have a special relationship with those who live on their
premises, and, accordingly, owe no such duty to a tenant.11 Therefore, be-
cause landlords will suffer no liability, criminal background checks create
unnecessary impediments to some prospective tenants who are in dire need
of affordable rental housing.
relationship, such as lease provision requiring protective services, exists); N.W. v. Anderson,
478 N.W.2d 542, 543 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (landlord has no duty to warn tenants unless
landlord has "special relationship to either the [tenant] whose conduct needs to be controlled
or to the foreseeable victim of that conduct").
105. See, e.g., Foxworth, 590 So. 2d at 1348 (landlord has no duty to provide security
unless landlord assumed the obligation); Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc., 382 So.
2d 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (part of rent dedicated expressly for security creates question
as to landlord's contractual liability to provide such protection).
106. See Smith v. Howard, 489 So. 2d 1037, 1038 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Foxworth, 590 So.
2d at 1348; Terrell v. Wallace, 747 So. 2d 748 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
107. Howard, 489 So. 2d at 1038.
108. Id. at 1037-38.
109. Id. at 1038.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Howard, 489 So. 2d at 1038.
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The majority of those with arrest records in the United States are people
of color.11 3 In New Orleans, the rate of arrest of black men increased after
the hurricane." 4 Using arrest and conviction records as a basis to deny pri-
vate rentals may lead to unjust and catastrophic results. Arrests have in-
cluded offenses that range from small infractions to felonies."' Minor in-
fractions may include crimes such as "taking items from hardware stores and
convenience stores and 'disturbing the peace.""' 6 Currently, a private land-
lord may readily investigate an applicant's criminal background, and many
are doing just that." 7 Unlike consumer credit checks that require the per-
son's consent due to privacy concerns," 8 a defendant's consent is not re-
quired to obtain a copy of the defendant's criminal record"'. In many in-
stances, arrest and conviction records are easily available on the Internet;
however, the results of such a search may be inaccurate or may lead to incor-
rect or misleading conclusions. Although a majority of states allow defen-
dants to seal or expunge records of arrests that did not lead to conviction,
120
thirty-three states prohibit the sealing or expungement of any conviction re-
cords and seventeen states allow only some conviction records, such as first-
time offenses, to be sealed or expunged.' Criminal records in twenty-eight
states are available on the Internet, 22 in addition to records available at the
courthouse. In Louisiana, records of convictions, whether old or minor, are
available for review.12 1 In addition, the state makes accessible records of
defendants on parole. 124 The state does, however, permit the sealing of some
113. See generally, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Statistics, Profile of Jail Inmates,
2002, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pji02.pdf (last visited July 9, 2007); U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Bureau of Statistics, Blacks Were Almost Three Times More Likely Than Hispanics
and Five Times More Likely Than Whites to be in Jail,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/jailrair.htm (last visited July 9, 2007).
114. See George Ploss, America's Real "Prisoner's Dilemma, "UNIVERSITY WIRE, Mar. 27,
2007.
115. See Levingston, supra note 53, at 9.
116. The Praxis Project, Missing Stories From Katrina Coverage: Survivors Locked Up in
Makeshift Jail, http://www.thepraxisproject.org/tools/YMCkatrina.doc, (last visited July 9,
2007).
117. CAREY, supra note 80, at 19.
118. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
119. SAMUELS & MUKAMAL, supra note 80, at 15.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. SAMUELS & MUKAMAL, supra note 80, at 15; see also La. Dep't of Public Safety and
Corrects, Parole Board Dockets,
http://www.corrections.state.la.us/Offices/paroleboard/paroledockets.htm (last visited July 9,
2007).
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arrest records if the arrest did not lead to conviction and, at least, some arrest
records are shielded from the public eye. 12' Nonetheless, there is no prohibi-
tion on using these records as a basis for denial of rental housing. But what
happened to "innocent until proven guilty"? Is a minor or old conviction
really a credible and reasonable basis on which to deny housing? Something
needs to be done to relieve this problem.
Louisiana should consider enacting a law, similar to a bill proposed in
Illinois," 6 that would limit a private landlord's ability to deny housing based
on any arrest or conviction records. In January 2005, Illinois Rep. Chapin
Rose introduced a house bill, amending its Landlord and Tenant Act, that
would permit a private landlord to perform criminal backgrounds checks on
prospective tenants; however, the original version of the bill noted that a
"landlord may refuse to lease the property ... if the criminal background
check of the person contains any felony convictions or indicates that the per-
son is a registered sex offender."'' 2 7 Consequently, only those actually con-
victed of committing certain egregious crimes would be susceptible to being
denied a private rental.
Some may argue that a reason for conducting a criminal background
check is to circumvent the FHA and serve as a pretext to discrimination. 
28
The proposed Illinois bill, both in its original and amended versions, includes
a proviso that "[t]he landlord may not use the criminal background check to
discriminate against a protected class."' 19 Thus, the bill recognized the dan-
125. See LA. REV. STAT. § 44:9 (2006); see also SAMUELS & MUKAMAL, supra note 80,
atl5.
126. See H.B. 0367, Illinois State Assembly, 94th General Assembly (2005), available at
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=367&GAID=8&DocTypelD=HB&L
egld=14619&SessionlD=50&GA=94 (last visited July 9, 2007) [hereinafter Illinois Bill].
127. Id. (emphasis added). The bill was later amended in February 2005 to permit the
landlord to refuse to rent to a prospective tenant if:
(i) the individual's tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of
other individuals or the individual's tenancy would result in substantial physical
damage to the property of others; or (ii) the individual has been convicted by any
court of competent jurisdiction of the illegal manufacture or distribution of a con-
trolled substance as defined in the federal Controlled Substances Act or the Illinois
Controlled Substances Act.
Id. Unfortunately, this amendment would seemingly permit a landlord to interpret an arrest or
conviction record and determine that renting to such individual could create a threat under
subsection (i). This proposed bill is still pending, and the legislative session ended sine die.
Id.
128. See, e.g., Eliza Hirst, The Housing Crisis for Victims of Domestic Violence: Dispa-
rate Impact Claims and Other Housing Protection for Victims of Domestic Violence, 10 GEO.
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 131, 133 (2003).
129. Illinois Bill, supra note 126.
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gers concomitant with permitting a landlord to employ a criminal record as a
basis for refusing to rent to a tenant.
V. CONCLUSION
Two years after Katrina left her mark on the Gulf Coast, renters are left
with few options to resettle in their former communities. Funding programs
set aside to benefit renters are few and far between. Landlords who own
from one to four rental units can tap into $869 million in public funding,'30
which pales in comparison to the $7.5 billion devoted to owners of damaged
homes. 131
In January 2007, The Road Home launched a Small Rental Property
program, which was designed to provide incentives to rebuild affordable
rental housing.' 3 2 Even though there may be proposed tax incentives to lure
developers back into the area, such solutions may address long-term needs
but do little to fill the immediate need for affordable rental communities.
Not only are renters priced out of communities, but minority renters are also
faced with bias in the market. '33
Moreover, various attempts at enacting legislation have exacerbated the
problem through limiting access to rentals. Other curative measures-such
as the proposed legislation to eliminate barriers-have simply been aban-
doned. The tension created by the landlord's ability to deny housing to rent-
ers with criminal backgrounds highlights competing policy concerns in the
region. On one hand, there is the need to protect the safety of the residents
130. David Hammer, Relief Far Off for La. Rental Owners, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 4,
2007, available at http:///www.nola.com/printer/printer.ssf?/base/news-
7/1167893962187170.xml&coll 1 (last visited July 9, 2007). The program will be managed
by the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development, the state Office of Commu-
nity Development and privately-contracted manager ICF International. Id; see also THE
ROAD HOME, supra note 9, at 5.
131. Hammer, supra note 130, at 1.
132. See The Road Home, Press Release, Rental Property Owners Encouraged To Apply
To The Road Home Small Rental Property Program, Jan. 29, 2007,
http://www.road2la.org/news releases/rentallaunch_012907.htm. The Small Rental Property
program provides incentives, such as no interest forgivable loans, to property owners to rent
their small-scale rental properties to low- and moderate-income tenants at affordable rates.
The Road Home, Overview of Small Rental Property Program,
http://www.road2la.org/rental/overview.htm (last visited July 9, 2007).
133. A recent study revealed that black residents "encountered discrimination nearly six
times out of 10 when apartment hunting in the New Orleans area post-Katrina." Gwen Filosa,
Bias is Found in Rental Market, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 25, 2007,
http://www.nola.com/printer/printer.ssf?/base/news-81177482229124760.xml&coll=1 (last
visited July 9, 2007).
[Vol. 31
82
Nova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol31/iss3/1
2007] A SNAPSHOT OF RENTERS' RIGHTS FOLLOWING DISASTERS 485
of rental property by properly screening out criminals. On the other hand is
the need to provide affordable housing access for those with a prior criminal
record.
As the rebuilding process continues in the Gulf Region, the difficulties
for renters presented by legislation and criminalization demonstrate that there
is a need to focus the lens on these issues which impact renters. The obsta-
cles that were presented by the hurricane, the flood, and the ensuing housing
difficulties have a pronounced negative impact on the minority communities.
The snapshot of the housing crisis for New Orleans serves as a powerful re-
minder for other communities suddenly forced to rebuild.
As one commentator noted, "The most important thing that needs to be
saved (and rebuilt) is lower and middle income housing, shotguns, double
shotguns, comer stores, Creole cottages and camelbacks all combining to
make an urban fabric that does not exist in any other city."
134
134. Erin Rensink, New Orleans, quoted in CNN REPORTS KATRINA STATE OF EMERGENCY
168 (2005).
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1. INTRODUCTION
"With hurricanes, tornados, flooding, and severe t[hunder]-storms tear-
ing up the country from one end to another... [a]re we sure this is a good
time to take God out of the Pledge of Allegiance?"'
All kidding aside, the hurricanes of 2005 captured national attention and
continue to cause many Americans to ask what they can do to better prepare
for the next major disaster. There is cause for continued concern: according
to the Insurance Information Institute, 2 there are an average of twenty-five
catastrophes each year causing at least $25 million in direct insured dam-
ages.3 In 2006, there were thirty-three events of this major magnitude.4
Like any other American, those in the legal community may find themselves
victimized by disaster. Even firms who are not themselves the victims of
disaster would benefit in knowing how to advise clients who have been vic-
tims.
This article examines the tax and insurance implications of disasters on
law firms. Whether a large firm or a sole practitioner, it is prudent to antici-
pate and prepare for emergencies. Examining consequences along the full
spectrum of contingencies will enable law offices to posture themselves to
minimize their risk and to take advantage of opportunities to improve cash
flow during recovery.
Tax relief available to all victims forms the baseline for discussion.
Particular emphasis is placed on additional tax benefits from major disasters
(i.e., those the president has declared as disaster areas under the Robert T.
1. Father Joe, Wit & Wisdom of Jay Leno, http://fatherjoe.wordpress.com/2006/07/28/
wit-wisdom-of-jay-leno/ (last visited June 14, 2007).
2. Insurance Information Institute, About I.I.I., http://www.iii.org/media/about/ (last
visited June 14, 2007). The Insurance Information Institute has tracked and provided insur-
ance information to the government, media, universities, and the public for over forty years.
Id.
3. Insurance Information Institute, Catastrophes: Facts and Statistics: Insured Losses
for U.S. Catastrophes 1997-2006, http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/catastrophes/
content.print (last visited June 14, 2007) [hereinafter Catastrophes: Facts and Statistics].
4. Id.
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Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act-also called the
Stafford Act).5 In addition, because costs of insurance are deductible as
business expenses, so long as "ordinary and necessary, ' 6 the interface be-
tween taxes and insurance should be examined to maximize protection,
minimize risk, and optimize tax treatment.
Hurricane Katrina was the most expensive disaster in United States his-
tory.7 Section II of this article puts this tragedy in perspective and discusses
the risks of a repeat disaster of this magnitude.
Section III discusses tax relief available to victims of disaster. It looks spe-
cifically at noteworthy disasters to give the reader an appreciation of the
scope and flavor of tax relief that might be occasioned by future national
disasters. Tax relief ranges from a minimum threshold available to all tax-
payer victims up to the unprecedented tax relief to the victims of Hurricane
Katrina.
The article next emphasizes precautionary measures firms should take
to insulate themselves as much as possible from the significant financial
costs of being struck by a hurricane or other disaster. Section IV exposes
specific gaps in insurance coverage, often found in policy "exclusions,"
which leave many holding the bag after a major disaster. Post-Katrina cases
upholding flood damage exclusions are specifically discussed. Recent, pro-
posed, and pending legislation, including proposed federal catastrophe insur-
ance or reinsurance, is also evaluated.
Section IV also considers existing and proposed tax measures to allow
both individuals and businesses to accelerate recovery. The prospects of tax-
advantaged catastrophe savings accounts, small business administration re-
lief, and other potential federal emergency tax relief are detailed.
5. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
5121-5206 (2000 & Supp.) (authority of the president to declare National Disaster Areas is
pursuant to § 401 of the Stafford Act at 42 U.S.C. § 5170).
6. I.R.C. § 162 (2004); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1933).
7. Catastrophes: Facts and Statistics, supra note 3.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Catastrophes in Context
The year 2005 was the most active and devastating hurricane season in
United States history.8 In fact, the National Hurricane Center issued more
hurricane forecasts in 2005 than in any previous year.9 Prior to these storms,
Hurricane Ivan and Hurricane Charlie in 2004 had refreshed our memory
about the widespread scope of damage and destruction a hurricane could
produce. ° Indeed, these hurricanes should have served as a wake up call to
Americans who may have forgotten about the horrors of Hurricane Andrew
in 1992, a category 5 hurricane,'1 and the most costly disaster in world his-
tory before Hurricane Katrina. 12
According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
"flooding, severe storms, and hurricanes are the most common and costly
causes of disaster declarations in the United States; at least 10 such events
since 1989 have each required FEMA relief expenditures in excess of a bil-
8. See id Three of the ten most costly disasters ever occurred in 2005. Id. The gov-
ernment recognizes damages wrought (in constant dollar values) versus loss of life as the
measure of destruction, because evacuations and emergency life-saving response can prevent
loss of life. See FRANCES F. TOWNSEND, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA:
LESSONS LEARNED 1, 151 n.2 (2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-
learned.pdf. "[P]roperty destruction correlates more directly to the magnitude of the disaster
alone." Id.
9. For a detailed examination of tropical storm prediction accuracy and methodology,
see generally James L. Franklin, 2005 National Hurricane Center Forecast Verification Re-
port, NAT'L HURRICANE CTR., May 21, 2006, at 1,
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/verification/pdfs/Verification_2005.pdf. "Not only were the 12-72
h[our] forecasts more accurate in 2005 than they had been over the previous decade, but the
forecasts were also more skillful." Id. at 6.
10. At the time, Hurricanes Ivan and Charley were two of the top five most costly storms
in world history. Catastrophes: Facts and Statistics, supra note 3.
11. Hurricanes are rated on the Saffir-Simpson Scale from Category 1 (mildest; winds
74-95 mph) through Category 5 (most severe; winds greater than 155 mph). Hurricane!
2006: A Hurricane Preparedness Booklet, ACCUWEATHER.COM (May 2006),
http://vortex.accuweather.com/adc2004/pub/images/promos/florida2004/hurricane-book.pdf.
Although Hurricane Katrina reached Category 5, it was actually lower at landfall. See Na-
tional Weather Service, National Hurricane Center: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Archive,
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/KATRINA.shtml (last visited June 14, 2007) (view
links for Monday, August 29, 2005).
12. Catastrophes: Facts and Statistics, supra note 3.
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lion dollars."' 3 Of course, any major disaster could leave a legal office in
ruins, in addition to causing personal tragedy and loss for its victims.
Hurricanes are only one form of natural disaster. Tornados, earth-
quakes, wildfires, blizzards, volcanoes, landslides, mudslides, flooding, and
hailstorms also wreak havoc. Other disasters, such as tsunamis, could poten-
tially threaten the United States, though the threat, historically, has been
comparatively minor. 14
However, even a smaller tragedy, such as a lightening strike triggering a
fire, could be devastating. Because fires are vastly more numerous,' 5 they
continue to impact tens of thousands of taxpayers each year.16 For example,
while the major hurricanes of 2005 captured all of the media's attention, over
the same timeframe, the American Red Cross responded to a record 72,883
disasters, most of them fire-related. 17
Based upon these statistics, it is prudent to understand the full range of
tax relief and insurance options that might be available. The tragedy that
disrupts your law practice may not be a hurricane or even a declared national
disaster. If you fail to adequately prepare, a disaster may end your business.
Even if a disaster is not financially fatal, appreciating the tax consequences is
in every practitioner's interest.
13. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S. TSUNAMI PREPAREDNESS: FEDERAL AND
STATE PARTNERS COLLABORATE TO HELP COMMUNITIES REDUCE POTENTIAL IMPACTS, BUT
SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES REMAIN, GAO-06-519, at 11 (June 5, 2006), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06519.pdf.
14. Id. "[T]he frequency of damaging tsunamis in the United States has been low, com-
pared with other natural hazards." Id. at 10. According to the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration, the last significant tsunami struck Skagway, Alaska, in 1994, causing
"one death and $25 million in damages." Id. at 10-11.
15. On average, there have been over 1.5 million fires annually in the United States over
the past ten years. See U.S. Fire Administration, http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/statistics/national/
(last visited June 14, 2007).
16. Id.
17. Press Release, Am. Red Cross, Survey Reveals Americans Not as Prepared as They
Think (May 23, 2006), available at http://www.redcross.org/pressrelease/
0,1077,0_314_5398,00.html.
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B. Demographic and Weather Trends
The United States should expect a major catastrophic hurricane, Cate-
gory 3, 4, or 5, to make landfall every six to seven years. 18 Even weaker
storm systems can cause tremendous flood damage. 19 For example, Cate-
gory 2 hurricanes, while weaker than major catastrophic hurricanes, gener-
ally have higher moisture content and account for considerable flood dam-
age.20
Mitigation measures, predominantly improved building codes, have
helped to "harden" vulnerable property. 21 However, the lure of the coast
continues to bring more people and property into the areas most likely to be
affected by hurricanes.22 Over half of all Americans now live in coastal
counties, which is an increase of thirty-three million people since 1980.23
Because of these predictable weather profiles and demonstrated demographic
trends, the risks from hurricanes will always be present.24
III. TAx ADVICE FOR DISASTER VICTIMS
Presuming the survival and functionality of the firm or practitioner, the
next question becomes how best to help both the business itself and any cli-
18. See Eric S. Blake et al., The Deadliest, Costliest, and Most Intense United States
Tropical Cyclones from 1851 to 2005 (and Other Frequently Requested Hurricane Facts),
NAT'L WEATHER SERV., NAT'L HURRICANE CTR. (Apr. 2007), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/
pdf/NWS-TPC-5.pdf.
19. H.R. REP. No. 107-495, at 1104 (2002) (testimony of Dr. Len Pietrafesa, North Caro-
lina State University, in support of the Inland Flood Forecasting and Warning System Act of
2002).
20. Id.
21. See ROBERT P. HARTWIG, PRESENTATION TO THE WHARTON RISK MANAGEMENT AND
DECISION PROCESSES CENTER ROUNDTABLE: THE LESSONS OF HURRICANE ANDREW: IS
FLORIDA -REALLY READY? 37 (June 11, 2002), http://server.iii.org
/yy objdata/binary/68602 1_1_0/hurricanestudy.pdf.
22. For example, in the past twenty-five years, "communities along the ... East Coast
have dramatically increased development . . . despite the knowledge that a hurricane or large
tropical storm could cause significant damage to property and life." H.R. REP. No. 107-495 at
4; see also Insurance Information Institute, Hurricanes: Facts and Statistics: Leading States
in Population Growth 1980-2003 (1), http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/hurricanes/
(last visited June 14, 2007) [hereinafter Hurricanes: Facts and Statistics].
23. Hurricanes: Facts and Statistics, supra note 22 (stating that fifty-three percent of the
United States populace resided in coastal areas in 2003).
24. Forecasters have long predicted a "damaging period of frequent storms" that could
"cost more than $110 billion if it hit... New England." H.R. REP. No. 106-526, at 16 (2000)
(testimony in support of Homeowners' Insurance Availability Act of 2000); see H.R. REP. No.
107-495, at 3.
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ents who are disaster victims. For this reason, appreciating the tax conse-
quences of the disaster is doubly important. First, it allows the firm itself to
maximize its own tax relief, which is perhaps the key to survival for smaller
or less capitalized firms. Second, those firms and practitioners that survive
and rebound must be able to competently help their clients to do the same.
To address both facets, the discussion below examines individual as
well as business tax issues. It emphasizes knowledge and preparation ahead
of time to minimize and to help posture to mitigate the effects of the damage.
This advice can also be funneled to clients proactively so that they may bet-
ter plan, and then execute, their emergency plans.
A. Tax Relieffor Victims ofAll Casualties
Fortunately, the federal government has historically afforded some re-
lief to victims of all casualties. 5 Section 165 of the Internal Revenue Code
allows a tax deduction for "casualty losses.",26 A casualty loss is a loss due
to "fire, storm, shipwreck or other casualty, or from theft., 27  The "other
casualties" language has been construed by the courts to require a sudden
and unexpected loss, as opposed to a loss derived from gradual deteriora-
tion.2 s For example, flooding due to a hurricane would be a casualty, while
flooding due to worn-out pipes would not.
Section 165 entitlement is independent of any nationally declared emer-
gency.2 9 Therefore, any natural disaster, flood, or fire will be a casualty enti-
tling the taxpayer to favorable treatment under the code. 3 One disadvantage
of section 165, for individuals, is that it is only available to taxpayers who
itemize their deductions. 3' For businesses, of course, all expenses are item-
25. For an excellent discussion of the pre-2005 tax treatment of disasters, see generally
Francine J. Lipman, Anatomy of a Disaster Under the Internal Revenue Code, 6 FLA. TAx
REv. 953 (2005).
26. I.R.C. § 165(a), (c)(3) (2004 & Supp.).
27. Id. § 165(c)(3). For individuals, deductible losses must be "incurred in a trade or
business," derive from some other profit-seeking activity, or "arise from fire, storm, ship-
wreck, theft, or other casualty." Id. § 165(c).
28. See, e.g., Corbaley v. Comm'r, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1570, 1572 (1984) (aircraft crash
due to engine failure not a casualty if caused by inadequate maintenance).
29. But see I.R.C. § 165(i) (timing advantage in declared emergency).
30. See generally id. § 165.
31. See generallyid. §§ 161-199.
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ized.32 Other limitations reducing section 165's efficacy in compensating
individuals for personal IOSS 33 are similarly not applicable to businesses. 34
A disadvantage for businesses is that uninsured "loss" is confined to the
depreciated value of property that is damaged or destroyed.35 Because this
"book value" often radically understates the costs of replacement property,
the advantage to the taxpayer may not be nearly as generous as it would first
appear.
A corollary would be that insurance proceeds, based on replacement
cost, would lead to a casualty gain for the same reason. For instance, office
furniture purchased in 2002 for $10,000 and depreciated to $5,000 may cost
$15,000 to replace in 2007. If insured with replacement cost coverage, the
taxpayer would have a casualty gain of $10,000, which would be a gain on
the books only, because the $15,000 would be needed to replace the dam-
aged items. One source of relief from this dilemma would be section 1033 of
the Internal Revenue Code.36 This section allows a taxpayer to replace prop-
erty that has been involuntarily converted without recognizing any gain,37
unless the taxpayer receives cash above the amount actually reinvested.38 In
a declared emergency, the taxpayer has four years,39 versus the typical two
years,40 to secure qualifying replacement property.
Despite the statutory presumption that, unless otherwise excluded, all
accessions to wealth constitute income pursuant to section 61 of the code, 41
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has long acknowledged that welfare
42payments need not be reported as income. Disaster relief is a type of wel-
fare payment because it helps individuals and families who are put in need
based on the emergency confronting them. 43 "The assistance that a govern-
ment grants its citizens who sustain personal injury and property damage as
32. See id. § 162.
33. See id. § 165(h) (10 percent adjusted gross income reduction and $100 per casualty
reduction in the amount allowed to be deducted by individuals, unless loss is to property held
for trade, business, or investment).
34. See I.R.C. § 165(c). Damages to an individual's property used in a trade or business
(such as a sole practitioner's law practice) are not subject to these reductions. Compare id. §
165(c)(1), with id. § 165(c)(3).
35. Id. § 165(b). See generally id. §§ 1011, 1012, 1016.
36. Id. § 1033.
37. See id. § 1033(a)(1).
38. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(A).
39. Id. § 1033(a)(2)(B)(i).
40. Id. § 1033(h)(1)(B).
41. Id. § 61(a).
42. Rev. Rul. 74-205, 1974-1 C.B. 21; see also I.R.S. Notice 2002-76, 2002-2 C.B. 917
(tax-exempt grants following September 11, 2001).
43. Rev. Rul. 76-144, 1976-1 C.B. 17, 17-18.
[Vol. 31
91
: Nova Law Review 31, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
2007] TAXAND INSURANCE CONSEQUENCES OF MAJOR DISASTERS 495
the result of hurricanes, tornadoes, earth-quakes and other natural disasters is
motivated by its obligation to assist in alleviating the suffering and damage
caused by the disaster." 44 However, while government public welfare pay-
ments to individuals are tax exempt, similar relief payments to businesses are
not.45
Because of the turmoil of the moment-safeguarding family members
and trying to put lives back together-paying taxes may be the last thing on
anyone's mind. In addition, law firms and sole practitioners may be con-
fronted with lost or destroyed records. Taxpayers, whose records are lost or
who are otherwise unable to meet filing deadlines because of a natural disas-
ter, may be granted an extension by the IRS based upon "reasonable
cause." 46 The mere fact you were the victim of a disaster does not automati-
cally qualify as reasonable cause; instead, the IRS evaluates all such requests
on a case-by-case basis.47
B. Advantages for Victims of Presidentially Declared Disasters
There is more flexibility in the Internal Revenue Code for victims of
presidentially declared disasters than for victims of other casualties. 48 The
Secretary of the Treasury has discretionary authority in times of presiden-
tially declared disasters to offer a blanket extension for up to one year for
affected taxpayers to file and pay taxes.49 Compare this favorable treatment
with sections 6081 and 6161 of the code, which allow the Secretary discre-
tion to extend deadlines for "a reasonable time not to exceed six months" for
51disasters that do not result in a declared 50 disaster area.
44. Id. at 18.
45. Compare Rev. Rul. 74-205, 1974-1 C.B. 21 (social benefit program payments not
includible in income), and Rev. Rul. 76-144, 1976-1 C.B. 17 (disaster relief in interest of
general welfare-not income), and Rev. Rul. 98-19, 1998-1 C.B. 840 (relocation payments for
moving from flood-damaged residence not taxable), with Rev. Rul. 2005-46, 2005-30 I.R.B.
120 (emergency grants to businesses are not tax exempt).
46. Internal Revenue Manual 25.16.1.1 (2003), available at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/ch12s0 .html.
47. Id. For example, if a taxpayer arranged for a loan to pay taxes due on his business,
but the bank scheduled to close on the loan where the business was not open due to severe
damages, the IRS would consider abatement "using reasonable cause criteria." Id.
48. Compare I.R.C. § 7508A (2004 & Supp.), with id. §§ 6081, 6161.
49. Id. § 7508A(a).
50. "Declared" is used throughout as an equivalent to "presidentially declared." See
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707, 102
Stat. 4689 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2000 & Supp.)). Both relate to areas de-
clared by the president to be National Disaster Areas pursuant to section 401 of the Stafford
Act. Id. at § 401, 102 Stat. at 4696.
92
Nova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol31/iss3/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31
The code also allows other advantages for victims of presidentially de-
clared tragedies. 52 For example, section 7508A allows the Secretary discre-
tion to disregard deadlines for filing and payment of taxes in declared disas-
ter areas.53 It states:
In the case of a taxpayer determined by the Secretary to be af-
fected by a Presidentially declared disaster ... the Secretary may
specify a period of up to one year that may be disregarded in de-
termining... [whether filing or payment of tax]54 were performed
within the time prescribed ... the amount of any interest, penalty,
additional amount, or addition to the tax ... [and] the amount of
any credit or refund.55
These extensions are then automatic for affected taxpayers in the de-
clared disaster region.56 In addition to the obvious advantage of additional
time pursuant to this relief, the IRS has been empowered to forgive interest
and penalties whenever such relief is granted.57 For taxpayers who fail to
qualify as "affected taxpayers" or who are outside declared disaster areas,
51. I.R.C. § 6161(a)(1); see also id. § 6081 (discretion to extend filing any time based on
reasonable cause).
52. See, e.g., id. § 1033(h) (favorable treatment of insurance proceeds and doubling of
time to replace involuntarily converted property). See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying
text.
53. See I.R.C. § 7508A.
54. Id. § 7508A(a)(1) specifically allows the following relief when time is disregarded:
(A) Filing any return of income, estate,.., gift tax, [employment, or excise tax];
(B) Payment of any income, estate,.., gift tax, [employment, or excise tax] ... or
any installment thereof or of any other liability to the United States in respect
thereof;
(C) Filing a petition with the Tax Court for redetermination of a deficiency, or for
review of a decision rendered by the Tax Court;
(D) Allowance of a credit or refund of any tax;
(E) Filing a claim for credit or refund of any tax;
(F) Bringing suit upon any such claim for credit or refund;
(G) Assessment of any tax;
(H) Giving or making any notice or demand for the payment of any tax, or with re-
spect to any liability to the United States in respect of any tax;
(I) Collection, by the Secretary, by levy or otherwise, of the amount of any liability
in respect of any tax;
(J) Bringing suit by the United States, or any officer on its behalf, in respect of any
liability in respect of any tax; and
(K) Any other act required or permitted under the internal revenue laws specified
by the Secretary.
Id. § 7508A(a)(1)(A)-(K).
55. Id. § 7508A(a) (emphasis added).
56. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
57. Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA), I.R.C. § 7508(a)(1).
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there is no authority to forgive interest, and the IRS will consider abatement
of late payment penalties on a case-by-case basis.58
The authority to disregard time under section 7508A offers important
additional procedural protections. 59 Perhaps most critical for a tax practitio-
ner, it extends the time to file a petition with the Tax Court and to file a
claim for a refund or credit, or any other act required or permitted "under the
internal revenue laws."6 °
Section 165(i) allows another substantial advantage to victims of de-
clared disasters-an "[e]lection to take the deduction" for casualty losses in
the immediately preceding tax year. 6' The benefit of this preference is two-
fold. Obviously, taking the election affords earlier tax relief for the loss.
Additionally, allowing the taxpayer the option to choose the year to take the
deduction allows the taxpayer the benefit of selecting the tax year that yields
a better result. The preceding tax year may well reflect greater income due
to the lack of catastrophic interruption; therefore, relief for the earlier period
may well be from a higher marginal tax rate.
After the terrorist bombings of September 11, 2001, section 139 was
promulgated to codify that recipients are not taxed on "qualified disaster
relief payment[s]. 62  However, this section only applies to relief payments
made to individuals.63 Thus, any disaster relief granted to businesses would
be includable as income.
64
C. Additional Tax Relief Following Specific National Disasters
Congress and the IRS have acted on an ad hoc basis in the past in af-
fording tax relief to victims of disaster. This section captures some of the
more predictable responses (time extensions to file and pay taxes), as well as
the more generous breaks that have accompanied some tragedies. It is not
intended as an exhaustive discussion; rather, this section will provide insight
58. See id; I.R.C. §§ 6081, 6161, 6601, 7508A.
59. See id. § 7508A(a).
60. Id.
61. Id. § 165(i)(1). The election is irrevocable after ninety days. 26 C.F.R. § 1.165-11(e)
(2006).
62. I.R.C. § 139(a) (added by Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-134, § 111, 115 Stat. 2427, 2432 (2002)). Qualified disasters include presidentially de-
clared disasters, disasters from terrorist or military activity, disasters resulting from accidents
involving common carriers, or other events determined by the Secretary to be catastrophic. Id.
§ 139(c)(1)-(3). Amounts paid by federal, state, or local governments determined to warrant
assistance are also not taxable. Id. § 139(c)(4).
63. Id. § 139(a).
64. See Rev. Rul. 2005-46, 2005-2 C.B. 120, 122 (emergency grants to businesses are not
tax exempt).
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into the spectrum of tax relief that has been afforded, at times in the past, and
to suggest that tax relief has, at times, been more creative and substantial in
the recent past. 
65
As noted above, under section 6081, the Secretary may extend the dead-
line for filing a return for a reasonable amount of time.66 The deadline for
payment of taxes due may similarly be extended "for a reasonable period not
to exceed [six] months. ' '67 The IRS used this authority to grant automatic tax
relief to victims of Hurricane Hugo,68 Hurricane Andrew,69 and Hurricane
Iniki. 70 To qualify for this blanket extension, taxpayers had to be affected by
the disaster.71 Taxpayers alerted the IRS that they were affected by writing
72the name of the disaster on the top of their tax return. Taxpayers with an
address within the disaster area were presumed to be affected; other taxpay-
ers needed to submit a short statement of how the hurricanes "adversely af-
fected their ability to meet their tax obligations. 73
Although no tax relief was provided by Congress to the victims of Hur-
ricane Hugo, Congress extended explicit tax relief to the victims of Hurri-
canes Andrew and Iniki.74 It also retroactively afforded tax relief to victims
of all presidentially-declared disasters after September 1, 1991. 75 The new
law allowed victims of declared emergencies four years versus two years to
replace their home and its scheduled contents without recognizing a taxable
gain.76 Congress also created tax advantages for insured individuals to the
65. For a more detailed discussion of the tax relief related to each of the disasters in this
section, see generally Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., The Flurry of Tax Law Changes Following the
2005 Hurricanes: A Strategy for More Equitable Tax Treatment of Victims, 72 BROOK. L.
REv. 799 (2007).
66. I.R.C. § 6081(a).
67. Id. § 6161(a)(1). The limit may be longer for persons abroad and is twelve months
for estate tax payments. Id.
68. I.R.S. Notice 89-136, 1989-2 C.B. 451, 451-52.
69. I.R.S. Notice 92-40, 1992-2 C.B. 371, 371-72.
70. I.R.S. Notice 92-44, 1992-2 C.B. 373, 375.
71. See id.; supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
72. I.R.S. Notice 92-44, 1992-2 C.B. at 375; I.R.S. Notice 92-40, 1992-2 C.B. at 372;
I.R.S. Notice 89-136, 1989-2 C.B. at 452.
73. Id.
74. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, I.R.C. § 1033(h)(1) (1996).
75. Id. § 1033(h)(2). This benefit included victims of Hurricane Andrew, Hurricane Iniki
(the worst hurricane to strike the Hawaiian Islands in a century), any other declared disasters
occurring in 1992, and all subsequent disasters. See Proclamation No. 6491, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,
553 (Oct. 14, 1992).
76. I.R.C. § 1033(h)(1)(B).
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extent their unscheduled contents were destroyed-involuntarily con-
verted-as a result of a declared disaster."
Changes granting identical treatment to businesses followed many years
later.78 The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 extended the four-
year replacement period in declared disaster areas to property held for a trade
or business. 79 Therefore, any business property-real or personal-is now
subject to the same favorable tax treatment when the property destroyed is in
a declared disaster area. 80 This authority would allow a law firm to rebuild
on the same site or to relocate its practice to another area within the four-year
window without recognizing any gain on the involuntary conversion.8'
In addition to substantive tax relief following Hurricanes Andrew and
Iniki, the IRS announced that it would expedite review of applications for tax
exempt status by groups newly formed to aid the disaster victims. 82 The IRS
also indicated it would not raise issues concerning approved charitable or-
ganizations that might otherwise affect an organization's qualification for tax
exempt status-such as an organization rendering assistance in good faith to
its own employees who were victims of the disasters. 83 Finally, for desig-
nated counties and parishes impacted by Hurricane Andrew, the IRS pro-
vided relief from certain low income housing credit requirements.
84
After Hurricane Andrew, the Northridge Earthquake was the most
costly U.S. natural disaster before Hurricane Katrina.85 On January 17,
1994, this earthquake, which measured 6.8 on the Richter scale, "jolted the
San Fernando Valley, Dust] 20 miles northwest of downtown Los Ange-
77. Id. § 1033(h)(1)(A). The IRS interpreted this provision generously for the taxpayer.
See generally Rev. Rul. 95-22, 1995-1 C.B. 145, 145-46 (excluding from income all gain on
nonscheduled personal property).
78. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, §1119, 110
Stat. 1755, 756.
79. Id. at § 1119(b) (referring to I.R.C. §1033(h)(1)(B)).
80. Id. at § 1119(a).
81. See id.
82. I.R.S. Announcement 92-140, 1992-41 I.R.B. 75 (referring to Hurricane Iniki relief);
I.R.S. Announcement 92-128, 1992-38 I.R.B. 42 (referring to Hurricane Andrew relief).
83. I.R.S. Notice 92-45, 1992-2 C.B. 375.
84. I.R.S. Notice 92-43, 1992-2 C.B. 373 (authorizing relief from carryover allocations
under I.R.C. § 42(h)(1)(E) and recapture under § 42(j)(4)(E)).
85. ROBERT P. HARTWIG, HURRICANE SEASON OF 2005: IMPACTS ON US P/C INSURANCE
MARKETS IN 2006 & BEYOND 13 (2006),
http://server.iii.org/yyobjdata/binary/744085_1_0/katrina.pdf [hereinafter HARTWIG,
HURRICANE SEASON].
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les."86  The Northridge Earthquake "caus[ed] more than 60 deaths [and]
12,000 injuries." 87  It destroyed 8,000 homes and damaged more than
114,000 buildings. 88  According to the Insurance Information Institute, it
caused $15.3 billion in insured losses.89
Congress provided no tax relief to the earthquake disaster victims. 9
Perhaps because such a low percentage of the buildings damaged were
homes, Congress felt less sympathy for business and other property loss.9
In any event, the IRS response was also less pronounced.92 The quake relief
was less extensive than the relief to the 1992 hurricane victims.93 Like the
1992 relief, the IRS granted extensions of time to file and pay taxes, but in-
stead of a six month extension, the extension was only for ten calendar
days.94 The IRS also suspended normal collection and examination actions
for two weeks-versus thirty days for affected taxpayers in the 1992 hurri-
cane disaster areas.95 Finally, the IRS announced that it would expedite re-
view of applications for tax exempt status by groups newly formed to aid the
disaster victims, and it would "not raise certain issues" concerning charitable
organizations that might affect an organization's tax exempt status.
96
Following Hurricane Andrew, Hurricane Iniki, and the Northridge
Earthquake, the states of Florida, California, and Hawaii intervened to pre-
vent a near total collapse of their respective insurance markets. 97 Perhaps
these state bail-outs averted the need for serious discussion of federal tax
86. Insurance Information Institute, Hot Topics & Issues Updates, Catastrophes: Insur-
ance Issues, http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/xxx (last visited June 14, 2007)
[hereinafter Catastrophes: Insurance Issues].
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. See Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, supra note 86.
92. Id.
93. Compare id., with I.R.S. Announcement 92-128, 1992-38 I.R.B. 42.
94. I.R.S. News Release IR-94-5 (Jan. 19, 1994) ("IRS Offices to Provide Disaster Tax
Assistance"). Taxpayers were directed to mark the return: "LA EARTHQUAKE." Id.
95. I.R.S. News Release IR-92-88 (Aug. 28, 1992); I.R.S. News Release IR-92-91 (Sept.
16, 1992).
96. I.R.S. Notice 94-15, 1994-1 C.B. 337, 337 (2000).
97. See H.R. REP. No. 106-526, at 15 (2006). Other risk-prone states lacking state insur-
ance programs saw "applications to state FAIR (Fair Access Insurance Requirements) plans
and beach plans (so-called markets of last resort for homeowners' insurance which generally
provide less coverage at a greater price) increased dramatically during the last half of the
1990s." Id. at 16.
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relief. In any event, other than the limited relief discussed above, no tax re-
lief was spawned by these major tragedies. 98
Compared with the limited tax relief to victims of earlier natural disas-
ters, Congress was quick to authorize federal tax relief for the victims of the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.9 The Victims of Terrorism Tax
Relief Act of 2001100 granted the victims of these atrocities substantial
tax relief, including-among other things-relief from income taxes at
a minimum of $10,000;10 "exclusion of certain death benefits;"' 10 2 "estate tax
reduction;" ' 3 "exclusion of disaster relief payments;"" and, "exclusion of
certain cancellations of indebtedness." ' 5  It also allowed "payments by
charitable organizations [to be] treated as exempt payments." ' 6 Finally, the
Act delegated authority to the IRS to postpone certain deadlines for up to one
year in cases of natural disaster, military, or terrorist attack. 
07
In addition to tax relief for individual victims, another Act also created
a "New York Liberty Zone" with substantial tax advantages for Liberty Zone
businesses. 108  These benefits included employment credits; 0 9 bonus and
98. See Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, supra note 86. Perhaps the most notable by-
product of Hurricane Andrew was the call for better building codes and better enforcement of
existing codes. Id.
99. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, § 105(a)(1), 115
Stat. 2427, 2432 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the I.R.C.).
100. Id.
101. Id. § 101(a) (codified at I.R.C. § 692(d)(2) (2004 & Supp.)). The IRS allowed full
abatement of all tax liability for tax years 2000 and 2001 for victims killed in the attacks.
I.R.S. News Release IR-2002-07 (Jan. 23, 2002). At the same time, the IRS forgave the tax
liability for 1994 and 1995 for the victims of the Oklahoma City bombing. Id.
102. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, § 102, 115 Stat.
at 2429 (codified at I.R.C. § 101).
103. Id. § 103 (codified at I.R.C. § 2201).
104. Id. § 111 (codified at I.R.C. § 139). "[Section] 139(b)(4) codifies ... [the] general
welfare exclusion for qualified disaster relief payments to individuals." I.R.S. Notice 2002-
76, 2002-2 C.B. 917, 918. "Because of the extraordinary circumstances surrounding [such
disasters], [the IRS] anticipate[s] that individuals will not be required to account for actual
expenses" so long as the amount of relief is commensurate with the anticipated expenses
incurred. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
105. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, § 105, 115 Stat. at 2432 (codified at
I.R.C. § 108).
106. Id. § 104, 115 Stat. at 2431 (codified at I.R.C. § 501).
107. Id. § 112, 115 Stat. at 2431 (codified at I.R.C. § 7508A) (increased from 120 days).
108. Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, § 301, 116
Stat. 21, 33 (codified at I.R.C. § 1400L). "'New York Liberty Zone' means the area located
on or south of Canal Street, East Broadway (east of its intersection with Canal Street), or
Grand Street (east of its intersection with East Broadway) in the Borough of Manhattan in the
City of New York, New York." I.R.C. § 1400L(h). Liberty Zone businesses are those em-
ploying no more than 200 employees which rebuilt in the footprint of the terrorist bombings of
98
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accelerated depreciation and increased expensing for qualified Liberty Zone
property; 1 ° tax exempt bond advantages;' and, an extension from two to
five years for not recognizing gains for property involuntarily converted
(where replacement property was in the Liberty Zone). 112 Some of the tax
advantages for individuals and businesses foreshadowed a similar Congres-
sional response to the massive 2005 hurricane disasters. 113
After 9/11, Congress extended the IRS authority to "disregard" time
under section 7508A from 120 days to one year. 114 The IRS was also em-
powered to waive interest, as well as penalties, when disregarding time."l 5
These important provisions are now part of the statutory framework protect-
ing disaster victims in declared emergencies. 
116
Despite the high number of hurricanes in 2004-Charley, Ivan, Frances,
and Jeanne-and the magnitude of the damages they caused, Congress af-
forded no tax relief to victims. 117 The IRS, however, used its discretion to
disregard time and extend time for filing and payment of taxes. 118 Although
September 11, 2001 (commonly thought of as ground zero), as well as any businesses dam-
aged or destroyed by the attacks that relocated anywhere else within New York City. See id. §
1400L(a)(2)(C).
109. See I.R.C. § 1400L(a)(2)(D); see also id. § 51.
110. See id § 1400L(b)(2)(C); see also id. § 168(k).
111. See generally id. § 1400L(d)-(e).
112. See I.R.C. § 1400L(g).
113. Compare id. § 1400L, with I.R.S. Notice 2001-61, 2001-2 C.B. 305, 305-07.
114. I.R.S. Notice 2001-61, 2001-2 C.B. at 306. Earlier in 2001, in response to the New
Mexico wildfires, the IRS had similarly construed its authority under code section 7508A to
run consecutively (versus concurrently) with its extension authorities under sections 6081 and
6161. I.R.S. Notice 2001-30, 2001-1 C.B. 989, 989-90.
115. See I.R.S. Notice 2002-40, 2002-1 C.B. 1152, 1152. This notice is based on new
authority from the Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001. Id.; see also Victims of
Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, § 112, 115 Stat. 2427, 2433-34
(2002).
116. See generally I.R.C. § 1400.
117. But cf Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA), Pub. L. No. 109-73, §
403(a), 119 Stat. 2016, 2027 (providing tax relief to victims of Hurricane Katrina).
118. While it was, at that time, the most expensive ever, the widespread loss in 2004 did
not lead to any federal legislative tax relief. See Blake et al., supra note 18. There was a
flurry of IRS activity. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2004-76, 2004-2 C.B. 878, 878 (relief from
certain requirements due to Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne); I.R.S. Notice
2004-62, 2004-2 C.B. 565, 565 (additional relief for areas affected by Tropical Storm Bonnie,
and Hurricanes Charley and Frances); I.R.S. News Release IR-2004-115 (Sept. 10, 2004)
(extending time to file and pay taxes for Hurricane Frances); I.R.S. News Release IR-2004-
108 (Aug. 16, 2004) (extending time to file and pay taxes for areas affected by Tropical Storm
Bonnie and Hurricane Charley). The IRS granted extensions of time to file and pay taxes;
relief from deadlines involved in section 1031 like-kind exchange transactions; and, a suspen-
sion of the income limitations (ordinarily required for occupants of low-income housing) to
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massive IRS activity was the norm again in 2005, this time Congress was
awakened by the devastation and stepped in with the most comprehensive tax
relief ever for victims of natural disasters. 1 9 This flurry of activity is the
subject of the next section.
D. The Post-Katrina High Water Mark for Tax Relief
The Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA) was signed
by President Bush and became law on September 23, 2005.120 KETRA con-
tained important tax benefits both for individuals and for businesses. 12 1 Title
I crafted special rules for using retirement funds. 12 2 Title II allowed em-
ployment relief. 123 Title III contained incentives for charity and Title IV
created miscellaneous additional benefits. 124 These benefits are discussed in
detail in the sections that follow. The cumulative benefit was significant, as
KETRA was estimated to cost the federal government $6.1 billion in fore-
gone tax revenue. 125
KETRA opened the door to wide-ranging tax relief for hurricane vic-
tims. 126 Following the continued devastation wrought by Hurricanes Rita
and Wilma over the ensuing weeks, Congress passed additional tax relief
legislation. 127 The Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 (GO Zone Act) was
passed on December 15, 2005, and signed into law on December 21, 2005.128
allow landlords of such property to provide temporary lodging to individuals displaced by
Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne. I.R.S. Notice 2004-76, 2004-2 C.B. at 878;
see also I.R.S. Notice 2005-3, 2005-1 C.B. 447, 447; I.R.S. Notice 2004-74, 2004-2 C.B. 875,
875; I.R.S. Notice 2004-75, 2004-2 C.B. 876, 876 (relief in Ohio due to post-hurricane severe
storms and flooding); I.R.S. News Release IR-2004-118 (Sept. 22, 2004).
119. See infra part D.
120. See KETRA, Pub. L. No. 109-73, 119 Stat. 2016 (codified in scattered sections of the
I.R.C.).
121. See generally id.
122. See generally id. §§ 101-104.
123. See generally id. §§ 201-202.
124. See generally id. §§ 301-306,401-407.
125. DAVID L. BRUMBAUGH, MAJOR TAX ISSUES IN THE 109TH CONGRESS, CRS REPORT
FOR CONGRESS 9 (May 22, 2006), available at
http://www.house.gov/english/pdf/majortaxissues.pdf.
126. See generally KETRA, § 403(a), 119 Stat. at 2027.
127. Before Rita had struck, the president had announced a desire to create an opportunity
zone for redevelopment, and Congress was working to pass such legislation. U.S. Senate
Committee on Finance, Remarks of Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa (Sept. 12, 2005), avail-
able at http://www.senate.gov/-finance/press/Gpress/2005/prg09l205.pdf. "We're looking at
depreciation changes, tax-exempt bond authority, [tax-exempt bond finding], and enterprise-
zone initiatives." Id.
128. Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-135, 119 Stat. 2577, 2642.
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The tax relief for those affected by the later hurricanes was packaged with
more far-reaching relief for those affected by Hurricane Katrina.
The core disaster area for Hurricane Katrina was renamed the "Gulf
Opportunity Zone," or "GO Zone,"1 29 and similar tax advantaged areas were
established for the victims of Hurricanes Rita and Wilma-the "Rita GO
Zone"'130 and "Wilma GO Zone." 131 As with the initial KETRA relief, only
those areas "determined by the President to warrant individual or individual
and public assistance from the Federal Government" qualified for special GO
Zone tax benefits. 132
This layered scheme of relief, with KETRA at times supplemented by
and at times superseded by the GO Zone Act, is complex and confusing. It
also created disparate tax treatment.1 33  Those within the "GO Zone"
(Katrina victims) were afforded some benefits not shared by those in the
"Rita GO Zone" or "Wilma GO Zone ' 3- .or example, Congress provided
an enhanced education tax credit, for tax years 2005 and 2006, for students
who attended educational institutions in the (Katrina) GO Zone. 135 A variety
of economic stimuli were also uniquely targeted to the victims of Katrina's
devastation.1 36 This article does not detail the disparities in treatment be-
tween the victims of the various 2005 disasters; 137 rather, it looks at the
range of tax remedies that Congress unleashed to try to deal with the after-
math of the disasters. The following sections summarize the significant tax
relief remedies from the 2005 legislation.
1. Statutory Extensions to File and Pay Taxes
Congress required the Secretary of the Treasury to extend inter alia the
period for filing and payment of taxes to all taxpayers in the three declared
disaster areas, "for a period ending not earlier than February 28, 2006. ''I38
While the IRS could, and ultimately did, "disregard" a year under code sec-
129. I.R.C. § 1400M(1) (2004 & Supp.).
130. Id. § 1400M(3).
131. Id. § 1400M(5).
132. Id. § 1400M(1), (3), (5).
133. Id.
134. Note, some of the victims of Hurricane Katrina were also victims of Hurricane Rita;
if they qualify for individual or individual and public relief due to Katrina, these measures
protect them. See I.R.C. § 1400M(1).
135. See id. § 14000.
136. See infra notes 155-77 and accompanying text.
137. For such an analysis, see Tolan, Jr., supra note 65.
138. I.R.C. § 1400S(c).
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tion 7508A,139 KETRA represented the first time Congress had usurped this
discretionary authority. For the future, if a catastrophe is sufficiently tragic
or widespread, Congress may again be prompted to act, because there is no
reason to expect that loss of records and inability to timely prepare and file
returns will not ensue.
2. Enhanced Retirement Account Access
Special rules for use of retirement funds first adopted in KETRA were
extended to also include individuals who sustained economic loss from Hur-
ricanes Rita and Wilma.'40 Victims whose primary residences were located
in the designated disaster areas were authorized to withdraw, without pen-
alty, up to $100,000 from an eligible retirement plan. 141
Under this authority, individuals may prorate income over three
years,142 repay within three years (and characterize the distribution as a roll-
over),143 or, if preferred, borrow up to $100,000 from their employer retire-
ment savings plan and repay the sum within five years.144 Such flexibility
allows people to borrow from themselves without penalty at a time when
they are most desperate for funds. Despite pension reform and congressional
efforts to relax some of the IRA rules in 2006, Congress did not make access
to retirement accounts for disaster victims a permanent part of the code. 1
45
3. Improved Casualty Loss Deduction and Other Deductions
Those suffering casualty losses attributable to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita,
or Wilma were allowed relief from the ten percent AGI and $100 reductions
on casualty losses under code section 165.146 The dates of the losses neces-
sarily needed to correspond to the periods after the respective hurricanes
made landfall. 1
47
139. Id. § 7508A.
140. See id. § 1400Q.
141. Id. § 1400Q(a); Section 402(c)(8)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code defines an eligi-
ble retirement plan. Id. § 402(c)(8)(B).
142. I.R.C. § 1400Q(a)(5).
143. Id. § 1400Q(a)(3)(A).
144. Id. § 1400Q(c).
145. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-280, § 1201(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1063
(codified at I.R.C. § 408(d)(8)) (allowing tax exempt distributions for charitable donation);
Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2004, Pub. L. 109-432, §307(a), 120 Stat. 2922, 2951
(codified at I.R.C. § 408(d)(9)) (allowing tax-free one-time IRA distribution to fund Health
Savings Account).
146. I.R.C. § 165(h)(1); see also id. § 1400S(b).
147. Id. § 1400S(b).
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Special rules for determining earned income related to the Earned In-
come Credit and the refundable component of the Child Tax Credit were
likewise afforded to "qualified individuals" in all three disaster areas. 148 To
qualify, the victims had to either be displaced from their principal place of
abode by the hurricane, or had to qualify for individual or individual and
public assistance from the federal government. 1
49
4. Improved Deductibility of Charitable Donations
As an incentive for charitable donations, Congress lifted the ceiling on
charitable deductions. 15 ° The ceiling is typically ten percent of a corporate
taxpayer's taxable income.51 or one-half of an individual taxpayer's adjusted
gross income. 152 KETRA and the GO Zone Act broadly enhanced charitable
giving incentives. 153 To enjoy relief from the limitations on charitable giv-
ing, corporate taxpayers were allowed to make contributions in 2005 to relief
efforts supporting any of the three 2005 hurricanes.154 Individual taxpayers
enjoyed tax relief, so long as cash donations were made after August 28,
2005, and before December 31, 2005, regardless of whether the donations
were linked to hurricane relief. 
55
Other changes beneficial to charity were also conceived. The mileage
rate for charitable use of a vehicle in 2005 hurricane relief efforts was sub-
stantially increased. 56 In the alternative, reimbursement for charitable use
of a vehicle to provide Hurricane Katrina relief was excluded from in-
come. 157 Donors of books to public schools were given explicit relief from
downward adjustments of the deduction (to offset capital gains, as required
148. Id. § 1400S(d)(2)(B), (C), (D).
149. Id.
150. Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA), Pub. L. No. 109-73, § 301,
119 Stat. 2016, 2022; see I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (limiting most charitable deductions to 50%
of the taxpayer's contribution base); id. § 170(b)(1)(B)(i) (limiting other charitable deductions
to 30% of the taxpayer's contribution base). Ordinarily, excess donations may be carried
forward for the next five years. Id. § 170(b)(1)(B)(ii).
151. I.R.C. § 170(b)(2)(A).
152. See id. § 170(b)(1)(A), (B). The taxpayer's contribution base is adjusted gross in-
come computed without regard to any net operating loss carryback. Id. § 170(b)(1)(F); see
also id. § 172. KETRA also excluded qualifying contributions from itemized deductions for
purposes of the overall limitations in section 68 of the code. KETRA, § 301(c), 119 Stat. at
2023; see I.R.C. § 68.
153. I.R.C. § 1400S(a).
154. Id. § 1400S(a)(4)(A)(ii).
155. Id. § 1400S(a)(4)(A)(i).
156. Compare id. § 170(i) (fourteen cents per mile), with KETRA, § 303, 119 Stat. at 2024
(70% of standard business rate-yielding thirty-two cents per mile).
157. KETRA, § 304, 119 Stat. at 2024.
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by section 170(e) of the Internal Revenue Code). 158 Finally, businesses were
encouraged to donate food inventory before December 31, 2005. "9
5. GO Zone Business Relief
While many of the GO Zone business tax incentives would not be help-
ful to rebuilding a law practice, 160 employee retention credits 16 1 and the other
measures explained here may be significant. Of course, these benefits are all
limited to the victims of the 2005 hurricanes. For future mega-disasters,
however, Congress could allow similar relief.
Employee retention credits were created to motivate employers to retain
employees in the disaster areas. These credits were extended to eligible em-
ployers in the Hurricane Katrina GO Zone, 162 the Hurricane Rita GO
Zone, 163 and the Hurricane Wilma GO Zone. 164 The credit was made avail-
able to large and small businesses alike. 1
65
For employers meeting the geographic requirements, the tax relief is
very similar to the Work Opportunity Tax Credit in section 51 of the Internal
Revenue Code. 66 The qualifying business can claim a 40% tax credit of the
first $6,000 for each retained employee. 167 For a company retaining a large
number of workers, the relief could be substantial. For example, a company
retaining 100 workers could potentially claim a $240,000 credit.' 68  Of
course, a credit is much more valuable than a deduction since it directly off-
158. Id. § 306, 119 Stat. at 2025. While undoubtedly prompted by the need to restock
public school books following Katrina, tax relief was not limited to donations to those affected
by Hurricane Katrina. Id. However, the December 31, 2005, termination eliminates its utility
for future crisis situations. Id. § 306(a)(iv), 119 Stat. at 2026.
159. Id. § 305(a)(iv), 119 Stat. at 2025. The limitation on contributions of food inventory
is up to 10% of the business' aggregate income. KETRA, § 305(a)(ii), 119 Stat. at 2025.
160. While $700 million in new market tax credits were created to redevelop the GO
Zone, credits were available only to qualified community development agencies making quali-
fied low-income community investments. Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005, I.R.C. §§
1400M-T. As a possible indirect benefit, Congress authorized nearly $8 billion in tax-exempt
bonds for construction in the disaster of residential rental projects, nonresidential real prop-
erty, or public utilities in the GO Zone. Id. § 1400N(a)-(b).
161. Id. § 1400R.
162. Id. §§ 1400M(2), 1400R(a).
163. Id. §§ 1400M(3), 1400R(b).
164. I.R.C. §§ 1400M(5), 1400R(c).
165. Initially, under KETRA, the relief was only available for small businesses. Compare
Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA), Pub. L. No. 109-73, § 202(c), 119 Stat.
2016, 2022, with Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005, I.R.C. § 1400R.
166. I.R.C. § 51 (2004).
167. Id. § 1400R(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1).
168. (40% x $6,000 = $2,400) x 100 - $240,000.
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sets tax liability. In this example, the $240,000 credit would be equivalent to
a deduction of $685,714 for a corporation in the 35% tax bracket. 169
The credit amount is, however, limited to "qualified wages" paid after
the business became inoperable, but before the business resumed significant
operations. 170 Thus, if a business was only shut down for two days and pay-
roll to each eligible employee was $100 per day, the credit would only be
$8,000, versus the $240,000 potential credit described above. 17 1 This addi-
tional restriction is sensible given the circumstances, because it prevents a
business only incidentally impacted from receiving a windfall.
It is also interesting to note that the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, an
incentive to employers to hire members of disadvantaged groups,1 72 was
offered to those hiring Hurricane Katrina employees (including displaced
employees), but was not extended to employers hiring those affected by the
later hurricanes. 173  This may reflect a concern that Katrina victims were
more disadvantaged or more displaced than those of the later hurricanes or it
may be that Congress later decided to restrict the advantage exclusively to
employers within the relief areas.
Special depreciation allowances were established for GO Zone property
placed into service from August 28, 2005, through the end of 2007 (2008 for
nonresidential real property and residential rental property). 174 Half of the
adjusted basis of the property can be written off the first year, plus ordinary
depreciation can then be taken on the remaining half. 175 Code section 179
limits were also increased for the GO Zone by up to $100,000.176 Section
179 establishes a limit for the maximum cost of capital property (otherwise
required to be depreciated over time) that can be deducted in the immediate
tax year as a current expense. 177
In a similar vein, taxpayers in all three GO Zones may elect to take up
to fifty percent of any GO Zone clean-up cost as a deduction for the taxable
year in which the cost is incurred. 178 They can also deduct one hundred per-
169. $240,000/.35 = $685,714.29.
170. I.R.C. § 1400R(a)(2)(C), (b)(2)(C), (c)(2)(C).
171. ($100 x 2 days)(100 employees) = $20,000 x 40% credit = $8,000.
172. I.R.C. § 51.
173. See Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA), Pub. L. No. 109-73, §
201, 119 Stat. 2016, 2020. Katrina employees were identified as members of a targeted group
under section 51 for purposes of this credit; the deadline for hiring displaced workers was
December 31, 2005. Id. § 201(b)(2), 119 Stat. at 2021.
174. Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005, I.R.C §§ 1400M-T (2004 & Supp.).
175. Id.
176. Id. § 1400N(e).
177. Id.
178. Id. § 1400N(f).
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cent of any environmental remediation costs, including remediation of haz-
ardous substances as well as petroleum products, in the year clean-up costs
are incurred. 179 To qualify for either of these special provisions, the clean-up
must be conducted before December 31, 2007. 180
Finally, instead of the typical two-year carryback period for net operat-
ing losses (pursuant to section 172(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code), the
act allows a five-year carryback for any qualified GO Zone loss.' 8 ' This
period is the same period as the net operating losses carryback after 9/11,
when Congress was trying to jumpstart the economy, 82 and is two years
more generous than the net operating losses carryback period allowed for
casualty losses for individuals or for any size business under section 165 of
the code.' 83 Like the preceding relief, the increased flexibility is also ac-
companied by substantive tax advantages. Here, the longer carryback period
may enable a taxpayer to offset income in a tax year that would otherwise be
unreachable. 1
84
6. Housing Credit for Displaced Individuals
Perhaps the most novel 2005 tax relief was the creation of a new ex-
emption for housing displaced hurricane victims. A $500 exemption was
created for tax years 2005 or 2006 for each Katrina victim taken in.'8 5 The
maximum reduction of income for any taxpayer is limited to $2000 (four
displaced persons). 186 Relief is restricted to situations where the taxpayer
does not receive rent from the displaced individual-or any other amount
from any source-in connection with providing the housing.187 Also, the
displaced individual cannot be the spouse or dependent of the taxpayer. 
88
GO Zone measures also included tax relief for situations involving em-
ployer-provided housing. 189 Qualified employees were allowed to exclude
179. I.R.C. § 1400N(g).
180. Id. § 1400N(f), (g).
181. Id. § 1400N(k).
182. Id. § 172(b)(1)(H).
183. Id. § 172(b)(l)(F). Note that the net operating loss carryback for small businesses in
a declared disaster area is also three years (versus two) for any operating loss, not just those
losses due to the casualty. I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(F)(ii)(II).
184. The entire net operating loss is carried to the earliest of the taxable years to which
such loss may be carried. I.R.C. § 172(b)(l)(F)(i).
185. Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA), Pub. L. No. 109-73, § 302(a),
119 Stat. 2016, 2023.
186. Id. § 302(b)(1).
187. Id. § 302(c)(3).
188. Id. § 302(c). There is no restriction on other relatives. Id.
189. See I.R.C. § 1400P(a), (b), (f) (2004 & Supp.).
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from gross income up to $600 of the value of lodging provided by their em-
ployer from January 1, 2006, through July 1, 2006. 19o Additionally, the em-
ployer was allowed a tax credit of "30 percent of any amount which is ex-
cludable from the gross income of a qualified employee."' 9'
IV. IDENTIFYING AND ELIMINATING ExPoSURE TO DISASTER
A. Insurance Challenges
1. Coverage Inadequacies (Type and Amount)
Individuals and businesses have used insurance to protect against finan-
cial perils for hundreds of years. 192 Standard insurance typically protects
against fires, vandalism, burglary, theft, or storm activity.' 93 However, in-
surance against water damage from storms has been seriously limited.
194
Most policies contain an express flood exclusion. 195 However, catastrophic
damage from hurricanes often results from flood damage due to the storm
surge and heavy rains. 196 Consequently, many do not have the right types of
insurance coverage.' 97
Unfortunately, many disaster victims find out too late that they lack the
proper flood insurance. Historically, floods have been "one of the most de-
structive national hazards facing the people of the United States."', 98 For
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (1 Wall.) 1, 30-33 (1870) (discussing evolu-
tion of maritime insurance over the past ten centuries).
193. See generally National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2000 &
Supp.); see also Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, supra note 86.
194. Policies typically insure against some severe weather damage, such as wind and hail
coverage, but exclude flood and storm surge damage. See, e.g., Leonard v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684, 695-96 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (policy precluded damage from
flooding and storm surge during Hurricane Katrina, but covered damage caused by wind).
The Insurance Information Issues indicates a typical homeowner's policy contains a provision
stating "[w]e do not pay for loss to the interior of a building or to personal property inside,
caused by rain, snow, sleet, sand, or dust unless the wind or hail first damages the roof or
walls and the wind forces rain, snow, sleet, sand, or dust through the opening." HARTWIG,
HURRICANE SEASON, supra note 85, at 145.
195. See id. at 146.
196. For example, Hurricane Katrina damages, due to storm surge and flooding, were
estimated at $44 billion, compared to $38 billion for all other property damage. HARTWIG,
HURRICANE SEASON, supra note 85, at 36, 48.
197. For a discussion regarding problems arising in litigation concerning the flood exclu-
sion, see infra part IV.A.2.
198. S. REP. No. 93-583 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3217, 3218 (mandating
coverage of federally-backed housing loans in flood hazard areas).
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decades, Congress has been "acutely aware of the national need for a reliable
and comprehensive flood insurance program,"' 99 because as many as "ninety
percent of all natural disasters in [this country] involve flooding.,
200
The hurricane and flood devastation of 2005 was no exception. In Lou-
isiana alone, Hurricane Katrina caused over $38 billion in flood and storm
surge damage-most of it uninsured.201 In comparison, Louisiana was also
the hardest hit with conventional insured losses due to Katrina of over $22.5
billion./20
With the real property boom of the past few years, those who have
not simultaneously increased their coverage may find themselves underin-
sured.20 3 Currently, fifty-nine percent of homeowners are uninsured or un-
der-insured. °  While comparable data is not available for commercial prop-
erty, with vacancy rates dropping, the commercial realty sector has likewise
shown positive growth over the past two years.2 0 5
199. Id.
200. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY:
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO ENHANCE OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM, GAO-06-119, at 1 (Oct. 18, 2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06l19.pdf; see generally JANE G. GRAVELLE, TAX POLICY
OPTIONS AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (Sept. 16, 2005), available
at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/53669.pdf.
201. See ROBERT P. HARTWIG, LOUISIANA LEGISLATIVE WOMEN'S CAUCUS WORKSHOP ON
INSURANCE & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, LOUISIANA INSURANCE MARKET OVERVIEW:
TOWARD VIABLE INSURANCE MARKETS IN THE POST-KATRINA & RITA ERA, 25-27 (Jan. 27,
2007), http://server.iii.org/yyobjdata/binary/7546991_0/louisiana.pdf [hereinafter
HARTWIG, LOUISIANA INSURANCE MARKET OVERVIEW].
202. See id. at 26 (excludes $1.47 billion in flood-damaged vehicles covered by compre-
hensive policies).
203. See Press Release, National Association of Realtors, Metro Home Prices Transition in
Second Quarter (Aug. 15, 2006), http://www.realtor.org/pressroom/news-releases/2006/
2ndqtrmetrosO6.html (price increases easing to single digit rise); Press Release, National
Association of Realtors, Home-Price Appreciation Stays Hot in Most Metro Areas (Nov. 15,
2005), http://www.realtor.org/pressroom/newsreleases/2005/homeprices3rdqtr05.html
(median home prices reflect 14.7% increase in 2005 compared to historically typical in-
crease-% to 2% over inflation rate since 1968).
204. See HARTWIG, LOUISIANA INSURANCE MARKET OVERVIEW, supra note 201, at 48
(although the numbers have improved in the past few years, most homes are still undervalued
by 22%).
205. Press Release, National Association of Realtors, Commercial Real Estate Continues
Uptrend (May 18, 2006), http://www.realtor.org/pressroom/newsreleases/
2006/comrclmktupdatemay06.html. David Lereah, the chief economist for the National Asso-
ciation of Realtors, noted, "we are seeing healthy levels of commercial real estate space being
purchased, rented, and occupied." Press Release, National Association of Realtors, Commer-
cial Real Estate Market on Uptrack with Lower Vacancies (June 14, 2005),
http://www.realtor.org/press-room/news-releases/2005/commreonuptrack.html.
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Flood insurance has not been commercially available through the pri-
vate insurance industry "[b]ecause of the high risks and the lack of under-
writing standards. 20 6 Therefore, in 1968, Congress created a voluntary Na-
tional Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) underwritten by the federal govern-
ment.2 °7 Over the years, the federal government assumed responsibility for
providing relief and for partial indemnification for property losses resulting
from floods.208
One serious fault of the NFIP is that communities must decide to "opt
in" to the plan-if the community does not opt in, flood insurance under the
NFIP is not available within that community. 209 This presents an obviously
insurmountable obstacle for a firm seeking such insurance.
Other significant drawbacks derive from non-participation by communi-
ties in Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA) that fail to opt in. For example,
SFHA that fail to opt in are ineligible for any form of federally-funded or
supported financial assistance for acquisition or construction purposes.210
Furthermore, if flooding in a declared disaster area occurs in a non-
participating SFHA community, no federal financial assistance can be pro-
vided for permanent repair or reconstruction of insurable buildings (although
other disaster assistance is not cut off). 2 1 1 However, if the community ap-
plies and is accepted into the NFIP within six months of a presidential disas-
ter declaration, the limitations on federal disaster assistance are lifted.21 2
This community option to retroactively opt in after a declared disaster
created a free-rider problem. Without opening up its constituents to any li-
ability for premiums, the community remained eligible for federal assistance
for the first declared emergency (a "try it before you buy it" approach for the
city), while at the same time such a community's residents were prevented
from obtaining any flood insurance.213 With such a dichotomy, it is no sur-
prise that the NFIP was underutilized and undercapitalized.
206. S. REP. No. 93-583 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3217, 3219.
207. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572, 574 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2000 & Supp.)); see also S. REP. No. 93-583.
208. See id.
209. See 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(a).
210. Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-234, § 202(a), 87 Stat. 975.
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 5172(a).
212. See generally id.
213. See generally GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness, Response,
and Recovery: Hearing on Hurricane Katrina Before the S. Homeland Sec. & Gov 't Affairs
Comm., 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the
United States), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/030806Walker.pdf [hereinafter
Walker Statement].
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In his 2006 testimony before Congress, the Comptroller General de-
clared the NFIP program "essentially bankrupt., 214 To meet pressing needs
from the 2005 flooding, produced by the hurricanes, Congress agreed to a
$17 billion bail out.215 As demonstrated by system failure in 2005, Congress
has yet to strike the right balance with the NFIP.216
The NFIP is broken for a variety of reasons. Most who need flood in-
surance do not purchase it. 217 Premiums are also "woefully inadequate given
the technical bankruptcy of the NFIP., 218  Even for those who do insure,
because of subsidies, they do not bear the true share of costs associated with
their risks.219 In this regard, subsidies, like federal emergency relief itself,
could actually stimulate overdevelopment of risky areas. 220 Although a leg-
islative fix to the NFIP was proposed in 2006, it failed to gather the neces-
sary momentum for passage.22'
Regardless of whether the government or private industries offer insur-
ance, tax relief measures should serve as incentives for people to carry ade-
quate insurance. Indeed, one of the goals of the Stafford Act is "encouraging
individuals, [s]tates, and local governments to protect themselves by obtain-
ing insurance coverage to supplement or replace governmental assis-
tance. ' 22 2
214. Id. at 38. "The magnitude and severity of the flood losses from Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita overwhelmed the ability of the NFIP to absorb the costs of paying claims, providing
an illustration of the extent to which the federal government is exposed to claims coverage in
catastrophic loss years." Id.
215. National Flood Insurance Program Further Enhanced Borrowing Authority Act of
2005, 42 U.S.C. § 4016(a) (increasing maximum loan from $3.5 to 18.5 million), amending
National Flood Insurance Program Enhanced Borrowing Authority Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.
§4016(a) (increasing maximum loan from $1.5 to $3.5 million).
216. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FISCAL ExPOsuRES: IMPROVING THE
BUDGETARY Focus ON LONG-TERM COSTS AND UNCERTAINTIES, GAO-03-213, at 1 (Jan. 24,
2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03213.pdf (federal insurance exposes
government to future, potentially significant, unbudgeted costs).
217. "More than 11 million U.S. homes are in flood zones, . . . [but] [o]nly about one in
four homeowners who live in areas vulnerable to floods purchase federal flood insurance."
Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, supra note 86.
218. HARTWIG, HURRICANE SEASON, supra note 85, at 138.
219. See L. JAMES VALVERDE, JR., MANAGING NATURAL DISASTER RISK: WHAT ROLE
SHOULD THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PLAY? 5 (Jan. 2006), available at
http://server.iii.org/yyobj data/binary/749407_1_0/DisasterRisk.pdf. "[F]ederal insurance
programs are rarely actuarially sound." Id.
220. See generally Catastrophes: Facts and Statistics, supra note 3; see also HARTWIG,
HURRICANE SEASON, supra note 85, at 15, 57. Insurers have stated that the cost of natural
catastrophes leads to the overdevelopment in risky areas. See generally Catastrophes: Facts
and Statistics, supra note 3.
221. See H.R. REP. No. 109-410 (2006).
222. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b)(4) (2000 & Supp.).
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2. Cases Expose Limitations and Systemic Inadequacies
Based on the scope of devastation in the wake of the hurricanes and
flooding in 2005, it is not surprising so many lost so much. Given the insur-
ance deficits identified above, it is also not surprising that so many found
they were inadequately insured. Indeed, the delayed and rude awakening as
to these inadequacies could also be expected. The case law confirms the
necessity of securing separate flood insurance because of the flood exclusion
in basic casualty policies.
For example, in Buente v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance
Co.,223 the taxpayer challenged the insurance policy flood exclusion only to
find that it prevented recovery for flood damages.224 Even though the flood-
ing was undeniably a byproduct of the hurricane, the court held, consistently
with many other cases, 225 that the flood damage is not within the storm cov-
erage because the language of the flood exclusion is unambiguous.226
Beyond this fundamental limitation, case law confirms that merely hav-
ing two parallel systems leads to confusion-resulting in gaps in coverage
and evidencing systemic flaws with the flood insurance scheme. The cases
show potential for consumers to be unaware, ill-advised, and perhaps inten-
tionally misled by their insurance agents. In addition, the cases show how
the dual scheme can erode the insurer's commitment to pay what is owed,
and in some cases, motivate unsavory practices.
Many victims have alleged that their agents negligently failed to dis-
close the significance of the flood exclusion or mention that additional flood
insurance was available at all.227 Others allege that their agents mistakenly
223. 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 23742, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 11, 2006).
224. Id. at *2.
225. See, e.g., Brown v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 06-9470, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5038
(E.D. La. Jan. 22, 2007); Andry v. Audubon Ins. Co., No. 06-3187, 2006 WL 3904998 (E.D.
La. Dec. 27, 2006); Tropic Sun Towers Condo. Ass'n v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 6:05-cv-
1284-Orl-18DAB, 2006 WL 3544854 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2006); Leonard v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Miss. 2006); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig.,
466 F. Supp. 2d 729 (E.D. La. 2006).
226. Buente, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23742, at *4-5.
227. See, e.g., Brown, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5038, at *2 (agent misrepresented "all en-
compassing nature" of policy and did not disclose that "deluxe all risk" policy excluded flood
coverage); Word of Faith Christian Fellowship, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No.
1:05CV691 LTS-RHW, 2006 WL 2359673, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 15, 2006) (agent negli-
gently alleged policy was comprehensive to include water damage); Carter v. Metro. Cas. Ins.
Co., No. 1:06CV271 LTS-RHW, 2006 WL 2359044, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 15, 2006) (agent
neglected to advise flooding was excluded); Harris v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 1:06CV43 LTS-
RHW, 2006 WL 2077585, at *2 (S.D. Miss. July 24, 2006) (agent failed to advise flood insur-
ance was available and necessary); Ballantyne v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:06CV53
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told them that separate flood coverage was not necessary to cover losses
from water damage due to a hurricane. 2 8
Other litigation was spawned by claimants who alleged that their insur-
ance agents lied to them about the scope of their coverage. In Denton v.
Lamey,229 the Dentons alleged that Lamey agreed to provide both home-
owner's insurance and flood insurance and negligently failed to do so, even
after accepting their premiums for both policies.2 30 The United States Dis-
trict Court determined there were triable issues of material fact that allowed
231plaintiffs to survive a motion for summary judgment.
The case illustrates the mere fact that when two different policies are
required for comprehensive protection, it can give rise to confusion-even
where both are marketed and administered by the same company.2 3 2 That
claimants might mistakenly believe they have purchased both policies is a
flaw inherent in the system. Even more troublesome is the potential that the
insurance policies could be provided by multiple providers who, by virtue of
the system, must share liability for loss and determine how to allocate this
loss. Conflicts and disputes between those with directly competing financial
interests could be predicted in a hurricane scenario when there is water dam-
age from both high winds and penetrating rain, as well as flooding.
Andry v. Audubon Insurance Co. ,233 demonstrates how even those indi-
viduals who seek full insurance protection could be caught in the finger
pointing between insurers and the necessary evil that ensues in sorting out
liability. Gilbert and Alicia Andry were cautious and prudent homeowners
who purchased three separate insurance policies to protect their new home in
Pass Christian, Mississippi.2 34 They purchased their primary homeowner's
policy from Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company, obtained
a flood policy issued by the federal government through Nationwide, and
bought a wind and hail policy through the Mississippi Windstorm Underwrit-
LTS-RHW, 2006 WL 2359169, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 15, 2006) (agent neglected to advise
flooding was excluded).
228. Ladner v. Davis, No. 1:06CV90 LTS-RHW, 2006 WL 2095338, at *1 (S.D. Miss.
July 27, 2006).
229. No. 1:06CV676 LTS-RHW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82701, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 7,
2006).
230. Id at *2-3.
231. Id. at *4-6.
232. See 42 U.S.C. § 4081(a) (2000 & Supp.) (allows NFIP to select commercial insurance
agents to interface administratively with NFIP clients concerning federal flood insurance
coverage; the agent may or may not be the same carrier as the insured's casualty policy car-
rer).
233. No. 06-3187, 2006 WL 3904998 (E.D. La. Dec. 27, 2006).
234. Id. at *2.
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ing Association (MWUA). 2 35 "It is undisputed that both the MWUA and the
Nationwide homeowner's policies exclude[d] coverage for flood damage." 2
36
The dispute arose about whether damage resulted from the wind (alleg-
edly blowing the home away) or from water damage due to flooding (alleg-
edly washing the home away).2 37 The Nationwide policy specifically ex-
cluded flooding resulting from high tides or storm surge.238 Plaintiffs al-
leged Nationwide wrongly failed to pay for the wind damage covered under
their policy. 239 Curiously, Nationwide argued that the policy did not include
wind damage either, despite the fact the policy "states the exact opposite. 24 °
The MWUA policy was administered by Audubon, who serviced plain-
tiffs' claim.241 Plaintiffs alleged that the Audubon adjuster wrongfully calcu-
lated the claim on their completely demolished home, by constructing a hy-
pothetical waterline on the nonexistent wall and estimating damages only
above the line (far less than their policy limits or the replacement cost of
their home).242 Presumably, the imaginary line would be used to reduce li-
ability by subtracting the flood damage that would have occurred below the
line if the house and its contents had remained. Plaintiffs alleged that the
claims adjuster from Audubon admitted upon inspection "that the policy
limits [would have been] exhausted," but that he was required to adjust the
claim based upon the imaginary waterline.243
The case has not been addressed on the merits, as the United States Dis-
trict Court found that jurisdiction was proper in the state court. 244 Despite
Nationwide's claims that the scope of the flood insurance coverage was a
federal issue, the court remanded the case for further proceedings.24 5
235. Id. The MWUA was established in Mississippi in 1970 for coverage against wind-
storms and hail along the Gulf Coast. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 83-34-1 to 83-34-29 (1972); An-
dry, 2006 WL 3904998, at *1 n.2.
236. Andry, 2006 WL 3904998, at *9.
237. Id. at * 1-2.
238. See id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at*9 n.11.
241. Andry, 2006 WL 3904998, at * 1. Audubon Insurance Company (a subsidiary of
AIG-American International Group, Inc.) was acting as an agent of the MWUA servicing
insurer. Id. at *5.
242. Id. at *7.
243. Id.
244. Id. at *9-11. Note that even though the case involved a Mississippi home and insur-
ance policies in effect in Mississippi, the case was brought in Louisiana, as the plaintiffs were
Louisiana citizens, and it was remanded to the Judicial District Court for the Parish of Plaque-
mines, State of Louisiana. Andry, 2006 WL 3904998, at *11.
245. Id. at*10-11.
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This multi-insurer tension is inevitable when one obtains policies from
two separate insurance companies covering the same property. In any gray
area, each insurer is financially motivated to assert that the other is more
liable. Allowing insurers to duke it out in litigation or arbitration, at the ex-
pense of the insured-who suffers without compensation-is a travesty.
Thus, the potential for multiple policies, where neither insurer accepts liabil-
ity, is a serious flaw undermining the effectiveness of the flood insurance
program.
While it is highly predictable that claimants would not be paid for flood
damage when their policies contained a flood exclusion, and it is somewhat
predictable that some insurers might squabble about the scope of their policy
coverage, it is less predictable that insurers would be reluctant to pay for
claims admittedly within the scope of coverage.
In Broussard v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (Broussard II),246 a
case involving both wind damage (covered by the policy) as well as excluded
flood damage, that is exactly what happened . 47 The plaintiff in Broussard
suffered both covered and excluded losses.24 8 The insurance company expert
testified as to the existence of covered losses.249 Yet, the insurer failed to
pay any of the damages, because it had not dispositively established the
amount excluded as flood damage.250
The court found the burden was on the insurer to prove how much water
damage was excluded, after the plaintiff proved a prima facie case that the
property sustained wind damage.25' State Farm failed to meet this burden
and paid the price.252 In addition to relief for the policy limits, the jury
awarded $2.5 million in punitive damages, which later was reduced to $1
million.253 The punitive damages awarded in Broussard against State Farm
might motivate more cooperative claims processing and serve as a deterrent
for other insurers refusing to pay at least what they acknowledge is due.
In summary, while those who are savvy about insurance probably ap-
preciated that a flood insurance policy from the National Flood Insurance
Program was required for flood protection, others were confused, ignorant,
or perhaps even mislead by their insurance agents. Regardless of why, most
246. No. 1:06CV6 LTS-RHW, 2007 WL 1438792, at *1 (S.D. Miss. May 11, 2007).
247. Id. at *1-2.
248. See id
249. Id. at *2.
250. Id.
251. BroussardI, 2007 WL 1438792, at *2.
252. Id.
253. Broussard v. State Farm & Cas. Co. (Broussard 1), No. 1:06CV6 LTS-RHW, 2007
WL 268344, at * 1, 3 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 31, 2007).
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were not adequately protected. The litigation that ensued, and continues,
after the 2005 hurricanes reflects this unfortunate reality. However, even
though the two separate halves-casualty insurance and flood insurance-
are not as advantageous as one comprehensive whole, it is still better for
individuals in participating communities to purchase both halves.
3. The Push for Insurance Reform
Due to insured losses hitting record proportions, Congress is consider-
ing federalizing reinsurance of the hurricane insurance market for homeown-
ers. 254 Despite the fact that many in the private insurance industry are op-
posed to such federalization--citing ability to withstand the highest loss
years on record with sufficient policy reserves 255-there has been open de-
bate in the insurance industry about the need for federal reinsurance.
256
As the debate over how to structure catastrophic insurance lingers, no
one disputes the need for homeowners to have access to affordable insur-
ance. 25 7 Congress must take care, however, that any tax relief for victims of
disaster encourages prudent decisions-such as motivating individuals to
obtain sufficient insurance, including flood insurance for those at risk-
versus exacerbating a false sense of security that a government bailout could
promote.258
Florida House Memorial 11 A urges Congress to adopt a federal catas-
trophe insurance program, to participate in a federal/state issues summit, to
254. See H.R. 91, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007) (reinsurance available under this act "shall
provide insurance coverage against residential property losses to homes (including dwellings
owned under condominium and cooperative ownership arrangements) and the contents of
apartment buildings"). For past failed efforts along these lines, see, e.g., H.R. 846, 109th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2005) (federal auctions of catastrophe reinsurance contracts); H.R. 4366,
109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005); H.R. 4507, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005) (allowing States with
catastrophe insurance programs to purchase federal reinsurance).
255. See generally Is America's Housing Market Prepared for the Next Natural Catastro-
phe?: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Serv. 109th Cong. 34-36 (2006) (statement of Dennis C. Burke, Vice President of State Rela-
tions, Reinsurance Association of America) [hereinafter Is America's Housing Market Pre-
pared for the Next Natural Catastrophe?].
256. VALVERDE, JR., supra note 219, at 4-5; see also Is America's Housing Market Pre-
pared for the Next Natural Catastrophe? supra note 255, at 41-43 (statement of Alex Soto,
President, InSource, Inc., on behalf of the Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of
America, Inc.).
257. "[U]sing history as a guide, natural catastrophes will inevitably place a tremendous
strain on homeowners' insurance markets in many areas, will raise costs for consumers, and
will jeopardize the ability of many consumers to adequately insure their homes and posses-
sions." H.R. 4366, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
258. See Catastrophes: Facts and Statistics, supra note 3.
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provide specific federal tax legislation supporting disaster preparedness and
relief (including tax deductions), and to engage in a national hurricane re-
search initiative. 259 The aspect concerning federal reinsurance is discussed
here, while the ability of taxpayers and insurers to set aside funds on a tax-
advantaged basis is discussed below in section B.2.
The federal government would be the ultimate reinsurer of super large
losses associated with only the most severe "mega-catastrophes., 2 60 "A na-
tional catastrophe insurance program is necessary to promote personal re-
sponsibility among policyholders; support strong building codes, develop-
ment plans, and other mitigation tools; maximize the risk-bearing capacity of
the private markets; and provide quantifiable risk management through the
Federal Government., 261 Rather than relying exclusively on FEMA emer-
gency relief and knee-jerk tax cuts and incentives, such a program would
allow the promise of federal coverage to enhance insurability within vulner-
able markets by making insurance affordable to those most likely to be af-
fected by a hurricane.
Following the overwhelming demand on its Florida Hurricane Catastro-
phe Fund (FHCF) in 2004-2005, Florida has also been revamping its State
Catastrophic Reinsurance Program.262 Florida House Bill IA, which became
law on January, 25, 2007, allows a temporary opportunity for insurers to
increase their premiums for and coverage by the FHCF.2 63 The Florida Leg-
islature intended "to create a temporary emergency program, applicable to
the 2007, 2008, and 2009, hurricane seasons, to address these market disrup-
tions and enable insurers, at their option, to procure additional coverage from
the [FHCF]. ' 2 4
259. Fla. H.M. 11 A (2007) (National Catastrophe Solutions) (enrolled Jan. 22, 2007).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See FLA. STAT. § 215.555 (2006).
263. Id.
264. Id.
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B. Posturing for the Storm
1. Existing Measures
Every taxpayer can take reasonable measures to prepare for a disaster:
hardening buildings and facilities to hurricane and other storm threats, creat-
ing redundant records and storing them away from any high risk area (e.g., a
fire safe box loaded with an emergency copy of electronic records and criti-
cal paper records-such as past tax returns, client records and contact infor-
mation, etc.), and ensuring an up-to-date inventory of property. With mod-
em technology, most urgent data can be carried on a thumb-drive or saved to
other electronic media.
The challenge of creating and maintaining an up-to-date inventory of
office items, equipment, furniture, plants, decorations, artwork, etc. can be
much more onerous. It is the taxpayer's burden to prove the amount of every
claimed deduction, show receipts to establish the initial cost basis of prop-
erty, and provide accounting documents to establish the depreciated value of
items damaged or destroyed. 65 Photo or video evidence of the condition of
property before it is destroyed also goes far in encouraging insurance adjust-
ers and the IRS to accept higher valuations. Certainly, any precious items
should be periodically appraised.
How frequently to back up electronic data, conduct inventory, and ap-
praise property depends upon how vulnerable the law practice is to known
hazards. If a taxpayer is vulnerable to hurricanes or is located in a known
floodplain, it would also be prudent to invest in measures to mitigate the
effects of storm surge or rising water. The NFIP allows discounted premi-
ums for communities who participate in a Community Rating System (CRS),
because they have extensive floodplain management programs.266 The
FEMA website discusses the CRS and other "FloodSmart" programs.
267
Premiums may be reduced by up to forty-five percent for mitigation, plan-
ning, and preparedness.268 In addition, such measures help save lives and
property.
265. I.R.S. Publ'n 547, Casualties, Disasters, and Thefts, at 3-5 (2006).
266. FEMA, Community Rating System, http://www.fema.gov/business/nfip/crs.shtm (last
visited June 14, 2007).
267. Id.
268. Id.
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2. Proposed Tax Measures Promoting Insurance
In Florida, after the devastating 2004 hurricane season, the notion of a
hurricane savings account for individuals was first introduced.2 69 The hurri-
cane savings account was forecasted "to cover an insurance deductible or
other uninsured portion of the risks of loss from a hurricane, rising flood
waters, or other catastrophic windstorm event. 27°  Because the accounts
would only safeguard homesteads, they would be beyond the reach of credi-
tors.27 1
However, benefits of such an account are not realized unless or until the
federal government creates such a tax-exempt or tax-deferred savings vehi-
cle. 72 While Florida unanimously petitioned Congress for such legislation
in 2006,273 and Congress introduced a bill to create a Catastrophe Savings
Account,2 74 the legislation was still not enacted in 2006.275
Florida renewed its efforts to stimulate such legislation in 2007.276 As
proposed, the Florida House Memorial asks for the creation of tax exempt
accounts for taxpayers to accumulate financial reserves on a tax-advantaged
basis for the purpose of paying for mitigation enhancements and catastrophic
losses.277 The proposal also requests changes to the tax code that will allow
personal income tax deductions for insurance costs and mitigation expenses.
"[T]he [Florida] [1legislature urges Congress to provide a federal income tax
deduction for residential property insurance premiums paid by consumers to
offset the dramatic cost of property insurance. 278
269. See Fla. Judiciary Comm., SB 660 (2005) Staff Analysis 1-5 (Feb. 8, 2005) (on file
with comm.), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/2005/Senate/bills/analy-
sis/pdf/2005s0660.ju.pdf.
270. FLA. S. JOUR. 406 (Reg. Sess. 2005), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/data/ses-
sion/2005/senate/j oumals/pdflbound/sjO41305.pdf.
271. See FLA. STAT. § 222.22 (2006). Section 222.22 of the Florida Statutes exempts
hurricane savings accounts and other preferred savings programs from legal process. Id.
However, this benefit attaches only when "the federal government provides tax-exempt or tax-
deferred status to a hurricane savings account." Id. § 222.22(4)(c).
272. Id. § 222.22. The federal government has not yet created such a favored tax position.
See H.R. 4836, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).
273. Florida Congressman Files Catastrophe Savings Account Legislation, INS. J. (Mar. 6,
2006), available at http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/southeast/2006/03/06/66203.htm.
274. See RAWLE 0. KING, HURRICANE KATRINA: INSURANCE LOSSES AND NATIONAL
CAPACITIES FOR FINANCING DISASTER RISK, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 10 (Sept. 15, 2005),
available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/data/2005/upl-meta-crs-7611/
RL33086_2005Sep15. pdf.
275. See Fla. H.M. lIA (2007).
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. Id. at 4.
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The Florida legislature also asked Congress to "[c]reat[e] tax-deferred
insurance company catastrophe reserves to benefit policyholders." '279 "These
tax-deferred reserves would build up over time and only be eligible to be
used to pay for future catastrophic losses. 28 ° Congress is already consider-
ing the latter form of requested tax relief. The Policy Holders Protection Act
is a bill "[t]o amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide for the
creation of disaster protection funds by property and casualty insurance
companies for the payment of policyholders' claims arising from future
catastrophic events.
' 281
C. Recovery and Rebuilding
No one knows whether those affected by the next disaster will enjoy the
same tax relief as the victims of the 2005 hurricanes. Because congressional
response has varied in the past, it is prudent to exploit current code provi-
sions which afford relief to all casualty victims, while remaining alert for
new legislation, and paying particular attention to IRS news releases, an-
nouncements, and notices likely to follow a major disaster.282 After Hurri-
cane Katrina, for instance, there were twenty-nine IRS releases within thirty
days of the storm.283
1. Small Business, Heightened Vulnerabilities
Immediate relief from tax filing deadlines and payment obligations in
the wake of Hurricane Katrina was timely and essential, because many im-
portant books and records had been lost or destroyed due to the widespread
devastation and massive flooding.284 In addition, where records miracu-
lously survived, the evacuated often had no immediate access to them. 285
Although it sounds obvious, such relief is especially necessary for small
businesses that are barely making their payroll week to week.286 According
279. Id. at 3; see H.R. 4836, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).
280. Fla. H.M. 1 A.
281. See H.R. 164, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007) (modifying I.R.C. § 832 (2004)).
282. After Hurricane Katrina, for example, IRS Commissioner Mark Everson, announced
deadline extensions within days of the storm. I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-84 (Aug. 30,
2005) ("IRS Grants Tax Relief for Hurricane Katrina Victims"),
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/ 0,,id=147055,00.html.
283. Internal Revenue Service, News Releases for September 2005,
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/content/0,,id= 149346,00.html (last visited June 14, 2007).
284. See Rodney C. Runyan, Small Business in the Face of Crisis: Identifying Barriers to
Recovery from a Natural Disaster, 14 J. CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT. 12, 12-13 (2006).
285. See id. at 13.
286. See id.
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to the Small Business Administration (SBA), twenty-five percent of small
businesses may not survive a major disaster.287
Of course, tax relief or assistance from the tax system is but one small
part of the relief available.288 Ultimately, the small firm or sole practitioner
must have sufficient financial resources to rebuild and reopen. The SBA
recognizes the special vulnerability of small businesses and makes loans
available for victims of declared natural disasters. 289 Although the loans are
obviously available to small businesses, even large businesses and individu-
als may apply and qualify for these loans. 290 Regrettably, in a major disaster,
the SBA may be overwhelmed, making relief in the form of low or no inter-
est loans slow.
291
2. Opportunity Zones
No one can depend on the government to establish an opportunity zone
following a disaster. Nevertheless, it is important to realize the potential
benefits of an opportunity zone if one is declared. Since history affords the
Liberty Zone and the GO Zone as examples of substantial tax advantages for
affected victims, it is prudent to stay alert to congressional actions to afford
similar relief in the future, and to be postured to immediately take advantage
of that relief.
287. Press Release, Insurance Information Institute, Can Your Business Survive a National
Disaster? Advance Planning, Proper Insurance Are Essential (Apr. 13, 2004),
http://www.iii.org/media/updates/press.736350/.
288. See Lipman, supra note 25, at 955-61. In her article entitled Anatomy of a Disaster
Under the Internal Revenue Code, Professor Francine J. Lipman provides an excellent exami-
nation of how tax consequences dovetail with other federal relief. Id.
289. U.S. Small Business Administration, Disaster Assistance for Businesses of All Sizes,
available at http://www.sba.gov/npm2006/NPM2006/disaster-recovery-for-biz-color.doc (last
visited June 14, 2007).
290. Surprisingly, "the majority of SBA disaster assistance is directed to homeowners, to
help rebuild their homes." The Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Small Businesses: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Small Business & Entrepreneurship, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement
of Hector V. Barreto, Administrator, United States Small Business Administration), available
at http://sbc.senate.gov/republican/HTML/hearings/109/Barretto%20testimony.pdf. As of
September 22, 2005, the SBA had "distributed approximately 850,000 applications for loans
to individuals and businesses." Opening Statement on the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Small Businesses and Entrepreneurship: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Small Business &
Entrepreneurship, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (opening statement of Sen. Olympia J. Snowe, Chair,
S. Comm. on Small Business & Entrepreneurship), available at
http://sbc.senate.gov/republican/HTML/hearings/92205SnoweStmnt.pdf.
291. See Walker Statement, supra note 213, at 42 (stating that the public expressed wide-
spread dissatisfaction with the SBA and their backlog of about 103,300 hurricane-related loan
applications, which averaged about 94 days).
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In a nutshell, the procedural advantages of delayed filing and payment
of taxes should benefit all taxpayers who otherwise would have taxes due.
Forgiveness of interest and penalties should make this especially desirable in
a declared emergency area.
The ability to amend past returns to claim net operating losses will af-
ford an excellent opportunity to improve cash flow. Similarly, cash flow
could be improved by accelerating any deductions into a previous period. By
taking them earlier, there is possibly a twofold advantage. First, there may
be more income to offset, perhaps allowing a taxpayer with a marginal rate
of twenty-five percent to slip down into the fifteen percent bracket. 292
Second, the ability to treat a business cost as an expense that is deducti-
ble this year, versus a capital asset-which depreciates over time-enhances
cash flow by reducing tax liability now as opposed to spreading it out over
future tax periods. Reduced liability translates into lower tax withholding
right now as estimated payments are reduced to reflect increased expens-
ing.293 In addition, if offered the opportunity, the taxpayer should take ad-
vantage of the immediate deduction for section 179 property instead of
spreading these costs through depreciation.
V. CONCLUSION
Although promising changes are on the horizon, there is no reason for
prudent taxpayers to wait for legal developments before getting their finan-
cial affairs in order. You will not be able to choose whether you will be a
physical victim-that is why they are called acts of God-but you can influ-
ence, in important respects, whether you will be a financial victim.
Everyone should seek an appropriate mix of insurance. For businesses,
these ordinary and necessary expenses are deductible in the year paid.294 A
prudent business will be fully insured while carrying a substantial deductible,
so that catastrophic events will amount to setbacks but not failure.
292. See I.R.C. § 1 l(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2004 & Supp.).
293. Estimated tax payments earlier in the tax year would have been based on expectations
of greater income and fewer expenses. I.R.S. Publ'n 505, Tax Withholding and Estimated
Tax, at 7 (2007) available at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p505/ch02.html. Cash flow is
improved by either reducing estimated payments immediately, due to changed circumstances
based on the disaster and concomitant beneficial tax considerations; or, at worst, a bigger
refund will be obtained at the end of the fiscal year if estimated payments are continued at pre-
existing levels,resulting in overpayment. Id.
294. DAVID. L. BRUMBAUGH, TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR CATASTROPHIC RISK INSURANCE
RESERVES: EXPLANATION AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 1 (Sept. 2,
2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33060.pdf.
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While an extension of time to file and pay taxes is likely, keeping a re-
dundant set of records in a safe yet accessible location will jumpstart an abil-
ity to amend a previous return to take advantage of the three-year net operat-
ing loss carryback under code section 172(b)(1)(F),295 or the retroactive relief
afforded under code section 165(i) 296 in a major disaster.
Finally, staying abreast of IRS releases and post-disaster relief legisla-
tion will allow firms and clients alike to maximize whatever compassionate
tax relief is afforded. Together, these measures should help both lawyers and
clients weather the storm.
295. I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(F).
296. Id. § 165(i).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of the free market has been honored throughout the history
of the United States as advancing our economy by promoting competition.'
While the free market is an integral part of American culture, difficulty de-
velops when business practices overlap with public policy concerns. 2 Insur-
ance companies that provide hurricane coverage are in business to make a
* J.D. Candidate, May 2008, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Cen-
ter. Sara Graditor has a B.S. in Business Administration with a concentration in Marketing
from the University of Central Florida. She would like to thank her mother Linda and father
Warren as she is very grateful for their limitless support and unconditional love. She gives a
very special recognition to Senator Walter "Skip" Campbell for his help in developing issues
and contributing to the research for her article. The author wishes to express her great appre-
ciation for all the hard work of her colleagues at Nova Law Review and the faculty of the Law
Center, especially Professor Marilyn Blumberg Cane for her suggestions and guidance.
1. See Katherine Swartz, Justifying Government as the Backstop in Health Insurance
Markets, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHics 89 (2001).
2. See id.
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profit for themselves while the product they sell is protection for the insur-
eds' health and safety.3 Having a responsibility to look out for their insur-
eds' best interests, as well as their owners' financial well-being, creates a
conflict of interest.4 The issue that will be examined in this article is
whether, and to what extent, the federal or state government should become
involved in the hurricane insurance industry.
Part II discusses the current conditions of the insurance industry as a
whole and the consequences of the suffering hurricane insurance market.
Part III will explain the need for reinsurance and its effect on the insurance
industry. Part IV will analyze the effect the suffering insurance and reinsur-
ance industry has on residents of Florida. Part V will discuss how the state
government once became involved by enacting Florida's Valued Policy Law,
and why that law no longer provides the protection it once did. Part VI of
this article will explore how the state intends to provide a solution to the hur-
ricane insurance problem in Florida. Part VII will then discuss a proposal for
the Florida Legislature to take action and provide hurricane insurance to
Florida residents. Part VIII will conclude that state government involvement
is necessary to stabilize the hurricane insurance market and to protect its
citizens' health, safety, and welfare.
II. INSURANCE: THE BUSINESS THAT CANNOT AFFORD PROTECTION
A. The Industry
All Florida residents who have mortgages are required by law to obtain
homeowners insurance.' Homeowners insurance typically covers "every-
thing except flooding caused by rising water."6 An increasing number of
policies are excluding wind damage caused by hurricanes.7 Companies that
choose to stay in the hurricane insurance market in Florida must increase
rates to survive in the hurricane insurance industry. 8 Consumers cannot af-
3. See FLA. STAT. § 215.555 (2006).
4. See id.
5. Id.; Interview with Walter Campbell, Sen., Fla. S., in Fort Lauderdale, Fla. (July 5,
2006) (audio on file with Nova Law Review).
6. BRYAN NORCROSS, HURRICANE ALMANAC 2006: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO STORMS
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 195 (2006).
7. Id.
8. See KEvIN M. MCCARTY ET AL., FLA. S., TASK FORCE ON LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS FOR
FLORIDA'S HURRICANE INSURANCE MARKET 4 (2006), available at
http://www.fldfs.com/hurricaneinsurancetaskforce/TaskforceRS2/draftlts6.pdf [hereinafter
TASK FORCE 2006].
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ford to pay "'[t]hese skyrocketing insurance rates.' 9 Floridians are left with
two options: spend an enormous amount of money protecting their homes
from hurricanes, or not protect their homes from hurricanes at all.'0 Many
are not even afforded the luxury of having an option as insurers increasingly
refuse to write policies for homeowners who live in areas at greater risk. 1
Hurricane Andrew's economic impact in 1992 forced insurance compa-
nies to re-evaluate the hurricane insurance market in Florida. 2 Ranked as
one of the ten most expensive United States catastrophes, Hurricane Andrew
ranks number two causing property insurers to pay $21.6 billion in property
coverage to this date.13 Residents of Florida sought "property and casualty
insurers to fund the long process of rebuilding."' 4 As a result of Hurricane
Andrew, "ten of the state's insurers" went bankrupt.' 5 Prior to Hurricane
Andrew, insurers capitalized on the construction boom in South Florida by
insuring homes at rates that were "inadequate to cover potential hurricane
losses."' 16 "It is a gross understatement to say that the potential destruction
resulting from a hurricane of Andrew's magnitude was largely unanticipated
both by the citizens of South Florida and their state and local governmental
officials."' 7
9. Beatrice E. Garcia, Keys Residents Storming Mad Over Insurance Rate Hikes: Keys
Residents and Business Owners Voice Worries About Huge Insurance Rate Increases, Fearing
Monroe County's Economy Will Be Hurt, KNIGHT RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, June 27, 2006, at
1 [hereinafter Garcia, Keys Residents Storming].
10. See TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 14.
11. Jonathan Brennan Butler, Insurers Under Fire: Assessing the Constitutionality of
Florida's Residential Property Insurance Moratorium After Hurricane Andrew, 22 FLA. ST.
U.L. REv. 731, 733-34 (1995). Florida's extremely high reading on the "hurricane property
risk scale" varies between 300 and 600. Fritz Yohn, Insurers Can Tame Hurricane Expo-
sures, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, June 12, 2006, at 12. This scale is based on two factors including
the "likelihood of a hurricane striking most any area within the state" and the magnitude of
property located in "counties having the highest hurricane likelihood." Id. Therefore, Florida
"[h]omeowners are being denied insurance or face crippling premiums." Janice Smith, Letter
to the Editor, FPL Only Part of Hurricane Issues, SUN-SENTINEL, June 14, 2006, at 20A.
12. See Butler, supra note 11, at 732-34. "Andrew was a wake-up call and learning
experience for the Florida market in 1992." See also TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 14.
13. TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 13. Hurricane Katrina is the most costly catastro-
phe to date incurring over $38 billion in insured losses. Id.
14. Butler, supra note 11, at 732.
15. Id. at 733.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 732.
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The 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons further reinforced the desire for
insurance companies to abandon the hurricane insurance market in Florida. 8
The 2004 season experienced four hurricanes "together creat[ing] 1.66 mil-
lion claims resulting in $20.9 billion dollars of insured losses in the Florida
market."' 9 The 2005 season resulted in another four hurricanes causing in-
surance companies a great delay in "recovering, recapitalizing, and rebuild-
ing" from the previous year. 20 The mentality shifted from preparing for the
return of another devastating Category Five hurricane, like Andrew, to pre-
paring for multiple storms of less magnitude, but of equal, if not greater,
economic impact.
2
'
Insurance companies used Andrew as a model in determining which in-
surance policies to renew or whether to renew them at all.22 In response,
insurers concluded that policies must be withdrawn in the coastal regions of
Florida.23 This conclusion remains as insurance companies increasingly re-
duce their risk of catastrophic loss by cutting back their level of exposure.24
Decisions by insurance companies to cancel policies after being with an in-
sured for "'years and years without filing a claim' are the insurers' reaction
to "not making money in the Florida homeowners' insurance market.
2 5
B. Florida's Response
The state has used its police powers to provide disaster relief by "taking
responsibility for the worst or highest risks" in the hurricane insurance mar-
ket. 6 After Hurricane Andrew, the Florida Residential Property Casualty
Joint Underwriting Association was established.27 This association was to
"provide a public/private response to the deterioration of insurance availabil-
18. See TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 14. "[T]he hurricanes of 2004 and 2005 of-
fered important lessons and insights to its citizens, legislators, insurers, reinsurers, and insur-
ance regulators." Id.
19. Id. at 11 (referring to Hurricanes Charley, Ivan, Frances, and Jeanne).
20. Id. at 12 (referring to Hurricanes Dennis, Katrina, Rita, and Wilma). As of March 6,
2006, "these four storms are estimated to have generated a combined 1.17 million claims and
at least a combined $9.3 billion in insured losses in Florida." Id.
21. See TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 14.
22. Butler, supra note 11, at 733.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Wayne T. Price, Brevard Faces Grim Reality of Insurance, FLA. TODAY, Apr. 5,
2006, at Al (quoting Sam Miller, the Executive Vice President of the Florida Insurance Coun-
cil).
26. Swartz, supra note 1, at 90; see FLA. STAT. § 215.555(1)(a)-(b) (2006).
27. TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 40.
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ity in the private market., 28 In addition, the Florida Windstorm Underwrit-
ing Association was created by law to make secure windstorm coverage for
residential policyholders unable to obtain it in the voluntary market. 29 To-
gether, the associations covered approximately 1.35 million policies with an
"exposure of almost $86.5 billion."30
Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Citizens) was created in 2002
to encompass both entities.3 Citizens' rates are required by law to be higher
than the rates of private insurers. 32 As a result, Citizens has a rate structure
that is not meant to compete with the private market. In fact, it is
"[d]esigned to offer insurance only where the private market will not provide
coverage" making it the "provider of last resort.,
34
The 2006 hurricane season presented some obstacles for Citizens.35 Poe
Financial Group (Poe), one of South Florida's largest property insurers, liq-
uidated its Florida property insurance business.36 Citizens, being the state's
insurer of last resort, then took over all of Poe's property and casualty poli-
cies. 37 Not only did Citizens take over more than 300,000 policies from Poe,
Citizens must also accommodate 50,000 new property and casualty applica-
tions it receives per month.38 The "explosive" growth of Citizens has forced
it to increase rates and decrease coverage. 39 Insurers insist that "[a] determi-
nation will have to be made on whether there is a public policy obligation to
insure all structures in the state. 4°
In addition to "insuring too many high-risk properties," Citizens never
fully recovered from the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons.4 ' During those
seasons, "Citizens collected $1.2 billion in premiums, but paid out more than
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See FLA. STAT. § 627.351(6)(a)(2), (u)(2); Christopher Oster, Carrick Mollenkamp, &
Chad Terhune, Hurricane Damage: After Storms, Florida Wakes Up to a New Insurance
Reality, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2004, at Al.
32. FLA. STAT. § 627.351(6)(m)(10).
33. Id. § 627.351(6)(m)(1)(a).
34. TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 40.
35. See Harriet Johnson Brackley, Judge Orders Troubled Insurer to Liquidate: Citizens
Ready to Take over Poe Policies, SuN-SENTINEL, June 1, 2006, at ID.
36. Id.
37. Randy Diamond, Citizens Not Happy to Be No. 1, TAMPA TRIB., June 29, 2006, at 1.
38. Id.
39. See Interview with Walter Campbell, supra note 5.
40. TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 40-41.
41. See Diamond, supra note 37.
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$3.9 billion in claims" incurring a loss of approximately $2 billion.12 Florida
decreased the loss to Citizens by paying a portion of the deficit with sales tax
revenues. 43 In exchange, the Florida State Legislature required Citizens to
collect enough money from customers to provide for future damage. 44 This
leaves Citizens without any other option but to increase rates. 5 The question
is how much? "Insurance analysts say one of the determining factors as to if
and how much premiums may rise depends on the hit reinsurers take., 46
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF REINSURANCE
A. Reinsurance
Basically, reinsurance is insurance for insurance companies.4 7 Insur-
ance companies purchase insurance from reinsurance companies "to aid in
covering larger-than-expected losses. 48  As in any other business, a rate
increase in the reinsurance industry results in a rate increase in the insurance
industry. 49  Consumers cannot escape "trickle-down economics"50 as the
"investment outlook for the reinsurance industry is negative."'"
The reinsurance industry continues to undergo legal problems in regards
to "bid rigging and improper reinsurance contracts. '52 "[S]everal state attor-
neys general .... the SEC, and the Department of Justice" continue to con-
duct investigations on reports published in February 2006, indicating several
"former executives at General Re Corp., a leading U.S. reinsurer," commit-
ted fraud from a reinsurance deal in 2000."3 Stemming from those fraud
42. CATHERINE A. SEIFERT & JOE NIEDZIELSKI, STANDARD & POOR'S, INDUSTRY SURVEYS:
INSURANCE: PROPERTY-CASUALTY 7 (July 13, 2006).
43. See TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 48; see Diamond, supra note 37.
44. Kathy Bushouse, Florida Legislature Leaves Much Unresolved on Insurance Issue,
KNIGHT RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, May 9, 2006, at 1 [hereinafter Bushouse, Florida Legisla-
ture].
45. See id.
46. Darren Currin, Commentary: Insurance Fears in Hurricanes' Wake, ST. LOUIS
DAILY RECORD, Sept. 30, 2005, at 1.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. CATHERINE SEIFERT, STANDARD & POOR'S, SuB-INDuSTRY REVIEW: REINSURANCE
(2006) [hereinafter SEIFERT 2006]. The most recent outlook for the reinsurance industry sug-
gests it is neutral, but this is mostly due to the fact that many reinsurers were able to profit
from the "mild hurricane season in 2006." See CATHERINE SEIFERT, STANDARD & POOR'S,
SUB-INDUSTRY REVIEW: REINSURANCE (2007).
52. SEIFERT & NIEDZIELSKI, supra note 42, at 6.
53. SEIFERT 2006, supra note 51.
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charges, an ongoing investigation of many other reinsurers is taking place. 4
"Some insurers now advocate for a federal regulator that would allow them
to bypass the current system that regulates insurance on a state-by-state ba-
sis." 5 This seems unlikely to happen as "the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners (NAIC), the organization of state insurance commis-
sioners, [argue] that industry standards across state lines can be developed
under the current system."56 The consequences of these ongoing investiga-
tions create barriers to an already unattractive market, "dampen[ing] investor
enthusiasm for many reinsurance stocks."5 "
Further, the insolvency of smaller reinsurers aid in further consolidation
of the reinsurance market. 18 As "larger, financially stronger" reinsurers take
over the industry, there is a concern that competitive pricing will soon disap-
pear."9 There is a strong indication that "reinsurers are reconsidering the
risk/return relationships available when compared with other investment
opportunities."60 The January 2006 market closed transactions at a slower
rate than in the past, including 2005.61 "[W]hile overall rates appear not to
have increased dramatically, wind reinsurance along the Gulf States is re-
ported to have risen substantially. 62
Legislators increasingly "face heightened public pressure" to provide
solutions to the declining reinsurance market before it exacerbates any fur-
ther.63 In response to the public, former Florida Governor Jeb Bush signed
legislation in May 2006 offering loans to insurers, encouraging them to write
policies in Florida. 64 In addition, Citizens is required by law to "make its
best efforts to procure catastrophe reinsurance at reasonable rates. 65 How-
ever, "reasonable rates" are expected "to cover [a] projected 100-year prob-
able maximum lOSS. '' 66 The bottom line is "[i]nsurers are ... buying more
reinsurance protection and paying more for that coverage. 6 7
54. See id.
55. SEIFERT & NIEDZIELSKI, supra note 42, at 5.
56. Id. at 5-6.
57. SEIFERT 2006, supra note 51.
58. SEIFERT & NIEDZIELSKI, supra note 42, at 1.
59. See id.
60. TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 13.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. SEIFERT & NIEDZIELSKI, supra note 42, at 2.
64. Id.
65. FLA. STAT. § 627.351(6)(c)(10) (2006).
66. TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 52 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 627.351(6)(c)(9)).
67. SEIFERT & NIEDZIELSKI, supra note 42, at 7.
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B. The Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund
The problems with the residential property insurance market, caused by
Hurricane Andrew, in effect created problems with the reinsurance market.68
As reinsurers became more and more hesitant to provide coverage for insur-
ers in Florida, state action was deemed necessary to stabilize the market.69
Section 215.555 of the Florida Statutes created the Florida Hurricane Catas-
trophe Fund (FHCF) in an effort to protect the residents of Florida from an-
other catastrophic hurricane loss.70 Acting as a state administered reinsur-
ance program, the FHCF will partially reimburse those insurers who experi-
ence such a loss.7 Every property insurer who writes covered policies in
Florida is required to purchase reinsurance from the FHCF.12 This provides
insurance companies with security and encourages them to conduct business
in Florida."3
However, the overpowering combination of the 2004 and 2005 hurri-
cane seasons caused the cash resources of the FHCF to become strained.7 4
The four hurricanes in 2004 incurred insured losses of approximately $21
billion from 1.67 million claims.75 The FHCF valued their losses at $3.85
billion of that total amount.76 In 2005, Hurricane Wilma alone caused about
$7.9 billion in insured losses from residential property.77 The FHCF expects
to lose at least $2.6 billion of that total amount. 8
Further, computer models used to predict future economic impact of
hurricanes proved to be grossly inaccurate.79 Consumer demand surged as
an inevitable consequence of the previous hurricane seasons.80 As a result,
the FHCF incurred a loss for which it did not prepare.8 1 "With 10% adverse
loss development," FHCF must reserve $3.1 billion, the total amount of cash
available, to be used for claims made from the 2005 losses.8 2 Since the
68. FLA. STAT. § 215.555(1)(b).
69. Id. § 215.555(1)(a).
70. See id. § 215.555.
71. Id. § 215.555(4)(a).
72. Id.
73. See generally FLA. STAT. § 215.555.
74. TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 47.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 47.
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. Id.
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FHCF's cash resources will be exhausted due to the 2005 claims, "there will
not be any cash available to be carried forward for 2006 claims payments
when the 2006 hurricane season begins. 83 Without the FHCF able to pro-
vide reimbursement, insurers will need to be issued revenue bonds to recu-
perate.84 Legislators issued $1.5 billion in bonds to help the FHCF recover
from a $1.41 billion deficit resulting from the 2005 hurricane season.85 The
FHCF borrowed an additional $2.8 billion in preparation for the 2006 hurri-
cane season.8 6 Few future preventative measures exist for the FHCF. 87 Ex-
pansion of the monetary fund for the FHCF is not an option because Florida
policyholders, including "all property and casualty policyholders excluding
workers compensation and medical malpractice," would be placed in the
position of funding the added coverage. 8  Reduction of the fund would
worsen the problem as cash reserves would diminish at a faster rate, increas-
ing the need to issue bonds.89
The Florida Administrative Code allows insurance companies in Florida
to raise rates as long as they are approved by state regulators.9" Among the
few expense factors taken into consideration in each homeowner's rate filing
is the cost of reinsurance.9 In fact, reinsurance is broken down into specific
expense factors which are taken into account when determining the cost of
reinsurance in relation to the price of rates.92
State Farm Florida Insurance Co. (State Farm) "insures more than one
million policyholders statewide."93 The company submitted its rates early to
state regulators in hope to secure and collect higher premiums.' As Flor-
ida's number two home insurer, a request was made "for the company's larg-
est-ever rate increase in the state." 95 However, this request was made prior
to learning of the significant increase in cost for reinsurance. 96 State Farm
withdrew its initial request to reevaluate how high rates must be to make a
83. Id.
84. TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 47.
85. Stephanie Horvath & Dara Kam, State's Disaster Fund Boosted, PALM BEACH POST,
June 16, 2006, at ID.
86. Id.
87. See TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 47.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 690-170.013 (2006).
91. Id. r. 690-170.014(10)(f).
92. Id. r. 690-170.014(11).
93. Kathy Bushouse, State Farm Aims Higher: Reinsurance Tab to Force Second Re-
quest for Even Steeper Rate Increases, SUN-SENTINEL, July 7, 2006, at ID.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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profit. 97 This presents the question as to whether the FHCF, by providing
additional insurance capacity, continues to serve its purpose to improve the
state's economy and protect its citizens' health, safety, and welfare.9"
IV. THE HARD TRUTH
Generally, the purpose for insurance is to provide security for its con-
sumers.99 Insurance companies guarantee their ability to provide money to
their policyholders in situations where the policyholder might undergo an
unaffordable, unforeseeable loss."°° Thus, the reason why consumers pur-
chase hurricane insurance is to gain some sense of assurance that they will be
able to rebuild or reconstruct their home in the event of a catastrophic loss. 01
Without this guarantee, there would be no need for insurance companies.'02
Fear sets in when consumers are unable to afford to protect themselves with
hurricane insurance.103 The situation becomes worse when the consumer is
no longer in control and is refused coverage entirely. "
As "no place in Florida is immune from hurricane risk," the need to pro-
tect one's home applies to every resident of Florida." 5 People who live
along the coast cannot find hurricane insurance because private insurance
companies refuse to write them policies. 106 This is because "practically all
private insurers consider the [coast] too risky."10 7 As a result, Citizens must
provide them with the necessary insurance to protect them from potential
hurricane damage.'08 However, as noted above, Citizens' rates must be sig-
nificantly higher than those offered by private insurers. '09 Many cannot "af-
ford to live on either coast or nearby."" 0  The attitude of some is: "If you
cannot afford the cost or it is not available in your area, you should move.""'l
97. Id.
98. See TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 46.
99. See generally FLA. STAT. § 627.351 (2006).
100. Id.
101. Id
102. Id.
103. Garcia, Keys Residents Storming, supra note 9.
104. Id.
105. TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 15.
106. Interview with Walter Campbell, supra note 5.
107. Garcia, Keys Residents Storming, supra note 9.
108. See FLA. STAT. § 627.351 (2006).
109. Id.
110. Marvin Meyerhoffer, State Should Take a Role in Bolstering Citizens Insurance, THE
LEDGER (Lakeland, Fla.), Dec. 29, 2005, at A10.
111. Id.
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However, the hard truth is that "millions of coastal homeowners remain in-
adequately insured and unprepared for the [next hurricane] season."" 2
Even when Floridians are able to find residential hurricane insurance, it
costs an enormous amount."' Some believe Floridians need to gain an un-
derstanding that insurance companies are businesses that need to make a
profit to survive.'14 Since insurers are "working furiously" to secure a future
profit, it is easy for them to forget the very purpose insurance companies
were meant to serve. 15 Thus, homeowners are unable to secure insurance
rates at reasonable amounts." 6 Moreover, Citizens simply cannot afford to
cover every homeowner in Florida.' "[T]he bottom line on homeowners
insurance is harsh: Costs more. Covers less."'" 8
Further, those who spend the money to be insured have significant diffi-
culty collecting on their policy when a catastrophe actually does occur." 9 A
hurricane's impact on a community leads policyholders to make claims."12
This causes insurance companies to incur a huge loss upon payment of every
policy."'2 Therefore, insurance claims and disputes over coverage are inevi-
table. 2  Since many insurers "are not going to pay up," multiple lawsuits are
filed against insurance companies. 23 In fact, lawsuits are still taking place
from hurricanes that occurred in Florida about ten years ago. 2 4
The on-going need for a solution progresses as fewer options exist
every day. 25 Florida State Senator Walter "Skip" Campbell explains:
We are going to have a major crisis statewide with people that
can[not] afford property insurance rates and that [is] going to cre-
ate a crisis in multiple sectors of our economy. [P]eople will not
be able to sell their houses because there won't be buyers because
112. Survey Shows Residents in Hurricane- Vulnerable States Under Insured, NEW
ORLEANS CITY Bus., May 16, 2006, at 1.
113. Smith, supra note 11.
114. Robert Sims, Editorial, Insurance Industry Needs Regulating, SUN-SENTINEL, June
14, 2006, at 20A.
115. Beatrice E. Garcia, Check Your Coverage Carefully, MIAMI HERALD, May 24, 2006,
at 13 [hereinafter Garcia, Check Your Coverage].
116. Id.
117. See TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 40-41.
118. Garcia, Check Your Coverage, supra note 115.
119. Daniel Ostrovsky, Following Hurricanes, Litigation Against Insurance Companies
Increases, THE DAILY RECORD (Baltimore), Aug. 31, 2005, at 1.
120. See SEIFERT & NIEDZIELSKI, supra note 42, at 1-2.
121. Id.
122. See Ostrovsky, supra note 119.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Interview with Walter Campbell, supra note 5.
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buyers can[not] afford to pay the taxes and insurance. So, the
banks are going to hurt, the mortgage companies are going to hurt,
[the] real estate agents are going to hurt, and [the] general econ-
omy is going to start hurting because we will not have people who
can, in fact, live in our communities to perform the jobs that we
need; such as teaching, such as police officers ... this is going to
go one level even further down because we are seeing some of the
commercial property owners . . . having the same problems as the
residential community, which is they're getting hit with increased
property taxes and almost astronomical property insurance rates.
So, what do they do? [They increase rent.] This is the beginning
of the problem and it's more far-reaching than anybody can ever
think about. 1
26
Awareness of the increasing insurance problems in Florida has caused
many residents to voice their opinions as to what actions the state should take
in response to this predicament. 127 As "the continued availability of property
insurance . . . is critical to the state's economic survival," the controversial
topic of whether state action is necessary in response to hurricane insurance
problems, once again, presents itself to the Florida Legislature. 1
28
V. THE PREEMPTION OF A VERY OLD STATUTE
A. Florida's Valued Policy Law
Problems with the insurance industry prompted the Florida Legislature
to act as long ago as 1899 when its first valued policy law was put into ac-
tion. 129 "A valued policy is 'one in which the value of the thing insured, and
also the amount to be paid thereon in the event of loss, is settled by agree-
ment between the parties and inserted in the policy."" 3 The "principal ob-
ject and purpose" of Florida's valued policy law is to determine the amount
of money the insurer must pay the insured in the event of a total loss, prior to
the occurrence of such an event.' 3 ' Moreover, it "requires the insurer to as-
certain the insurable value at the time of writing the policy," and to write it
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Sims, supra note 114; Smith, supra note 11.
128. TASKFORCE2006,supra note 8, at 10.
129. See John V. Garaffa, Florida's " Valued Policy'" Law-The Eye of the Storm, 79 FLA.
B.J. 8 (Apr. 2005).
130. R. Jason Richards, Florida's "Valued Policy Law": Clarifying Some Recent Miscon-
ceptions, 79 FLA. B.J. 18, 19 (Dec. 2005) (quoting Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Curl, 721 So. 2d 431,
433 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
131. See Garaffa, supra note 129, at 8; see also FLA. STAT. § 627.702 (2006).
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therein. 3 2 The statute plays a major role in insurance law as it "is part of
every real property casualty insurance policy written on property in Flor-
ida." 133
The statute serves to prevent future problems between insurers and poli-
cyholders by resolving the issue of how much the insurer must pay without
the trouble of negotiation or litigation. 134 It "operates like a liquidated dam-
ages clause rather than as an indemnity contract."' 3 5 The statute states:
In the event of the total loss of any building, structure, mobile
home... or manufactured building... located in this state and in-
sured by any insurer as to a covered peril... the insurer's liability
under the policy for such total loss, if caused by a covered peril,
shall be in the amount of money for which such property was so
insured as specified in the policy and for which a premium has
been charged and paid. 136
The statute emphasizes that two requirements must be met to qualify
under the valued policy law. 137 First, an insurer must insure the property as a
covered peril. 138 Second, the damage incurred must amount to a total loss. 139
However, "the statute does not define the term 'total loss."" 14 ° For over a
century, it has been left to the courts to determine and define what constitutes
a total loss."'4 Two tests evolved by case law including the identity test and
the restoration test. 142
First, the identity test will apply if the damage caused to the home "is so
severe that it has lost its identity and character." '1 3 This test is satisfied even
if the home is capable of being used for an alternative useful purpose.'" The
identity test is also met in the event of a constructive total loss. 14 A con-
structive total loss occurs when "an ordinance or regulation prevents repair"
132. Garaffa, supra note 129, at 8.
133. Mierzwa v. Fla. Windstorm Underwriting Ass'n, 877 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2004).
134. See FLA. STAT. § 627.702.
135. Richards, supra note 130, at 19.
136. FLA. STAT. § 627.702(l)(a).
137. See id. § 627.702(1)(b); Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d at 775.
138. § 627.702(1)(b); Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d at 775.
139. § 627.702(l)(b); Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d at 775.
140. See FLA. STAT. § 627.702; Garaffa, supra note 129, at 10.
141. Garaffa, supra note 129, at 10.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 10-11.
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of the damage caused by the hurricane. '46 As a result, the identity is essen-
tially lost. 147 Second, the restoration test applies in situations where "a rea-
sonably prudent owner" would not rebuild property to its pre-loss condition
with the remains of the structure. 1
48
B. The State Controversy
The interpretation of the valued policy law in Florida has set forth con-
troversy between insurers and policyholders since its inception.' 49  In
Mierzwa v. Florida Windstorm Underwriting Ass 'ni5° in June 2004, the val-
ued policy law was found to apply to different covered perils insured by mul-
tiple insurers.' A homeowner's wind insurance was provided by one car-
rier, while the flood insurance was provided by another carrier.' The wind
insurer's "policy expressly excluded flood damage."' 53 A local ordinance
was applied by the court to determine whether the home was a total loss. '
54
It provided that damage caused to a structure requiring repairs amounting to
more than fifty percent of its existing value must conform to the building
code."' A determination was made "that the total cost of repairs to the in-
sured building would exceed half of its value."' 56 Following this determina-
tion, the building had to be torn down and the site elevated. '17 Thus, the
court held that despite the separate policies covering separate perils, the
combination of the damage caused by wind in addition to the damage caused
by flood amounted to a total loss and resulted in the application of the valued
policy law.'58
The court of appeals found no causation requirement in establishing a
total loss because the valued policy law was "simple and straightforward."' 59
According to the court, the valued policy law only requires the covered peril
146. Garaffa, supra note 129, at 11.
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Redding, 37 So. 62, 65 (Fla. 1904) (holding the valued pol-
icy law is constitutional).
150. 877 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
151. Id. at776.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d at 776.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 776 n.3.
158. Id. at 775.
159. Id.; Garaffa, supra note 129, at 13.
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"be a covered peril" and not "the covered peril causing the entire loss."'
160
Moreover, Mierzwa established that courts may find a total loss by combin-
ing policies and applying the valued policy law even in situations where an
insurer expressly excludes certain types of coverage. 161 "Florida courts have
for years upheld an insurer's right to recover under two separate policies in
the event of a total loss under the valued policy law."162 However, legisla-
tive intent continues to be questioned as to whether the valued policy law is
meant to apply in these specific situations where perils are expressly ex-
cluded from coverage.163 The controversy exists precisely because the insur-
ance carrier is liable for the face amount of the policy only when a total loss
is established. 1
C. Federal Preemption
In a recent decision, the United States District Court of the Northern
District of Florida held that Florida's Valued Policy Law was preempted by
federal law. 165 In Greer v. Owners Insurance Co., 166 two separate insurance
policies provided separate types of coverage for one home. 167 One insurance
company only provided wind and fire insurance, expressly excluding flood
insurance from the policy.'68 The other insurance policy only covered dam-
age caused by floods. 169 The flood insurance policy was provided by the
National Flood Insurance Program "established by Congress, through the
National Flood Insurance Act."' 17 The court placed emphasis solely on the
fact that the director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) controls "the payment or disallowance of all flood insurance
claims."'' Those "[c]laims are paid out of a National Flood Insurance Fund
in the United States Treasury."' 72 Therefore, all the terms and conditions of
160. Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d at 776 (The court places strong emphasis on the distinction
between "the" covered peril and "a" covered peril by using italics in the opinion).
161. See id. at 779.
162. Richards, supra note 130, at 18.
163. Garaffa, supra note 129, at 5.
164. See Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d at 775.
165. Greer v. Owners Ins. Co., 434 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1275 (N.D. Fla. 2006).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1269-70.
168. Id. at 1270.
169. Id.
170. Greer, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1274; see 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2000).
171. Greer, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
172. Id.
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flood insurance policies are mandated and controlled by federal, not state,
regulations. '
It usually takes the combination of wind and flood damage for a build-
ing to lose its identity or appearance, thus making it a total loss for which the
valued policy law would apply. '74 Since the state cannot regulate the amount
of compensation one might receive after incurring flood damage, the valued
policy law will no longer apply in many situations.' The state's solution to
help its residents receive reimbursement towards protecting and securing
one's home is now outdated and essentially useless. 76
The state has taken few steps toward providing a solution to Florida's
insurance problem since the first valued policy law was enacted in 1899.177
Florida's legislature has placed little responsibility on property and casualty
insurance companies to charge affordable rates.77 This includes whether
hurricane insurance must be provided by insurers in addition to the more
profitable lines already offered, or if an insurer is required to provide hurri-
cane insurance at all. 179 "Many people have a philosophical problem with
the government[] being [involved] in the insurance business."' 80 "There is
now a widespread belief among economists, policy analysts, and policy-
makers that government should intervene in a market only when conditions
for competition are not in place, and the market fails to be efficient."
'181
There is no question that the hurricane insurance industry in Florida has lost
its appeal to private insurers and the market continues to decline.8 2 "[T]he
Florida legislature [must] get tough with the insurance industry," the only
question is how. 
83
173. Id.
174. See generally Mierzwa v. Fla. Windstorm Underwriting Ass'n, 877 So. 2d 774 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
175. See Greer, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.
176. See generally id.
177. See generally Garaffa, supra note 129, at 8.
178. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. § 690-170.013 (2004). A negative inference can be
drawn from the administrative code. Id. It provides certain procedural steps an insurer must
take prior to changing rates, but does not provide a cap for which rates may not exceed. Id.
179. Id.
180. NoRcRoss, supra note 6, at 238 (emphasis added).
181. Swartz, supra note 1, at 90.
182. See Mark Hollis, Insurance Policy: Four Varied Views, SUN-SENTINEL, July 26,
2006, at 10B.
183. Smith, supra note 11.
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VI. INTENTIONS, PLANS, PROPOSALS, & PROBLEMS
One option for the federal government is to shift the risk of very high
cost coastal properties away from carriers by "tak[ing] on the role of rein-
surer." 14 A memorial written by the Florida Legislature was presented to
the United States Congress urging their support in establishing a National
Catastrophe Insurance Program (Program).'8 5 Included in the proposal, the
Florida Legislature urged the United States Congress to:
1. Provid[e] consumers with a private market residential insurance
program that provides all-perils protection.
2. Promot[e] personal responsibility through mitigation; promot[e]
the retrofitting of existing housing stock; and provid[e] individuals
with the ability to manage their own disaster savings accounts that,
similar to health savings accounts, accumulate on a tax-advantaged
basis for the purpose of paying for mitigation enhancements and
catastrophic losses.
3. Creat[e] tax-deferred insurance company catastrophe reserves to
benefit policyholders. These tax-deferred reserves would build up
over time and [would] only be eligible to be used to pay for future
catastrophic losses.
4. Enhanc[e] local and state government's role in establishing and
maintaining effective building codes, mitigation education, and
land use management; promot[e] state emergency management,
preparedness, and response; and creat[e] state or multistate re-
gional catastrophic risk financing mechanisms such as the Florida
Hurricane Catastrophe Fund.
5. Creat[e] a national catastrophe financing mechanism that would
provide a quantifiable level of risk management and financing for
mega-catastrophes; maximiz[e] the risk-bearing capacity of the
private markets; and allow[] for aggregate risk pooling of natural
disasters funded through sound risk-based premiums paid in cor-
rect proportion by all policyholders in the United States. 1
86
184. Swartz, supra note 1, at 99. The government can shift high cost risk from carriers by
either "provid[ing] financial coverage outright" or by providing reinsurance. Id.
185. Fla. HM 541 (2006). A memorial is "[a] written statement of facts presented to a
legislature... as a petition." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 445 (2d ed. 2001).
186. Fla. HM 541 (2006).
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In sum, the Program would provide a uniform approach in responding
to catastrophes.' 87 A catastrophe is defined by the Insurance Services Office
as "an event that causes $25 million or more in insured property losses and
affects a significant number of property/casualty policyholders and insur-
ers.""'88 Therefore, natural disasters are not the only types of catastrophes.' 9
In response to the memorial, three bills were introduced to the United
States Congress.'9" All three address at least one element of the national
catastrophe fund proposal.' 9' One bill proposes to create a "Consumer Hur-
ricane and Earthquake Protection Fund."'192 This bill applies to all natural
catastrophes, such as tornadoes, volcanic eruptions, and hurricanes.' 93 If
enacted, it would provide reinsurance to insurance companies at lower rates
than they can obtain on the private market. 94 Similar to Florida's Hurricane
Catastrophe Fund, the Consumer Hurricane and Earthquake Protection Fund
"would be responsible for losses up to amounts determined on a state-to-state
or regional basis."' 95  States that already have catastrophe funds, such as
Florida, would pay losses up to their limits prior to receiving income from
the national fund. '96 In effect, "[t]he national fund would sell reinsurance to
the state funds."' 97 As the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund struggles to
recapitalize, this proposed bill does not set forth future safeguards against an
unexpected depletion of funds. 98
Another bill proposes to create the "Catastrophe Savings Account Act
of 2006."'99 Adding a chapter to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, this
Act would allow consumers "to manage a personal, tax-exempt Catastrophe
Savings Account. ' '200 The account, acting as a trust fund, would secure
money to be set aside for the exclusive use of designated beneficiaries in
187. See id.
188. Fla. H.R. Comm. on NCIP, HM 541 (2006) Staff Analysis 3 (rev. Apr. 12, 2006)
[hereinafter HM 541 Staff Analysis].
189. Id.
190. Id. at 3-4.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 3.
193. HM 541 Staff Analysis, supra note 188, at 3-4.
194. Id. at 3.
195. Id. at 4.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See HM 541 Staff Analysis, supra note 188, at 3-4.
199. Id. at 4.
200. Id.
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their time of need.21 The bill would establish certain requirements to be met
delineating which money would qualify under the Act. 212
The third bill presented to Congress proposes to create the "Policy-
holder Disaster Protection Act of 2005."'203 This bill suggests that Congress
provide incentives to insurance companies to provide natural disaster insur-
ance by revising the current tax laws.20 4 It recommends that insurance com-
panies have the ability to defer their taxes on claims arising from natural
disasters.205 The event must be a windstorm, earthquake, fire, flood, volcanic
eruption, tsunami, winter catastrophe, or hail.20 6 Further, it must be desig-
nated a catastrophe by either the President of the United States, the Property
Claim Services, "or by the chief executive official of a [s]tate or territory of
the United States, or the District of Columbia."2 7
While all three bills purport to move toward the goal of providing sta-
bility in the hurricane insurance industry, "[t]hey don't deal with reality or
solve problems, they just move money around., 28 Since damage caused by
hurricanes is unpredictable, it is difficult for insurance companies to calcu-
late future projections. 29 A national catastrophe fund, applying to all natural
catastrophes, is said to help make future projections more predictable.210 In
effect, this would allow insurance companies to "make a reasonable estimate
of what their losses will be and what they have to charge., 211 A national
catastrophe fund conceptually would provide a solution for stabilizing the
hurricane insurance market, while allowing consumers to have access to such
funds. 212  Since flood insurance policies are controlled by federal regula-
tion, 213 a conclusion may be drawn that natural catastrophe insurance policies
should be controlled by federal regulation as well. However, similar plans
have been presented to the United States Congress in the past and have failed
simply because there was not a nationwide natural catastrophe insurance
market.214
201. Id. One wonders if the tax benefit of having this trust account would ever amount to
enough to compensate for a significant loss in the event of a natural disaster. Id
202. HM 541 Staff Analysis, supra note 188, at 4.
203. Id. at 4.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. HM 541 Staff Analysis, supra note 188, at 4.
208. NORCROSS, supra note 6, at 239.
209. Id. at 237.
210. See id.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 238.
213. 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2000).
214. Hollis, supra note 182; see generally SEIFERT & NIEDZIELSKI, supra note 42, at 5-20.
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On November 7, 2006, Florida elected Charlie Crist as its new gover-
nor.215 Throughout the race, all four candidates formulated ideas concerning
hurricane insurance issues, as it was "one of the most talked-about items in
the Florida governor's race. Since then, Florida residents increasingly
"demand" government action. 2 7  Governor Crist also recognizes that "the
need to deliver Floridians relief from high insurance prices" must take prior-
ity.218 In response, the Florida Legislature called a special session specifi-
cally addressing the issue of hurricane insurance.2 9 While all of the propos-
als attempted to lessen the problem, none of them provided an actual solution
to the problem. 220 "In the last three decades, economists and, increasingly,
politicians have argued that the free market advances economic growth and
opportunity more effectively than government policies intended to achieve
such goals.",22' However, the goal of supporting efficiency is based on the
existence of an already competitive marketplace.22 2 Another factor to con-
sider is that the property insurance industry "spends millions of dollars a year
to influence public policy in Florida.2 23  As such, the legislators are not
likely to enforce or create any significant regulations on private insurance
224
companies.
VII. FLORIDA STANDS ALONE
The business of hurricane insurance has a responsibility to provide pro-
tection for their clients, which results in a conflict of interest. The com-
pany's desire to make a profit no longer accommodates the client's desire for
safety resulting in a lose-lose situation. In a high risk industry, such as Flor-
215. Florida Department of State: Division of Elections-Election Results: November 7,
2006 General Election, Official Results, http://election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/
index.asp?ElectionDate=l 1/7/2006 (select "Governor and Cabinet") (last visited May 27,
2007).
216. Hollis, supra note 182.
217. Off to a Stormy Start, SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 17, 2007, at IA.
218. Kathy Bushouse, Mark Hollis, & Linda Kleindienst, Insurance Rates May Drop 25%,
SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 18, 2007, at IA.
219. Kathy Bushouse, What Wrecked Property Insurance?, SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 13, 2007,
at IA.
220. See id. The proposals included an expansion of the FHCF, freezing Citizens' rates at
the 2006 levels, requiring private insurers who sell homeowners insurance in other states to
also sell homeowners insurance in Florida, and allowing homeowners to buy property insur-
ance without hurricane coverage. Id.
221. Swartz, supra note 1, at 89.
222. Id. at 89-90.
223. Jason Garcia & John Kennedy, Insurance Giants Wield Their Might: Companies
Spend Millions on Campaigns and Lobbying, SN-SENTINEL, Jan. 16, 2007, at IA.
224. See generally id
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ida's hurricane insurance industry, one option is for the insurance companies
to charge higher rates making hurricane insurance unaffordable. 225 Another
option is for the government to require insurance companies to charge lower
rates causing their businesses to suffer.226 A third option is for the federal
government to provide more funds for reinsurance and hope that insurance
companies will lower prices if they can attain lower reinsurance rates. 2 7
The first option has already taken place as premium rates for hurricane
insurance coverage have increased, leaving many Floridians uninsured.228
The second option will help lower hurricane insurance rates, but companies
will attempt to balance their loss by increasing rates in other types of insur-
ance they offer.229 While the third option will help the coastal states and
other states regularly prone to natural disasters, as already discussed, it is not
necessary to every state's needs.23 °
As certainty and stability in the natural catastrophe insurance market is
not enough of an incentive for the federal government to establish a national
solution, the alternative option is for the state government to "provide finan-
cial coverage outright. 231' Florida's unique tropical atmosphere brings se-
vere storms and hurricanes, causing significant damage to residents' homes
every year.232 There is no discrepancy that "insurance companies are not in
the insurance business when it comes to hurricanes., 23 3 "[I]f the government
acts to cover the costs of the worst risks, an inefficient market can become
more efficient, and a non-functioning market can be stimulated to form.
23 4
In furtherance of protecting both the interests of the insurance company
and the interests of the policyholder, the state should provide hurricane in-
surance to its residents. This type of "radical" state action is justified be-
cause hurricane insurance in Florida is now recognized as a necessity, not a
privilege.23 5 Since the government has the ability to tax, the amount of
money previously given to insurance companies to cover hurricane insurance
225. SEIFERT & NIEDZIELSKI, supra note 42, at 1-2.
226. See id. at 21.
227. See Swartz, supra note 1, at 99.
228. See, e.g., Stephanie Horvath, Premium Pressures Force Tough Choices: Homeown-
ers Insurance Rate Hikes, PALM BEACH POST, May 29, 2006, at IF (explaining how one cou-
ple dropped their insurance coverage when the hurricane coverage increased 194%).
229. See SEIFERT & NIEDZIELSKI, supra note 42, at 20.
230. See Swartz, supra note 1, at 99.
231. See id.
232. See NORCROSS, supra note 6, at 195, 236.
233. Id. at 238.
234. Swartz, supra note 1, at 99.
235. See Price, supra note 25 (quoting Bill Newton, the executive director of the Florida
Consumer Action Network).
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should instead be invested and reserved by the state government for catastro-
phic situations. A condition precedent to being entitled to these funds would
be the requirement that each Florida resident assess the value of their home
qualifying them for a certain amount of insurance based on various factors.
By completely removing hurricane insurance from Florida's insurance mar-
ket, insurers no longer have to concern themselves with raising prices or liti-
gation following unpaid claims. The insurance industry will continue to re-
main profitable, as it will offer all other lines of insurance. Further, residents
of Florida will effectively secure hurricane coverage with the guarantee that
there will be enough funds to pay for their claims.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The catastrophic hurricanes which Florida has experienced over the past
few years have caused many people to suffer. As a result, insurance compa-
nies reacted by decreasing their exposure to the market. In effect, most resi-
dents of Florida are left without any hurricane insurance at all. Others are
left spending enormous amounts of money protecting their homes. The de-
cline of the hurricane insurance industry in Florida is part of a chain reaction
causing the state's economy to suffer.236 People from other states are less
likely to move to Florida.237 This prevents Florida residents from having the
opportunity to sell their homes.238 Further, Florida residents who cannot
afford to purchase hurricane insurance come to the realization that they will
need to move to a state with lower risk exposure.2 39
Florida's few remedies offered, including Citizens and the Florida Hur-
ricane Catastrophe Fund, are not adequately functioning to meet the many
needs which they were intended to address.24° Both Citizens and the Florida
Hurricane Catastrophe Fund are still trying to recapitalize after the previous
two hurricane seasons. 241' At the same time, an increasing number of hurri-
cane insurance companies are evacuating the Florida market.242 Therefore,
recapitalization for Citizens will be very difficult as it fulfills its duty as the
insurer of last resort and assumes every policy that is unable to acquire pro-
243tection.
236. See Interview with Walter Campbell, supra note 5.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See generally TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8.
241. Id. at 40-42.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 40.
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The need for the government, federal or state, to restore the natural ca-
tastrophe insurance market is ripe for review2 Current proposals for gov-
ernment involvement do not provide an ultimate solution to stabilizing Flor-
ida's insurance market.245 The state urges Congress to aid in Florida's fight
for survival from catastrophic events. 246 At the same time, the federal gov-
ernment restrains from interfering with state policies against natural disas-
ters. This is due to the belief that it would not be of concern to every state.
State government involvement will provide stability in the hurricane insur-
ance market, but will not address every problem hurricane insurance presents
to insurers, policyholders, or the state itself. Therefore, the controversy re-
mains as to how the state or federal government should react as government
involvement with the insurance industry will infringe on traditional concepts
of free trade. 47 Still, recognition of government involvement is evolving
allowing for future changes to be made to adapt to new problems that arise.
244. Id.
245. See Hollis, supra note 182.
246. Id.
247. See id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Every year the United States is devastated by multiple natural disas-
ters.' Whether it is a hurricane ravaging the coastline with its winds exceed-
ing 100 miles per hour, extreme flooding leaving thousands stranded and
* J.D. Candidate 2008, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center. Jenni-
fer Sniffen has a B.A. in English from the University of North Carolina at Charlotte with a
minor in Mass Media Communications. The author wishes to give special thanks to her par-
ents for their continuous encouragement and support. She would also like to extend recogni-
tion to Professor Leslie Cooney for her valuable suggestions, and the entire Nova Law Review
staff for their tremendous amount of time and hard work.
1. See generally Norman M. Goldfarb, Hurricane Katrina: There's More Where That
Came From, I J. CLINICAL RES. BEST PRACS., Oct. 2005.
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homeless, an earthquake on the west coast, a fire, or a terrorist attack threat-
ening the lives of many;2 natural disasters are not new and unfamiliar occur-
rences across the United States.3 In 2005, the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency declared sixty-eight natural disasters in the United States and
its territories.4 Because natural disasters continuously occur,5 the impacts on
contractual obligations become important to parties seeking relief from
breach of contract claims that result from the inability to perform due to the
occurrence of a disaster.6
Typically, "[c]ontract liability is strict liability," and therefore, contracts
are formed with the intention to be absolute.7 A party, as a result, may be
liable for breach of contract even when the party is not at fault.8 A claim of
force majeure can be asserted as an affirmative defense by a party in a suit
arising out of nonperformance of contractual obligations. 9 Force majeure is
either used to describe an "event or occurrence, or [a] legal concept."1°
"Force majeure" is a French term that is defined as a supervening force."
2. See THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 5 (2006),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-leamed.pdf [hereinafter
FEDERAL RESPONSE].
3. See Goldfarb, supra note 1. Natural disasters affect many parts of the United States
each year, specifically forty-one states and territories in 2004. Id. Although a terrorist attack
is not considered a natural disaster because it is not a force of nature, in the past few years, the
common characteristics between a natural disaster and a terrorist attack were recognized. See
Marc Racicot, Learning from the Storm, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 9, 2006, available at
http://www.aiadc.org/AIAdotNET/docHandler.aspx?DocID=298620; Marc Sandalow, War on
Terror: Four Years After 9/11: The Quest for National Security, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 11, 2005,
at Al; Jon Elliston, Disaster in the Making, INDEP. WKLY., Sept. 22, 2004, available at
http://www.indyweek.com/gyrobase/Content?oid=oid%3A22664. Additionally, the conse-
quences flowing from terrorist attacks, like natural disasters, are beyond the control of the
parties involved in contracts and the events may result in catastrophic effects. See Racicot,
supra; Cathryn A. Reynolds & Alexander P. Steffan, Reconsidering Force Majeure Clauses in
the Wake of Increased Acts of Terrorism, REAL EST. BAR ASS'N (Fall 2004), available at
http://www.rc.com/documents/Force%20MajeureREBA 11.04.pdf.
4. Goldfarb, supra note 1.
5. See id.
6. See FEDERAL RESPONSE, supra note 2.
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11 introductory note (1981).
8. See id. § 261.
9. 1 AM. JuR. 2D Act of God § 3 (2005).
10. "Force Majeure'" and "Fortuitous Event" as Circumstances Precluding Wrongful-
ness: Survey of State Practice, International Judicial Decisions and Doctrine, [1978] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 66, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/315/1977.
11. James Seely, Force Majeure-Planning for the Unexpected,
http://www.excelmeetings.com/about/articles/forceMajeure.htm (last visited May 27, 2006).
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Although force majeure is not a new concept to the area of contract law,12
the presence of force majeure clauses in contracts are becoming more impor-
tant after natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina occur. 3 However, "not
all contracts [include] force majeure clauses,"14 and often, even if they do,
the term is merely stated in the contract and is likely considered boilerplate
because it is not bargained for. 5
After the 2005 hurricane season, merely including a force majeure
clause in a contract is not enough. 16 This could become a problem for parties
faced with large penalties and damages for a breach of contract because typi-
cally a force majeure clause will excuse a party's performance under a con-
tract when there is an unavoidable "event beyond the party's control,"' 7 mak-
ing the party's performance impossible. 8 Additionally, considering that the
occurrence of category four and five hurricanes, cyclones, and typhoons have
significantly increased over the past thirty-five years,' 9 and many more re-
gions of the United States may also be affected as a result, businesses and
other parties are likely to depend on the ability to seek relief from perform-
ance of contractual obligations because of an event beyond its control.
20
Furthermore, while there may not be many breach of contract lawsuits fol-
lowing disasters in 2005 that are currently published, they will continue to
12. P.J.M. Declercq, Modern Analysis of the Legal Effect of Force Majeure Clauses in
Situations of Commercial Impracticability, 15 J.L. & CoM. 213, 213 (1995).
13. Ned Bergin, Force Majeure Issues Relating to Katrina (Sept. 21, 2005),
http://www.joneswalker.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/ForceMajeure.pdf. Hurricane Katrina af-
fected many businesses and other parties to contracts and their "ability ... to fulfill their con-
tractual obligations." Id.; see also Reynolds & Steffan, supra note 3. Following September
11, 2001, it is likely that contracts will be reexamined and the definition of force majeure will
be expanded to include "acts of terrorism" that may be either actual or threatened. Reynolds
& Steffan, supra note 3. By expanding the definition of force majeure, contracting parties
will be given extra protection against nonperformance. Id.
14. Denise L. Nestel, Force Majeure Clauses: The Basics, CONSTR. EXECUTIVE, Feb.
2006, at 42.
15. See Seely, supra note 11.
16. See Porter & Hedges LLP, Force Majeure: One Size Does Not Fit All (July 3, 2006),
http://www.porterhedges.com/Page.aspx?AbsDocID=39121 BF4-B4A4-4F83-B080-A4B7F
196936D.
17. HURRICANE KATRINA HELPING HANDBOOK: A RESOURCE FOR INDIVIDUALS, FAMILIES,
AND SMALL BUSINESSES 17-9 (2005), http://www.mofo.com/about/Katrina.pdf [hereinafter
HURRICANE KATRINA HELPING HANDBOOK].
18. Nestel, supra note 14, at 42.
19. Goldfarb, supra note 1.
20. See Nick Nierengarten, Be Sure Your Company Is on Solid Legal Ground, Just in
Case, STAR TRIB., Dec. 18, 2005, available at http://gpmlaw.com/gpmwww/pdfs/Nierengarten
%20Star/o20Tribune%201205.pdf.
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increase in the future.2 Like claims following the September 11 terrorist
attacks, it could be a long time before claims resulting from Hurricane
Katrina and other disasters "find their way through [our] court system.5
22
In the remaining sections of this article, other important concepts in-
volving force majeure clauses will be discussed. Part II will give an over-
view of force majeure and why force majeure clauses are necessary in con-
tracts. Part III will explain how a party to a contract seeking to have nonper-
formance of obligations excused is able to invoke a force majeure clause and
the steps that need to be fulfilled in order for the force majeure clause to be a
defense to breach of contract claims. Part IV will go into detail about the
most common types of contracts affected by force majeure events. Part V
will conclude the discussion and summarize all of the important concepts and
issues that follow force majeure clauses.
II. A GENERAL OVERVIEW: THE FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE DEFINED
Force majeure is considered "[a]n event or effect that can be neither an-
ticipated nor controlled." 23 As a result, not all conditions or events are situa-
tions that will excuse performance of contractual obligations,24 and therefore
contractual obligations can only be excused under force majeure in extreme
and unusual circumstances, such as a hurricane. 25 Likewise, force majeure is
used all over the world to excuse obligations under a contract where causes
beyond a party's control create an inability for a party to perform.26  A
party's inability to perform under a contract must be determined based on an
objective standard, which shows that no one could perform the party's obli-
gations under the contract.27 For example, "[e]xtraordinary circumstances
may occur during the life of a contract and prevent a party from performing
its obligations. 28
21. See Celia Hitch, Hurricanes, Terrorists, Pandemics, and Force Majeure: Have You
Looked at Your Lease Lately? REAL EST. BRIEF, Summer 2006, at 2.
22. Id.
23. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 673 (8th ed. 2004).
24. Nestel, supra note 14, at 42.
25. AM. HOTEL & LODGING ASS'N, MEETING IN THE MIDDLE 6 (2005).
26. 6 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O'CONNOR, JR., BRUNER AND O'CONNOR ON
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 21:6 (2002).
27. HURRICANE KATRINA HELPING HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 17-9.
28. Torys LLP, The Technology Group, Memorandum, Force Majeure: Contracting to
Deal With Extraordinary Events (Aug. 3, 2001), http://www.torys.com/publications/pdf/
artech-21 t.pdf.
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Because force majeure refers to a superior or irresistible force, it is of-
ten used interchangeably with an "act of God.",29  An act of God excuses
events beyond the control of mere human agency3" and occurs when there is
an intervention of an "extraordinary, violent, and destructive agent, [which
because of] its very nature raises a presumption that no human means could
resist its effect."31 Furthermore, when the subject matter of a contract is de-
stroyed because of an act of God and the party seeking to be excused is not at
fault, the contract will be terminated relieving both parties of any further
obligations.3 2 In many instances, specific weather conditions have been con-
sidered acts of God when the necessary prerequisites were met.33 For in-
stance, a "severe weather [condition] must be atypical, unexpected, and...
have an adverse impact" on the party's performance under the contract.34
Although courts have found the two terms to be similar, they have also
recognized that force majeure is a more expansive concept.35 A force ma-
jeure clause is placed in a contract so that the contracting parties know what
types of events and circumstances will create an impossibility to perform as a
result of an act of God.36 Additionally, a force majeure clause is included in
a contract in order for the parties to expressly allocate risk and to provide
notice to the parties that the occurrence of certain events may result in sus-
pension of their performance,37 thereby excusing a party's obligations with-
out incurring any liability for damages.38 As a result, some parties may be
wrongfully claiming force majeure as a defense when there is no express
allocation of risk.3 9 Generally, if one party's performance is excused, the
29. 1 AM. JuR. 2D Act of God § 2 (2005).
30. 5 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O'CONNOR, JR., BRUNER AND O'CONNOR ON
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 15:46 (2002).
31. Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Finlay, 185 So. 904, 905 (Ala. 1939) (quoting Steele &
Burgess v. Townsend, 37 Ala. 247, 256 (Ala. 1861)).
32. 17B C.J.S. Contracts § 525 (1999).
33. 1 AM. JuR. 2D Act of God § 4. Some weather conditions found to be acts of God are
droughts, flooding, freezing temperatures, fog, high winds or a hurricane, ice storms, and
lightning. Id.
34. Donald W. Gregory & Stuart W. Harris, Floods, Acts of God, and Force Majeure
Clauses, CODE NEWS, Jan./Feb. 2005, available at
http://www.keglerbrown.com/publications/construction/industry/code-news/050101-dwg-
swh.asp.
35. 1 AM. JuR. 2D Act of God § 2.
36. Perlman v. Pioneer Ltd. P'ship, 918 F.2d 1244, 1248 n.5 (5th Cir. 1990).
37. Nierengarten, supra note 20.
38. Jennifer M. Bund, Note & Comment Force Majeure Clause: Drafting Advice for the
CISG Practitioner, 17 J.L. & COM. 381, 399 (1998).
39. Nierengarten, supra note 20.
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other party's performance is also excused.4° However, a party cannot invoke
a force majeure clause if the event causing nonperformance involved human
intervention.4 This is a common occurrence when a party is not directly
affected by the force majeure event, such as the inability to obtain materials
because the supplier cannot provide and deliver the materials needed.42
Therefore, a force majeure clause is not an all-inclusive fixed rule of law that
regulates every force majeure clause inserted in a contract; it will usually
explain the specific types of circumstances that will excuse nonperform-
ance.
43
Force majeure clauses do not apply in every situation where one party is
unable to fulfill obligations under a contract. 4 A party seeking excuse from
performance as a result of a change in economic circumstances, greater ex-
penses, fear of travel, or a threat of any type will not be granted relief from
nonperformance.45 Consequently, when buyers of property in New York
City executed an agreement and then defaulted because they feared traveling
after the September 11 terrorist attacks,46 a court held that their obligations
would not be excused. 7 Furthermore, if fear and uncertainty were enough to
constitute force majeure, thereby excusing performance, "contracting would
no longer provide any stability and predictability. 48
III. THE PROCESS FOR INVOKING A FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE
A force majeure clause can be invoked, excusing performance of obli-
gations due to situations explained in the clause, when the situation provided
in the contract does in fact occur 49 and then prevents performance." Once
an event that triggers a force majeure clause occurs, the party seeking relief
40. Bergin, supra note 13, at 1.
41. Fla. Power Corp. v. City of Tallahassee, 18 So. 2d 671, 675 (Fla. 1944). "[The event]
must be the sole proximate cause of the nonperformance, without the participation of man,
whether by active intervention or negligence or failure to act." Id.
42. See Nestel, supra note 14, at 42.
43. Perlman v. Pioneer Ltd. P'ship, 918 F.2d 1244, 1248 n.5 (5th Cir. 1990).
44. AM. HOTEL & LODGING ASS'N, supra note 25, at 7.
45. Id.
46. Uzan v. 845 UN Ltd. P'ship, 778 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172-73 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); See
also infra text accompanying note 211. If the parties in Uzan had not been able to get to the
United States because flights were not operating, they may have had a force majeure excuse to
nonperformance or delay of performance. See generally 1 AM. JUR. 2D Act of God § 4.
47. Uzan, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 178.
48. OWBR, LLC v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1224 (D.
Haw. 2003).
49. See Nestel, supra note 14, at 42.
50. Id. at 43.
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must determine how it affects its obligations under the contract.51 For in-
stance, if the force majeure event does not affect the parties' ability to fulfill
any of their obligations and business can continue normally, the force ma-
jeure clause is not necessary and cannot be invoked as a defense to nonper-
formance. 2 After a force majeure clause is officially invoked, "courts will
enforce [the] clause unless it is 'manifestly unreasonable.' 5 3
The party seeking excuse from nonperformance has the burden to prove
that the force majeure clause should be invoked. 4 Generally, in order for a
force majeure clause to be invoked by a party seeking to excuse nonperform-
ance, certain prerequisites must be met.55 First, the event has to be found to
fall within the terms provided for in the clause. 6 Second, the event must
have reasonably been beyond that control of the party seeking to be excused
from performance.57 Third, it must be determined what effect the force ma-
jeure event will have on the obligations of the party seeking to be excused.58
Finally, the party seeking relief must provide notice to the other party to the
contract.59
A. Examining the Language Present in the Clause
The language contained in a force majeure clause must be relied upon
and analyzed in order to determine what constitutes a force majeure event,
thus triggering the clause, and to figure out its effect on a party's contractual
duties.6° Force majeure clauses should identify the effects of certain trigger-
ing events on each party's obligations.6 Often, the clause will provide that
at the time a specific event or set of events occurs, each party's obligations
are either suspended for the duration of the triggering event6 2 or may be ter-
51. Joni R. Paulus & Dirk J. Meeuwig, Force Majeure-Beyond Boilerplate, 37 ALTA. L.
REv. 302, 308 (1999).
52. Id.
53. Bund, supra note 38, at 401.
54. R & B Falcon Corp. v. Am. Exploration Co., 154 F. Supp. 2d 969, 973 (S.D. Tex.
2001).
55. Declercq, supra note 12, at 230.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Bund, supra note 38, at 406.
60. Maralex Res., Inc. v. Gilbreath, 76 P.3d 626, 636 (N.M. 2003).
61. Paulus & Meeuwig, supra note 51, at 309.
62. Id.
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minated along with the contract. 63 "[T]he scope and application of a force
majeure clause depend on the terms of the contract. '6 For example, if the
clause limits the events that trigger it to specific acts of God, then the event
must be nonhuman and occur without any human intervention to become an
excuse for nonperformance which the parties intended to be sufficient during
contract formation. 65 In Perlman v. Pioneer Ltd. Partnership,66 the court
stated that when the language in the contract is unambiguous, it will trump
the principals of force majeure because a court should not interject terms that
the parties did not bargain for.67 Additionally, when a devastating force ma-
jeure event occurs, the language in the contract is important to the parties
trying to escape liability because not all delays causing nonperformance will
be excused and the clause will inform a party as to whether the performance
of obligations under the contract are suspended, delayed, or terminated all
together.68
[M]any clauses are ... limited to delays 'in shipment' of goods
and [will] not cover shortages of supply [or] availability of [a]
product. Thus, while the delays in shipments while export eleva-
tors re-open and catch up with back logs may be covered by most
clauses, longer term shortages due.., to the failure in the supply
chain, crop failure, or lack of refining capacity may not.
6 9
1. Specificity of the Clause
Generally, a force majeure clause that is clearly drafted will be enforced
according to the specific language provided, which will determine the inter-
pretation a court will put on it.7" A clause's wording can expand or limit the
types of events that will be considered severe enough to warrant relief from
63. Demrie Wilkinson, In the Wake of the Hurricane: The Lessons of a Force Majeure
Clause-Oh When the Saints . . ., 10 PROPERTY WRITES 4, 6 (2006), available at
http://www.hklaw.com/content/newsletters/property/property021606.pdf.
64. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Hunt Petroleum, Inc., 157 S.W.3d 462, 466 (Tex. Ct. App.
2004). "Where a contract specifies that upon the occurrence of force majeure, the contractual
obligations are suspended, it is clear that the parties intend that the present obligations to
deliver and take gas are suspended through the duration of the force majeure." Paulus &
Meeuwig, supra note 51, at 311.
65. Nestel, supra note 14, at 42.
66. 918 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1990).
67. Id. at 1248.
68. Richards Butler, Client Alert: Legal Implications of Hurricane Katrina (2005) (on
file with Nova Law Review).
69. Id.
70. R & B Falcon Corp. v. Am. Exploration Co., 154 F. Supp. 2d 969, 973 (S.D. Tex.
2001).
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performance.7' Whether the clause constructed in the contract is considered
broad or narrow plays a big part in determining the types of events that will
excuse contractual duties.72 Consequently, courts have held that the tradi-
tional definition of force majeure should not be relied upon when the parties
indicate the effect, scope, and application of the term as applied to their con-
tract.73 Furthermore, the precise language in the contract should be exam-
ined to provide evidence of the parties' intent and to determine what events
excuse performance under the force majeure clause.74
When a clause is narrowly constructed, it will list specific events that
prevent performance and include only a narrow catch-all phrase so that the
contracting parties should not have any problem determining what events
will qualify for excuse under the force majeure clause.75 If the force majeure
clause specifically includes the event that actually prevents performance,
then it will be excused.76 However, if the clause is constructed broadly, the
wording will often create an ambiguity, and the events that are likely to be
covered under the clause will be harder for parties to determine.77 This is
because a broad force majeure clause only states a few events that will qual-
ify as force majeure events and then provides a catch-all phrase like "or other
events beyond its control" or "[other] unavoidable causes."78 If this is the
case, and the clause doesn't specifically define "force majeure," it will
probably be considered a catch-all force majeure provision,79 resulting in the
clause being construed against the drafter.8" Therefore, a broad force ma-
jeure clause will be narrowly interpreted, only encompassing the specific
events or things stated in the contract,81 because "general words are not to be
given expansive meaning; they are confined to [the] things of the same kind
71. Id.
72. HURRICANE KATRINA HELPING HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 17-10.
73. R & B Falcon Corp., 154 F. Supp. 2d at 973.
74. Id.
75. HURRICANE KATRINA HELPING HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 17-10.
76. Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295, 296 (N.Y. 1987).
77. Paulus & Meeuwig, supra note 51, at 307.
78. HURRICANE KATRINA HELPING HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 17-10. "No party shall
be liable for any failure to perform its obligations in connection with any action described in
this Agreement, if such failure results from any act of God, riot, war, civil unrest, flood, earth-
quake, or other cause beyond such party's reasonable control." Force Majeure Clause in
Contracts, ALLBUSINESS.COM, http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/contracts-agreements/541-
I.html (last visited May 27, 2007).
79. Declercq, supra note 12, at 225.
80. Paulus & Meeuwig, supra note 51, at 307.
81. Seitz v. Mark-O-Lite Sign Contractors, Inc., 510 A.2d 319, 321 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1986).
2007]
154
Nova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol31/iss3/1
NOVA LA WREVIEW
or nature as the particular matters mentioned. 8 2 Courts have concluded that
if a party at the time of contracting wishes to receive protection beyond the
impracticability doctrine, the clause should be written with particularity and
not general language.83 Furthermore, unless the clause provides that the
events are "without limitation,"' the events that are included in the contract
as those that will excuse a party's obligations may not excuse nonperform-
ance after all.85
2. Contracts Without Force Majeure Clauses
Fortunately, the absence of a force majeure clause in a contract will not
always be detrimental to a party seeking to be excused. 6 The clause does
not necessarily have to be written in the contract because it can be oral; how-
ever, it may then be subject to the Statute of Frauds. 87 Additionally, a force
majeure clause may be found to be an implied-in-fact risk allocation by the
parties, which is evidenced by their intentions. 8 A majority of jurisdictions
will still excuse a party that cannot fulfill obligations under a contract as a
result of a force majeure event, even when no force majeure clause can be
found in the contract.89 Only a minority of jurisdictions continue to hold that
a party who does not perform will still be held liable for their nonperform-
ance when a force majeure clause is not present in the contract. 90 Some
courts will not even automatically excuse a party to a contract when the in-
ability to perform their obligations is due to a force majeure event that was
provided for in the clause. 9' A court will likely expect the party seeking
82. Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295, 297 (N.Y. 1987).
83. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 13.19 (5th ed. 2003).
84. Yale University Library, Licensing Digital Information, Licensing Terms & Descrip-
tions: Force Majeure (2000), http://www.library.yale.edu/-Ilicense/forcecls.shtml.
Neither party shall be liable in damages or have the right to terminate this Agreement for any
delay or default in performing hereunder if such delay or default is caused by conditions be-
yond its control including, but not limited to [a]cts of God, [g]ovemment restrictions,... wars,
insurrections, and/or any other cause beyond the reasonable control of the party whose per-
formance is affected.
Id.
85. Nestel, supra note 14, at 42.
86. Joan Teshima, Annotation, Gas and Oil Lease Force Majeure Provivisions: Con-
struction and Effect, 46 A.L.R.4TH 976, 981 (1986). At least "one treatise claims that it does
not view the absence of a force majeure clause from an oil and gas lease as having special
significance." Id. at 983.
87. PERILLO, supra note 83, § 13.19.
88. Id.
89. Nestel, supra note 14, at 43.
90. Id.
91. Bund, supra note 38, at 400.
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excuse to establish that it was actually prevented from performing its obliga-
tions and that the event causing nonperformance was not reasonably within
its control.92
Likewise, without a force majeure clause in the contract, parties could
be at the mercy of a court's interpretation and application of legal principles
to their contract. 93 Sometimes, however, when there is not a force majeure
clause in the contract, a party can look to applicable state statues that address
defenses to nonperformance of contract obligations. 94 Parties affected by
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita are able to consult the Louisiana Civil Code
Articles to determine how they apply to nonperformance under their specific
contract if the parties never addressed how a hurricane or other force majeure
event would impact their obligations to each other.95 Similarly, parties to
contracts faced with breach of contract claims in other states may also con-
sult various state statutes for relief concerning force majeure issues.96
B. Reasonably Beyond the Control of the Breaching Party
In order for a breaching party to present a defense to the nonperform-
ance of contractual obligations, the force majeure clause may be invoked if
the event was beyond the control of the party seeking to be excused from
performance.97 Under common law, the impossibility to perform, or events
reasonably beyond a party's control were essential to force majeure
clauses. 98 Events outside one's control might include acts of God, sudden
illness, fire, theft, natural disasters, or other situations where parties cannot
take actions to protect themselves from risk.99 In proving that the event is
beyond the breaching party's control, this party must have performed in good
faith and must show that no reasonable steps could have been taken to avoid
the event.'0° If an extraordinary event occurs, it will be characterized as a
force majeure event if the party's failure to perform-not the event itself-
92. Id.
93. See Wilkinson, supra note 63, at 5.
94. See Eric Lockridge & Dean Cazenave, Post-Katrina Louisiana Contracts and the
Doctrine of Impossibility (2005), available at
http://www.keanmiller.com/pubs/Doctrine%20otP/o20lmpossibility.pdf.
95. Id.
96. Bergin, supra note 13, at 1.
97. Nestel, supra note 14, at 42.
98. Porter & Hedges LLP, supra note 16.
99. Seely, supra note 11.
100. Delclerq, supra note 12, at 238.
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could not have reasonably been prevented. 0' Merely claiming that the event
could have been prevented is immaterial.0 2 In Atkinson Gas Co. v.
Albrecht,10 3 the force majeure clause in a gas and oil lease was not triggered
when the Railroad Commission required a well to be shut in because the
company failed to comply with specific regulations that were within its rea-
sonable control."0
Another way a court can determine whether the nonperformance of the
contract was reasonably beyond the control of the breaching party is to look
at whether the parties contemplated the event at the time of contracting. 105
Generally, the parties will be found to have either contemplated or not con-
templated the supervening event.'1 6 Although contemplation of the force
majeure event is technically a subjective concept, it has been transformed
into an objective concept through a reasonableness test.'0 7 When a party's
performance is objectively impossible, it literally cannot perform due to cir-
cumstances beyond its control.'0 8 However, when a party's performance is
only subjectively impossible, performance is technically possible, and a party
may be responsible in some way for the nonperformance. 09 In Perlman, the
party's nonperformance was not excused because the event creating nonper-
formance was reasonably within its control and was foreseeable at the time
of contracting."' Furthermore, Perlman's performance had not been ren-
dered impossible or untenable-an important prerequisite needed to invoke a
force majeure clause excusing nonperformance. "'
1. Foreseeability
Many force majeure clauses require an event to be unforeseeable at the
time the contract is formed. 112 This is because "under some circumstances, a
party may have [actually] assumed the risk of an unforeseen force majeure
101. Bruce Leshine, Force Majeure After 9/11: New Issues in a New World,
OUTSOURCING J., Feb. 2003, http://www.lb3law.com/docs/ForceMajeureOJFeb03.cfin.
102. See Atkinson Gas Co. v. Albrecht, 878 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App. 1994).
103. Id. at 236.
104. Id. at 241.
105. 2 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, BRUNER AND O'CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 7.230.53
(2002).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 305 (2004).
109. Id.
110. 918 F.2d 1244, 1248-49 (5th Cir. 1990).
111. Id. at 1248, 1250.
112. Nestel, supra note 14, at 42-43.
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event.""' 3 The concept of foreseeability, when used to invoke a force ma-
jeure clause as an excuse to performance, can often be controversial, espe-
cially if the event that causes nonperformance was foreseeable at the time of
contracting." 4 Many cases have held that a party cannot use a force majeure
defense when the contract failed to cover a foreseeable risk. 5 As a result, if
steps were not taken to protect against the breach and the parties did not dis-
cuss the impact of the event on the parties' contractual obligations, relief will
not be granted to the party seeking to be excused. 6
Because a force majeure event may be generally foreseeable, but not
specifically, the foreseeability test is based on the parties' hindsight and is
often ambiguous in its application. 117 This is likely to be an issue following
Hurricane Katrina and other natural disasters where the event itself may have
been foreseeable, but not the unexpected mass destruction that inadvertently
results from it." 8 The possibility of such catastrophic flooding that occurred
as a result of a Category 4 hurricane hitting New Orleans on August 29,
2005, "9 was incredibly slim, despite the foreseeability that a Category 4 or 5
hurricane could hit New Orleans straight on. 1
20
Consequently, courts have expressed greater "concern for the reason-
ableness of the parties' foresight" regarding specific circumstances rather
than the objective foreseeability of the actual event occurring.121 This may
work in favor of a party who is seeking to excuse its nonperformance under a
contract as a result of Hurricane Katrina because, from an objective perspec-
tive, "over a period of many years, scientists had predicted that a strong
storm could breach the levees,"' 122 and even a relatively weak storm coming
from the right direction would push a wall of water into the heart of New
Orleans.123 However, it is also possible that the parties could have reasona-
113. Bergin, supra note 13, at 1.
114. 2 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 105, § 7.230.53.
115. See PERILLO, supra note 83, § 13.19.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Bergin, supra note 13, at 1.
119. John Schwartz, An Autopsy of Katrina: Four Storms, Not Just One, N.Y. TIMES, May
30, 2006, at Fl.
120. Bergin, supra note 13, at 1; see also Farnsworth v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New
Orleans, 139 So. 638, 641 (La. 1932) (holding that the contractor assumed the risk of the
excessive rainfall, but not the actual flooding that was caused by the abnormal rain and cre-
ated a delay for timely performance).
121. Bergin, supra note 13, at 2.
122. CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, AN UNNATURAL DISASTER: THE AFTERMATH OF
HURRICANE KATRINA 13 (2005), http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/Unnatu-
ralDisasterSumm_513.pdf.
123. Id.
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bly foreseen the event occurring and just decided that it was not important
enough to address it under the clause in the contract.'24 Likewise, the fact
that natural disasters may not be entirely predictable cannot be held as "an
excuse for careless [contract]" formation. '25 The "common thread running
through [the doctrine of foreseeability] is that contractual nonperformance
will be excused.. . due to unforeseen circumstances or events that are mate-
rially different from the basic assumptions of the parties when the contract
was formed."' 26
2. Fortuitous Event
"A fortuitous event is one that could not have been reasonably foreseen
at the time the contract was made"127 because it is an event that "occurs only
by chance."' 12' Fortuitous events will only relieve a party of its obligations
under a contract when performance of those obligations is actually impossi-
ble. 129 Therefore, if the fortuitous event only makes performance more bur-
densome, nonperformance will not be excused under the force majeure
clause. 30
In coastal regions of the United States that may be susceptible to being
hit by hurricanes, it is important to note that there is authority which provides
that "hurricanes are ipso facto.'. fortuitous events," and as a result, not rea-
sonably foreseeable by parties at the time of contracting.3 2 However, if the
contracting parties indicate in their agreement "that they foresaw the risk of a
hurricane or flooding," then a hurricane that hits and causes flooding will not
be held to be a fortuitous event.'33 This is because, in some cases, a seem-
ingly fortuitous event, such as a flood, will not excuse delays caused by the
event if the flooding was was foreseeable. 1' Because of the nature of a hur-
ricane, disputes are likely to arise regarding whether the catastrophic flood-
124. Bergin, supra note 13, at 2.
125. David E. Cooper, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Contracting for Response and Re-
covery Efforts 4 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06235t.pdf.
126. 6 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 26, § 21:6.
127. Lockridge & Cazenave, supra note 94.
128. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 680 (8th ed. 2004).
129. See id. Some state statutes may provide that a party is not liable to perform when
nonperformance of obligations "is caused by a fortuitous event that makes performance im-
possible." LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1873 (1987).
130. Lockridge & Cazenave, supra note 94.
131. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 847 (8th ed. 2004). Ipsofacto means "[b]y the very nature
of the situation." Id.
132. Lockridge & Cazenave, supra note 94.
133. Id.
134. Gregory & Harris, supra note 34.
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ing and damage that resulted from the hurricanes in 2005 were reasonably
foreseeable at the time of contracting. 135 Furthermore, like insurance com-
panies following a natural disaster such as a hurricane, although the hurri-
cane itself may not be reasonably foreseeable because it is an ipso facto
event, the flooding that resulted from it might have been considered foresee-
able leaving parties with no relief when there is an impossibility to per-
form. 1
36
C. Effect of the Event on the Obligations Seeking to be Excused
"There is no 'one size fits all' force majeure clause that will protect all
[parties].' ' 137 Because courts often construe terms present in a force majeure
clause narrowly, many times the impossibility of a party to perform under a
contract is not excused unless the event causing nonperformance is included
"within the meaning of the clause."' 38 One of the most important questions
is how "the contract define[s] force majeure."' 3'  As shown in Maralex Re-
sources, Inc. v. Gilbreath,' if specific types of force majeure events are
provided in the contract, a party will not be excused from its obligations if
one of those events does not occur. 4 ' Performance of the contractual obliga-
tions was not excused because the lease provided that the force majeure
clause would only pertain to "external forces beyond the control of [the
lease], such as [a] natural disaster[]."' 42 The event allegedly causing nonper-
formance of obligations was a result of internal mechanical operations,
which was not addressed in the contract and was within the party's con-
trol. 143
Although many states rely on common law force majeure, others do not
rely on common law concepts.4' In some states, force majeure depends
upon what the contract defines it as, and therefore, parties affected by a natu-
ral disaster may be subject to whatever the contract provides if it is deter-
mined that another state law is applicable to the contract. 14' For example, in
135. See Lockridge & Cazenave, supra note 94.
136. Hitch, supra note 21, at 2.
137. Porter & Hedges LLP, supra note 16.
138. HILLMAN, supra note 108, at 306.
139. Joseph P. Dirik, Make Sure Your Contract Defines Force Majeure (Nov. 1, 2005),
http://www.texas.construction.com/2005/11/01/tc_11 01 2 0 0 5_p 3 5 -01.asp.
140. 76 P.3d 626 (N.M. 2003).
141. Id. at 636.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 636-37.
144. Porter & Hedges LLP, supra note 16.
145. Id.
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Texas, if there is no force majeure clause in the contract, the party seeking
excuse must still perform its obligations despite the fact that performance is
impossible because of causes beyond the party's control. 4 6 This may be-
come important for victims of Hurricane Katrina because Texas is so close
by, and contracts could have been formed by parties from Louisiana with
parties in the State of Texas. '47
Even though an event itself may excuse a party's obligations under a
contract because it falls within the language of the clause, if there was never
a valid and enforceable contract at the time it occurred, the clause cannot be
invoked.'48 Furthermore, if an event does not directly affect a party's per-
formance, the obligations under the contract will not be excused.'49 The
blockade and traffic slow-down in one situation did not relieve a party of its
contractual obligation for timely performance because the traffic did not
trigger the force majeure clause.' 50 Sometimes an event may excuse obliga-
tions under the contract when a force majeure clause provides that upon the
occurrence of an event there might be an exception regarding part of a
party's obligations.'' For example, although many leases extend the time
for performance of the obligations when a force majeure event occurs, they
often tend to carve out an exception for rent, by stating that the obligation
will remain unaffected.'52 This may affect people who cannot work to pay
their rent because of the disaster occurring. 153
D. Notice to the Other Party to the Contract
Sometimes, when stated in a contract, in order to successfully invoke a
force majeure clause, the party seeking to be excused from contract obliga-
tions must give notice to the other party to the contract that the force majeure
clause is being used as a defense to its nonperformance.' 54 Likely, this is
because parties to a contract want to ensure that they will have an opportu-
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Goldstein v. Lindner, 648 N.W.2d 892, 899 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). There was never a
mining lease because the necessary permits were not obtained and therefore there was no
performance that could have been prevented a party from occurring, thus allowing the party to
invoke the force majeure clause under the contract. Id. at 899-900.
149. Paulus & Meeuwig, supra note 51, at 306.
150. Id.
151. Hitch, supra note 21, at 2.
152. Id.
153. FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, supra note 2, at 9. Jobs have been
scarce and the unemployment rate for evacuees of Hurricane Katrina was close to 28%. Id.
154. 1 AM. JUR. 2D Act of God § 13 (2005).
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nity to cure or mitigate damages. 55 Additionally, many clauses make notice
a condition precedent to claiming force majeure or state that the failure to
provide notice to the other party within the time given will waive a party's
claim to force majeure.156 When it is stated in a force majeure clause that
notice must be given, often there are express time limits provided in the
clause within which the party seeking to be excused must inform the other
party in order to avail itself of the defense. '57
The consequences that follow from a party not providing notice within
the time limitations are often a matter of contention.158 Often when the
downside of nonperformance is greater, more importance is attached to a
force majeure clause and thus it is more important for notice to be given. 159
If notice is not given, the party will forfeit its right to invoke the force ma-
jeure clause 160 and the clause may be rendered defective. 161 The requirement
for a party to give notice to the other party to the contract depends on "the
form of the ... clause itself; the relation of the clause to the whole contract;
and general considerations of law."'
162
Furthermore, it is not enough that the entire world may be aware of the
natural disaster that has occurred. 163 If the contract specifies that notice must
be given to the other party in the event one party wants to invoke the force
majeure clause, then the party must be diligent in checking its contract be-
cause notice to the other party is what will trigger the force majeure protec-
tion." After Hurricane Katrina, in order for businesses to rely on force ma-
jeure as a defense to any breach of contract claims that might arise following
the event, they were forced to post notices of force majeure on the internet to
provide notice to everyone that either their performance would be delayed or
that their offices would be closed. 1
65
155. Porter & Hedges LLP, supra note 16.
156. Id.
157. Richards Butler, supra note 59.
158. Peter Godwin & Dominic Roughton, Force Majeure: Impartiality of the Engineer
(Mar. 2006), http://www 1.fidic.org/resources/contracts/godwinmarch06.asp.
159. Porter & Hedges LLP, supra note 16.
160. Goldstein v. Lindner, 648 N.W.2d 892, 898 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). In Goldstein,
notice was never given to the other party, and therefore, even if the lease had been valid and
enforceable, the lack of notice prevented the clause from being triggered. Id.
161. Godwin & Roughton, supra note 158. Many cases hold that the "[florce [m]ajeure
clause [is] defective for being out of time." Id.
162. Id.
163. Richards Butler, supra note 68.
164. Id. "[Just] because everyone knows about [Hurricane] Katrina, [doesn't mean] notice
provisions can be disregarded." Bergin, supra note 13, at 1.
165. Wilkinson, supra note 63, at 6.
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IV. FEELING THE EFFECTS: COMMON CONTRACTS AFFECTED
When a natural disaster occurs, contracts will inevitably be disrupted.166
In the minutes, hours, and days following a disaster, cities, streets, ports, and
rail lines may be closed, thereby preventing access in or out of the area. 167
This could lead to longer distances needing to be traveled, traffic congestion,
and slower distribution.'68 After a hurricane or other natural disaster, parties
may claim force majeure based on an unavailability of labor or goods.'69
Because "force majeure clauses are very common in construction and supply
contracts,"' 170 a party will likely try to invoke the clause after a disaster re-
sults due to a loss of power, loss of surface transportation, and damage or
loss to business structures and facilities. 171
A. The Shipping Industry
Following a disaster such as Hurricane Katrina, there was concern that
ports would be affected by a shifting of sandbanks and shipping channels
leading through the delta to the Mississippi as a result of the high winds dur-
ing the storm. 172 If this were to occur, 6000 vessels and rail hubs would be
impacted by the inability for ships to reach their required destinations. 
73
Consequently, the weekend after Hurricane Katrina hit, over 100 vessels
were waiting to enter the Mississippi, while others were trapped up the
river. 174  Force majeure clauses become important in such circumstances,
which end up preventing timely performance either because carriers must
wait until they can gain access to shipping routes, or they are forced to use
alternate routes that will make delivery trips longer. 175  When the Port of
New Orleans-a port which is used for more than half of the nation's grain
exports-was closed, shippers were forced to try to use railways or trucks to
166. See Fred Savaglio & Bob Freitag, JUST-IN-TIME INVENTORY: EFFECTS ON
EARTHQUAKE RECOVERY 1-5 (2005). "Earthquakes, floods, hurricanes and blizzards have
regularly hampered deliveries." Id.
167. See generally id. at 5.
168. Id.
169. Porter & Hedges LLP, supra note 16.
170. Bund, supra note 38, at 412.
171. Savaglio & Freitag, supra note 166, at 9.
172. Richards Butler, supra note 59.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Lisa Girion, Businesses Seek a Legal Escape from Terrorism, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14,
2001, at Cl. Shippers were forced with having to make longer trips in order to satisfy their
delivery obligations during the Suez Canal Crisis. Id.
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transport goods. 176  However, this provided more problems for suppliers
when trying to meet their time schedules after Hurricane Katrina, because
two of the biggest railroads in the eastern United States could not reach New
Orleans and Alabama. 177 This caused trains to be halted on 500 miles of
track, which is typically used by fifty freight trains a day. 78
Fortunately, force majeure clauses allow distribution and shipping com-
panies to "avoid [large] penalties for failing to deliver products [because of]
circumstances beyond [their] control."' 179
If, because of any such circumstance, seller is unable to supply the
total demand for the goods, seller may allocate its available supply
among itself and all of its customers, including those not under
contract, in an equitable manner. Such deliveries so suspended
shall be cancelled without liability, but the contract shall otherwise
remain unaffected. 80
Likewise, businesses and suppliers that are parties to sales contracts,
and that become affected by a natural disaster, may be shielded from "failing
to deliver products in the event [that their] factory [or facility] is unusable
after a storm."' 18 ' For example, after Hurricane Rita hit the coastline, many
businesses and communities were still feeling the devastation of Hurricane
Katrina and therefore some manufacturers were forced to shut down their
plants which substantially reduced the amount of product available for manu-
facturing other items. 
82
B. Gas and Oil Production
Gas and oil disruptions and shortages can affect many areas of the
United States.' 83 After Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma hit the Gulf
Coast in the Fall of 2005, pipelines transporting refined products either "had
176. Mary Conatzer, Katrina Disrupts Many Industries, NEWS & OBSERVER, Sept. 1, 2005,
at D1.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Jack Kaskey, Rita May Cause Slowdown in Filling Huntsman Orders, DESERET
NEWS, Sept. 30, 2005, at D12.
180. MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-617 (2002).
181. Girion, supra note 175.
182. Kaskey, supra note 179. A plant used to produce more than 55% of the material used
to make plastic car parts and bottle caps was shut down because of Hurricane Rita. Id.
183. Storm's Wake: Hurricane Likely to Cause Harm Beyond Areas of Devastation, THE
PRESS DEMOCRAT, Sept. 4, 2005, at G2. "Katrina could have a wider impact on the nation
than any other natural disaster in history." Id.
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service outages or through-put reductions."' 184 The disruption can be attrib-
uted to the destruction of I l l production platforms and 52 platforms being
seriously damaged.' 85 Additionally, over a million barrels of oil per day
were shut in as a result of the gulf hurricanes, amounting to 25% of the
United States source for crude oil production and 20% of natural gas output
being affected. 8 6 This likely impacted many contracts because "[g]as pro-
duction can [only recover] as fast as transport facilities return to service."1 87
In a gas and oil contract, a force majeure clause is used to relieve a les-
see from the "harsh termination of the lease due to circumstances beyond its
control [and which] would make performance untenable or impossible."' 88
However, a gas and oil lease could also specify through a provision in the
contract, that the lease cannot be terminated by a force majeure event occur-
ring. 189 If there is a force majeure provision in the contract, a force majeure
clause must be read "in light of the whole contract."' 90 When a contract in-
volves a sale or supply of oil, coal or natural gas, a problem might arise when
trying to invoke the clause because the contracts tend to include both a "take-
or-pay" provision and a force majeure clause. 9' Generally, a party's per-
formance under a gas and oil lease all depends on the degree to which the
take-or-pay provision affects how the force majeure clause will be inter-
preted.192 In a take-or-pay provision, "a party can either ... take the mini-
mum purchase obligation of the oil, coal or natural gas, or... pay the mini-
mum bill as determined by the contract."' 193 In addition to the impact of the
take-or-pay provision on the force majeure clause, courts have held that it is
not proper to inject terms into a gas and oil lease when the force majeure
clause does not specify that the event excusing performance must "be un-
foreseeable or beyond the control of the lessee," which may help parties
faced with the argument of whether the event was actually foreseeable. '"
Furthermore, a force majeure or similar clause may be included in an
agreement to provide for a temporary cessation of production following expi-
184. Lawrence Kumins & Robert Bamberger, Oil and Gas Disruption from Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, CONG. RES. REP., April 6, 2006, at 3.
185. Id. at2.
186. Id. at 1.
187. Id. at 8.
188. 38AM. JUR. 2DGas&Oil§91 (1999).
189. Id.
190. Delclerq, supra note 12, at 228.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. (emphasis omitted).
194. 38AM. JUR. 2DGas&Oil§91.
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ration of the primary term.1 95 If this is the case, "the lessee must exercise
diligence to overcome the conditions that result in a cessation of the produc-
tion, and resume production within a reasonable time."' 196 Ordinarily, a ces-
sation in production will only be considered temporary in order to avoid ter-
mination of the contract when it is caused by a sudden stoppage of the
well. 197
C. Transportation
Transportation services, such as airlines, cruise ships, buses, and trains,
are often suspended or delayed for a period of time after a natural disaster
occurs because specific routes and departure-and-arrival stations may be
closed.'98 After a hurricane, flights may be suspended until it is safe to fly
travelers into an affected area.' 99 Additionally, rail transportation may be
stopped for days, disrupting the normal schedule; also cruise ships may have
to cancel their trips due to closed ports, and subsequently be forced to oper-
ate out of new ports as a result of the disaster occurring.2 °°
Generally, because travelers' reservations and tickets for airlines consti-
tute enforceable contracts,20 ' if an airline fails to perform under the contract
the ticket purchaser may be able to sue for breach of contract.20 2 However,
this option is only available to ticket holders when an airline's nonperform-
ance is due to something "within the airline's control '20 3 and not due to
weather related conditions or force majeure events.20 4 Even if a traveler is
entitled to compensation, if he decides to accept the compensation that the
airline immediately provides, then the right to seek additional compensation
in the future through a suit in small claims court will be waived. 205
195. Id. § 239.
196. Id.
197. See id.
198. See generally UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI CIVIL LEGAL CLINIC ET AL., HURRICANE
KATRINA: LEGAL ISSUES § 15, http://katrinalegalrelief.org/katrina manual.pdf (last visited
May 27, 2007) [hereinafter HURRICANE KATRINA: LEGAL ISSUES].
199. See Ted Jackovics, South Florida Air Traffic: Still Reeling from Wilma, TAMPA
TRm., Oct. 26, 2005, at 1. Air travel was suspended after hurricane Wilma because of power
outages at the airports in the areas affected. Id.
200. HURRICANE KATRINA: LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 198, § 15.
201. Ed Perkins, Where the Little Guy Has a Fair Chance to Win, THE RECORD, Dec. 4,
2005, at T3.
202. Id.
203. George Hobica & Kim Liang, Airline Rules for Contract of Carriage Have Changed,
DAILY HERALD, Aug. 28, 2005, at 2.
204. Perkins, supra note 201.
205. Id.
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When a force majeure event occurs and a person purchases a ticket prior
to the event taking place, that passenger may or may not be able to resched-
ule their flight or get a complete refund without penalties.2 6 Even though
most airlines accommodated rescheduling and refunds without penalties after
Hurricane Katrina, they were subject to conditions and restrictions.2"7 Be-
cause travel policies for rescheduling and refunds are not federally regu-
lated,2" 8 when travel suppliers put together refund and ticket policies for
flights to affected areas after the hurricane and for the months ahead, the
policies differed from one carrier to the next.20 9 Consequently, it may be
easier for travelers to re-book their flights for a later date than to cancel alto-
gether and get their money back.210 This was a common problem following
the September 11 terrorist attacks because ticket holders were skittish about
flying.21" ' However, travelers seeking a full refund as a result of the force
majeure event were out of luck five months later because there was no longer
an immediate terrorist threat to air travel.
2 12
Similarly, it does not matter if the purpose of buying the ticket and trav-
eling to the desired destination becomes pointless after the disaster occurs
because in most situations, airlines will only refund the full ticket price if the
scheduled flight did not operate.21 3 As a result, even though flights were
providing service to New Orleans two months after Hurricane Katrina, if a
person booked her ticket with the plan of having a wedding, she would likely
only get an opportunity to reschedule, despite the fact that the purpose of her
trip could not have taken place due to the catastrophic damage in the city.
2 14
Additionally, even when some airlines revised their policies for passengers
scheduled to travel into or out of New Orleans, rescheduling or a full refund
was limited to a specified period.2 15 Some airlines stipulated that reschedul-
ing and refunds were only applicable to flights scheduled from August 25,
2005 to September 30, 2005,216 and others provided that the refund or re-
206. HURRICANE KATRINA: LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 198, § 15.1.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Katrina Postponed Wedding, Leaving Plane Tickets up in Air, USA TODAY, Jan. 13,
2006, at D3.
210. See Girion, supra note 175.
211. Id.
212. OWBR, LLC v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1224 (D.
Haw. 2003).
213. Katrina Postponed Wedding, supra note 209.
214. See id.
215. See United Airlines Revises Ticket Policies for New Orleans Area Travel Affected by
Hurricane Katrina, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 31, 2005, at 1.
216. Id.
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scheduling had to occur within 180 days of when the original flight was
scheduled, and that it only covered flights through 2005 and not after.21 7
D. Power Companies
Storms and natural disasters can potentially devastate power infrastruc-
tures 218 and when this happens parties may wish to find out what can be done
about their loss of electricity. After Hurricane Katrina, there were about two
and a half million people without power2" 9 and a few months later, following
Hurricane Wilma, there were over three million people without power.2
However, despite the number of people without electricity, power companies
are not insurers of continuous service if the interruption is beyond their con-
trol.
22 1
Generally speaking, an electric power company which contracts to
supply current, although not an insurer of service, has an obliga-
tion to provide a patron with adequate and continuous service, aris-
ing either from express contract, regulatory enactments, or implied
contract, and the supplier is, ordinarily at least, subject to a duty to
exercise reasonable care to fulfill such an obligation.222
Furthermore, when there is no force majeure provision in the contract
defining the company's liability, and a consumer is trying to prove that the
power company is liable, the consumer must show that the power company
was negligent in some way when unintended interruptions occurred. 23
Even if liability is based partly on the negligence of the power supplier
or entirely on the contract, courts have typically held power companies not
liable, and have relieved them from any penalties resulting from unintended
interruptions "either as a matter of general principle or because of an express
contractual or regulatory provision, where the interruptions resulted from an
'act of God' or from circumstances beyond the control of the supplier., 224 In
217. See Katrina Postponed Wedding, supra note 206.
218. FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, supra note 2, at 8.
219. Id.
220. FLORiDA STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM, SITUATION REPORT No. 17: WILMA'S
AFtERMATH 2 (Oct. 25, 2005), http://www.floridadisaster.org/eoc/eoc_activations/Wilma05/
Reports/SitrepWilma_102505_1 7final.pdf.
221. Waukesha Gas & Elec. Co. v. Waukesha Motor Co., 209 N.W. 590, 591 (Wis. 1926).
222. Annotation, Liability of Electric Power Company to Patron for Interruption, Failure,
or Inadequacy of Power, 4 A.L.R.3D 594, 598 (1965) [hereinafter Liability of Electric Power].
223. Id.
224. Id.
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Florida Power Corp. v. City of Tallahassee,22 5 the Supreme Court of Florida
held that a hurricane hitting the city for a period of hours was considered an
act of God, thereby relieving the company from the failure to deliver
power.226 Because the power company's failure to deliver power was di-
rectly traceable to the hurricane and one of the only justifiable reasons for an
interruption,227 there was no breach of contract for which the power company
could be held liable.22 Similarly, courts have not even definitively held a
power company to be liable for an intentional interruption as a result of a
maintenance test when there was a force majeure clause in the contract.229
E. Construction Projects
Although unexpected events such as natural disasters may not have a di-
rect effect on construction projects, the events could directly affect costs
associated with a project.230  Hurricane Katrina dramatically increased the
cost of materials for construction projects and the time needed to obtain the
materials for those projects.2 1' Additionally, material shortages may cause
project delays and increased costs for completion.2 32 Despite a contractor's
inability to control the weather, nonperformance under the contract will not
be excused because they can plan for what happens when an uncommon or
unforeseen event occurs.233
In many construction contracts, a force majeure clause will not relieve a
contractor of its obligation to perform, unless the event preventing perform-
ance was unforeseeable at the time the parties formed the contract. 234 When
there is no force majeure clause in the contract, the risk of loss for any unex-
pected or unforeseen events generally falls on the contractor who is provid-
ing materials and labor.235 This is because when performance could be jeop-
ardized by a particular event, the omission of that event and its effects on the
225. 18 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1944).
226. Id. at 675.
227. Id. at 674-75.
228. Id. at 675.
229. Liability of Electric Power, supra note 222, at 608.
230. MCAI, Construction Law Update, Apr. 27, 2006, http://www.mcai.com/newsletter/
FullArticle.c fm?ArticlelD=238.
231. See id.
232. Stephen A. Bell, Material Shortages and Other Problems Hindering Performance-Is
There Relief? CONSTR. L. NEWSLETTER (State Bar of Tex., Houston, Tex.), Nov. 1999, avail-
able at http://www.constlaw.org/newsletters/newsnov99.cfm.
233. See MCAI, supra note 230.
234. Dirik, supra note 139.
235. See MCAI, supra note 230.
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parties' contractual obligations may result in no relief being provided.236
However, many times even when there is a force majeure clause in the con-
tract, a contractor's remedies will be limited after the force majeure event
occurs.
2 37 For instance, a contractor could be allowed a time extension for
delays created by the force majeure event, but he could also "be prohibited
from recovering any costs" resulting from the delay. 231
V. CONCLUSION
"Even if protection from force majeure events exists, the clause may not
be captioned 'force majeure' or include this term. ' 239 Therefore, it is impor-
tant to know what they will look like so that force majeure and similar
clauses can be reviewed periodically by parties.24° This will help make par-
ties to contracts aware of what events are likely to be considered "force ma-
jeure" and whether notice must be given in order to invoke the clause if the
event does fall within the terms of the clause.
Because of the magnitude of the 2005 hurricane season and other natu-
ral disasters across the United States, the increasing importance of placing
force majeure clauses in contracts is becoming known. 241' Additionally, be-
cause the language in the clauses plays such a huge part in a party's relief,
parties no longer have the ability to rely on any common law concepts to fill
in the gaps.242
236. See Bell, supra note 232.
237. See MCAI, supra note 230.
238. Id.
239. Nestel, supra note 14, at 42.
240. Godwin & Roughton, supra note 158.
241. Porter & Hedges LLP, supra note 16.
242. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey focuses on juvenile delinquency and child welfare cases
and to a lesser extent on adoption matters as they relate to child welfare
cases. It discusses several Supreme Court of Florida cases in these topic
areas which have clarified important issues as well as a high court opinion on
the subject of juvenile curfews. The courts of appeal were active in inter-
preting a variety of statutory issues and, as they have done for years, held the
trial courts strictly accountable for compliance with statutory obligations in
both child welfare and dependency cases.
II. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
A. Adjudicatory Issues
In 2003, in a very widely followed case, Tate v. State,1 which was the
subject of a special issue of the Nova Law Review,2 the Fourth District Court
of Appeal established the procedural approach to be used in evaluating the
competency of young defendants in the juvenile and adult criminal courts.3
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. This article covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2004
through June 30, 2006. The author thanks Ashley Jewell Dillman for her assistance in the
preparation of this article.
1. 864 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
2. Michael J. Dale, Making Sense of the Lionel Tate Case, 28 NOVA L. REV. 467 (2004).
3. Tate, 864So.2dat5l.
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Since that time, a number of courts have ruled on a variety of procedural
issues related to juvenile competency.4
Section 985.223 of the Florida Statutes contains a number of provisions
regarding how courts should handle competency in delinquency proceed-
ings.5 One of the major focuses of the law is the distinction between a child
who is incompetent because of mental illness or retardation and a child who
is incompetent because of age or immaturity or any reason other than mental
illness or retardation.6 In Department of Children & Families v. C.C. (C. C.
I),7 the issue was whether the trial court could commit a child to the De-
partment of Children and Families (DCF) in the absence of evidence show-
ing mental illness or retardation.8 Ruling strictly as a matter of statutory
interpretation, the court read the law to provide that a child who is deter-
mined to be mentally ill or retarded and who is adjudicated incompetent to
proceed must be committed to DCF for treatment or training, whereas a child
who is adjudicated incompetent because of age or immaturity may not be
committed to either DCF or the Department of Juvenile Justice. 9 Because
the child's lack of competence derived from age and lack of maturity, the
appellate court quashed the order placing the child with DCF.'0 In W.G. v.
State," the issue was whether a trial court may order competency restorative
services for an incompetent child charged with a misdemeanor by placement
of the child in a private facility.' 2 The appellate court said that the trial court
lacked the authority to do so under the law because the statute stated that trial
courts may not order any restorative services for an incompetent juvenile
who was charged with what would be a misdemeanor. 3 The court recog-
nized that there might be some difficulty in understanding the logic underly-
ing the statutory scheme but that the law was clear on its face.14 Chapter 985
also provides that where it appears that a child may never become competent,
the court may dismiss the proceeding."5 In State v. J.L.M, III,16 an eight-
4. See, e.g., Michael J. Dale, 2004 Survey of Florida Juvenile Law, 29 NOVA L. REv.
397, 399 (2005) [hereinafter Dale, 2004 Survey].
5. See generally FLA. STAT. § 985.223 (2006).
6. Id. § 985.19(2).
7. 889 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
8. Id. at 966.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 910 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
12. Id. at 331.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 332.
15. FLA. STAT. § 985.19(5)(c) (2006).
16. 926 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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year-old was declared incompetent. 17 The evidence suggested that the child
would not become competent in the next two years.' 8 The appeals court re-
versed the trial court dismissal because the evidence showed only that it was
unlikely that the eight-year-old "could be trained to [become] [competent]
within the next 4 [to] 6 years."' 9 The trial court did not find that the child
would never become competent to proceed during the statutory period.2"
The appellate courts have also ruled on several issues related to techni-
cal compliance with the involuntary commitment statute. First, in MH. v.
State,2 the First District Court of Appeal held that when the trial court
makes an order of involuntary commitment pursuant to chapter 985, it must
make findings pursuant to three separate prongs of the state statute: 1) that
the child is mentally ill or retarded; 2) that because of the mental illness or
retardation the child is "manifestly incapable of surviving" or that "[t]here is
a substantial likelihood that in the near future the child [would] inflict serious
bodily harm on [him or her]self or others;" and 3) that "less restrictive alter-
natives" for treatment are inappropriate.2 2 Finally, in Department of Chil-
dren & Families v. WJ.R.,23 the appellate court held that prior to a commit-
ment of a minor to DCF for competency restoration, DCF must be properly
served and given notice and allowed to participate in a meaningful manner in
the dispositional proceeding.24
Issues relating to the waiver of the right to assistance of counsel in de-
linquency proceedings come up regularly throughout the country.25 The
juvenile's right to counsel was established by the Supreme Court opinion in
In re Gault26 in 1967, and cases interpreting the case are also heard by the
Florida appellate courts each year.27 In K.E.N. v. State,28 the appellate court
held, inter alia, that it had grave reservations concerning whether the specific
guidelines established by the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure that govern
the substantive right of the juvenile to counsel, can be complied with by a
17. Id. at 458.
18. Id. at 459.
19. Id. at 461.
20. Id.
21. 901 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
22. Id. at 200 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 985.19(3) (2006)).
23. 915 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
24. Id. at 246 (citing Dep't of Child. & Fam. v. J.F.C., 901 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2005)).
25. See generally MICHAEL J. DALE, ET AL., Representing Children in Juvenile Justice
Proceedings, in REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT 5.03(1 1)(d)(i) (2006).
26. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
27. See Michael J. Dale, 2002 Survey of Florida Juvenile Law, 28 NOVA L. REV. 1, 2
(2003) [hereinafter Dale, 2002 Survey].
28. 892 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
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"group rights advisory," or an announcement of the rights the children pos-
sess made by the court to a group of youngsters appearing before it.29 The
inquiry that the court must make includes a thorough analysis of each child's
comprehension of the offer of the right to counsel and each child's capacity
to make an intelligent and understandable choice to waive it.3" In C.K. v.
State,31 "the trial court failed to make [the] thorough inquiry [necessary]...
to obtain [a] waiver in writing," have the mother verify that the decision was
discussed, and find that the waiver "appeared to be knowing and volun-
tary."32 The checklist the court must run through has been rearticulated by
the appellate courts on a number of occasions and yet, inexplicably the trial
courts seem to have trouble complying as the court found in C. V. v. State.33
In that case, at arraignment the trial court accepted an oral waiver of counsel
and admission to the charges but failed to inform the child of his rights that
would be relinquished.3 4 The court did not warn the child of the danger and
disadvantages of representing himself, nor did the court make any inquiries
about whether the child's decision was voluntary and knowingly made."
Again, the court failed to obtain a written waiver of counsel.36 On a more
technical level, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed in T.H. v. State
(T.H. 1j),37 where the child was not advised of his right to counsel at a hear-
ing, and the error was not caught until six days after the dispositional hearing
where the child refused counsel. 38 The appeals court held that was funda-
mental error and reversed.39
In J.R.. v. State,4 ° the child appealed from an order committing him to
a residential facility on revocation of probation.41  Because the waiver of
counsel in the original delinquency proceeding was not knowingly or intelli-
gently made, the appellate court held that the trial court could not commit the
child upon revocation of probation.42 Finally, in D.K. v. State,43 an appeal
was taken in a case involving representation by a certified law student in-
29. Id. at 1179.
30. Id.
31. 909 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
32. Id. at 604 (internal quotations omitted).
33. 915 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
34. Id. at 665.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 899 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
38. Id. at 505.
39. Id.
40. 898 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
41. Id. at 1094.
42. Id.
43. 881 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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tern. 44 The appeals court held that "because the name of the certified legal
intern representing [the child was] not listed on the waiver form, it cannot be
said that [the child] made a knowing and intelligent waiver of [the] right to
legal representation. '45 Therefore, the court reversed. 6
Issues relating to application of the United States Supreme Court ruling
in Miranda v. Arizona47 continue to come before the Florida appellate
courts.4 8 The cases deal both with issues of whether the individual is in cus-
tody and whether the confession given was voluntary under the totality of
circumstances test set forth by the Supreme Court of Florida in Ramirez v.
State.49 In J.G. v. State,5 ° the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent on a
charge of sexual battery and appealed on grounds that he was in custody and
the waiver of Miranda rights was not voluntarily, knowingly and intelli-
gently made.5 The appellant was thirteen years old and a seventh-grader
enrolled in an exceptional student educational school setting at the time of
the interview.5 2 The youngster "was familiar with the juvenile justice sys-
tem."53 In addition to the failure to notify the appellant's parents or custo-
dian that the child was in custody as provided by Florida law,5 4 but which
would not by itself dispose of the waiver issue, there was no evidence upon
which the court could evaluate the voluntariness of the waiver. 15 Nor did the
trial court make any factual findings. 56 The appellate court held that
"[m]erely reading the Miranda rights form to a [thirteen]-year-old . . . or
having [the child] read the rights form, by itself [did] not establish that [the
child] understood and comprehended the rights he was giving up" as a con-
sequence of the waiver. 7 Furthermore, the court found that a family friend,
whose interests lay closer to that of the victim, assisted in obtaining the con-
fession by tricking the child through an explanation that there was a video
44. Id. at 51.
45. Id. at 52.
46. Id.
47. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
48. See Dale, 2004 Survey, supra note 4, at 401.
49. 739 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1999).
50. 883 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
51. Id. at 917-18.
52. Id. at 924.
53. Id.
54. See FLA. STAT. § 985.207 (2003).
55. JG., 883 So. 2d at 924.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 925.
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tape recording of the child "inappropriately touching the victim.' '5 8 Under all
these circumstances the appeals court reversed."
A juvenile was charged with committing the offense of poisoning food
or water with intent to kill in B.MB. v. State.6 The interrogation of the child
occurred on school grounds by a police officer who had been called to the
school. 6' The appellate court reversed the trial court finding that the child
had knowingly and voluntarily waived Miranda warnings and further found
that the child was in custody at the time of the police interview. 62 In so do-
ing, the court noted that whether the law would have been applied differently
had the case been handled by a school resource officer and an assistant prin-
cipal was not before the court. 63 The police officer turned off the tape re-
corder and, in testimony at trial, said that he orally administered the Miranda
warnings at that point in time. 64 The appellate court held that there was no
doubt that the child was in custody. 65 Applying the Ramirez test governing
totality of the circumstances and recognizing that "there is no bright line rule
that would render a confession by juvenile involuntarily," the court held that
a number of factors would produce a finding that the waiver was not volun-
tary.66 The court found that the tape recording was turned off and thus there
was no first hand evidence. 67 There was nothing in the record to show that
the child clearly understood her rights.68 In particular, the child's "age, ex-
perience and background did not allow her to appreciate the gravity of the
situation" (the student was in middle school) nor was there any "indication
that [the child] understood that serious criminal charges could result" (a fel-
ony).69 Further, the child was not provided with an opportunity to consult
with a parent before being questioned. 7
Part of the test for the obligation to read a respondent Miranda warnings
is that the person be in police custody for interrogation.7' In J.C.M v.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 927.
60. 927 So. 2d 219, 220 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
61. Id. at 221.
62. Id. at 223.
63. Id. at 221. A number of courts have held that if a police officer is acting as a school
resource officer, the New Jersey v. T.L. 0. test will be applied. See discussion of New Jersey v.
T.L.O., infra nn. 110-11; see also In re W.R., 634 S.E.2d 923, 926-27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
64. B.MB., 927 So. 2d at 222.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 223.
68. Id.
69. B.MB., 927 So. 2d at 223.
70. Id.
71. See J.C.M. v. State, 891 So. 2d 573, 576 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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State,72 a twelve-year-old was adjudicated to have committed an act of van-
dalism involving the windshield of an automobile.73 The trial court denied a
motion to suppress, and after an adjudication and disposition, the child ap-
pealed.74 The sole witness in the case was a police officer who was called to
the scene "in response to a report that someone had damaged [the victim's]
car windshield by what appeared to be a BB gun shooting. 75 The police
officer interviewed the child and, after two other officers arrested the father
in the child's presence, told the child to wait until the youngster's brother
came to get him.76 During that period, the police officer fabricated a story
that the victim had videotaped the event.77 The child, in response, incrimi-
nated himself. 78 The appellate court held that the child was in custody when
he made the admissions.79 Applying an objective test of whether a reason-
able person in the suspect's position would have perceived the situation as
such, the appellate court held that the child was detained, albeit for his own
safety, and that the police officer was clearly interrogating the child. 80 The
appellate court therefore reversed.8'
An interesting jurisdictional issue was before the Fourth District Court
of Appeal in State v. Jones.82 The issue was whether juveniles charged with
traffic offenses, such as "driving without a valid license," should have their
cases heard "in the traffic division of the county court" or "in the juvenile
division of the circuit court ... as delinquency matters., 83 On a petition for a
writ of prohibition after several cases had been dismissed and then trans-
ferred to the juvenile division of the circuit court, the appeals court held that
the Florida statute specifically exempts traffic offenses from circuit court
jurisdiction, and therefore, "the county court has original jurisdiction over
offenses allegedly committed by the . . . [juveniles]."84 They are not statuto-
rily viewed as acts of delinquency. 85
72. Id. at 573.
73. Id. at 575.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. J.C.M, 891 So. 2d at 577.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. J.C.M, 891 So. 2d at 578.
82. 899 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
83. See id. at 1280.
84. Id. at 1281.
85. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 26.012 (2003)).
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The parents of a victim appealed from a trial court order denying a mo-
tion to set aside a pretrial intervention agreement in a delinquency case.8 6 In
S.K. v. State,87 the respondent had been charged with "lewd and lascivious
molestation" of a minor child. 8 The amended petition "later filed chang[ed]
the offense to a misdemeanor battery."89  The court entered a negotiated
agreement known as a "PAY agreement,"9 which "is an acronym used to
refer to [a] prosecution alternative[] . . . youth agreement[]." 9' The victim's
parents, who disagreed with the disposition, sought to challenge the agree-
ment on several grounds.92 The appellate court held that "the decision to
prosecute lies solely with the State [and] not with the victim of a crime," the
juvenile rules of procedure do not provide "for the victim or the victim's
parents to be involved in the submission of [the] treatment plan or in the de-
cision to" hold or waive the hearing, and the victim's parents are not parties
who will be "allowed to refuse consent to a waiver of a hearing. 93
In delinquency cases involving child victims, issues of hearsay testi-
mony by minors often come before the court. 94 Such was the case in G.H. v.
State.95 In a sexual abuse case, the child victim's mother testified that "the
child told her . . . that someone with [the a]ppellant's first name [had]
touched her, and the child was afraid to reveal [the] information because [of
threats]. 96 The trial court, when asked to rule on the child's hearsay state-
ments, allowed the testimony finding "specifically that the statements [were]
reliable and trustworthy." 97 The appellate court held that the trial court was
in error, because in all cases the court must make specific findings of fact on
the record regarding the reliability of the statements. 98 However, on the facts
of the case, because there was direct testimony from the child upon which
the court could rely for its adjudication, the error was deemed harmless.99
The question of whether a juvenile has the right, through counsel, to
make a closing argument in a delinquency case was before the appellate
86. S.K. v. State, 881 So. 2d 1209, 1210 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
87. Id. at 1209.
88. Id. at 1210.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. S.K., 881 So. 2d at 1210 n.1.
92. Id. at 1210-11.
93. Id. at 1212.
94. The same is true in child welfare cases. See generally MICHAEL J. DALE, ET AL., The
Child Witness, in REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT 7 (2006).
95. 896 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1 st Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
96. Id. at 834.
97. Id. at 835.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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court in J.MS. v. State.'0° The child had been charged "with disorderly con-
duct . . . and disruption of an educational institution."' 0 ' When the State
rested, the child's "defense [counsel] moved for a dismissal arguing that yell-
ing [and] cursing [was] not enough to prove disorderly conduct" and that
"there was no inticement or encouragement.' ' 0 2 "The court denied the mo-
tion[] and found [the child] guilty of both counts," whereupon the "defense.
• . asked for a closing argument."' 3 "[T]he court denied the request, citing
the lateness of the hour and another pending case ... [but] allowed [the] de-
fense counsel to submit a memorandum" and also, at the dispositional hear-
ing, some six weeks later, the right to make a renewed motion for judgment
of acquittal and a closing argument."04 Citing earlier case law, the appellate
court held that "it is an absolute violation of the Sixth Amendment for [a]
court to deny ... defendant[s] the right to make [a] closing argument."'0 5
The appeals court held that the defense was denied the ability to "mak[e] an[]
argument prior to the court's finding of guilt."'0 6 "[M]ak[ing] a written clos-
ing argument and [an oral] argument at the disposition hearing after the"
determination of guilt had already been made "[did] not cure the preju-
dice.' 0 7 The court reversed for a new adjudicatory hearing.'08
Issues involving searches in schools come up regularly in Florida delin-
quency cases in the Florida courts as they do elsewhere.'0 9 Pursuant to the
Supreme Court opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O.," 1 the test for search and
seizure in schools is reasonable suspicion."' The courts have also held that
suspicion-less administrative searches of students are proper under certain
circumstances. 112 In C.N.H. v. State, 113 a child "entered a plea of no contest"
100. 921 So. 2d 813, 814 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006). See also S.S. v. State, 204
S.W.3d 512, 513 (Ark. 2005).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 815.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. IMS., 921 So. 2d at 816 (quoting M.E.F. v. State, 595 So. 2d 86, 87 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1992)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See 2 MICHAEL J. DALE, ET AL., Representing Students in School Related Matters, in
REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT 6 (2006); Dale, 2004 Survey, supra note 4, at 399-401;
Dale, 2002 Survey, supra note 27, at 6-7.
110. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
Ill. Id. at 342.
112. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648, 664-65 (1995) (applying
random drug analysis testing policy to a student athlete).
113. 927 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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in a delinquency case having been charged with "possession of a weapon on
school property.""' 4 The school in question was "an alternative middle
school," which "ha[d] a policy of [carrying out] daily suspicionless pat-down
searches of every student every morning before [the students were] permitted
to go to ... class[].""' 5 The appeals court held that in the context of"an ad-
ministrative search, the warrant and probable cause showing is replaced by
[a] requirement ... [of] a neutral plan for execution; a compelling govern-
mental need; the absence of less restrictive alternatives; and reduced privacy
rights.""' 6 Under the facts of the case, the appeals court held that the admin-
istrative searches were proper." 7
Florida courts have held that a school resource officer-a police officer
assigned to a school-when conducting a search in a school, need only have
reasonable suspicion to search." 8 The court so held in State v. J.H. 9 In
J.H., "[a] police officer.., at the school was told by another student [who
had been] found with marijuana, that [the respondent] had possessed mari-
juana earlier [in the] day. The officer contacted the dean . . . [who] asked
[the juvenile] to step out of class, and [when] the officer asked if [the young-
ster] had anything improper on him," the child offered up the marijuana.'20
"[A]cknowledg[ing] that the standard is a reasonable suspicion," the child
argued, nonetheless, that because he was in custody, Miranda warnings
should have been given. 122 The appeals court held that while it may be cor-
rect that in a "custodial interrogation by the officer" Miranda warnings were
required, that issue was not dispositive "because the drugs would have been
discovered inevitably without [the] interrogation."'' 23 It therefore reversed
the trial court order upholding the suppression. 124
114. Id. at2.
115. Id.
116. Id at4.
117. Id. at4-5.
118. State v. J.H., 898 So. 2d 240, 241 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. D.S.,
685 So. 2d 41, 43 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 240.
121. Id. at 241.
122. Id. at 240.
123. J.H., 898 So. 2d at 241.
124. Id.
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B. Dispositional Issues
The Supreme Court of Florida has decided two significant cases involv-
ing dispositional issues during the most recent survey period. In J.I.S. v.
State,"25 the question was whether a juvenile who received "an indeterminate
residential commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) [is] enti-
tled to credit for time served in secure detention before the commitment?"' 26
The Court held that in the case of "'indeterminate' commitment, which is a
residential commitment [where the DJJ has] authority over the [defendant]
until ... [the youngster] reaches a statutorily prescribed age,... credit for
time served in secure detention [pre-commitment] is not required by any
court rule, statute, or constitutional provision."' 2 7 Therefore, the child is not
entitled to credit for time served."'2 However, the Court stated that "credit is
required [in] a 'determinate' commitment" setting."' 29 That is, "for an of-
fense such as a misdemeanor that ... necessarily conclude[s] before the ju-
venile reaches the age at which [the authority of DJJ ends]," credit for time
served does apply. '30 The distinction between determinate and indeterminate
sentences is as follows: "[C]ommitments circumscribed by the maximum
adult punishment [are] 'determinate' and those limited only by the offender
[obtaining] a certain age [are] 'indeterminate."" 3' As the Court noted, be-
cause "[t]he juvenile justice system [focuses on] rehabilitat[ing] youth,"
youngsters "are committed for indeterminate lengths of time"'32 as a general
proposition in the absence of a statute that states otherwise. 133  Thus, it is
"generally impossible to [set] a date from which to deduct time spent in se-
cure detention." '134
The second Supreme Court of Florida case involving dispositions in de-
linquency cases is N.C. v. Anderson. 1"' The issue before the Court was
125. 930 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2006).
126. Id. at 589.
127. Id. at 590.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. J.LS., 930 So. 2d at 590. For a discussion of the Supreme Court of Florida's view of
.entitlement to jail credit on an adult sentence, see Moore v. State, 882 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 2004).
131. J.1S., 930 So. 2d at 592.
132. Id. at 593 (quoting C.C. v. State (CC. 1), 841 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2003)).
133. See id at 595.
134. Id. at 593 (quoting C.C. 1, 841 So. 2d at 658).
135. 882 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 2004); see also D.G. v. State, 896 So. 2d 920, 921-22 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (applying the N.C. holding to situations "where special conditions of
probation [need] not [be] orally pronounced at [a] disposition hearing").
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whether, in addition to being "entitled to a written order of disposition con-
taining all the terms of disposition," a juvenile is entitled "to an oral pro-
nouncement containing all of [those] terms?"' 136 The Court held that as a
matter of due process, there is no requirement "that the trial court issue an
oral pronouncement of disposition," and that the relevant rule of juvenile
procedure contains "adequate safeguard[s] for minors who wish to challenge
their written dispositions."' 37 The majority based its due process analysis on
the flexibility in juvenile cases as distinguished from adult criminal cases.' 38
The flexibility allows the State to act in its parens patriae role differently,
and therefore, a balance is struck with respect to "informality" and "flexibil-
ity.' 139 What is odd about this rationale is that flexibility is used by the
Court as the predicate for providing less information to juveniles, 140 who it
would seem, need more information.
Chief Justice Pariente concurred because of her desire to discuss a sepa-
rate issue not before the Court, "but which nevertheless deserve[d] atten-
tion." 4 ' The issue was "the lack of adequate gender-specific programs and
services for... delinquent girls"'' 42 "with a history of sexual abuse and de-
pression, [who] acted out and committed a misdemeanor domestic bat-
tery."'143 The juvenile before the court in N.C., who did not receive the ser-
vices she needed "in a lower level program or. . . intensive home services,"
and thus, was placed in a higher level program, demonstrated the need of the
governmental branches to "cooperate to ensure that [the] juvenile justice
system can fulfill its mandate of providing rehabilitation [services] to chil-
dren ... most at risk and most [at] need."'"
The issue of whether a fine can be part of a disposition, among other is-
sues, was before the Fifth District Court of Appeal recently in A.MP. v.
State.145 At disposition, the court held that "the fact that she went to trial
cost the taxpayers in this community a greater amount. And [the court
would] like to have fines [that] have some relationship to the impact on the
community."' 146 The appellate court held "that the trial court [had] no power
to impose a fine on a juvenile in... delinquency proceeding[s] because [the]
136. NC., 882 So. 2d at 991.
137. Id. at 993 (citing FLA. R. JUv. P. 8.135).
138. Id. at 994.
139. Id. (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984)).
140. Id.
141. N.C., 882 So. 2d at 996 (Pariente, C.J., concurring).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 997.
144. Id.
145. 927 So. 2d 97, 98 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
146. Id. at 99.
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imposition of a fine is not included within the powers of disposition given to
the trial court in a delinquency proceeding."147
In a second case involving the powers of the delinquency court, B.R. v.
State, 14 among the issues was the question of whether or not the trial court
could, at disposition, refuse to allow the juvenile's parent to speak. 149 The
appellate court reversed on the basis of a state statute which required the
Florida court to give all parties the right to comment before determining and
announcing its disposition. 50 To make matters worse, as the appellate court
explained, in addition to preventing the respondent's mother from speaking
at the dispositional hearing, the trial court made statements which discour-
aged the child's right not to plead guilty in contravention of prior Florida
case law. 1' The appellate court reversed, ordering that a new dispositional
hearing be held before a different judge. '52
An issue that comes up with some regularity is the question of the juve-
nile court's ability to order the DCF to provide certain services to children
before the delinquency court. One such issue is treatment for a juvenile de-
tained under the Jimmy Ryce Act.'53 Several courts have now held that the
trial court exceeded its authority in ordering DCF to provide a specific treat-
ment for such children including, most recently, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal in Department of Children & Families v. C.B. 154
In R.D. W. v. State,'-" a case involving an unusual factual scenario, a ju-
venile charged with possession of cannabis, who later entered a plea of no
contest to the charge-and where the court withheld adjudication placing the
youngster on probation-appealed from the dispositional order to the extent
that it required him to remove a tattoo from his neck as a special condition of
the probation.'56 The appellate court reversed, finding no legal basis upon
147. Id. at 100.
148. 902 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
149. Id. at 334.
150. Id. at 335 (citing FLA. STAT. § 985.23(l)(d) (2004)). The opinion was also based on
prior Florida case law which "held that a trial court's failure to allow a child's parents to tes-
tify at a disposition hearing constitutes reversible error." Id. (citing K.R. v. State, 584 So. 2d
1132 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) and T.H. v. State (T.H. 1), 573 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1991)).
151. Id. (citing A.S. v. State, 667 So. 2d 994, 995-96 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
152. B.R., 902 So. 2d at 336.
153. See FLA. STAT. §§ 394.910-.932 (2006).
154. 884 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004); see also Dep't of Child. & Fams. v.
Harter, 861 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs. v. I.C.,
742 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
155. 927 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
156. Id. at 195-96.
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which the court could enter the order of tattoo removal.'57 The test for spe-
cial conditions of probation is found in the Supreme Court of Florida opinion
Biller v. State. 158 There was no evidence in the record in R.D. W. that the
tattoo had anything to do with the condition of probation found in Biller,
such as the "relationship to the crime which the defendant was convicted,...
conduct that is in itself criminal, or ... conduct which is reasonably related
to the defendant's future criminality."' 159 The State argued that state law pro-
vides that a minor may not be tattooed without written, notarized consent of
the parent or guardian, and therefore it would violate the law for the juvenile
to have a tattoo placed on his or her body unless parental permission is ob-
tained. '60 The court rejected this argument, finding that it is "the person who
tattooed the minor who breaks the law.'' 6. Judge Palmer dissented in the
appellate court on the ground that having the tattoo was unlawful. '62
Restitution-related issues come up repeatedly before Florida's interme-
diate appellate courts. 163 In C.T.H. v. State,'64 a juvenile had been charged
with trespass to a structure and resisting arrest. 16' The child pleaded no con-
test.166 At a restitution hearing, the complaining witnesses testified that the
juvenile had trespassed on his property several times, sprayed a fire extin-
guisher, ransacked the house and that property was taken. 167 The trial court
ordered $1,279 in restitution. 168 Because the loss must be connected causally
to the offense charged and cannot be ordered for an unconnected offense, and
where, in the case at bar, it was unclear what damage related to the trespass
charges, the court on appeal reversed and remanded for a new restitution
hearing. 169  The same issue was before the court in S.M v. State.17' The
child pleaded no contest to trespass in a conveyance (a vehicle).17' At the
restitution hearing, the owner of the automobile testified to $2647.71 in dam-
157. Id. at 195.
158. 618 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1993).
159. R.D.W, 927 So. 2d at 196 (citing Biller, 618 So. 2d at 734-35).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 197 (Palmer, J., dissenting).
163. See Dale, 2004 Survey, supra note 4, at 404-05.
164. 905 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
165. Id. at 1031.
166. Id. at 1032.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. C.T.H., 905 So. 2d at 1032-33; see also Glaubius v. State, 688 So. 2d 913 (Fla.
1997); Johnston v. State, 870 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Faulkner v. State, 582
So. 2d 783 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
170. 881 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
171. Id. at 79.
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age. 172 The appellate court reversed and remanded because there was no
evidence showing the juvenile was responsible for the damage. 173 It, too,
was reversed and remanded for a new restitution hearing. 1
74
III. DEPENDENCY
One of the commonly litigated grounds for dependency in Florida is
whether a child is at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or
neglect by a parent, legal custodian, or sibling.' 75 In M W. v. Department of
Children and Family Services (M W II),' 76 a father appealed from a depend-
ency finding as to three natural children based upon his sexual abuse of a
step-sibling. 177 Despite the fact that a psychologist testified that the chances
of the subject children being abused was "below base rates but ... not zero
by any means,"'' 78 the appellate court affirmed. 17 Because the nature of the
harm was so great, the court ruled it was intolerable to allow even a low
probability of abuse. 8
0
Under Florida law, a dependency petition does not have to be filed
against both parties. 8' A petition may allege acts by only one parent. 
82
However, parents who are not respondents are nonetheless parties and, as
such, are entitled to be served with pleadings, orders, and papers.8 3 How-
ever, because they are not respondents, they have neither a statutory or con-
stitutional right to counsel according to the court in C.L.R. v. Department of
Children & Families. 1
84
Under Florida law, gay and lesbian couples may not marry.1 5 Florida
does not recognize same sex marriages validly entered elsewhere.8 6 While
172. Id.
173. Id. at 80.
174. Id.
175. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(14), (34) (2006) (describing Florida's definition of depend-
ency and legal custody); R.F. (In re M.F.) v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 770 So. 2d 1189 (Fla.
2000).
176. 881 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
177. Id. at 734.
178. Id. at 737 (emphasis omitted).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. FLA. STAT. § 39.501(3)(c) (2006).
182. Id.
183. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.225(c).
184. 913 So. 2d 764, 767 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
185. FLA. STAT. § 741.212 (2006).
186. Id.
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Florida law does allow gay and lesbian couples to act as foster parents, I1 7
they may not adopt. 188 In D.E. v. R.D.B.,189 a mother's former gay partner
commenced a dependency proceeding alleging the child born through artifi-
cial insemination was abused and/or neglected because the biological mother
cut off visitation with the former partner. '90 Under Florida law, a non-parent
cannot seek custody or visitation. 91 The appeals court held that a parent's
decision to deny contact with someone who has no rights to custody or visi-
tation with a "child is an inadequate ground upon which to base" dependency
adjudication. 9 '
DCF sometimes seeks to place dependent children in residential mental
health treatment facilities. 19' In 2000, the Supreme Court of Florida decided
M W. v. Davis (M. W. )194 in which it held that an adjudicatory hearing, albeit
one that did not comply with Florida's civil commitment statute (known as
the Baker Act), was required prior to such a placement. 95 The question in In
re J. W 96 was what should be the proper standard of proof in such a proceed-
ing. 197 Making reference to the child's substantial liberty interest "in not
being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment," the Court in J W. held
that the standard was clear and convincing evidence. 19 8
Florida law provides that a parent of sufficient means can be ordered to
pay fees established by DCF for the care of a child who has been placed in
shelter care as long as the parent is afforded notice and an opportunity to be
heard about the amount of the assessment. 99 In D. W. v. Department of Chil-
dren & Families,200 a case indistinguishable from the opinions and involving
the same judge, the Honorable Daniel Dawson, the appeals court reversed
and remanded for a new hearing on notice to the parents because the support
order had been entered without notice.20 ' The circumstances under which the
187. See Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 808, 814
(11 th Cir. 2004).
188. FLA. STAT. § 63.042.
189. 929 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
190. Id.
191. Id. (citing Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
192. Id. at 1165.
193. See M W. v. Davis (M. W. I), 756 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2000).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 109.
196. 890 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
197. Id. at 339.
198. Id. at 340.
199. FLA. STAT. § 39.402(1 1)(a) (2006).
200. 882 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
201. Id. at 493; see R.M. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 877 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2004); L.O. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 876 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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payment orders were made are remarkable. As a matter of administrative
convenience, they were "entered under [a] separate case number in the do-
mestic relations division, not in the dependency" division by Judge Daw-
son. 212 As the appeals court noted, it is possible for the court to enter a sup-
port order other than through Chapter 39.203 But to do so, without notice to
the parent, some seventy years after the seminal United States Supreme
Court ruling in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,2 4 which es-
tablished the due process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard,
where the government is involved in a taking of property, is inexplicable.2 °5
The question of whether non-respondent custodians are entitled to pay-
ment of attorneys fees in a dependency proceeding was before the Fifth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal in Department of Children & Families v. H.G.206 A
child with multiple developmental and emotional problems was in the care of
his uncle and aunt, his mother having died and his father having been incar-
cerated for most of the child's life. 07 When the aunt and uncle could no
longer care for the boy and because he needed residential care, DCF com-
menced a dependency proceeding in which the custodians were notified but
not named as respondents. 28 The custodians hired a lawyer for whom they
later sought payment. 209 The appeals court overturned the trial court's award
of attorney's fees.2" ° It held that the custodians were merely participants in
the proceeding and not parties. t 1 Only parties are statutorily authorized to
seek fees.2"2
A question involving the application of the constitutional right to con-
frontation and cross-examination of one's accuser in a dependency court was
before the Third District Court of Appeal in A.B. v. Department of Children
& Families Services.213 The mother was charged with neglect for failure "to
protect her [fifteen-year-old daughter] from the stepfather's sexual and
physical abuse. ,21 4 The child testified by deposition.2 5 The appeals court
202. D. W., 882 So. 2d at 493.
203. Id.
204. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
205. Id. at 320.
206. 922 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
207. Id. at 1073.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1075.
211. H.G., 922 So. 2d at 1075.
212. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01(49), 57.105 (2006)).
213. 901 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
214. Id. at 325.
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rejected the mother's constitutional claim for two reasons.21 6 First, it held
the dependency proceeding is a civil rather than criminal proceeding and,
therefore, the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation did not apply." 7 Sec-
ond, "the [respondent's] counsel was given [the] opportunity to cross-
examine the child" at the deposition.218
IV. PROSPECTIVE ABUSE AND NEGLECT
Florida courts continue to be faced with vexing issues related to the in-
terpretation of the Supreme Court of Florida's 1991 opinion in Padgett v.
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,2 9 in which the Court held
that a trial court may constitutionally terminate parental rights to a child who
had not yet been abused or neglected based upon past abuse by the parent of
another child.22 ° In K.A. v. Department of Children & Family Services,22'
the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the termination of parental
rights to a child who had been the subject of egregious abuse, but reversed as
to two older siblings on grounds that there was no competent, substantial
evidence that the parent posed a substantial risk of significant harm to those
children.222 The court found "no nexus or predictive relationship between
the past abuse of the infant. .. and prospective abuse of the older children,"
under a test set forth in a number of earlier intermediate appellate court opin-
ions.223 In so doing, however, the court recognized a conflict among the dis-
trict courts of appeal involving the proper analytic framework for determin-
ing whether or not another child may become a victim of prospective
abuse.224 It commented upon the difference between the Fifth District view
that allows a presumption that past egregious abuse of one child is predictive
of future abuse of another child 225 and the Fourth District position that a pre-
215. Id.; see FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.245(g)(3)(B)(ii) (providing that someone who is unavailable
because he or she lives more than 100 miles from the place of hearing or is out of state may
give testimonial evidence by deposition).
216. A.B., 901 So. 2d at 326-27.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 327.
219. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
220. Id. at 571.
221. 880 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
222. Id. at 710.
223. Id. at 709 (citing A.D. (In re G.D.) v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 870 So. 2d 235,
238 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
224. Id.
225. Id.; see also Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs. v. B.B., 824 So. 2d 1000, 1007 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2002); A.B. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 816 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2002).
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sumption is unconstitutional "because it relieves the state of its burden to
demonstrate that the reunification of [a] parent and child poses a substantial
risk of harm to that child. ' 226 The court in K.A. did not reach this question,
because applying either test, it concluded, the State had not met its burden of
showing that the parent posed a substantial risk of significant harm to the two
older children, and thus far the trial court's position was not found to be er-
roneous. 
227
The issue referred to by the appellate court in K.A. on the question of
proof in a termination of parental rights case involving harm to one child
serving as the basis for a claim involving a second child finally reached the
Supreme Court of Florida in Florida Department of Children & Families v.
F.L. (F.L. 11)228 The Court analyzed the statute, finding it constitutional, but
reversed the Fourth District opinion on the grounds that the State must prove,
in such a case, both prior involuntary termination to a sibling and "a substan-
tial risk of significant harm to the current child., 229 The opinion, over a dis-
sent by Justice Weld with which Justice Cantero concurred, interpreted
Padgett in light of the 1998 amendment to Chapter 39 as remaining un-
changed in terms of its requirements. 23" Thus, in addition to being obligated
to prove both a prior involuntary termination of the parental rights for a sib-
ling and a substantial risk of significant harm to the child before the court,
the State must also prove that termination of parental rights is the least re-
strictive methodology to protect the child from harm.23' The Court explained
that egregious abuse and neglect of another child tends to indicate a greater
risk of harm to the current child, while the amount of time that has passed
since the prior involuntary termination is also relevant. 32 Evidence of
change of circumstances of the parent since the prior involuntary termination
was also viewed by the court as being significant as past conduct necessarily
has some predictive value regarding the parent's future conduct. 233 Finally,
the court emphasized that the parent was "not required to show ... changed
circumstances to avoid a termination of rights under section 39.806(1)(i).,, 234
226. K.A. (In re KA.), 880 So. 2d at 709 n.1 (citing F.L. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams. (F.L.
1), 849 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
227. Id. at 709.
228. 880 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2004).
229. Id. at611.
230. Id. at 609.
231. Id. at 610.
232. Id.
233. F.L. II, 880 So. 2d at 610.
234. Id.
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Incarceration is another ground for termination of parental rights in
Florida.235 Interpretation of the termination statute in the context of the par-
ent serving a prison sentence was before the Supreme Court of Florida in the
fall of 2004.236 The certified conflict issue before the Court was whether the
incarceration provision, requiring a parent to be incarcerated for a substantial
portion of the period of time before the child obtains the age of eighteen,
requires consideration of the entire period of incarceration or only the period
to be served after the termination petition has been filed.237 In B.C. v. De-
partment of Children & Families (B.C. 11),238 the Supreme Court of Florida
held that only the remaining period of incarceration is the appropriate stan-
dard. 239 Applying principles of statutory construction, and over a dissent by
Justice Wells, the Court applied a narrow interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage and a constitutionally-required focus on future harm to the child.24°
The second case involving egregious conduct as grounds for termina-
tion of parental rights was D.A.D. (In re D.A.D. II) v. Department of Chil-
dren & Family Services.24' In that case, the child's father strangled a man to
death in the family home while the mother and children were visiting rela-
tives in another state.242 There was also evidence that "the [f]ather had shot
his brother-in-law in an unsuccessful murder-for-hire plot," although he was
not charged with this attempt.243 This evidence was presented at the adjudi-
catory hearing as well as evidence of what was described by the court as the
children's "long [and] harrowing relationship with [their] [f]ather. '' 2' The
children's "[f]ather was an alcoholic and [a] cocaine-abuser with an exten-
sive criminal record who was frequently jailed" and "never contributed
money [to] the household expenses" as well as an individual who exhibited
"jealous and controlling behavior toward the [m]other.' ' 245  The appellate
court held that the "[f]ather's homicidal conduct was deplorable and outra-
geous." However, there was inadequate evidence to establish a "sufficient
235. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(d) (2006).
236. B.C. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams. (B.C. 1), 887 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 2004).
237. Id. at 1051.
238. Id. at 1046; see also Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs. v. B.C. (B.C. 1), 884 So. 2d 995
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003); J.W. (In re A.W.) v. Dep't of Child. & Fan. Servs., 816 So. 2d
1261 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); J.P.C. (In re J.D.C.) v. Dep't of Child. & Fain. Servs., 819
So. 2d 264 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
239. B.C. 11, 887 So. 2d at 1055.
240. See id. at 1057.
241. 903 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
242. Id. at 1036.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1038.
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nexus between [that] conduct and the specific harm to the children" in sup-
port of an egregious conduct finding. 246 Rather, the appellate court held the
father's conduct which amounted to "an unrelenting pattern of abuse," ne-
glect, and abandonment, did constitute egregious conduct.247 Therefore, the
court affirmed the termination of parental rights.248
As noted previously in a survey article in this law review, the parent's
failure to appear at a hearing in a termination of parental rights case can re-
sult in a default and a termination of parental rights.2 49 The issue arose again
in Department of Children & Families v. A.S.25° In an opinion which con-
flicted with courts in other districts, the Fifth District held that the failure to
appear by a parent does not constitute consent to termination under one pro-
vision of the Florida Statutes rendering proceedings involuntary.251  There
are two separate provisions of the Florida Statutes--one governing involun-
tary termination and the other governing voluntary termination.252 The court
engaged in a process of statutory construction and concluded that the legisla-
ture did not intend that consent under the one provision governing an invol-
untary proceeding be turned into one that is voluntary.253 For these reasons,
it reversed noting its conflict with the Second District.
254
A second failure to appear case resulting in termination of parental
rights is E.A. v. Department of Children & Families Services.2 55 In this case,
the parent arrived at the termination hearing about twenty-two minutes after
the testimony began, explaining that he had been "ensnarled in a traffic jam
resulting from an automobile accident., 256 He further indicated that he had
called the court and left a message relating to his tardiness.257 The trial court,
nonetheless, determined that the respondent had been defaulted and would
not be permitted to participate in the proceeding.258 Under Florida law, if the
parent fails to appear at the appropriate time and place, both statute and the
rules of juvenile procedure give the court the ability to consider the parent's
246. D.A.D. (In re D.A.D. II), 903 So. 2d at 1037.
247. Id. at 1039.
248. Id. at 1041.
249. See Dale, 2002 Survey, supra note 27, at 22-23.
250. 927 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
251. Id. at 205.
252. See FLA. STAT. § 39.801(3)(d) (2006).
253. A.S. (In re R.S.), 927 So. 2d at 208-09.
254. Id. at 209 (citing In re A.D.C., 854 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002); and In re
T.S., 855 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
255. 894 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 5th Dist Ct. App. 2005).
256. Id. at 1051.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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absence to constitute consent to the termination of his or her parental
rights.259 However, referring to prior case law, the appellate court in E.A.
held that the purpose of the rule was "not to terminate parental rights on a
'gotcha' basis."2" Concluding that implied consent based upon a late arrival
to a hearing should be disfavored, the appellate court reversed.26'
In the event a parent fails to appear and a termination is entered, a mo-
tion to vacate a default judgment terminating parental rights is appropriate,
and if the parent has a meritorious defense, the motion should be granted.262
This matter arose in E.S. v. Department of Children & Family Services.63
Both the mother and her appointed counsel were absent at the final hearing
on termination of her parental rights. 264 The next day the mother moved to
set aside the default on the grounds that she was unable to attend the hearing
because she had medical justifications and that appointed counsel had ad-
vised the judge's chambers that he was in another hearing and was therefore
unable to be in attendance at the present trial. 265 Although the appellate court
shared the trial court's skepticism about the sufficiency of the mother's
medical excuse, the court held that the mother had acted with due diligence
in filing the motion and given the fact that the mother had attended all of the
previous hearings in the case, she should have been permitted to testify in
opposition to the argument that her medical excuse was insufficient and she
had no meritorious defense.2 66 For these reasons the appellate court re-
versed. 267
In In re TB. v. Department of Children & Family Services,268 the trial
court granted termination of parental rights and denied a parent's request for
a continuance resulting in a failure to appear at the adjudicatory hearing. 69
The appellate court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in not
granting the father's request for a continuance. 270 The father had driven nine
hours to this hearing, but could not attend on the next day, which was when
259. Id. (citing B.H. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 882 So. 2d 1099, 1100 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2004)).
260. E.A., 894 So. 2d at 1051.
261. Id. at 1051-52.
262. E.S. v. Dep't of Child. & Fain. Servs., 878 So. 2d 493, 497 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2004).
263. Id. at 493.
264. Id. at 494.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 496.
267. E.S., 878 So. 2d at 497.
268. 920 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
269. Id. at 171.
270. Id. at 174.
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the case was rescheduled. 271 The court "ordered the father to appear the next
day before [a different judge], and the father [had] responded that he could
not., 27 2  The appellate court reversed on the grounds that the trial court
"placed more emphasis on judicial econom[ic] . . . convenience than on the
father's right to [care for] his child and ... have his day in court, 273 which
constituted reversible error.274
One of the basic grounds for termination of parental rights is abandon-
ment. 75 Another is failure to comply with the case plan.276 Regardless of
the grounds for termination of parental rights, the Department of Children
and Family Services must plead the correct grounds and then offer proof.
277
In T.M v. Department of Children & Families (T.M 11),278 the Department
alleged that a father failed to comply with the case plan and his continued
involvement with the child threatened the child's life and safety. 279 The ap-
pellate court found that the Department had not proved either ground, and
thus a court finding of abandonment must be reversed because that was not
one of the grounds pleaded.80
The right to counsel for parents in dependency and termination of pa-
rental rights proceedings in Florida is governed by statute.281' The United
States Supreme Court has never held that there is an absolute right to counsel
for parents even in termination of parental rights cases.282 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court of Florida has held that the state constitutional due process
clause does not create a right to appointed counsel in termination of parental
rights cases.283 The Court has spoken about the effectiveness of counsel in a
dependency context. 284 That topic has been the subject of discussion in sur-
285 in8avey articles in this law review ' and in an incisive student article.286 The
271. Id. at 171.
272. Id.
273. T.B., 920 So. 2d at 174.
274. Id. at 171.
275. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(b) (2006).
276. Id. § 39.806(1)(e).
277. See T.M. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams. (T.M 11), 905 So. 2d 993, 998 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2005).
278. Id. at 993.
279. Id. at 995.
280. Id. at 998-99.
281. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.801-.817 (2006).
282. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
283. In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 87 (Fla. 1980).
284. See S.B. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 851 So. 2d 689, 690-92 (Fla. 2003).
285. Dale, 2004 Survey, supra note 4, at 423.
286. Michele R. Forte, Making the Case for Effective Assistance of Counsel in Involuntary
Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, 28 NOVA L. REv. 193 (2003).
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question left unanswered by the Supreme Court of Florida was whether the
statutory right to counsel for parents in TPR cases would generate a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. That issue was before the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in E. T. v. State.287 In a detailed opinion by Judge May with
a partial dissent by Judge Stevenson, the court held as a technical matter that
the parent, who filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus had used the in-
correct methodology and instead should have been taken on appeal.2 8 The
court also certified the question of whether Florida recognizes a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel arising from a lawyer's representation of a
parent in a termination of parental rights case and what procedures should be
followed to pursue such a claim.2 89 Judge Stevenson dissented, writing that
he would hold that Florida's due process clause does guarantee a right to
meaningful and effective assistance of counsel in a TPR proceeding.290
V. ADOPTION
The Supreme Court of Florida has recently spoken on the issue of the
need of consent by the Department of Children and Family Services to adop-
tion proceedings in B. Y v. Department of Children & Families, 291 clearing up
a conflict between the district courts of appeal.2 92 The Court reviewed the
state statutes governing child welfare matters and analyzed the ongoing ju-
risdiction and obligations of the trial court.2 93 The Court reviewed the Flor-
ida Statutes governing consent to adoption, finding that a court may finalize
an adoption without consent of the Department if such consent is unreasona-
bly withheld.2 94 Thus, given the legislative mandates for the Court's contin-
ued jurisdiction to advance children's best interests, the Court has the author-
ity to grant the adoption without the consent of the Department when such
consent is unreasonably withheld.
The First District Court of Appeal recently held that there is a right to
counsel for a parent in a Chapter 63 adoption case predicated upon the ad-
verse parent's right to defend a petition to terminate parental rights pursuant
to that chapter. 295 In G.C. v. W.J,296 the appellate court reversed the trial
287. 930 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
288. Id. at 729.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 727 n.2, 729 (thirty-one states have addressed the issue); 1 MICHAEL J. DALE ET
AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT 4.06[ 1 ][c] (2006).
291. 887 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2004).
292. Id. at 1254.
293. Id. at 1255-56.
294. Id. at 1257.
295. G.C. v. W.J., 917 So. 2d 998, 999 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
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court holding that while Chapter 63 does not speak to express appointment of
counsel, the entitlement was inherent or fundamental where parental rights
are subject to termination.297
The issue of how courts hearing adoption cases and termination of pa-
rental rights cases relate to each other was before the appellate court in In re
S.N. W.298 The specific issue was whether the circuit court was required by
statute to permit an adoption agency to intervene in a dependency proceed-
ing.299 Under the facts of the case, a dependency proceeding was brought
against the birth mother who thereafter, independently, and without notice to
DCF, contacted an adoption agency and adoption proceedings com-
menced. 300 "Prior to the adjudicatory hearing," the adoption agency filed a
petition to terminate parental rights, but the petition was not filed within the
dependency case.3"' While the TPR proceeding was pending, the agency
"filed a request to intervene in the dependency action .... to dismiss [that]
action, and [to] terminate the jurisdiction of the dependency court. 30 2 Al-
though the issue was not strictly one of subject matter jurisdiction, the appel-
late court held that "[t]he court in which the adoption proceeding [was] pend-
ing and the court in which the dependency proceeding [was] pending are
both circuit courts with jurisdiction to determine [the] issue[]."3 °3 Neither
statute nor court opinion mandates how the circuit court may administer the
reassignment of cases as long as the cases are within the jurisdiction of the
circuit court. 3' However, Chapter 39 does say that the "orders of [a] de-
pendency court 'shall take precedence over other custody and visitation or-
ders' entered" in any other circuit court.305 The appellate court concluded
that the adoption agency was entitled to intervene in a dependency proceed-
ing pursuant to the adoption law.306
296. Id. at 998.
297. Id. For a more detailed explanation of the right to counsel for parents in termination
of parental rights cases and dependency cases, see discussion supra p. 23. See also Michael J.
Dale, Providing Counsel to Children in Dependency Cases in Florida, 25 NOVA L. REV. 769,
784 (2001).
298. Adoption Miracles, LLC (In re S.N.W.) v. S.C.W., 912 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2005).
299. Id. at 373.
300. Id. at 370.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 371.
303. Adoption Miracles, LLC (In re S.N. W.), 912 So. 2d at 373-74.
304. See id at 372.
305. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.013(4) (2005)).
306. Id. at 374.
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Finally, in J.L v. Department of Children & Family Services, °7 the ap-
pellate court was faced with a procedural issue relating to whether DCF ter-
mination of parental rights permanency staffing meetings are subject to the
Sunshine Law and whether failure to notify the public, the parents, and the
attorneys of such a meeting violates the statute.3 °8 The court held that the
Sunshine Law does not apply to termination of parental rights meetings that
are carried out by DCF for the purpose of determining whether to file a peti-
tion to terminate the parental rights. 30 9 The court applied Florida case law,
statutes, and the administrative code governing the Sunshine Law, conclud-
ing that nothing in the law provides that official action be taken at the staff
meeting and further that Chapter 39 contains principles standing for the
proposition that all information involving the child is to be confidential.
3 0
VI. CURFEW
The issue of juvenile curfews has been before a variety of courts in a
variety of jurisdictions for a number of years now.31 The courts have gener-
ally upheld juvenile curfew ordinances where they are narrowly drawn and
based upon documented evidence of the need for them to reduce crime.3 1
The subject recently reached the Supreme Court of Florida for the second
time.3 13 The issue in State v. jp. 31 4 was first, what level of constitutional
analysis should be applied to two local Florida ordinances, second, whether
the ordinances implicated juveniles' rights to free speech and assembly, and
third, whether the ordinances were narrowly tailored to serve compelling
governmental interests and therefore whether they violated the juveniles'
constitutional right to freedom of movement and privacy. 3 5 First, the Court
reaffirmed that strict scrutiny is applied in Florida.31 6 Recognizing that a
child's constitutional rights are not absolute, the Court held that the cities'
assertion of a compelling interest in preventing victimization of youngsters
can outweigh privacy right for the youngsters during curfew hours if the or-
dinances are narrowly tailored to achieve that end, and further, that the mu-
nicipalities may have a compelling interest in protecting the juveniles and
307. 922 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
308. Id. at 406.
309. Id. at 407.
310. Id.
311. See 1 DALE ET AL., supra note 290, 1 3.02[3][e][ii].
312. Id.
313. See State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1116-17 (Fla. 2004).
314. Id.
315. Id. at 1104-06.
316. Id. at 1109.
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reducing juvenile crime, which would outweigh the juveniles' right to travel
freely during this time period, again, as long as the ordinances are narrowly
tailored.317 Oddly, while the data supporting the compelling governmental
interest was challenged by the juveniles, the Court held that statistical data is
not necessary, nor is scientific analysis, to show the wisdom of the legisla-
ture's determination."' However, the Court concluded that the ordinances
were not narrowly drawn because they imposed criminal sanctions for sec-
ond and subsequent violations, and thus, did not meet strict scrutiny as they
were antithetical to the municipalities' stated interest in protecting the juve-
niles from victimization." 9 Judge Wells and Judge Cantero dissented at
length as to the strict scrutiny standard and other constitutional rights.320
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida has been quite active in dealing with sev-
eral major issues involving the rights of children including curfews and stan-
dards for termination of parental rights, delinquency, and adoption. The in-
termediate appellate courts have also responded to important issues govern-
ing the rights of children. However, in addition, the intermediate appellate
courts have continued their longstanding approach to juvenile justice and
child welfare cases in which they hold the trial courts strictly accountable for
compliance with both constitutional and state statutory obligations. On occa-
sion, the appellate courts have been blunt in their response to errors of the
trial courts that the appellate courts viewed as basic and obvious.
317. Id. at 1112-13.
318. JP.,907So. 2dat 1117.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1120-38 (Wells, J. and Cantero, J., dissenting).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Georgia v. Randolph (Randolph III),' the United States Supreme
Court held that law enforcement may not conduct a warrantless search of a
premises shared by co-occupants where a physically present co-occupant
expresses his or her refusal to consent to the search, even if law enforcement
obtains the voluntary consent of another co-occupant of the premises.2 This
article will introduce the historical context of the decision and provide an
overview of the Randolph III opinion. The article also discusses cases that
have addressed the impact of Randolph III on the future of third-party con-
sent in the context of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion. In conclusion, the author will offer his own observations regarding the
opinion.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND-A REFLECTION ON THE PAST
A. The Fourth Amendment Generally Prohibits Warrantless Searches
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
no person will be subjected to "unreasonable searches and seizures" of their
"persons, houses, papers, and effects." 3 Unlike most constitutional amend-
ments, the Fourth Amendment further includes specific language regarding
its application, stating, "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."4  Consequently, war-
rantless searches by law enforcement are generally deemed per se unreason-
able) With the passage of time, however, courts have carefully loosened the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment by carving out a number of
limited, well-defined exceptions.' Although recognizing that factual circum-
1. 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).
2. Id. at 1518-19.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. Id.
5. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914).
6. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (holding evidence of
crime will not be suppressed where officers discover the evidence during a warrantless entry
of a home in pursuit of a fleeing felon); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) (ex-
plaining that police may enter a home without a warrant where an exceptional circumstance
exists); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948) (asserting that evidence will not
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stances, often of a time-sensitive nature, may justify these exceptions, the
United States Supreme Court has been reluctant to infringe upon the protec-
tions of the Fourth Amendment that were so specifically outlined by the
framers of the United States Constitution.7 Thus, the Court has observed,
"[w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as
a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government
enforcement agent. '"8
B. Valid Consent Is an Exception to the Warrant Requirement of the
Fourth Amendment
Beginning in the early 1900s courts began to realize that a warrantless
search by law enforcement with the voluntary consent of the property owner
could not logically qualify as an "unreasonable" search.9 For example, in
United States v. Williams, " officers obtained the permission of a ranch
owner to "look the premises over.""1  While on the premises, the officers
located what appeared to be evidence of a moonshine operation. 2 In up-
holding the search, the United States District Court for the District of Mon-
tana stated, "[t]his search without warrant, but with [the owner's] consent,
was not unreasonable."13  Armed with this realization, valid consent was
later recognized as one of the limited, well-defined exceptions to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 14 Further development of this prin-
ciple over time would soon reveal that valid consent, as an exception to the
freedom from warrantless searches, would become a useful tool for law en-
forcement and expand to encompass a variety of factual scenarios.
be suppressed based upon warrantless entry where police are confronted with the imminent
possibility that evidence will be destroyed).
7. See Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 315-16 (1921).
8. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 295 F. 219, 220 (D. Mont. 1924); Cass v. State,
61 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Tex. Crim. App. 1933).
10. 295 F. at 220.
11. Id. at 219.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 220.
14. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S.
624, 629 (1946), vacated, 330 U.S. 800 (1947).
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C. Valid Consent Does Not Require a "Knowing and Intelligent" Waiver
of Fourth Amendment Rights by a Defendant
Given the overwhelming importance of constitutional rights to the
American system of justice, the prosecution bears a heavy burden anytime it
attempts to prove that an accused has waived one of those rights. 5 Specifi-
cally, in most circumstances, the prosecution is required to prove that the
person waiving a constitutional right knew of both the existence of the right
as well as his or her right to refuse to waive the right. 6 Commonly referred
to as a "knowing and intelligent waiver,"' 7 this burden has been applied to a
variety of constitutional rights in criminal cases. ' Therefore, since consent
to a warrantless search, at the most basic level, is nothing more than a waiver
of a person's Fourth Amendment rights, does law enforcement have to in-
form an accused of his or her right to refuse to consent to a search? The
United States Supreme Court answered this question in the negative in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 19
In Schneckloth, evidence was obtained against the defendant during a
consensual search of a vehicle. 20 Although both California appellate courts
affirmed the defendant's conviction, the defendant pursued a writ of habeas
corpus in federal court. 21 Setting aside the district court order denying ha-
beas relief, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
the prosecution was required to prove that the person granting consent knew
he or she had the right to refuse to waive his or her Fourth Amendment
rights. 22 The United States Supreme Court reversed, stating, "[w]hile knowl-
edge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the
government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an
effective consent.,
23
The primary significance of Schneckloth was that the Supreme Court
distinguished the protections of the Fourth Amendment from other constitu-
15. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938).
16. Id.
17. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
18. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 526 (1972) (waiver of the right to a speedy trial);
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) (waiver of the right to confrontation); Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191 (1957) (waiver of the right to be free from double jeopardy);
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942) (waiver of the right to counsel).
19. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
20. Id. at 220.
21. Id. at 221.
22. Id. at 221-22.
23. Id. at 227.
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tional "trial rights," such as the right to counsel, which usually require a
knowing and intelligent waiver.24 However, the practical, common sense
reasoning utilized by the Court in reaching this conclusion demonstrated the
Court's willingness to expand, rather than further restrict, the principles sur-
rounding consent searches except in cases involving coercion or threats. For
example, the Court noted that the burden imposed on the prosecution by the
Ninth Circuit decision would be unworkable in real world application, as the
prosecution would seldom be capable of proving that an unprovoked, con-
senting defendant knew of his/her right to refuse consent.25 In so reasoning,
the Court stated, "[a]ny defendant who was the subject of a search authorized
solely by his consent could effectively frustrate the introduction into evi-
dence of the fruits of that search by simply failing to testify that he in fact
knew he could refuse consent., 26 Additionally, the Court observed that it
would be completely "impractical ' 27 to impose a requirement that law en-
forcement provide a defendant with a detailed warning in consent search
cases. 21 Observing that consent searches often occur under the time pres-
sures of active investigations and in such intimate places as the home, the
Court stated, "[t]hese situations are a far cry from the structured atmosphere
of a trial where, assisted by counsel if he chooses, a defendant is informed of
his trial rights.,
29
D. Valid Consent May Be Effectively Obtained from a Variety of Persons
Other than the Defendant
In the simplest of cases involving consent searches, a property owner
has voluntarily acquiesced directly to law enforcement officers, in their pres-
ence, to a warrantless search and evidence unearthed during the search is
used against the property owner.3 ° In such cases, it should come as no sur-
prise that evidence may be used against the property owner since it is pre-
cisely that property owner who has waived his/her very own Fourth Amend-
ment rights by virtue of his/her very own consent.3 However, the evolution
of legal principles over time is seldom as elementary as the reasoning found
in the simplest of cases, as varying factual nuances consistently challenge the
24. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 237-38 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 458
(1938)).
25. Id. at 230.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 231.
28. Id.
29. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 232 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969)).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 295 F. 219, 220 (D. Mont. 1924).
31. Id.
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complacency of seemingly well-settled doctrines. The development of case
law involving consent searches provides an excellent example of this con-
stant dilemma.
As more cases involving consent searches began reaching appellate
courts, it soon became clear that joint ownership or use of property by multi-
ple persons would present unique questions regarding the effectiveness of
consent by one person to the detriment of others.32 Specifically, courts were
faced with the question of whether, via consent, an individual may waive the
Fourth Amendment rights of another individual, based upon the fact that the
individuals jointly share use and control of the property at issue.33 For ex-
ample, in Stein v. United States,34 a wife discovered that her husband pos-
sessed and used opium in their home.35 The couple later separated with the
husband moving to his mother's home and the wife eventually moving into a
friend's home.36 The wife later returned to the marital home with federal
narcotics agents and permitted the agents to search the home.37 The agents
discovered drug-related evidence that was used against the husband in a
prosecution for drug crimes.38 In rejecting the husband's argument that the
search was not permitted by the Fourth Amendment, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the wife could unilaterally permit warrantless entry by
law enforcement without the consent of her husband.39 The court relied
heavily upon the fact that the husband and wife both had an equal right to
possess the home, stating that "[t]he right of [the wife] to enter the house
cannot be seriously questioned."4
As case law continued to evolve, the authority of persons having equal
rights of possession and control of property to authorize a warrantless search
to the detriment of other co-occupants or co-owners was further extended to
encompass an assortment of factual scenarios." Some courts seemed to fo-
32. See, e.g., Cofer v. United States, 37 F.2d 677, 679 (5th Cir. 1930) (addressing
whether a wife's consent was binding on her husband where police coerced her consent).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463, 464 (4th Cir. 1962).
34. 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1948).
35. Id. at 852.
36. Id. at 853.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Stein, 166 F.2d at 855.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Gurleski v. United States, 405 F.2d 253, 260-63 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding
that consent of a joint user of an automobile is effective against other users); United States v.
Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463, 465 (4th Cir. 1962) (holding that consent of a person who borrows an
automobile temporarily, while the automobile is in that person's possession, is effective
against the actual owner); see Teasley v. United States, 292 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1961)
(holding that joint occupant of an apartment may consent to a warrantless search to the detri-
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cus their reasoning on the fact that the person authorizing the warrantless
search possessed the same right to authorize entry by law enforcement as the
person against whom the evidence was being used.42 However, in 1969, the
United States Supreme Court articulated an additional justification for per-
mitting warrantless third-party consent searches, which focused on the ac-
tions of the person against whom evidence is being used in assuming the risk
that other persons may consent to warrantless searches by police.4 3
In Frazier v. Cupp,44 the defendant jointly used a duffel bag with his
cousin. 45 The cousin permitted a warrantless search of the bag by law en-
forcement and evidence was discovered linking the defendant to a murder.46
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the United
States Supreme Court "dismissed rather quickly, ' 47 the defendant's conten-
tion that the search was not authorized by finding that the defendant, as the
person against whom the evidence was being used, maintained the duffel bag
jointly with his cousin and left the bag in his cousin's home. 48  Conse-
quently, the Court stated that the defendant, "must be taken to have assumed
the risk that [his cousin] would allow someone else to look inside., 49 The
Court's discussion in Frazier regarding third-party consent consumed ap-
proximately one page of the published opinion of the Court and was by no
means an exhaustive analysis. 50 However, in 1974, the Court would take the
liberty to create a more well-defined standard in third-party consent cases in
United States v. Matlock.5
In Matlock, the defendant was arrested in the yard of a residence he oc-
cupied with other persons for the crime of bank robbery.52 The arresting
officers were aware that the defendant lived in the residence, however, the
officers did not request consent from the defendant to search the residence.53
Instead, the officers approached an individual named Gayle Graff at the door
ment of other co-occupants); United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69, 74 (7th Cir. 1954) (finding
evidence acquired during a warrantless search of a printing plant operation admissible where
business partner of the defendant consented to the warrantless search by police).
42. See Eldridge, 302 F.2d at 467-68; Sferas, 210 F.2d at 74-75.
43. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
44. Id. at 731.
45. Id. at 740.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Frazier, 394 U.S. at 740.
49. Id.
50. See generally id.
51. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
52. Id. at 166.
53. Id.
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of the residence who ultimately permitted the officers to come inside. 4
Once inside, Ms. Graff consented to a warrantless search of the home, in-
cluding a bedroom that she shared jointly with the defendant." The officers
obtained evidence against the defendant during the search that was used by
the prosecution. 6 The Court held that valid consent may be obtained from
someone other than the defendant, "who possessed common authority over
or other sufficient relationship to the premises. 517 Although the Court re-
manded the case for further findings consistent with the opinion,58 the Court
specifically defined "common authority"59 as not being represented by the
person's interest in the premises searched in the context of property law but
instead, the Court stated that such authority:
rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally
having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is rea-
sonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to
permit inspection in his own right and that the others have as-
sumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common
area to be searched.60
As a result, the Court defined "common authority" to consent based
upon two factors: first, based upon the inherent right of the co-occupant
granting the consent to do so; and second, the actions or inactions of the de-
fendant against whom evidence is being used in "assuming the risk" that
his/her co-occupant will grant consent.6'
The Matlock decision represents the first time that the United States Su-
preme Court established significant, guiding principles regarding when one
person's consent is valid to the detriment of another. Although questions
would soon arise regarding the scope of one's consent under MailoCk,62 the
opinion reached landmark status as its holding began to be recognized and
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166-67.
57. Id. at 171.
58. Id. at 178.
59. Id. at 171 n.7.
60. Id.
61. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Orejuela-Guevara, 659 F. Supp. 882, 885-89 (E.D.N.Y.
1987) (noting that consent may not be valid where the third-party granting consent does not
possess a sufficiently close relationship to the property searched).
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applied throughout the federal system. 63 However, the Matlock decision
specifically reserved the question of whether a warrantless search is permis-
sible when officers reasonably believe that they are obtaining consent from
an individual with "common authority" over the premises but, in fact, the
person does not have such authority.' The Court would not address this
issue until approximately sixteen years later in Illinois v. Rodriguez.65
In Rodriguez, police in Chicago were called to the home of an individ-
ual named Dorothy Jackson.66 Upon arrival, the officers met Ms. Jackson's
daughter, Gail Fischer, who appeared to be the victim of a physical attack.67
Fischer informed the officers that Rodriguez had beaten her up earlier in the
day at his apartment, which was also located in Chicago, but on a different
street. 6' Fischer then traveled with the officers to the apartment in order to
arrest Rodriguez; however, the officers did not obtain a search warrant or an
arrest warrant.69 Upon arrival, Fischer entered the apartment using a key and
permitted the officers to come inside. 70
Unknown to the officers at the time, Fischer had taken the key without
Rodriguez's permission, and had moved out of the apartment with her chil-
dren approximately one month prior to the incident.7 Fischer's name was
not on the lease for the apartment, she paid none of the rent for the apart-
ment, and she was not permitted to have guests in the apartment without
Rodriguez's permission.72 However, Fischer referred to the apartment as
"our[s] ' , 73 while conversing with the officers, and indicated that she had
clothing and furniture inside the apartment.74
Once inside, the officers discovered evidence of drug-related activity in
the living room and bedroom where Rodriguez was actually present and
sleeping during the search. 75 Rodriguez was arrested on drug related charges
and subsequently moved to suppress the evidence found inside his apart-
63. See United States v. Sullivan, 544 F. Supp. 701, 714 (D. Me. 1982) (providing a
thorough list of federal cases recognizing and applying Matlock between 1974 and 1982
throughout the country).
64. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7.
65. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
66. Id. at 179.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 180.
70. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 180.
71. Id. at 181.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 179.
74. Id.
75. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 180.
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ment.76 Finding that Fischer was nothing more than an 'infrequent visi-
tor"' 7 incapable of granting consent to search the apartment, the trial court
granted Rodriguez's motion. 8 The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed,79
concluding that the officers' belief, no matter how reasonable, that consent
was valid is of no consequence to a Fourth Amendment analysis.8" The State
of Illinois's petition for review by the Supreme Court of Illinois was denied
and the case ended up before the United States Supreme Court.8'
The Court began its opinion by expressly stating that the State of Illi-
nois had not met its burden of showing that Fischer possessed "common au-
thority" over the apartment necessary to authorize her to grant consent to the
detriment of Rodriguez since she was no longer a joint occupant.82
Nevertheless, the Court held that valid consent may be obtained from a
third-party where officers reasonably, though erroneously, believed that the
consenting third party possesses common authority over the premises.83 In
spite of the fact that Fischer was not a joint occupant of the apartment, the
Court reasoned that all that is required in justifying a warrantless search
based upon third-party consent is that the police officers make reasonable
conclusions from the facts.84 In determining if police conduct is reasonable,
the Court observed that the Fourth Amendment does not require that an offi-
cer's assessment always be factually accurate, but only that the officer's as-
sessment of the facts at issue be objectively reasonable.85
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188-89.
81. Id. at 180-81.
82. Id. at 181 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974)).
83. Id. at 186-88.
84. Id. at 186.
85. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188.
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E. Prior to Randolph, Valid Consent Could Be Effectively Obtained from
Persons Other than the Defendant, Even If the Defendant Was Present
at the Time of the Warrantless Search and Objected to the Search
Once legally identified as an exception to the Fourth Amendment war-
rant requirement,86 valid consent would expand to permit third parties having
actual authority,17 as well as apparent authority, 88 over property to pennit
law enforcement to conduct a warrantless search to the detriment of a crimi-
nal defendant. However, if such a third party consents to a warrantless
search but the defendant, having equal authority over the property and pre-
sent at the time of the search, objects to the search, may the police proceed
without a warrant? 89 Approximately thirty-two years after Matlock, and six-
teen years after Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court would answer
this question decisively in the negative. 9 Prior to Randolph III, however,
every federal circuit to address this question consistently reached the oppo-
site result with little debate. 9'
In allowing warrantless searches under these circumstances, federal
courts relied almost exclusively on the standard set forth in Matlock.92 Some
federal courts addressed the issue fairly briefly with very little substantive
analysis. 93 Utilizing a more extensive analysis, however, other courts ex-
panded the application of the Matlock standard to provide that a person with
common authority over property may permit a warrantless search by law
enforcement even if the defendant has equal authority over the property, is
present at the time of the search, and specifically objects to the search. 94 In
so reasoning, some courts concluded that when a defendant assumes the risk
86. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S.
624, 630 (1946).
87. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171.
88. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186-88.
89. See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph (Randolph III), 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1520
(2006).
90. Id. at 1520-21.
91. See United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323, 1328 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Morning, 64 F.3d 531, 536 (9th Cir. 1995); Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1548 (11th Cir.
1995); United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, 33 (1 st Cir. 1992); United States v. Baldwin, 644
F.2d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883, 885 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (per curiam); United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687 (6th Cir. 1977).
92. See Rith, 164 F.3d at 1328; Morning, 64 F.3d at 534-36; Lenz, 51 F.3d at 1548;
Donlin, 982 F.2d at 33; Sumlin, 567 F.2d at 687-88.
93. See Lenz, 51 F.3d at 1548; Donlin, 982 F.2d at 33; Baldwin, 644 F.2d at 383.
94. See Rith, 164 F.3d at 1328; Morning, 64 F.3d at 534-36; Lenz, 51 F.3d at 1548;
Donlin, 982 F.2d at 33; Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687-88.
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that others will consent to a warrantless search by cohabiting with other peo-
ple, he or she essentially waives his or her expectation of privacy to a limited
extent.95 By way of example, in United States v. Rith,96 the Tenth Circuit
held that a son, who lived in his parent's home, could not revoke the previ-
ously obtained consent of his parents to a warrantless search, even though the
revocation was made contemporaneous to the search.97 The court stated,
Under Matlock and its interpretive progeny, [the son] had no ex-
pectation of privacy that negated his parents' consent to a search of
their home. To hold otherwise would undermine the gravamen of
Matlock: "any of the co-habitants has the right to permit the in-
spection in his own right and ... the others have assumed the risk
that one of their number might permit the common area to be
searched. 98
The majority of state appellate courts addressing this issue concurred
with the federal courts' conclusion.99 However, a small minority of state
appellate courts, including the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida
reached a contrary result.l"° Of the courts subscribing to this view, the Su-
preme Court of Washington provided the most thorough analysis. 101 In State
v. Leach, 10 2 the defendant's girlfriend consented to the search of an office
that she and the defendant possessed equal control over.0 3 The defendant
was present at the time of the search but the record in Leach did not indicate
that he actually objected to the search. "4 The court held that the girlfriend's
95. Rith, 164 F.3d at 1328; Morning, 64 F.3d at 536; Sumlin, 567 F.2d at 688.
96. 164 F.3dat 1323.
97. Id. at 1328.
98. Id. (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974)); see also Morn-
ing, 64 F.3d at 536 (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7) (stating that "[a] defendant cannot
expect sole exclusionary authority unless he lives alone"); Sumlin, 567 F.2d at 688 (stating
with regard to a joint occupants ability to object to a warrantless search consented to by a co-
occupant that "[tihere is no reasonable expectation of privacy to be protected under such cir-
cumstances").
99. See, e.g., Love v. State, 138 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Ark. 2003); People v. Sanders, 904
P.2d 1311, 1315 (Colo. 1995); City of Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 203-05 (Wyo.
1991); People v. Cosme, 397 N.E.2d 1319, 1321-23 (N.Y. 1979); State v. Ramold, 511
N.W.2d 789, 792 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994); Brandon v. State, 778 P.2d 221, 223-24 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1989); State v. Frame, 609 P.2d 830, 832 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
100. See, e.g., Shingles v. State, 872 So. 2d 434, 437-39 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004);
State v. Leach, 782 P.2d 1035, 1038-40 (Wash. 1989).
101. See Leach, 782 P.2d at 1038-40.
102. Id. at 1085.
103. Id. at 1036.
104. Id. at 1036-37.
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consent did not justify a warrantless search.'1 5 The court distinguished
Matlock, stating that the Matlock standard only applied to "absent, noncon-
senting" defendants. 06 Since the defendant in Leach was present at the time
of the search, the court found the warrantless entry by police to be unlawful
in spite of the girlfriend's consent. 107
III. RANDOLPH V. GEORGIA-THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
In late May 2001, "Scott Randolph and his wife, Janet [Randolph],
separated."'0 8 Prior to this separation, the coupled resided in a home located
in Americus, Georgia that they rented from Scott Randolph's father, Edward
Randolph.' 09 Both Mr. and Mrs. Randolph considered the home to be their
marital residence. "0 However, when the couple separated, Mrs. Randolph
traveled to Canada to stay with her parents, taking the couple's child and
some belongings with her. "' Mr. Randolph remained at the home in Ameri-
cus, Georgia. 112 For reasons unknown, Mrs. Randolph returned to the home
in Americus, Georgia in early July 2001. "'
At approximately 9:00 a.m. on July 6, 2001,'14 Mrs. Randolph re-
quested that local police come to the home regarding a domestic dispute with
Mr. Randolph. "5  Upon arrival, Mrs. Randolph complained that Mr.
Randolph had taken the couple's child to a neighbor's home following their
dispute." 6 Not long after the police arrived, Mr. Randolph returned to the
home stating that he had taken the child to a neighbor's home fearing that
Mrs. Randolph may attempt to flee to Canada with the child again." 7 Accu-
sations of misconduct soon erupted from both Mr. Randolph and Mrs.
105. See id. at 1040.
106. Leach, 782 P.2d at 1038 (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170
(1974)).
107. Id. at 1040.
108. Georgia v. Randolph (Randolph I1), 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1519 (2006).
109. Id. at 1519; see also Brief for Petitioner at 3, Georgia v. Randolph (Randolph III),
547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006) (No. 04-1067); Respondent's Response to Petition for
Certiorari at 3-4, Georgia v. Randolph (Randolph II), 604 S.E.2d 834 (Ga. Nov. 8, 2004) (No.
A03A0906).
110. Respondent's Response to Petition for Certiorari, supra note 109, at 2.
111. Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
112. Randolph v. State (Randolph 1), 590 S.E.2d 834, 836 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
113. Randolph I, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
114. Randolph I, 590 S.E.2d at 836.
115. Randolph ll, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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Randolph. ' Mrs. Randolph accused Mr. Randolph of using substantial
quantities of cocaine, thus resulting in financial problems for the couple." '9
Mr. Randolph denied the allegations and, in retaliation, alleged that it was
Mrs. Randolph who abused both drugs and alcohol. 20 In fact, at subsequent
hearings in the case, Mr. Randolph would accuse Mrs. Randolph and an un-
known male companion of consuming as many as thirty-six bottles of beer in
the twenty-four hour period prior to the incident with police.' 2' He described
her as being unsteady on her feet, smelling of alcohol, and experiencing di-
lated pupils at the time of the encounter with police. 122 Although police de-
nied witnessing Mrs. Randolph in a state of intoxication or incapacity, the
police acknowledged that there was hostility and animosity between the cou-
ple at the time. 1
23
One of the officers, Sergeant Brett Murray,1 24 traveled with Mrs.
Randolph to the neighbor's home in order to retrieve the child. 125 Upon re-
turning to the home, Mrs. Randolph continued to complain about Mr.
Randolph's drug abuse and further stated that there was evidence of his drug-
related activities inside the home. 26 Sergeant Murray asked Mr. Randolph
about his drug abuse'27 and requested his consent to search the home. ' 28 Mr.
Randolph, an attorney, "unequivocally refused" to grant consent. 129 Sergeant
Murray then requested the consent of Mrs. Randolph which she "readily
gave."' 130 Mrs. Randolph then proceeded to take the officer inside the home
to the couple's upstairs bedroom.' Inside the bedroom, Sergeant Murray
discovered what appeared to be a straw with cocaine residue on it, consistent
with an instrument used to ingest cocaine. 1
32
118. Id.; Randolph I, 590 S.E.2d at 836.
119. Randolph ll, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519; Randolph 1, 590 S.E.2d at 836.
120. Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
121. Respondent's Response to Petition for Certiorari, supra note 109, at 3-4.
122. Id. at 4.
123. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 109, at 4.
124. Brett Murray is now a Major with the Sumter County Sheriff's Department in Ameri-
cus, Georgia. Major Brett Murray, Sumter County Sherrifs Office, http://www.sumter-
ga.com/sheriff/index.html (last visited June 4, 2007).
125. Randolph 11, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
126. Id.
127. Id.; Randolph v. State (Randolph 1), 590 S.E.2d 834, 836 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
128. Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
129. Id.
130. Id.; Randolph 1, 590 S.E.2d at 836.
131. Randolph I1, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
132. Id.; Randolph 1, 590 S.E.2d at 836.
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Sergeant Murray left the home in order to obtain an evidence bag so
that he could properly collect and store the evidence. 33 He also contacted
the local district attorney's office and was instructed to stop the search and
obtain a warrant. "34 As Sergeant Murray approached the home in order to
retrieve the straw, Mrs. Randolph withdrew her consent to the search.
35
Sergeant Murray then took the straw, as well as the Randolphs, to the local
police station and obtained a search warrant for the home. 136 A subsequent
search of the home pursuant to the warrant revealed numerous drug-related
items. 137
Mr. Randolph was subsequently indicted for possession of cocaine.' 31
Mr. Randolph moved to suppress the evidence, contending that the search
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. "3' The trial court denied the motion,
but the Court of Appeals of Georgia granted Mr. Randolph's application for
interlocutory appeal. 14
0
The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed the trial court.'41 In particu-
lar, the court favored a bright-line rule that police must always obtain a war-
rant before conducting a warrantless search where officers received compet-
ing responses to a request for consent to search from co-occupants having
equal authority over the property at issue. '42 The court reasoned that it is
"inherently reasonable" in the context of the Fourth Amendment for police to
always honor and respect the refusal of a co-occupant to grant consent. 143 In
so reasoning, the court observed that if "common authority" is the basis for
one co-occupant's right to consent, then "common authority" is likewise a
basis for another co-occupant's right to refuse to consent.'" Consequently,
the court stated, "[i]nherent in the power to grant consent is the power to
vitiate that consent."' 145 Regarding cases involving a marital residence, the
court further noted that such a holding would also protect the sanctity of mar-
riage by not permitting a wife to overrule the objection of her husband. 146
133. Randolph 111, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Randolph 111, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
139. Id.
140. Id; Randolph v. State (Randolph 1), 590 S.E.2d 834, 836 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
141. Randolph I, 590 S.E.2d at 840.
142. Id. at 836-37.
143. Id. at 837.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Randolph I, 590 S.E.2d at 837.
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Rejecting a case-by-case analysis, the majority also concluded that a
bright-line rule would provide more defined guidance to law enforcement
when faced with similar circumstances to those presented in Randolph by
simply instructing officers to obtain a warrant.14 Additionally, responding
to the dissent, the majority distinguished Matlock based upon the fact that,
unlike the defendant in Matlock, Mr. Randolph was present at the time of the
search and unequivocally refused consent. 4  More specifically, the court
stated,
Matlock and its progeny stand for the proposition that, in the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrary, there is a presumption that a co-
occupant has waived his right of privacy as to other co-occupants.
However, when police are confronted with an unequivocal asser-
tion of that co-occupant's Fourth Amendment right, such presump-
tion cannot stand. 1
49
Judge Ellington and Judge Phipps each wrote their own concurring
opinions. 50 Judge Ellington simply reiterated his belief that the conclusion
of the majority effectively protected the privacy rights of citizens while si-
multaneously providing clear guidelines for law enforcement.' 5 ' Judge
Phipps, however, wrote his own special concurrence in order to express his
disagreement with the bright-line approach used by the majority in a number
of respects.' 52 Relying upon Matlock and its progeny, Judge Phipps advo-
cated a more case-by-case, fact intensive approach based upon a reasonable-
ness standard.'53 Judge Phipps ultimately agreed with the conclusion of the
majority, however, because Sergeant Murray was faced with "bickering
spouses" and possessed "no hard evidence" of a crime and, accordingly, did
not act reasonably in conducting a warrantless search based upon Ms.
Randolph's consent alone. 5 4 Under those circumstances, Judge Phipps con-
cluded that the officers should have obtained a warrant.' 55 Arguing that his
approach would provide "reasonably clear guidance" to law enforcement,
Judge Phips stated:
147. Id. at 838.
148. Id.; see United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
149. Randolph I, 590 S.E.2d at 838.
150. Id. at 840-43.
151. Id. at 840 (Ellington, J., concurring).
152. Id. (Phipps, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 840-43.
154. Randolph I, 590 S.E.2d at 843.
155. Id.
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If there is some objective verification that a crime has been com-
mitted, the police may search the common areas of a residence
with the consent of one occupant or spouse even if another co-
occupant or spouse objects. If one co-occupant or spouse simply
summons the police to a residence and accuses his or her co-
occupant or spouse of illegal conduct, the matter should be submit-
ted to a neutral and detached magistrate if another co-occupant or
spouse is present on the premises and objects. As always, in cases
of doubt and in the absence of exigent circumstances, a warrant
should be obtained. 1
56
Judge Blackburn joined Judge Andrews in a dissenting opinion.'57 Ar-
guing that the majority misconstrued and misapplied the Fourth Amend-
ment's reasonableness standard, Judge Blackburn focused almost exclusively
on Matlock and its progeny. With regard to the specific facts of Randolph,
Judge Blackburn concluded:
Because the defendant shared dominion over the property with his
wife at the time consent was given by her, the waiver of his expec-
tation of privacy with regard to the premises remained in effect.
With his expectation of privacy still waived with regard to his
wife, the defendant had no right to trump her consent to search
their home. 1
58
The Supreme Court of Georgia granted the State of Georgia's petition
for writ of certiorari.'59 However, in a remarkably brief opinion, the court
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.' 60 The court began
by recognizing that a co-occupant who possesses common authority over
property may consent on behalf of all others, as set forth in Matlock. 16' The
court further acknowledged the reasoning of Matlock, which states that a co-
occupant possesses "his own right" to consent and other co-occupants have
"assumed the risk" that he or she will exercise that right in their absence. 162
Nonetheless, the court distinguished Matlock based solely on the fact that
Mr. Randolph, unlike the defendant in Matlock, was present at the time of
the search and objected to it.163 Regarding the assumption of risk language
156. Id.
157. Id. at 843-52.
158. Id. at 845.
159. State v. Randolph (Randolph I), 604 S.E.2d 835, 836 (Ga. 2004).
160. Id. at 837.
161. Id. at 836-37 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974)).
162. Id. at 837 (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7).
163. Id,
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in Matlock, the court stated that "the risk 'is merely an inability to control
access to the premises [in] one's absence."' "'  Consequently, the court chose
to follow the lead of the Supreme Court of Washington in Leach and invali-
dated the search of Mr. Randolph's home. 
165
Three justices joined in a dissenting opinion.166 The dissent began by
pointing out that the weight of existing authority disfavored the majority's
conclusion.167 The dissent, also relying upon Matlock, concluded that Mr.
Randolph "assumed the risk" his wife would grant consent in her "own
right" and, therefore, Mr. Randolph could not subsequently invalidate his
wife's consent by way of his objection. 161
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 169 In the end, how-
ever, the Court adopted the same bright-line approach as the Georgia appel-
late courts below. 7° Specifically, the Court held, "a warrantless search of a
shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physi-
cally present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis
of consent given to police by another resident." 171
The Court began its analysis by briefly exploring the history of third-
party consent cases, beginning with the adoption of valid consent as an ex-
ception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, and concluding with
the holding in Rodriguez. 172  The Court noted the standard set forth in
Matlock, to the extent that a co-occupant with common authority over prop-
erty, may permit a warrantless search to the detriment of other absent co-
occupants. 173 Nevertheless, the Court observed that none of the prior third-
party consent cases from the United States Supreme Court dealt with the
issue of whether police may rely on the consent of one co-occupant in con-
ducting a warrantless search in the face of an expressed refusal to allow the
search by another, present co-occupant. 174 Thus, the Court concluded that
164. Randolph II, 604 S.E.2d at 837 (quoting 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZuRE: A
TREATISE ON THE FouRTH AMENDMENT § 8.3(d) (3d ed. 1996)).
165. Id. (referring to State v. Leach, 782 P.2d 1035, 1040 (Wash. 1989)).
166. Id. at 837.
167. Id. at 837-38 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 838.
169. Georgia v. Randolph (Randolph III), 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1520 (2006).
170. See id. at 1527-28.
171. Id. at 1526.
172. Id. at 1518-19, 1527-28 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990);
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 222 (1973); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958)).
173. Id. at 1519 (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170-71).
174. Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
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"[t]he significance of such a refusal turns on the underpinnings of the co-
occupant consent rule, as recognized since Matlock."175
The Court then provided insight into the meaning and significance of
the "common authority" necessary under Matlock to justify a warrantless
search. 176 The Court pointed out that "great significance [is] given to widely
shared social expectations" based, in part, on property law in determining the
reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment search.177 As such, the Court stated
that the objective reasonableness of a search under Matlock, "is in significant
part a function of commonly held understanding[s] about the authority that
co-inhabitants may exercise in ways that affect each other's interests." 78
After citing a number of cases in which no "common authority" could
justify a warrantless search based on third-party consent, 179 the Court turned
to the question of whether one co-occupant's consent to a search may over-
ride an objection to the search by another, physically present co-occupant. 180
In this regard, the Court observed by way of example that "no sensible per-
son" would enter a home where one co-occupant invites him/her inside, and
another co-occupant expressly refuses.' 8' The Court explained that such a
result is necessary because no socially recognized understanding, or legally
recognized doctrine of property law, exists as to the superior or inferior au-
thority of one co-occupant over the other in these circumstances.' 82 Accord-
ingly, the Court decided that "there is no common understanding that one co-
tenant generally has a right or authority to prevail over the express wishes of
another, whether the issue is the color of the curtains or invitations to outsid-
ers."' 183 Armed with this conclusion, the Court further reasoned that a "police
officer [has] no better claim to reasonableness" in conducting a warrantless
search under these circumstances, as one occupant's consent bears no greater
weight than another occupant's objection.'84
The Court next turned its attention to the potential impact that its deci-
sion may have on future investigations stating, "[y]es we recognize the con-
175. Id. at 1520.
176. Id. at 1521-22 (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170).
177. Id. at 1521.
178. Id.
179. Randolph 111, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1522 (citing Minnesota v. Olsen, 495
U.S. 91, 99 (1990); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964); Chapman v. United States,
365 U.S. 610, 617 (1961); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)).
180. Id. at 1522.
181. Id. at 1522-23.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1523.
184. Randolph 111, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1523.
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senting tenant's interest as a citizen in bringing criminal activity to light."' 185
Recognizing the competing interests of bringing new crimes to light, and, at
the same time, protecting the Fourth Amendment rights of the citizens, the
Court suggested a couple of ways that both interests may be preserved in
future cases. 186 Specifically, the Court explained that nothing in its decision
prevents future co-occupants from delivering evidence of crime directly to
law enforcement without a warrantless search,'87 and law enforcement may
still rely upon information obtained from the consenting co-occupant to ob-
tain a search warrant from a magistrate, regardless of whether another co-
occupant objects. 188 Responding directly to Chief Justice Roberts's dissent,
the majority also asserted that the decision would have "no bearing on the
capacity of the police to protect domestic victims ' ' 189 as police are still per-
mitted to enter a home without a warrant any time there is good reason to
believe that a threat of domestic violence exists.' 90 The Court, however, did
acknowledge that, in close cases, the rule it adopted may prevent police from
conducting a search for evidence where no exigency or other legally recog-
nized exception authorizes warrantless entry.' 9' Nevertheless, the Court de-
cided that such a risk was ultimately justified in order to adequately secure
the Fourth Amendment rights of the citizens. 1
92
At the conclusion of the majority opinion, the Court attempted to ad-
dress what it viewed as "two loose ends" created by its ruling. 193 First, the
Court addressed the language of Matlock, which states that a co-occupant of
shared property mutually used by multiple occupants possesses "his own
right" to consent to a search, and thus, reliance on the co-occupant's consent
by law enforcement is reasonable. '94 With regard to this loose end, the Court
observed that even though the co-occupant may possess "his own right" to
authorize warrantless police entry, the right is not so superior or powerful
that it may override the competing and equal right of the other co-occupants
to refuse to consent. "' The second loose end the Court sought to clarify was
the impact the decision would have on the standards set forth in Rodriguez
185. Id. at 1524 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971)).
186. Id. 1524-25.
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107 (1965)).
189. Randolph 111, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1525.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1525-26.
192. See id. at 1526.
193. Id. at 1527.
194. Randolph 111, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1527 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974)).
195. Id.
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and Matlock. '96 As noted by the Court, those cases rested upon similar facts
as to those at issue in Randolph 111.197 The defendants in those cases, like
Mr. Randolph, were physically nearby or actually present at the time of the
searches at issue. 198 In particular, the defendant in Matlock was in a police
car at the time of the search, and the defendant in Rodriguez was asleep in a
bedroom at the time of the search.' 99 Highlighting the formalistic character
of its decision, the Court stated:
If [Matlock and Rodriguez] are not to be undercut by today's hold-
ing, we have to admit that we are drawing a fine line; if a potential
defendant with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the door and
objects, the co-tenant's permission does not suffice for a reason-
able search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but not invited
to take part in the threshold colloquy, loses out.200
Accordingly, Randolph III imposes no obligation on law enforcement to
proactively seek the approval of any absent, or even nearby, co-occupant
prior to conducting a warrantless search based upon the consent of a present
co-occupant.20'
Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer both wrote their own concurring
opinions.202 Justice Stevens argued that the Randolph III decision validates
his view that the Court cannot focus solely upon the original understanding
of constitutional amendments and ignore the "relevance of changes in our
society. 2 3 Justice Stevens pointed out that when the Fourth Amendment
was adopted, a husband would have superior authority over premises than
that of his wife; thus, his consent would be the only relevant inquiry.2 4
Therefore, Justice Stevens noted that if the Court followed an original under-
standing of the Fourth Amendment, an arbitrary, if not blatantly discrimina-
tory, result may prevail.205 According to Justice Stevens, however, the pre-
sent society recognizes that both husband and wife have equal constitutional
rights regarding property, and "[a]ssuming that both spouses are competent,
196. Id. at 1527.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Randolph l11, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1527.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1527.
202. Id. at 1528-29 (Stevens, J., concurring), 1529-31 (Breyer, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 1528 (Stevens, J., concurring).
204. Randolph 111, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1529.
205. Id.
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neither one is a master possessing the power to override the other's constitu-
tional rights to deny entry to their castle. 20 6
Justice Breyer, on the other hand, wrote his own separate, concurring
opinion in order to express his agreement with the majority's conclusion and
articulate his own reasoning on how that conclusion should be reached.2"7
Justice Breyer advocated a more fact-specific approach, based upon the total-
ity of circumstances that, rather than imposing bright-line rules, focuses upon
the reasonableness of the officer's actions in conducting a warrantless
search. 20 ' Finding Sergeant Murray's search for evidence in the face of Mr.
Randolph's present objection to be unreasonable, Justice Breyer stated that
were the circumstances to change significantly, so should the result.20 9 Hint-
ing as to how he may decide future cases, Justice Breyer noted that evidence
of exigency, or an invitation to police by a potential abuse victim, may pro-
vide a "special reason" for an immediate entry by police, unlike the circum-
stances in Randolph III.
210
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote a dissenting opin-
ion.21" ' Chief Justice Roberts began his opinion by summarizing his dis-
agreement with the majority and stating his own opinion regarding what rule
should have been applied.21 2 Specifically, Chief Justice Roberts complained
that the majority's approach was too "random and happenstance" to ade-
23quately protect privacy. ' 3 Alternatively, Chief Justice Roberts argued the
Court should have held that any time a person shares a place with another, he
or she assumes the risk that person will permit law enforcement to enter,
even if he or she objects.214
Chief Justice Roberts then attacked the majority's reliance on under-
standings regarding "social expectations" in formulating its holding.2" 5
Chief Justice Roberts observed that concepts of what constitutes socially
acceptable conduct on the part of persons who share living arrangements
jointly does not provide a solid foundation on which to rest constitutional,
Fourth Amendment standards.2t 6 In direct contradiction to the majority's
observations regarding social expectations, Chief Justice Roberts pointed out
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1529-31 (Breyer, J., concurring).
208. Id.
209. Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1530.
210. Id. at 1530.
211. Id. at 1531-39 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 1531.
213. Id.
214. Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1531 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1531-32.
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that different factual situations within a social setting may give rise to differ-
ent social expectations.1 7 Through examples, Chief Justice Roberts noted
that the relationship among the parties, the reason for the visit, or perhaps
even the distance a visitor has traveled, may lead a visitor to enter a home at
the invitation of one co-occupant, even over the objection of another co-
occupant. 218 Chief Justice Roberts further observed that with the exception
of determining when a Fourth Amendment search has occurred, and when a
person has standing to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge, the Court has
not looked to concepts of social expectations in determining when a search is
reasonable in previous cases. 1 Instead, Chief Justice Roberts explained that
the Court's Fourth Amendment precedents focus more on the protection of
privacy than the impact on social expectations by looking to whether a per-
son has a legitimate expectation of privacy in gauging the reasonableness of
a search.220 As such, Chief Justice Roberts asserted:
A wide variety of often subtle social conventions may shape ex-
pectations about how we act when another shares with us what is
otherwise private, and those conventions go by of a variety of la-
bels-courtesy, good manners, custom, protocol, even honor
among thieves. The Constitution, however, protects not these but
privacy, and once privacy has been shared, the shared information,
documents, or places remain private only at the discretion of the
confidant. 221
To support this assertion, Chief Justice Roberts highlighted a number of
cases in which an individual was found to have waived his or her expectation
222of privacy in such things as oral conversations, personal property,223 and
private information. 24  Chief Justice Roberts observed further that the
Matlock 25 and Rodriguez2 6 decisions are consistent with this line of cases as
both decisions share the "common thread" found in all third-party consent
cases that one who shares control over property with others, assumes the risk
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1531-32 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
220. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
221. Id. at 1533 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
222. Id. (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971)).
223. Id. (quoting Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969)).
224. Randolph I, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1533-34 (quoting United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984)).
225. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177-78 (1974).
226. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 189 (1990).
2007]
220
Nova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol31/iss3/1
NOVA LA WREVIEW
that his or her co-occupants may consent to a warrantless search.227 Conse-
quently, Chief Justice Roberts stated:
The law acknowledges that although we might not expect our
friends and family to admit the government into common areas,
sharing space entails risk. A person assumes the risk that his co-
occupants-just as they might report his illegal activity or deliver
his contraband to the government-might consent to a search of
areas over which they have access and control. 228
Chief Justice Roberts then shifted his focus to the practical conse-
quences of the Randolph III decision. 229 First, Chief Justice Roberts stated
that the opinion is "so random in its application" that it cannot effectively
protect one's privacy.230 In particular, Chief Justice Roberts noted that the
opinion will afford no protection of a person's privacy right "if a co-owner
happens to be absent when police arrive, in the backyard gardening, asleep in
the next room, or listening to music through earphones so that only his co-
occupant hears the knock on the door.",231 Next, Chief Justice Roberts
pointed out that by not allowing police to search based on a co-occupant's
consent, simply because another co-occupant is present and objects, may
lead to retaliation against the consenting co-occupant by the objecting co-
occupant, or even destruction of evidence once the police leave the home.232
Moreover, with reference to domestic abuse case, Chief Justice Roberts ex-
plained that the exigency necessary to justify a warrantless search may not
always exist in every case.233 Additionally, Chief Justice Roberts determined
that the newly announced "'consent plus a good reason"' rule in domestic
abuse cases "spins out an entirely new framework for analyzing exigent cir-
cumstances. 234 Therefore, the rule seems contrary to the majority's appar-
ent disdain for a co-occupant's consent since such consent is a key factor in
determining whether police have a "'good reason' to enter the home.235
Summarizing his perceived inconsistency in the majority opinion, Chief
Justice Roberts stated:
227. Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1534-35 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 1536.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1537.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1538.
235. Id.
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The majority reminds us, in high tones, that a man's home is his
castle, but even under the majority's rule, it is not his castle if he
happens to be absent, asleep in the keep, or otherwise engaged
when the constable arrives at the gate. Then it is his co-owner's
castle. And, of course, it is not his castle if he wants to consent to
entry, but his co-owner objects.236
As a result, Chief Justice Roberts concluded:
Rather than constitutionalize such an arbitrary rule, we should ac-
knowledge that a decision to share a private place, like a decision
to share a secret or a confidential document, necessarily entails the
risk that those with whom we share in turn chose to share-for
their own protection or other reasons-with the police.
237
An originalist no doubt, Justice Scalia apparently felt called out by Jus-
tice Stevens' concurrence and, thus, issued his own dissenting opinion.238
First, Justice Scalia explained that the fact that the Fourth Amendment, as
part of an "unchanging [c]onstitution," often cross-references to the ever-
changing area of property law presents no major hurdle in the path of an
originalist. 23 9 Additionally, Justice Scalia "express[ed] grave doubt that to-
day's decision deserves Justice Stevens' celebration as part of the forward
march of women's equality," given the possible negative impact the decision
may have on law enforcement efforts to investigate domestic violence
against women by men. 240
Justice Thomas issued his own dissenting opinion in which he con-
cluded that Coolidge v. New Hampshire211 squarely controlled the outcome
in Randolph 111.242 In Coolidge, while investigating a murder, police asked
the wife whether her husband owned any guns. 243 Thinking her cooperation
would exonerate her husband, the wife obtained a number of her husband's
guns from the couple's bedroom and gave them to police.244 The Court later
rejected the husband's Fourth Amendment challenge on the grounds his wife
236. Id. at 1539 (citations omitted).
237. Randolph 111, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1539.
238. Id at 1539-1541 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
239. See id. at 1540.
240. Id. at 1540.
241. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
242. Randolph Il, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1541-43 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 486-90).
243. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 486.
244. Id.
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searched his home as an "instrument" of law enforcement.245 The Court rea-
soned that the wife was not converted to a government agent simply by vir-
tue of the fact that she made her own decision to cooperate with police.2 4
6
Therefore, based on Coolidge, Justice Thomas concluded that no Fourth
Amendment search occurred in Randolph III since Ms. Randolph acted on
her own accord in directing police to the drug-related area and was not acting
as an agent of the government.247
IV. SUBSEQUENT CASES-A GLIMPSE OF THE FUTURE
A. An Expressed Objection of a Co-occupant to a Warrantless Search May
Override the Voluntary Consent of Another Co-occupant Even if the
Objecting Co-occupant Is Not Physically Present at the Time of the
Search.
The first Florida court to address significant issues related to Randolph
I1 was the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.248
In United States v. Dominguez-Ramirez,249 agents with the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency intercepted a shipment of furniture
crossing the Mexican border in El Paso, Texas that contained marijuana and
was ultimately destined for Ocala, Florida.250  Law enforcement officers
from various local and federal agencies across the country decided to con-
duct a controlled delivery of the narcotics to the address in Ocala, Florida in
an attempt to further the investigation.25' The narcotics were delivered to a
Florida address where the defendant, his brother, and one other individual
were arrested.25 2 During a subsequent, late-night interview of the defendant,
law enforcement officers asked for the defendant's consent to search his
residence, located on a different street in Ocala, Florida.253 The defendant
authorized the officers to search his home "in the morning" and not that night
245. Id. at 487.
246. Id. at 487-88.
247. See Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1541-43 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 488-98).
248. See United States v. Dominguez-Ramirez, No. 5:06-cr-6-Oc-1OGRJ, slip op. (M.D.
Fla. June 8, 2006).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 2.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 3-4.
253. Dominguez-Ramirez, No. 5:06-cr-6-Oc-1OGRJ, slip op. at 4.
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because his wife was apparently taking insulin for a medical condition, and
consequently, he "did not want her disturbed" that evening.254
Law enforcement also interviewed the defendant's brother, who lived in
a room inside the defendant's home. 255 The brother consented to a search of
his room inside the home and was transported to the residence.256 The de-
fendant's wife came to the door of the residence and the officers informed
her of her husband's arrest and her brother-in-law's consent to search his
room.25 7 The defendant's wife permitted the officers to come into the home
and the officers began searching the defendant's brother's room.2 1 The offi-
cers ultimately obtained consent from the defendant's wife to search the en-
tire home. 259
In denying the defendant's motion to suppress, the court made two ob-
servations. 26' First, the court noted that the defendant never actually refused
to grant consent.26' Instead, the defendant gave a qualification that the offi-
cers could only search the home "[in] the morning. ' 262 In this regard, the
court stated, "[t]hus, in this case there was never a refusal to search by the
co-owner husband sufficient to raise the issue of whether both tenants must
consent before a search is conducted of jointly owned property.' '263 Next, the
court distinguished Randolph II based upon the fact that the defendant was
not physically present at the time of the search.2' Noting that the holding in
Randolph III was limited to its facts and that Randolph III did not overrule
the holding in Matlock, the court found this distinguishing characteristic sig-
nificant enough that the consent of the wife justified the warrantless
search.265 In particular, the court stated, "[t]he Randolph [I] Court, how-
ever, left intact the rule that the consent of only one co-tenant is sufficient so
long as the objector is not present and the police have not removed the ob-
jecting tenant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible objec-
tion. 266
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 5.
258. Dominguez-Ramirez, No. 5:06-cr-6-Oc-1OGRJ, slip op. at 5.
259. Id. at 3.
260. Id. at 17.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Dominguez-Ramirez, No. 5:06-cr-6-Oc-1OGRJ, slip op. at 17.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 17-18.
266. Id.
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The holding in Dominguez-Ramirez seems to indicate that some courts
may adopt a narrow, limited view of the holding in Randolph 111.267 Under
this view, even where police receive an objection from a co-occupant to a
warrantless search, subsequent consent to the search by a different co-
occupant may still justify the warrantless search so long as the objecting co-
occupant is not physically present at the time of the search and there is no
evidence that the officers purposefully removed the defendant from the loca-
tion in order to stifle any objection.2 61 Indeed, given the United States Su-
preme Court's own acknowledgement that its holding in Randolph III draws
a "fine line, 269 such an application may seem legally sound. 70 However,
this approach is at odds with the result reached by the only federal circuit
court of appeals to address substantial questions relating to the Randolph III
decision as of the date of this writing. 7'
In United States v. Hudspeth,272 law enforcement offices in Missouri
obtained a search warrant for a business, Handi-Rak Service, Inc., in relation
to sales of large quantities of pseudoephedrine-based products. 273  The de-
fendant was the Chief Executive Officer of the company and was present
during the search.274 As part of the search, officers discovered a compact
disc containing child pornography.275 The officers requested the defendant's
permission to search his personal residence, which he refused.2 76 The offi-
cers took the defendant to jail and then traveled to the defendant's residence
where they were greeted by the defendant's wife. 277 The defendant's wife
permitted the officers to enter the residence. 27" The officers explained that
they had found inappropriate material on her husband's business computer,
but did not inform her that he had already refused consent to search the cou-
267. See id.
268. See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph (Randolph III), 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1519-
20 (2006).
269. Id. at 1527.
270. See United States v. Reed, No. 3:06-CR-75 RM, slip op. at 4, 9 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 3,
2006) (reaching the same conclusion as the court in Dominguez-Ramirez on similar facts and
determining that applying the Randolph III standard to objecting co-occupants that are not
physically present at the time of the search would require the court to redraw the "fine line"
established by the United States Supreme Court).
271. See generally United States v. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2006).
272. Id. at 922.
273. Id. at 924.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 925.
276. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d at 925.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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pie's private residence. 279 The wife informed the officers that the couple had
two computers, one in their children's room and one in the garage of their
home; however, the wife refused to grant consent to conduct a search of the
residence.28 ° One of the officers then requested that the officers be allowed
to take the computers and some computer CDs with them.28 The wife ulti-
mately acquiesced.282 A subsequent search of the computer revealed nude
videos of the defendant's step-daughter that were taken without her knowl-
edge by a web camera.283 The defendant moved to suppress the evidence
found on both the business computer and the home computer, which the dis-
trict court denied.284 The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea,
reserving the right to appeal the suppression issue to the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals.285 The Eighth Circuit upheld the search of the business com-
puter, but reversed the decision with regard to the search of the home com-
puter. 286 The court did, however, remand the case back to the trial court so
that the parties could further develop the record regarding other secondary
grounds for admission of the evidence, such as inevitable discovery. 
287
In its opinion, the court observed the distinguishing characteristics of
both Matlock and Randolph.288 With regard to Matlock, the court noted that
the case at bar did not involve a situation where the defendant was present
but either did not object or was not invited to object. 289 Additionally, in rela-
tion to Randolph, the court pointed out, "Georgia v. Randolph does not di-
rectly address the situation present in this case, in which a co-tenant is not
physically present at the search but expressly denied consent to search prior
to the police seeking permission from the consenting co-tenant who is pre-
sent on the property., 290 Nevertheless, the court found Randolph to be the
controlling case.29' In particular, the court stated that constitutional concerns
identified in Randolph did not change simply because the objecting co-
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d at 925.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 926.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d at 932.
287. Id. at 931.
288. Id. at 930-32.
289. Id. at930-31.
290. Id. at 930.
291. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d at 930-31.
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occupant, who expressly objected to the search, was not physically present at
the time of the search.292
The court then attempted to address the concerns outlined in both the
majority and dissenting opinions in Randolph regarding the fear of retribu-
tion against a domestic abuse victim, who offers warrantless entry to law
enforcement over the objection of his or her co-inhabitant.2 93 The court ob-
served that since the objecting co-inhabitant is not actually present at the
time of police entry in situations such as those presented in Hudspeth, these
concerns would appear moot. 294 Specifically, the court noted, "to some de-
gree, the case for respecting the denial of consent by a non-present occupant
is stronger than the refusal of the physically-present occupant."
295
Circuit Judge Riley wrote a partial dissenting opinion in which he
reached a similar conclusion to that of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida in Dominguez-Ramirez.296 Accusing the majority
of misreading Randolph III, Judge Riley pointed out that the Court in
Randolph III adopted a very narrow and specific rule that only applies when
the objecting co-occupant is physically present.297 Thus, Judge Riley stated,
If the [United States] Supreme Court desired to adopt the broader
rule espoused by the majority here, the Court would not have con-
tinuously used the phrase "physically present," and would have
ruled [that] police entry without a warrant is unreasonable when-
ever the suspect refuses consent to search his residence, regardless
of where the suspect may be located at the time of his express re-
fusal.298
Judge Riley also observed that the majority opinion created policy is-
sues in real world application. 21 In short, Judge Riley characterized the ma-
jority opinion as promoting a "don't ask" and "ignorance is bliss" policy by
law enforcement, °° stating that, "the majority's holding encourages law en-
forcement, in seeking consent, to bypass the suspect lest the suspect refuse
[to] consent, and instead seek only the consent of an authorized co-occupant,
thereby avoiding the knowledge bar.",3 1
292. Id.
293. Id. at 931.
294. Id.
295. Id
296. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d at 933 (Riley, J., dissenting).
297. See id. at 932-33.
298. Id. at 933.
299. See id.
300. Id.
301. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d at 933-34 (Riley, J., dissenting).
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B. The Objection of a Non-probationer, Co-occupant May Override the
Prior Consent of His or Her Probationer Co-occupant Even if the Pro-
bationer Co-occupant Has Consented to Searches of His or Her Prem-
ises as a Condition of Probation
In the criminal justice system it is common for a defendant to be sen-
tenced to a period of probation instead of incarceration.3"2 Upon being sen-
tenced to probation, the probationer often accepts a waiver of his or her
Fourth Amendment rights as a term of probation, whereby the probationer
consents to a warrantless search of his or her premises by certain law en-
forcement officers.3 °3 So what happens when the probationer shares com-
mon authority over premises with a non-probationer co-occupant and that co-
occupant expressly objects to a warrantless search in spite of the proba-
tioner's limited waiver of his or her Fourth Amendment rights? Can a war-
rantless search continue in the face of such an expressed objection and, if so,
can evidence of culpable conduct be used against the non-probationer? As of
the date of this writing, these questions remain largely unresolved, especially
at the federal level.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York,
however, came close to addressing this issue in July of 2006. 3" In Taylor v.
Brontoli,a°5 officers attempted to search the home of a probationer pursuant
to the terms of the probationer's waiver of her Fourth Amendment rights.
30 6
The probationer's boyfriend, who was not on probation but shared common
authority over the premises, expressly objected to the search.30 7 The officers
searched the premises anyway and uncovered a firearm. 3 08 The boyfriend
was arrested in relation to the firearm. 30 9 He subsequently filed a lawsuit
against the officers pursuant to title 42, section 1983 of the United States
Code claiming that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the war-
rantless search to which he expressly objected.310 On summary judgment the
officers argued, inter alia, that the probationer's girlfriend had previously
consented to the search through the terms of her probation.31' Denying all
302. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 948.01 (2006).
303. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 383 So. 2d 991, 992 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
304. See Taylor v. Brontoli, No. 1:04-CV-0487, slip op. at 1 (N.D.N.Y. July 12, 2006).
305. Id. at 1.
306. Id. at 4.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 5.
309. Taylor, No. 1:04-CV-0487, slip op. at 5.
310. Id. at 1, 6.
311. Id. at 9.
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motions for summary judgment by all parties with leave to resubmit, the
court invited the parties to address the impact of the recent decision in
Randolph on the facts of the case. 3 2 The court appropriately observed that,
"[f]or the purposes of this case, the issue becomes whether a non-probationer
can refuse consent to a search of a home where he may have a legitimate
expectation of privacy, which is subject to searches by another occupant's
probationary status. 313
At least one state appellate court has held that a non-probationer co-
occupant may refuse consent to a warrantless search even if he/she resides
with a probationer that has previously consented to warrantless searches as a
condition of probation.3"4 A review of state cases at the time of this writing
reveals no other state or federal cases addressing this issue. Consequently,
the impact of the Randolph decision on cases involving facts similar to those
presented in Taylor remains an open question.
V. CONCLUSION-Two OBSERVATIONS
A. The Court in Randolph Seemed to Abandon the "Good Faith" Excep-
tion Established in Illinois v. Rodriguez
At the time of the search in Rodriquez, the officers did not factually have
any legal basis whatsoever to conduct a warrantless search of the defendant's
apartment. 3 ' The officers were not in pursuit of a felon,316 there was no
imminent threat of an emergency31 7 or destruction of evidence,3"8 and the
officers did not possess valid consent to conduct a warrantless search.3 19 In
fact, the individual who permitted the search had no actual authority to per-
mit entry by the police, or anyone else, since she was nothing more than an
"infrequent visitor, ' 32° who allowed the police to enter the apartment using a
key that had been apparently stolen from Rodriguez.3 2' Therefore, using the
strictest application of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, the stan-
312. Id.
313. Id. at 8.
314. See Donald v. State, 903 A.2d 315, 321 (Del. 2006).
315. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 182 (1990).
316. Compare id., with Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967).
317. Compare Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 182, with United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52
(1951).
318. Compare Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 182, with Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
14-15 (1948).
319. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 180.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 181.
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dard set forth in Matlock322 was clearly breached and Rodriguez's rights
were unquestionably violated. Nonetheless, the Court in Rodriguez seemed
to establish a good faith exception to the warrant requirement in third-party
consent cases.323 Specifically, the Court determined that even where the
police are wholly incorrect as a factual matter in concluding that they have
been given valid consent to search by an authorized third party, fruits of the
warrantless search will not be suppressed if the officer's conclusion was ob-
jectively reasonable.324
The Court in Randolph concluded that Sergeant Murray did not have the
authority to conduct a warrantless search of the Randolphs' home based upon
the consent of Mrs. Randolph.3 25  As in Rodriguez, the prosecution in
Randolph III ultimately failed to establish that Sergeant Murray had a legally
sound justification for conducting a warrantless search under the Matlock
standard. 326 However, applying the exception set forth in Rodriguez, 327 it
would seem that the relevant question was not whether Mrs. Randolph's con-
sent gave Sergeant Murray authority to conduct a warrantless search as
purely a matter of fact but instead, the question is, "would the facts available
to [Sergeant Murray] at the moment... 'warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief that [Ms. Randolph] had authority over the premises?"3 2
Much like the officers in Rodriguez,329 the facts presented led Sergeant
Murray to conclude that he had permission to conduct a warrantless search of
the Randolphs' home from a person with both actual and apparent authority
over the premises. 30 Mrs. Randolph readily gave Sergeant Murray permis-
sion to search her marital residence.33' As a spouse having equal rights to
the home, it was plausible for Sergeant Murray to conclude that Mrs.
Randolph possessed her own right to permit Sergeant Murray, or anyone
else, to enter the home, in spite of Mr. Randolph's objection to the search. 332
322. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974).
323. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188, cf United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921-22 (1984)
(holding that where officers, in good faith, reasonably rely on a warrant signed by a magis-
trate that lacks probable cause, fruits of the search will not be suppressed).
324. Id.
325. Georgia v. Randolph (Randolph 11), 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1519 (2006).
326. See id. at 1519-21; Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181; see also Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170,
171 n.7.
327. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188.
328. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)) (internal quotations omitted).
329. See id. at 179-80.
330. Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
331. Id.
332. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974). But see Randolph III,
547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1529-31 (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that Sergeant Murray's
decision to search was unreasonable).
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This is especially true in light of the fact that Mrs. Randolph voluntarily led
Sergeant Murray through the intimate areas of the home and into an area
where drug-related material was discovered. 13 Moreover, at the time of the
search, the overwhelming weight of federal and state authority legally sup-
ported Sergeant Murray's decision to conduct the search, even in the face of
Mr. Randolph's present objection."' Thus, as with the officers in Rodriguez,
at the very moment of the search, Sergeant Murray's conduct was entirely
reasonable under an objective standard.
As specifically noted in Rodriguez, the Court has historically applied a
good-faith, objective standard to police conduct in the context of Fourth
Amendment searches, even where officer's conduct was based solely upon
inaccurate conclusions.335 In short, prior to Randolph, the Court seemed
consistently reluctant to engage in after-the-fact, Monday morning quarter-
backing of decisions by police, made during the intensity of criminal investi-
gations, to conduct a warrantless search so long as there was no evidence of
coercion and the officer's conclusions were objectively reasonable. How-
ever, Randolph seems to alter, if not in part overrule, the holding of Rodri-
guez by applying a bright-line, all-inclusive approach that does not acknowl-
edge the reasonableness of the officer's conduct.
B. Justice Breyer Is the Member of the Court Most Likely to Change His
Position in Future Cases
Although Justice Breyer concurred with the decision of the majority in
Randolph, his core reasoning was quite different.33 ' The majority created a
bright-line, all-inclusive approach that will be applied in all future cases re-
333. Randolph 111, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
334. See generally United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323, 1328 (10th Cir. 1999); United
States. v. Morning, 64 F.3d 531, 536 (9th Cir. 1995); Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1548
(11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v.
Baldwin, 644 F.2d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883, 885
(D.C. Cir. 1979); United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687-88 (6th Cir. 1977); Love v.
State, 138 S.W.3d 676, 680 (Ark. 2003); People v. Sanders, 904 P.2d 1311, 1314-15 (Colo.
1995); City of Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 203-05 (Wyo. 1991); People v. Cosme, 397
N.E.2d 1319, 1321-23 (N.Y. 1979); State v. Ramold, 511 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Neb. Ct. App.
1994); Brandon v. State, 778 P.2d 221, 223-24 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); State v. Frame, 609
P.2d 830, 832 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
335. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 184-85 (1990) (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480
U.S. 79, 88 (1987)) (stating that evidence obtained in a search of an apartment should not be
suppressed where officers reasonably decided to search what is later determined to be two
separate apartments pursuant to an erroneous search warrant).
336. See Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1529-31 (2006) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring).
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gardless of the facts at issue.337 Justice Breyer, however, advocated a more
case-specific, fact-intensive approach which focuses primarily upon whether
the circumstances of the case demonstrate that law enforcement officers
acted reasonably in conducting a warrantless, consent search.338 Conse-
quently, in future cases involving consent searches, Justice Breyer is the
most likely member of the Court to permit the specific facts of the case to
dictate the ultimate outcome, and possibly shift the voting ratio of the Court
in favor of a more crime control oriented, pro-law enforcement result.
A review of the oral arguments in Randolph reveals that Justice Breyer
feared that a bright-line approach to the question of reasonableness might
have horrific results in future warrantless search cases with different facts
than those presented in Randolph.339 Justice Breyer raised few questions
throughout oral arguments until attorney Thomas C. Goldstein began his
argument on behalf of Scott Randolph.340 Mr. Goldstein advocated a narrow,
bright-line approach that all warrantless searches of a home are per se unrea-
sonable whenever law enforcement receives an expressed objection to their
search from a person having common authority over the premises.3 1' Justice
Breyer interrupted Mr. Goldstein's argument at one point stating, "[t]he two
words that come into my mind are 'spousal abuse.' 34 2 Justice Breyer then
explained that he was troubled by the prospect that in ambiguous cases,
where no exigency exists, a bright-line approach may result in law enforce-
ment officers not being able to effectively investigate spousal abuse.343 Spe-
cifically, Justice Breyer provided an example wherein police receive an
anonymous tip from a person that heard something "odd" at a neighbor's
home and, as a result, proceed to the home.3" When the police arrive, the
wife, who is sitting at the kitchen table, looks "oddly" at the officer and tells
the officer that she would like him to follow her upstairs to her bedroom.345
The husband is present and objects to the officer entering the home.3 46 Un-
der the circumstances of the example, Justice Breyer expressed grave con-
cem that police would not be able to enter the home in order to hear what the
wife wanted to tell the police in her bedroom that she was too afraid to say in
337. See id.
338. See id.
339. Transcript of Oral Argument at 37-40, Georgia v. Randolph (Randolph II1), 547 U.S.
103, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006) (No. 04-1067).
340. See generally id. at 1-30.
341. Id. at 31.
342. Id. at 37.
343. Id.
344. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 339, at 38.
345. Id.
346. Id.
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front of her husband.347 Indeed, Justice Breyer stated to Mr. Goldstein,
"[a]nd I [a]m telling you, quite frankly, that's what bothers me a lot., 348
In spite of what seemed to be an aversion to Mr. Randolph's position
during oral arguments, Justice Breyer ultimately agreed with the conclusion
of the majority.3 49 Justice Breyer, however, made it very clear that he did not
support a bright-line approach to the issue in Randolph, by stating in the first
sentence of his concurring opinion, "[i]f Fourth Amendment law forced us to
choose between two bright-line rules, (1) a rule that always found one ten-
ant's consent sufficient to justify a search without a warrant and (2) a rule
that never did, I believe we should choose the first. 350  Instead, Justice
Breyer favored a more fact specific approach that focuses on the totality of
the circumstances to determine whether the officers acted reasonably in con-
ducting a warrantless search.3 5' Justice Breyer noted that the spirit of the
Fourth Amendment recognizes that the circumstances of cases involving
warrantless searches can be very different and, consequently, where certain
facts may justify a warrantless search as being reasonable, others may not.352
Thus, Justice Breyer focused on four factual circumstances of the case in
Randolph III that supported his conclusion that Sergeant Brett Murray did
not act reasonably in conducting a search of the Randolph's home, specifi-
cally that: 1) the search was only a search for evidence; 2) Randolph was
present and expressly objected to the search; 3) there was no inference from
the facts that destruction of evidence was a concern of the officers; and 4) the
officers could have easily obtained a warrant prior to conducting the
search.353 As during oral arguments, Justice Breyer also made it clear in his
written concurring opinion that he was very concerned about domestic abuse
cases and that he would be inclined to rule a different way if future facts
demonstrate that a possible abuse victim were inviting the police into a
home.354 In fact, Justice Breyer stated, "[i]n that context, an invitation (or
consent) would provide a special reason for immediate, rather than later,
police entry. 355
347. Id. at 39.
348. Id.
349. Georgia v. Randolph (Randolph 111), 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1530 (2006)
(Breyer, J., concurring).
350. Id. at 1529.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Randolph 111, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1529-31 (Breyer, J., concurring); see Tran-
script of Oral Argument at 37-40, supra note 339.
355. Randolph I1, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1530-31 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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A close reading of the dissent written by Chief Justice Roberts may lead
one to speculate that Justice Breyer may have been initially inclined to sup-
port the conclusion of the dissenters or, perhaps, he was at the very least on
the fence prior to the opinion being finalized.356 Since Justice Alito took no
part in the decision, only eight members of the Court voted in the case. 357 In
addressing the perceived unsoundness of Justice Breyer's concurring opin-
ion, Chief Justice Roberts states that Justice Breyer, "joins what becomes the
majority opinion," which seems to indicate that Justice Breyer was the tie
breaking vote in one respect or another.358 Nonetheless, the majority opinion
of the Court certainly seems to reverse the trend of expanding the scope of
consent in third-party consent cases.359 However, it would seem that Justice
Breyer has left the door open for the government to possibly persuade him to
side with the government in future cases.
One can further speculate, with reasonable certainty, that Justice Breyer
will not strike down a warrantless search where there is solid evidence of
possible spousal abuse. 6  His questioning during oral arguments and his
statements in the written, concurring opinion reveal that Justice Breyer is
certainly opposed to placing overly restrictive barriers in the path of law en-
forcement efforts to thoroughly investigate such cases.3 62 This is even more
likely where the potential victim indicates a desire to seek the aid of law en-
forcement.363 However, Justice Breyer's willingness to review the facts of
the case, instead of applying a bright-line approach, indicates that he may be
persuaded to side with law enforcement in other, non-domestic abuse cases
as well.3' 6 For example, where officers are greeted by five residents of an
apartment who consent to a search for evidence, and one resident objects,
perhaps the totality of the circumstances would make a warrantless search
reasonable. 365 Or, as a further example, where police are searching a home
for a possible kidnapping victim as opposed to a mere search for evidence, it
seems likely that the officers' conduct might be viewed as reasonable by
Justice Breyer. 
3 66
356. See id. at 1531-39 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
357. See id. at 1528 (majority opinion).
358. Id. at 1539 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
359. See generally id. at 1518-28 (majority opinion).
360. See Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1529-30 (Breyer, J., concurring).
361. See id.
362. See generally id.; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 339, at 36-39, 49-50.
363. See Randolph 111, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1530 (Breyer, J., concurring).
364. See id.
365. See id.
366. See id.
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In addition, Justice Breyer has not been reluctant in past Fourth
Amendment search cases to make decisions, crime control oriented or other-
wise, based upon specific factual nuances of a case. This is especially true
when addressing issues of reasonableness on the part of law enforcement in
the context of Fourth Amendment searches of homes. By way of example, in
Minnesota v. Carter,367 an officer observed narcotics-related activity occur-
ring inside of a basement-level apartment by looking through a window of
the apartment covered by venetian blinds.3 68 The officer was positioned ap-
proximately one to one and a half feet from the window in a publicly acces-
sible area outside of the apartment and observed the activity through a space
in the blinds.3 69 Relying upon this information, the officer obtained a search
warrant for the home and a subsequent search revealed evidence of narcotics
trafficking.370
The majority opinion of the Court never reached the issue of whether
the officer's conduct constituted an unreasonable search.37' Instead, the ma-
jority concluded that the petitioner in the case lacked standing to bring a con-
stitutional challenge.372 However, as in Randolph, Justice Breyer wrote a
separate concurring opinion in which he agreed with the ultimate outcome of
the case, but for different reasons.373 While Justice Breyer concluded that the
petitioner did have standing to challenge the unlawful search,374 he further
observed that the actions of the officer in viewing the criminal activity from
a publicly accessible area outside of the home in plain view of all passersby
was not an unreasonable search. 375 Focusing on the facts of the case, Justice
Breyer specifically stated, "[o]ne who lives in a basement apartment that
fronts a publicly traveled street, or similar space, ordinarily understands the
need for care lest a member of the public simply direct his gaze down-
ward.
, 376
On the other hand, a little more than one year later, Justice Breyer
joined a rather unusual majority of Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and
Ginsburg in holding that conduct by police that was arguably similar to the
conduct at issue in Carter constituted an unreasonable search under the
367. 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
368. Id. at 85, 103.
369. Id. at 103 (Breyer, J., concurring).
370. Id. at 85 (majority opinion).
371. See id. at 87-91.
372. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 91.
373. See id. at 103-06 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Georgia v. Randolph (Randolph
II1), 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1529-30 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring).
374. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 103.
375. Id. at 104.
376. Id. at 105.
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Fourth Amendment. 377 In Kyllo v. United States, 378 officers utilized a ther-
mal imaging device from a public street to scan the exterior of a home in
order to detect infrared radiation coming from the home as a result of high
intensity heat lamps used to grow marijuana believed to be inside the
home. 17  The scan revealed an unusual amount of radiation coming from
certain areas of the home and, relying on this and other information, officers
obtained a search warrant.38 ° The majority reasoned that, by using this
equipment, the officers were privy to more than what the naked eye could
see from observing the exterior of the home from the street.3 8' Engaging in a
fact-intensive analysis, the majority concluded, "[w]here, as here, the Gov-
emnment uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of a
home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intru-
sion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without
a warrant.
' 382
377. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29, 40 (2001).
378. Id. at 27.
379. Id. at 29-30.
380. Id. at 30.
381. Id. at 33.
382. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"The public's confidence in the judiciary hinges on the public's percep-
tion of it, and that perception necessarily hinges on the media's portrayal of
the legal system."' -Justice Felix Frankfurter
An African proverb admonishes that: "Corn can't expect justice from a
court composed of chickens." 2 If the public's perception of justice is formed
by an opinion that judges are "insensitive, arbitrary, and aloof,"3 then it is
understandable that the public would have no expectation of receiving jus-
tice.4 Like the corn, the public is consumed unceremoniously as a means to
continuously feed a system that operates only to benefit itself. The speech
and conduct of judges contribute to creating a public perception that judges
are "incompetent, self-indulgent, abusive, or corrupt," and, across the coun-
try, these judges are the subject of numerous complaints.'
The challenge to this perception of justice is the reality that judges have
an affirmative duty to "uphold the integrity and independence of the judici-
ary" through speech and conduct.6 Judges also have a duty to "avoid impro-
priety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's activities."7
Additionally, a judge should execute judicial duties impartially and dili-
gently, ensuring that extra-judicial duties are undertaken to minimize the risk
1. John Seigenthaler & David L. Hudson, Journalism and the Judiciary, NJC ALUMNI
MAGAZINE, Winter 1997, at 15.
2. QuotationLibrary.com, Justice Quotes,
http://www.quotationlibrary.com/index.php?sid= 888012143&t=-subpages&cat=-257 (last
visited May 26, 2007).
3. J. Thomas Greene, Views from the Bench: Some Current Causes for Popular Dissat-
isfaction with the Administration of Justice, 14 UTAH B.J. 35, 36 (May 2001).
4. See id. at 35.
5. Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REv 431, 431 (2004).
6. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 1 (2004).
7. Id. Canon 2.
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of conflict.8 Currently, the country grapples with maintaining an independ-
ent, honest, and impartial judiciary. 9 However, Florida has taken the lead by
amending its code to ensure that the independence, integrity, and impartiality
of the judiciary are maintained.' 0 Like many other states, including the Dis-
trict of Columbia," Florida adopted the 1990 version of the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct to regulate the speech and conduct of judges. 12 In January
of 2006, Florida adopted amendments to its code in response to the recent
attacks on the independence of the judiciary. ' 3 These changes are indicative
of the importance in ensuring the independence, integrity, and impartiality of
the judiciary. 14
II. THE CASE FOR INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY, AND IMPARTIALITY
Public confidence in the fairness of judicial decisions is a foundation of
the judicial decision-making process and a byproduct of judicial independ-
ence. ' A judge must be free to act without fear of reprisal and without favor
8. Id. Canon 3, Canon 4A(3).
9. See Greene, supra note 3, at 37.
10. The Supreme Court of Florida amended the Code of Judicial Conduct on January 5,
2006. In re Amends. to Code of Jud. Conduct-ABA's Model Code, 918 So. 2d 949, 949
(Fla. 2006) (per curiam). Florida Canons 1, 2, 3, and 5 directly correspond to Canons 1, 2, 3,
and 4 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Compare FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canons 1-
3, 5 (2000), with MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canons 1-4 (2004).
11. See generally ALASKA CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (1998); ARIZ. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT
(1993); ARK. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (2006); D.C. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (1995); FLA. CODE
JUD. CONDUCT (2006); HAW. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (1992); IND. CODE OF JuD. CONDUCT
(2006); KAN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, §601A (1995); Ky. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (2006);
NEB. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (1992); NEV. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (2005); N.M. CODE OF JUD.
CONDUCT (2006); N.D. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (1998); OHIO CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (2005);
R.I. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (2006); S.C. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (1976); S.D. CODE OF JUD.
CONDUCT (2006); TENN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (2006); VT CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (2006);
VA. CANONS OF JUD. CONDUCT (2006); W. VA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (2006); WIS. CODE OF
JUD. CONDUCT (2006); WYO. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (2004).
12. Forty-nine of fifty states adopted the 1972 ABA Model Code, the 1990 version, or
both. Brief of ABA as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 8, Spargo v. N.Y. State
Comm'n on Jud. Conduct, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003) (No. 03-7250).
13. The Supreme Court of Florida requested that its Judicial Ethic Advisory Committee
(JEAC) study the proposed revisions to the ABA Model of Judicial Conduct and recommend
any appropriate amendments of its code. Amends. to Code of Jud Conduct-ABA's Model
Code, 918 So. 2d at 949. The JEAC filed a report on January 31, 2005, recommending sev-
eral amendments. Id. The amendments were published for comments and were adopted on
January 5, 2006. Id.
14. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT pmbl. (2006).
15. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT pmbl. (1990).
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toward an issue or individual. 6 When a judge can speak and act without fear
or favor, both integrity and independence are maintained. 17 Further, when a
judge adheres to the restraints placed on his or her speech and conduct, im-
partiality is maintained.
A. Perception of the Public
"'Perception is reality.' Each person has individualistic perceptions,
different ways of looking at things, yet each person is able to change his or
her perception, and, thus, change reality."'' 8 The partition between the per-
ception of justice and the reality of justice in our judicial system continues to
grow.19 This is due to the disparity between the public's concept of what
justice is and what justice should be.20 The discrepancy operates as a con-
cept discrete and insular from what judges or lawyers believe about the judi-
cial system.2' While repeated studies indicate that lawyers feel that they are
being judged unfairly by society, the basis for these perceptions must be un-
derstood before they can change. 2 Judges must be insulated from the exter-
nal controls that operate to challenge their independence. 23 However, judges
cannot escape the overarching negative perception of the legal system that
appears to engulf the judiciary.24
B. Portrayal by the Media
The coverage of courtroom dramas in the media perpetuates perceptions
that threaten to become a reality for the public. 25 Historically, the prolifera-
tion of television legal dramas generated perceptions created by media cov-
16. See FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT pmbl. (2006).
17. See id
18. Steven R. Sorenson, President 's Perspective: Perception Is Reality, 71 Wis. LAW. 61
(May 1998).
19. HARVEY LEVINE, LEVINE ON TRIAL ADVOCACY § 6.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Sorenson, supra note 18, at 62.
23. Miller, supra note 5, at 431.
24. See id
25. Greene, supra note 3, at 37. In Washington, D.C., at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), Monica Amarelo reported in
a news release that they were "seeing crime victims and jurors who have TV-fueled miscon-
ceptions of what evidence needs to be tested and how real-life investigations ought to be con-
ducted." Monica Amarelo, Pathologists Say TV Forensics Creates Unrealistic Expectations,
AM. Ass'N ADVANCEMENT OF SCI. (Feb. 21, 2005),
http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2005/0221 csi.shtml.
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erage of real court cases that may contain relatively little or no truth at all.26
In 2007 Florida was the venue of a poignant example of the impact on the
media coverage on the perception of judges.27 Circuit Court Judge Larry
Seidlin made news across the courtry for his antics from the bench for his
"witty"one liners and emotional and tearful delivery of his edicts.28 Judge
Seidlin was a presiding judge in some of the custody and legal proceedings
that ensued after the death of Anna Nicole Smith.29 His dramatic behavior
led to perception that his speech and conduct were intended to attract offers
for a courtroom television show.3 °
Additionally, the new genre of television crime dramas use the latest
scientific equipment that can detect, discover, diagnose, and dissect any
piece of evidence with absolute certainty.3 As a result, these dramas
threaten to generate a standard of proof beyond all doubt with the use of such
scientific equipment.32 The Maricopa County Attorney conducted a study
entitled The CSI Effect and Its Real-Life Impact on Justice.3 3 The study con-
cluded that television forensic crime dramas are having a significant impact
on juries and their perception about the availability and necessity of evi-
dence.34 Consequently, the impact of the media is evident in television and
real life court coverage.
26. See Greene, supra note 3, at 37. Leslie Abramson, a criminal defense attorney who
represented the Menendez brothers, remarked that some media coverage has little regard for
the truth. Leigh Buchanan Blenen, The Appearance of Justice: Juries, Judges and the Media
Transcript, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1096, 1098 (1996). She related a story about an
individual who claimed on a television show that he goes to go the Los Angeles jail every
three weeks to service Lyle Menendez's hairpiece and that Menendez's cell is right next door
to O.J. Simpson's cell. Id. The reality according to Abramson is that the hairpiece is not
serviced at all and that Simpson was housed in an area secluded from all other prisoners. Id.
at 1098-99.
27. This judge has since announced his retirement from the bench, effective July 31,
2007, to pursue a television career. Catherine Donaldson-Evans, Famed Judge to Step Down,
So. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, June 20, 2007, at B 1.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Catherine Donaldson-Evans, Anna Nicole Smith Snarky 'Judge Larry': Aspiring TV
Star or Regular Guy Running No-Jury Trial?, Fox NEWS, Feb. 20, 2007, available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,253198,00.html.
31. Greene, supra note 3, at 37.
32. During a recent jury selection in a drug possession case, I noted with interest as pro-
spective jurors questioned the prosecution and defense about scientific analysis. The prospec-
tive jurors inquired about the need and expectation of fingerprint and other forensic analysis
that would allow definitive determination of the weight and sufficiency of the evidence.
33. CSI: Maricopa County, The CSI Effect and Its Real-Life Impact on Justice, June 30,
2005, at 1, http://www.maicopacountyattomey.org/Press/PDF/CSIReport.pdf.
34. Id. at 5-7.
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Media coverage about the judicial system focuses on outrageous
cases.35 The coverage of high-profile cases has also contributed to negative
perceptions of the legal system and of judges. 36 As a result, the public's per-
ception of what really happens in the courtroom is obscured by a lens that
has little semblance of reality.37 These perceptions threaten to erode the in-
tegrity of the legal system.38 Unfortunately, the media's focus on sensational
trials and verdicts may play a role in some of the negative perceptions of
justice. 39 However, perceptions about the integrity of lawyers may play an
even larger role.4"
C. Experiences of the Participants
The public's perception about the impartiality of the judge may be
shaped by the role of the individual in the legal system. For example, in the
same trial, a victim, a juror, a plaintiff, a defendant, and a witness may each
have different perceptions about partiality and the judicial system.4' Accord-
ingly, each may have a different perception about the speech and conduct of
the judge. 42 This dichotomy becomes even more pronounced when the law-
35. LEVINE, supra note 19, § 6:25.14. Court TV brings the day to day reality of the court-
room to the general public. Every trial is not, however, carried out with the pomp and circum-
stance of the Scott Peterson, Robert Blake, or Michael Jackson trials. The snapshot of the
media's coverage of these trials may unfairly focus on judicial speech and conduct that creates
a perception that may or may not be reality. For information on each of these trials, please
refer to the Court TVwebsite. Information about the Scott Peterson trial can be accessed from
http://www.courttv.com/trials/peterson/ (last visited May 26, 2007). Information about the
Robert Blake trial can be accessed from http://www.courttv.com/trials/blake/ (last visited May
26, 2007). Information about Michael Jackson's various trials can be accessed from
http://www.courttv.com/trials/jackson/ (last visited May 26, 2007).
36. Greene, supra note 3, at 35, 37. The O.J. Simpson trial reportedly supports the public
belief that money can buy justice. Id.
37. Id. at 37.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Greene, supra note 3, at 36. A National Law Journal/West Publishing Company poll
suggests that respect for the legal profession is declining. Randall Samborn, Anti-Lawyer
Attitude Up, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 20. In a poll among a list of ten professions-
including lawyers--only 2% of those polled said they had "the most respect for lawyers." Id
This number was down from 5% in 1986. Id.
41. A victim who has been subjected to numerous interviews that require regurgitation of
a disturbing and painful event may feel re-victimized. Therefore, the individual may perceive
that justice is not served when a system seeks to ensure that a defendant's constitutional rights
are not compromised. If a juror is required to appear and to wait for a jury selection and trial
that is riddled with delay and interruption, the juror may perceive that grave injustices exist
within the judicial system.
42. Greene, supra note 3, at 35.
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yers are added to the equation.43 The prosecutor and the defense attorney
may have a different perception of justice that is dictated by the role they
play." Each may view the speech and conduct of the judge differently in
light of their roles as advocates and their beliefs about the independence,
integrity, and impartiality of the judge.45 Likewise, in a civil action, the
plaintiffs lawyer and the defendant's lawyer may each have different per-
ceptions of justice. Each may view the speech and conduct of the judge dif-
ferently, in light of their roles.
The negative perception of the public regarding the judicial system and
some lawyers is supported by empirical evidence.46 By its very nature, the
adversarial roles of lawyers can further distort the perception of justice.
Admittedly, these diametrically opposed roles create the basic foundation for
the fundamental challenge for the judge trying to positively affect public
perception. Ultimately, one must concede that the perception and reality of
integrity are cornerstones of an independent and impartial judiciary. 47
Therefore, if left unrestrained, the speech and conduct of judges may erode
the public's confidence in the judicial system.48
Studies have found that the public is more willing to accept an unpopu-
lar decision that is perceived as being fairly made.49 Therefore, the opportu-
nity to be fully and fairly heard carries great weight."° Moreover, a strong
correlation exists between the public's "[p]erception[] of fairness in the judi-
cial system, . . . [and] its perception[] of . . fairness in procedure[]."'"
"[B]ad judges terrorize courtrooms, impair the functioning of the legal sys-
tem, and undermine public confidence in the law., 512 Judges, whose speech
and conduct blatantly and repeatedly confront procedural fairness and create
patterns of misconduct, run the risk of decreasing the public's confidence to
the detriment of the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judicial
system. 3
43. Id. at 36.
44. Id. at 35.
45. Id. at 36. Both are seeking to prevail. Id.
46. LEVINE, supra note 19, § 6:2. It is suggested that political rhetoric, ads, and commer-
cials foster the perception of a "litigation crisis" severely tarnishing public perception. See
Greene, supra note 3, at 37-38.
47. Daniel W. Shuman & Jean A. Hamilton, Jury Service-It May Change Your Mind:
Perceptions of Fairness of Jurors and Nonjurors, 46 SMU L. REV. 449, 450 (1992).
48. Id. at451.
49. Id. at451 n.6.
50. See id.
51. Id. at452.
52. Miller, supra note 5, at 431 (quoting abstract).
53. See id.
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The public will not and cannot be expected to adhere to the decisions of
a court that lacks integrity and is not independent or impartial.54 Independ-
ence, integrity, and impartiality cannot be assumed or presumed from a court
that does not adhere to high principles in its conduct and speech on and off
the bench. 55 Because the possibility exists for judicial speech and conduct to
foster apprehension regarding the independence, integrity, and impartiality of
the judiciary, a judge must accept some regulation.56 In reviewing judicial
misconduct in this state, the Supreme Court of Florida has been critical of the
penalties imposed in some cases and has rejected some of the recommenda-
tions of the Judicial Qualification Commission (JQC) as too lenient.57 The
application of judicial discipline in Florida, a state which has adopted the
America Bar Association (ABA) Model Code of 1990 and most recently
adopted changes in its code in January 2006, will be used as a barometer for
general application.58
III. THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
A. The History of Judicial Discipline
The Code of Judicial Conduct is a standard of precepts by which judi-
cial speech and conduct are measured and by which disciplinary proceedings
are instituted against judges. 9 Each state has developed a standard for regu-
lating the speech and conduct of its judges which was generally, if not spe-
cifically, derived from ABA standards.6" Therefore, they provide an essen-
tial element to understanding the application of discipline against judges for
speech and conduct that affects the independence, integrity, and impartiality
of the judiciary.6
Standards of ethical guidelines were first created by the ABA for the
practicing bar in 1908.62 At the time that these guidelines were promulgated,
54. Shuman & Hamilton, supra note 47, at 451.
55. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial Ethics, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 3-4 (1988).
56. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT pmbl. (2004).
57. James R. Wolf, Judicial Discipline in Florida: The Cost of Misconduct, 30 NOVA L.
REV. 349, 349-50 (2006).
58. See In re Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla.
2006).
59. Wolf, supra note 57, at 351.
60. Shaman, supra note 55, at 3; see, e.g., In re Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla.
Bar, 933 So. 2d at 419.
61. Shaman, supra note 55, at 4.
62. ABA JOINT COMM'N. TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
BACKGROUND PAPER, at 1 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/
yld/elibrary/memphis04pdf/ethicscanon.pdf [hereinafter ABA BACKGROUND PAPER].
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judges were not included in their application. 63 Therefore, a tool for regulat-
ing judicial speech and conduct did not exist. 64 This exclusion of ethical
guidelines for judges was by no means an indication that the speech and con-
duct of judges did not warrant such regulation.65 Moreover, this lack of
guidelines for judges did not prevent the conduct of judges from becoming a
subject of concern about the independence, integrity, and impartiality of a
judge."
Also, in 1922 a commission on judicial ethics was established by the
ABA "to draft a code of judicial conduct., 67 The appointment of then Chief
Justice William Howard Taft to chair this commission accentuated the im-
portance of the charge of the commission.68
Finally, in 1924, the Canons of Judicial Ethics were promulgated and
approved by the ABA.69 There were thirty-six canons instituted which oper-
ated as a guideline for states to adopt and were intended as a guide for ideal
behavior.7 The intentional use of these canons only as a guide attracted
critics who asserted that their oratory admonitions provided little guidance in
determining a standard of proscribed conduct.7 This lack of a standard for
proscribed conduct resulted in the discipline of judges being neither uni-
63. Id. The ABA, immediately after adopting the first canons of professional ethics for
attorneys, sought to establish resolutions to include judicial discipline. Id. Resolutions were
unsuccessfully presented in 1909, and in 1917. Id.
64. See id.
65. See ABA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 62, at 1.
66. See Major League Baseball, History of the Game: Kenesaw Mountain Landis,
http://mlb.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/history/mlb history_people.jsp?story=com bio 1 (last
visited May 26, 2007); see also DAVID PIETRUSZA, JUDGE AND JURY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
JUDGE KENESAW MOUNTAIN LANDIS 191-93 (1998). In 1920, Judge Kennesaw Mountain
Landis supplemented his federal district judge salary by serving as the first commissioner of
baseball. Major League Baseball, History of the Game, supra. Judge Landis was brought in
to lend his reputation to baseball after scandal threatened the integrity of baseball with the
infamous White Sox scandal. Id. Players were alleged to have participated in a scheme to
throw the 1919 World Series. Major League Baseball, Chicago White Sox Timeline: 1919-
World Series, http://chicago.whitesox.mlb.com/cws/history/timeline01.jsp (last visited May
26, 2007). Although Landis banned eight players--even though they were acquitted at trial-
he was criticized for his ethics in failing to ban owner Charles Comiskey. See Major League
Baseball, History of the Game, supra. As a judge, Judge Landis earned $7,500 a year and
supplemented this salary with a $42,500 a year salary as commissioner. Id. He continued to
work as a federal judge while working as the first commissioner of baseball. Id.
67. ABA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 62, at 1.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Shaman, supra note 55, at 3.
71. Id.
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formly nor universally undertaken.72 Consequently, the Canons remained
virtually unchanged for almost fifty years.73
B. The Creation of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
In 1969, the ABA commenced a comprehensive review process to
evaluate and update the Canons of Judicial Ethics.74 However, it was not
until 1972 that these canons were modified to become the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct.75 This Model Code reduced the number of canons from
thirty-six to seven and incorporated language which eliminated the hortatory
language of the previous Canons of Judicial Ethics.76 Hence, the 1972 Code
indicated what a judge should do in an attempt to establish mandatory stan-
dards.77 This Model Code had no legal effect on the judges to whom it was
intended to apply, and it would be necessary for each state to enact statutes
or court rules that would make it mandatory and capable of enforcement. 78
By 1990, "forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Judi-
cial Conference" had adopted some form of the 1972 Model Code for regula-
tion of judicial speech and conduct.79
Also in 1990, a new version of the Model Code, adopted with five, not
seven, canons emerged with significant changes from the 1972 Code.8" First,
gender neutral language replaced the language in the 1972 Code, which had
utilized masculine references only.8 Second, a terminology section was
added to explain terms utilized in an attempt to ensure uniformity in under-
standing and application.82  Third, the language of the code was revised
again to address the enforcement power of the Model Code. 83 Therefore,
72. Id. at 6.
73. ANN. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT pmbl. (2004); see LISA L. MILFORD, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 3 (1992).
74. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Preface (1972).
75. ANN. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT pmbl.
76. See CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (1972); ABA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 62, at 1;
JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS (3d ed. 2000).
77. See generally CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (1972).
78. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 76, at 3.
79. Id.
80. ABA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 62, at 1; see MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT
(1990). Canons 4, 5, and 6 of the 1972 Code were combined into one canon dealing with
conduct. ABA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 62, at 1.
81. MILFORD, supra note 73, at 7. Compare MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (1990), with
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (1972).
82. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT pmbl. (1990).
83. ABA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 62, at 1; see also MODEL CODE OF JUD.
CONDUCT (1990).
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"should" was eliminated in favor of "shall" to emphasize the mandatory na-
ture of the standards being established.84 A note was added in the commen-
tary to indicate clearly and unequivocally that mandatory enforcement and
application was intended by the use of "shall" instead of "should."85 Most
notably, a preamble section was added, which explained: 1) how to apply
the code; 2) when to apply the code; and 3) why to apply the code. 6 This
explanation of the underlying principles of the code was an integral part of
the code's effectiveness as a tool for regulation.87
By 1990, forty-seven states had adopted the 1972 Code in some form.
With the adoption of the 1990 Code, twenty of these forty-seven states, plus
the District of Columbia, adopted the new Model Code of Judicial Conduct
as their state's code. 88 Two of the three states that previously had no code of
judicial conduct adopted the 1990 Code, bringing the total number of juris-
dictions to twenty-three. 9 While some states have adopted a combination of
the 1972 and 1990 Code, only Montana-with its own code-remains as the
state that has adopted neither the 1972 nor 1990 Code. 90 Consequently, the
Model Code operates as an excellent tool for application and analysis of ju-
dicial conduct.
C. The "New'" Model Code of Judicial Conduct
In September of 2003, the ABA Joint Commission on Evaluation of the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct was formed to review the Code of Judicial
Conduct and recommend changes.9 In announcing the commission, then
ABA President Dennis W. Archer, Jr. noted that it had been twelve years
since the ABA had taken a close examination of the Code, and that in light of
recent legal and political challenges and attacks on judges, some revisions
may be warranted. 92 Public meetings were held across the country in con-
junction with the ABA Annual Meeting. 93 The final draft report has been
84. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT pmbl. (1990).
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. MILFORD, supra note 73, at 9,
88. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 76, at 3 n. 19.
89. Id. at 4. Rhode Island and Wisconsin adopted codes based on the 1990 Model Code
of Judicial Conduct. Id.
90. See MONT. CONST. art V, § 11.
91. ABA Joint Comm'n to Evaluate the Model Code of Jud. Conduct, About the
Comm'n, http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/about.html (last visited May 26, 2007) [herein-
after About the ABA Joint Comm'n].
92. Id. Between 1988 and 1990, an extensive review and revision of the code led to the
1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct. ABA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 62, at 1.
93. About the ABA Joint Comm'n, supra note 91.
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released and is awaiting comment from the judiciary, the bar, and the pub-
lic. 94
1. Format Changes
Both format and substantive changes to the Code are being proposed by
the ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Con-
duct.95 The format changes entail the reorganization of the information cov-
ered within the Canons and the numbering system. 96 While Canons 4 and 5
address the same information they covered in the 1990 Code, most of the
information previously provided in Canons 1, 2, and 3 has been placed in
Canon 1.97 The judge's professional duties are addressed solely in Canon
2.98 The personal conduct of the judge will now appear in Canon 3 instead
of Canon 2. 9' Second, the 1990 Code generally presents an overarching
principle that is followed by subsections, which discursively provides the
parameters for speech and conduct.100 Instead, the new code would more
directly address permitted and prohibited speech and conduct.' ' The num-
bering system will also be changed from lettered canons with subsections A,
94. Id. Mark I. Harrison, the chair of the Commission, reported that as of April 2006:
The Commissioners agree that a short extension of our work will allow us to present the
best possible product to the ABA House of Delegates, both to provide clear and appropri-
ate guidance to the judiciary in the years ahead, and to assure the public that its trust in the
judiciary is well-founded .... We are committed to finishing our work this fall, to allow
full consideration of all the proposed changes in the Code before the House convenes for
the ABA Midyear Meeting in Miami in February 2007.
Statement of Mark I. Harrison to ABA (April 2006) (on file with Nova Law Review).
95. MARK I. HARRISON ET AL., INTRODUCTORY REPORT: PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE
ABA JOINT COMMISSION TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 1 (June 30,
2005). The Joint Commission operates under the auspices of the ABA's Standing Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, and on Judicial Independence, with a grant from
the Joyce Foundation. Id.
96. Id. at 3.
97. Id. The revised Canon 1 will address "both the obligation of judges to uphold the
integrity, impartiality, and independence of the judiciary and to avoid impropriety and its
appearance." Id
98. HARRISON ET AL., supra note 95, at 3. In the 1990 Code, this information is partly
covered in Canon 3. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. This change is modeled after the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
which is said to be "more straightforward and user-friendly." HARRISON ET AL., supra note 95,
at 3.
[Vol. 31
248
Nova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol31/iss3/1
THE REAL COSTS OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT
B, or C to numbered canons with rules.10 2 A comment section will replace
commentary throughout the code. '03
2. Substantive Changes
a. Canon 1-Conduct in General
"A judge shall... avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all of the judge's activities," so as to uphold "the independence, integrity,
and impartiality of the judiciary."" The addition of the language after the
comma is intended to emphasize the importance of avoiding impropriety and
its appearance. 105 It sets the tenor for judicial speech and conduct on and off
the bench by stressing the importance of independence, integrity, and impar-
tiality. 106 Throughout the comment to this canon, the word independence is
placed before both integrity and impartiality.'07 Citing to over three decades
of regulation of judicial conduct, the proposed changes place "the admon-
ishment that judges avoid not only impropriety, but also its appearance in
two places."' 0 8 This language, regarding impropriety and its appearance,
appears in the text of Canon 1 and in Rule 1.03 in the language "substantially
as [it] appear[s] in the present Code."'10 9
102. See JOINT COMM. TO EVALUATE THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, ABA, ATTACHMENT
B: FINAL DRAFT REPORT REDLINED TO CURRENT ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/redlinetocurrentcode.pdf [hereinafter
REDLINE TO CURRENT CODE]. For example, rules under Canon 1 would be designated: 1.01,
1.02, and 1.03. Id.
103. See id.
104. Id. Canon 1.
105. See id.
106. See Eileen C. Gallagher, The ABA Revisits the Model Code of Judicial Conduct: A
Report on Progress, 44 JUDGES J. 7, 7-8, (2005).
107. REDLINE TO CURRENT CODE, supra note 102, Canon 1 cmts. 1-3.
108. HARRISON ET AL., supra note 95, at 4. "The Commission ... received numerous
written communications on the question ... of whether the 'appearance of impropriety' con-
cept contained in the present Code should be retained." Id. Some "urged that the concept be
retained, [while] [o]thers, notably lawyers who represent judges and judicial candidates in
disciplinary proceedings, voiced concerns that the concept is not clearly definable and does
not provide judges and judicial candidates with adequate notice about what conduct might
constitute a disciplinable offense." Id.
109. Id.
2007]
249
: Nova Law Review 31, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LA WREVIEW
b. Canon 2-Judicial Conduct
"A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially ... and
diligently."" 0 The redline copy of Canon 2 exemplifies the extensive revi-
sions this Canon, which previously included only three subsections, has un-
dergone. "' As the title to this Canon suggests, the admonition that "a judge
shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially and diligently" is the
subject and principal focus of Canon 2.112 The proposed changes would add
seventeen additional provisions so that Canon 2 would contain twenty
rules. "3
Each rule addresses speech and conduct that may occur while the judge
is on the bench." 4 Most of the speech and conduct addressed in this Canon
was previously addressed in Canon 3 of the 1990 Model Code, using sub-
stantially the same language." 5 The additional language of "[g]iving prece-
dence to the duties of judicial office" further emphasizes the intent of this
Canon." 6 Impartiality and fairness are specifically addressed in a new Rule
2.06 that provides: "A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and decide all
cases with impartiality and fairness."" 7
"Rule 2.08, 'Demeanor and Decorum,' contains a new Comment to ac-
commodate" post-trial jury debriefing by delineating what must not be dis-
cussed." 8 The Comment to Rule 2.09, "Ensuring the Right to be Heard,"
adds a caution to judges to avoid coercion when "encouraging parties and
their lawyers to settle disputes where possible."" 9 In the proposal of Rule
2.10(B), judges are prohibited from "independently investigat[ing] facts in a
case '"  and the importance of an independent judiciary is once again em-
110. REDLINE TO CURRENT CODE, supra note 102, Canon 2.
111. Compare id., with MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2 (1990).
112. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2.
113. See REDLINE TO CURRENT CODE, supra note 102, Canon 2.
114. See id.
115. Compare id., with MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3 (1990).
116. REDLINE TO CURRENT CODE, supra note 102, Canon 2.
117. Id. at Canon 2, R. 2.06.
118. HARRISON ET AL., supra note 95, at 4. This is a relatively new practice and procedure
by some judges. See id.
119. Id. The proposal does not address the question of "[w]hether a judge who partici-
pates in facilitating settlement of a matter pending before him or her should be permitted to
hear that matter if settlement efforts are unsuccessful [but this question] has been the subject
of conflicting testimony." Id.
120. Id. The Comment to the Rule specifically includes a prohibition against the "use of
electronic research methods," including Internet research. HARRISON ET AL., supra note 95, at
4-5. The Comment also notes the "developing practices in... 'specialized courts,' such as
drug courts, domestic abuse courts, and others, [which] encourage or require judges to engage
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phasized.12 1 Rule 2.20 adds the duty of a judge to cooperate with judicial
and lawyer disciplinary authorities. 
22
c. Canon 3-Personal Conduct
123
"A judge shall conduct the judge's personal affairs to preserve the inde-
pendence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary."' 24  The revision lan-
guage for Canon 3 emphasizes the applicability of the code to speech and
conduct that may occur during the personal life of a judge, including disclo-
sure of information that may be deemed private. 25 Many new commentaries
have been added to this canon to provide clarity and clear guidance to the
judiciary regarding personal conduct. 126 For example, the revision comment
provides that judges should write letters of recommendation based on "only
knowledge obtained . .. in his or her official capacity." 127 While the com-
mentary is not new, it "addresses [a] long-standing debate about the appro-
priate use of judicial letterhead for references."'2 8
Second, "'ethnicity' and 'sexual orientation' [were added] to the list of
factors that must not be the basis for discrimination in the policies of clubs
and other membership entities to which judges seek to belong."'' 29 While the
in communications with individuals and entities" and may violate ex parte provisions.
HARRISON ET AL., supra note 95, at 5.
121. See id. at 4-5. The addition to "[tihe Comment to Rule 2.12, 'Disqualification,'
states that a judge 'should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the par-
ties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of disqualification, even if the
judge believes there is no real basis for disqualification,"' which raised the question of
"whether such an application of the disqualification rule is necessary or desirable, and specifi-
cally whether such an interpretation may work a hardship on one or both of the lawyers in a
proceeding." Id. at 5.
122. REDLINE TO CURRENT CODE, supra note 102, Canon 2, R. 2.20.
123. The present language of Canon 3 provides: "A judge shall perform the duties of
judicial office impartially and diligently." MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3 (2004). It
contains subsections A-F and addresses speech and conduct that may occur on the bench or
during the performance of judicial duties. Id. Incorporating this language and the subject
matter of Canon 3 into Canon 2 will make the focus of Canon 3 off the bench speech and
conduct. See HARRISON ET AL., supra note 95, at 3.
124. REDLINE TO CURRENT CODE, supra note 102, Canon 3.
125. See id
126. See HARRISON ET AL., supra note 95, at 5-6; REDLINE TO CURRENT CODE, supra note
102, Canon 3.
127. HARRISON ET AL., supra note 95, at 5.
128. Gallagher, supra note 106, at 9.
129. HARRISON ET AL., supra note 95, at 5. The issue of membership in the Boy Scouts of
America was specifically addressed as a result of the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). A Massachusetts Committee on Judi-
cial Ethics found that the prohibition against discrimination based on sex did not refer to dis-
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1990 Code presently contains a "prohibition against the manifestation of bias
in the court." The prohibition does "not appear with respect to organiza-
tional memberships held by a judge." 3 '
Third, the caveat remains "that a judge may belong to 'any organization
dedicated to the preservation of religious, ethnic, or legitimate cultural values
of common interest to its members' without fear of violation of this
canon. 131
Fourth, the comments note that attendance by the judge in violation of
this canon is well established as a per se violation.'32 Although, mere atten-
dance of a judge at an event in a facility of a group that he or she could not
join as a member does not violate the rule if attendance is an isolated event
and could not be perceived as an endorsement of the organization. '33
Fifth, "a judge [must] immediately resign from an organization to which
he or she belongs upon discovering that it engages in invidious discrimina-
tion... [but has] one year to withdraw from membership, unless he or she
was successful in influencing the organization to abandon its discriminatory
policies.' 13
4
d. Canon 4-Extrajudicial Conduct
"A judge shall conduct the judge's extra-judicial activities ... to mini-
mize the risk of conflict with [judicial obligations]."'' 35 "[T]he text of this
Rule remains largely unchanged," but the structure has changed, revising the
description of gifts to exclude "several items that are not, in common par-
lance, thought of as gifts, including but not limited to: ordinary social hospi-
tality; trivial tokens of appreciation; and loans, discounts, prizes, and schol-
arships that judges receive for reasons generally unrelated to their being
judges."' 36
crimination based on sexual orientation and, therefore, did not prohibit a judge from member-
ship. Mass. Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. No. 2001-1 (2001). An Arizona Judicial Ethics Advi-
sory Opinion found that without specific language prohibiting membership and participation
in groups that prohibit membership based on sexual orientation, judges were not barred from
participation in the Boy Scouts of America. Ariz. Sup. Ct. Jud. Ethics Adv. Comm., Adv. Op.
00-05 (2000).
130. HARRISON ET AL., supra note 95, at 5.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 6.
133. See id. at 5-6.
134. Id. at6.
135. REDLINE TO CURRENT CODE, supra note 102, Canon 4.
136. HARRISON ET AL., supra note 95, at 6.
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"Rule 4.13(A)(7) remains substantially similar to the present Code, but
includes several important changes."' 137 It provides that each jurisdiction
should set a specific amount for the reporting of gifts instead of simply re-
quiring that all gifts be reported.' 38 No gifts would be allowed for five years
from persons who previously appeared before the court or who are likely to
appear before the court in the foreseeable future. 1
39
First, Rule 4.14(A) would apply to waiver of charges as well as re-
imbursement of expenses. Second, permissible reimbursement is
specifically limited to necessary travel and lodging. Third, [and
the most important change is that] the condition precedent to ac-
cepting reimbursement or waiver of charges-that it not create an
appearance of impropriety-has been amended to identify specifi-
cally the potential that the acceptance of gifts has for creating the
perception that judicial integrity, impartiality, or independence
may be compromised.
The Comment explicating this Rule is designed to provide judges
with greater guidance when analyzing whether their reimburse-
ment for attendance at a given event may be perceived as casting
doubt on their integrity, impartiality, or independence. The
sources of funding for an event, the reasonableness of the expenses
paid, and the identity of the sponsor are all among factors that
judges are urged to consider when deciding whether to attend ex-
pense-paid seminars. 1
40
e. Canon 5-Inappropriate Political Activity
"A judge or candidate for judicial office shall not engage in political...
activity that is inconsistent with the independence, integrity, and impartiality
of the judiciary."' 4'4  The redline copy of Canon 5 includes both substantial
rule changes and significant comments to the canon. 142 These changes ap-
pear to be a manifestation of the need to ensure the independence, integrity,
and impartiality of the judiciary while recognizing "the political realities of
judicial selection."'' 43
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 7.
141. REDLINE TO CURRENT CODE, supra note 102, Canon 5. The former language is "[a]
judge or judicial candidate shall refrain from inappropriate political activity." MODEL CODE
OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5 (2004).
142. See REDLINE TO CURRENT CODE, supra note 102, Canon 5.
143. HARRISON ET AL., supra note 95, at 7.
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The redline version adds the language: "activity that is not inconsistent
with the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary."'" This
language embodies these overriding principles while addressing the issues
that may arise in the different methods of judicial selection. 45  Rule 5.01
addresses the issue of speech and conduct that: 1) is false and made "with
reckless disregard for the truth;"'146 2) might "reasonably be expected to af-
fect the outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending or impending;"'1
47
or 3) "make pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the
impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of office."' 141 Rules 5.02,
5.03, 5.04, and 5.05 each address a different method of judicial selection. 49
Rule 5.02, "Permitted Political and Campaign Activities of Candidates
for Judicial Office in Partisan Public Elections," contains specific language
to indicate the speech and conduct permitted. 50 This rule was contained in
the previous code and generally adds language that clarifies the speech and
conduct allowed.15 ' This rule specifically allows speech and conduct that
would be prohibited by other rules.1
52
Rule 5.03, "Permitted Political and Campaign Activities of Candidates
for Judicial Office in Non-Partisan Public Elections," and Rule 5.04, "Per-
mitted Political and Campaign Activities of Candidates for Judicial Office in
Retention Elections," add identical language that specifically references non-
partisan and retention elections, respectively. 53
Finally, Rule 5.05, "Permitted Political Activities of Candidates for Ap-
pointive Judicial Office," provides guidance for speech and conduct for those
seeking appointment. 1
54
144. REDLINE TO CURRENT CODE, supra note 102, Canon 5.
145. See id.
146. Id. R. 5.01(A)(I 1).
147. Id. R. 5.01(A)(12).
148. Id. R. 5.01(A)(13).
149. REDLINE TO CURRENT CODE, supra note 102, Canon 5.
150. Id. R. 5.01.
151. Compare id., with MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5 (2004).
152. REDLINE TO CURRENT CODE, supra note 102, Canon 5. For example, a judge or judi-
cial candidate in a non-partisan election would be prohibited from identifying the party to
which he or she belongs, but would be allowed pursuant to this rule. See id.
153. Id. R. 5.03, 5.04.
154. Id. R. 5.05.
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IV. THE SPEECH AND CONDUCT THAT THREATEN INDEPENDENCE,
INTEGRITY, AND IMPARTIALITY
A. Categories of Judicial Speech and Conduct: The Florida Model
A recent article by Judge James R. Wolf explores the cost of judicial
misconduct in Florida by conducting a comprehensive survey of judicial
discipline.' Judge Wolf identifies twenty categories of misconduct in his
analysis of judicial discipline.'56 The twenty categories are:
1) lacking judicial temperament; 2) failing to be impartial; 3) en-
gaging in ex parte communications; 4) violating recusal and dis-
closure requirements; 5) improperly communicating with the
press; 6) failing to follow the law while conducting judicial duties;
7) inappropriately using contempt power; 8) misusing office for
personal gain; 9) misusing office for the [benefit] of others; 10)
abusing substances; 11) improper[] receiving [of] gifts; 12) ...
improper sexual conduct; 13) ... improper behavior while practic-
ing law; 14) violating criminal laws; 15) . . . delay[] [in] ruling;
16) exhibiting a lack of candor during official proceedings; 17)
failing to file required ... disclosure . . . ; 18) criticizing jur[ors]
and ... officials; 19) use[] [of] intimidation ... ; and 20) ... elec-
tion misconduct. 1
57
Wolf s article does not analyze the misconduct in the context of the
most recent changes to the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct or the proposed
changes in the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.18  The categories that he
identifies are a comprehensive list of speech and conduct that frequently are
the subject of judicial discipline. 59 Narrowing the categories of misconduct
identified by Judge Wolf provides a more useful mechanism for a broader
155. Wolf, supra note 57, at 350.
156. Id. at 352-53.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 351. According to Wolf:
While a study of the seven canons of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct will cer-
tainly reveal what behavior constitutes judicial misconduct warranting the imposi-
tion of discipline, such a study cannot provide an adequate framework for determin-
ing the fairness or equality of the penalties actually received by judges for their
misconduct.
Id.
159. See Wolf, supra note 57, at 352-53. In his analysis of judicial discipline while refer-
ring to categories one through ten ofjudicial misconduct, Wolf states: "While these behaviors
are given many names, they essentially involve a judge being discourteous and not treating
people the way he or she would want to be treated." Id. at 367.
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analysis of the speech and conduct. 60 The twenty categories of misconduct
can be reduced to three areas of misconduct: 1) on the bench speech and
conduct; 2) off the bench speech; and 3) political speech and conduct. 6 '
These three categories provide a consolidated framework for comparison and
evaluation of the judicial misconduct, and should serve as an effective and
necessary tool for evaluating the regulation of judges in order to maintain
public confidence and ensure the independence, integrity, and impartiality of
the judiciary. 16 2 The examinations will necessarily include speech and con-
duct of judges during political activity to expose how the independence, in-
tegrity, and impartiality of the judiciary are affected.'16 3
B. Precepts for Regulation of Judicial Speech and Conduct
What a judge says can become as much the subject of discipline as what
a judge does. 16 The same speech may violate more than one provision, and
each must be examined through those rules, commentaries, and cases that
discuss the prohibited behavior. 165  An adequate examination of judicial
speech and conduct will necessarily overlap in depth and breadth of the
analysis of the canons that govern such speech and behavior. 166 While all of
the canons may provide a constructive framework for analysis when looking
at judicial speech or conduct, this examination of on the bench conduct will
focus on, and begin with, an analysis of Canon 3,167 and then establish the
implications of Canon 1168 and Canon 2.169 The emphasis on Canon 3 re-
flects its overriding precepts of independence, integrity, and impartiality, and
its emphasis on specific speech and conduct. 7 ' The utility of Canon 4 as a
tool for analysis is limited because of its framework, but it will be examined
160. Id. at 352. With fewer categories, the opportunity for comparison and analysis is
greater. See id. ("[I]t is beneficial for analytical purposes to identify narrow categories of
conduct and to create a large number of categories to ensure that the comparison of penalties
is truly for like conduct.").
161. See generally idat 352-53.
162. See Wolf, supra note 57, at 351 (raising many issues concerning discipline for judi-
cial misconduct and implying why such issues are grounds for public concern).
163. See id. at 352.
164. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3 (2004).
165. See Wolf, supra note 57, at 352.
166. See id.
167. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3 (2004).
168. See id. Canon 1 ("A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judici-
ary.").
169. See id. Canon 2 ("A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all of the judge's activities.").
170. See id Canon 3.
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for compliance. 17' Finally, Canon 5 will be used to examine political speech
and conduct. 
72
"A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judici-
ary."' 173  This canon invites desirable, not actual application, to judicial
speech and conduct, but has been successfully applied to judicial speech and
conduct, including political activity. 174 The principal indictment against sole
use of this canon as a disciplinary tool is that the "hortative and goal ori-
ented" language fails to "set forth ... the precise nature of the speech and
conduct that may be subject to discipline."'175
"A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all of the judge's activities."' 76 The overriding principle of this canon is the
recognition of the need to prohibit irresponsible and improper speech and
conduct through regulation. 17 This regulation includes definitions of impro-
priety and the appearance of impropriety. 7 8 It is impossible to list all speech
and conduct that is prohibited by this canon, but the commentary provides
that "improprieties under this standard include violations of law, court rules,
or other specific provisions of this Code."' 179 The test for the appearance of
impropriety of speech and conduct is objectively outlined as determining if
"the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impar-
tiality and competence is impaired."'' 80 This standard allows objective appli-
cation of this canon to a variety of speech and conduct ranging from an ex-
171. See id. Canon 4.
172. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5.
173. Id. Canon 1.
174. E.g., In re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529, 612 (Pa. 1992). Numerous states have consistently
noted the difficulty in applying this canon via case law. Id. Such cases involve examples of
on the bench speech and conduct. See, e.g., In re Jacobi, 715 N.E.2d 873, 874-75 (Ind. 1999)
(finding a violation of Canon 1 for extensive ex parte contact with a town's attorney and board
president when granting its temporary restraining order); In re Waterman, 625 N.W.2d 748,
748-50 (Mich. 1999) (hearing cases of attorneys to whom he leased offices). For examples of
off the bench speech and conduct see Miss. Comm 'n on Jud. Performance v. Blakeney, 848
So. 2d 824, 826 (Miss. 2003) (initiating ex parte contact with deputy in attempt to obtain
dismissal for defendant), and In re Esquiroz, 654 So. 2d 558, 558-59 (Fla. 1995) (charging a
judge with a DUI in violation of Canon 1 and Canon 2). For examples of political speech and
conduct see In re Koon, 580 S.E.2d 147, 148 (S.C. 2003) (illustrating an example of a case of
inappropriate political activity), and In re Rodriquez, 829 So. 2d 857, 858-60 (Fla. 2002)
(hearing a case on a campaign finance reporting irregularity).
175. In re Smith, 687 A.2d 1229, 1239 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Discipline 1996).
176. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2 (2004).
177. Id
178. Id.
179. Id. Canon 2 cmt.
180. Id.
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tramarital affair 8 ' to failing to pay for income tax preparation, while award-
ing an income tax accountant fiduciary appointments.'82
"A judge [should] perform the duties of [a judge] impartially and dili-
gently." 1 3  The all-encompassing nature of this canon provides the most
comprehensive umbrella for analysis of judicial speech and conduct.'"4 This
general applicability continues with the admonition that "judicial duties of a
judge take precedence over all the judge's other activities."' 1 5 "The judge's
judicial duties include all the duties of the judge's office prescribed by
law."'186 In pronouncing the standards that would apply to this canon, the
subsections identify the parameters as: 1) adjudicative duties;'8 7 2) adminis-
trative duties; 188 4) disciplinary duties; 189 and 5) those duties relating to dis-
qualification. 9 ' Ultimately, an allegation of improper speech or conduct
must generally include a violation of this canon, because it covers most as-
pects of how a judge should conduct judicial and extra-judicial activities.' 9
181. See In re Flanagan, 690 A.2d 865, 869, 880-82 (Conn. 1997) (holding that "a con-
sensual sexual relationship" of a judge "with his married court reporter constituted a violation
of [C]anons 1 and 2A").
182. In re Lebedeff, N.Y. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct (Nov. 5, 2003) available at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/L/lebedeff.htm (holding that judge's failure to pay
for tax preparation created an image of impropriety).
183. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3 (2004).
184. See generally id.
185. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3A (2006).
186. Id.
187. Id. Canon 3B; see Wolf, supra note 57, at 359. Judge Wolf identifies these duties in
terms of the need for the judge to "maintain[] competence .... order, and decorum" on the
bench and judicially perform duties with dignity and courtesy free of bias and prejudice.
Wolf, supra note 57, at 359. The administrative duties also require the judge to ensure "a
party's right to be heard" without improper ex parte communication or public comments.
FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B.
188. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3C; see Wolf, supra note 57, at 359. Generally,
these responsibilities include the adjudicative duties and the need to avoid favoritism and
nepotism when making appointments. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3C.
189. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3D; see Wolf, supra note 57, at 359. This duty
specifies the responsibility of a judge to report judicial and attorney misconduct. FLA. CODE
JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3D.
190. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3E; see Wolf, supra note 57, at 359. This duty
specifies the requirements of a judge for disclosure and recusal. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT
Canon 3E.
191. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3 (2004) ("The judicial duties of a judge
take precedence over all the judge's other activities. The judge's judicial duties include all the
duties of the judge's office prescribed by law. In the performance of these duties, the [stan-
dards of Canon 3] apply.").
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A judge should conduct "the judge's extra-judicial activities [as] to
minimize the risk of conflict with judicial obligations."1 92 This canon spe-
cifically applies to off the bench speech and conduct, and generally provides
guidance to the judge when participating in these activities.'93 Complete
withdrawal by the judge from all extra-judicial activities is neither advisable
nor required lest the judge becomes isolated from the community.'9' How-
ever, this canon makes clear that the judge must accept speech and conduct
limitations and expect to be the subject of scrutiny. 95
"A judge or judicial candidate shall refrain from inappropriate political
activity." 196 In recent years, the legislative branch has become involved in
attempts to encroach upon and politicize the issue of judicial independ-
ence. 197 In 2002, the United States Supreme Court became the venue of vo-
ciferous attacks on judicial speech and conduct, especially during elec-
tions. 19  In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,' 99 the Court found un-
constitutional a provision of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct that
prevented judicial candidates from announcing their views regarding dis-
puted legal and political questions.2t° In emphasizing the positive value of
announcements on views regarding disputed legal and political questions, the
192. Id. Canon 4.
193. Id.
194. Id. Canon 4 cmt.
195. Id.
Expressions of bias or prejudice by a judge, even outside the judge's judicial ac-
tivities, may cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a
judge. Expressions which may do so include jokes or other remarks demeaning in-
dividuals on the basis of their race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age,
sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 4 cmt. (2004).
196. Id. Canon 5.
197. Justice Ginsburg Snipes at Rep. DeLay, NEWSMAX.COM WIRES, Feb. 3 2001, avail-
able at http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/2/2/172414.shtml. Former Speaker
of the House Tom DeLay, when he was Minority Whip, introduced legislation to limit the
terms of federal judges and to restrict their review in death penalty and voter referendum
cases, asserting that Article II of the United States Constitution gives Congress appellate ju-
risdiction. Id. Representative DeLay announced to a group of reporters that, "judges need to
be intimidated." Id. In a speech about judicial independence on February 1, 2001, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg responded to DeLay's comment calling him an exterminator. Id. Jus-
tice Ginsburg said columnist Bob Herbert of the New York Times got it right when he said in
a December 2000 column that, "[a]n intimidated judge is a worthless judge." Id.; see also
Debora K. Kristensen, In Search of Judicial Independence, 46 ADVOCATE 27, 30-32 (Idaho
State Bar, June 2003).
198. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002).
199. Id. at 765.
200. Id. at 788.
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Court stated that candidate platforms and positions are "what the elections
are about." ''
C. Parameters of Judicial Speech and Conduct
The use of the canons for the examination of on the bench and off the
bench speech and conduct must be preceded by determining what is meant
by judicial duties.20 2 This canon provides guidance stating that judicial du-
ties are "all [of] the duties of the judge's office prescribed by law."2 3 Since
by law a judge is capable of being called into service twenty-four hours a
day, do judicial duties encompass all speech and conduct by a judge? For the
purpose of analysis under this canon, judicial duties will be used in reference
to speech and conduct which occur while on the bench or while carrying out
a judicial finction.2° Consequently, anything that a judge says or does in
direct connection with judicial duties can and will be subject to examination
under this rubric.205
1. On the Bench Speech and Conduct
On the bench speech may encompass the following: 1) "lacking judi-
cial temperament;" 2) "failing to be impartial;" 3) "engaging in ex parte
communications;" 4) "exhibiting a lack of candor during official proceed-
ings;" 5) "criticizing juries and . . . officials;" and 6) "us[e] [of] intimida-
tion., 20 6 The use of intimidation must be examined on a case-by-case basis
since the speech or conduct may be indicated by a single event. 207 Arguably,
both failing to be impartial and the use of intimidation could also occur off
the bench for personal advantage or some other reason.208 However, those
instances, for the purpose of this analysis, will be characterized as "misus[e]
201. Id.
202. Although a definition was eventually agreed upon, the drafting committee of the 1972
canon encountered difficulty in fashioning a definition of judicial duties. MODEL CODE OF
JuD. CoNDucT Canon 3 (2004).
203. Id. This definition also encompasses those duties provided for by common law, rule,
regulation, statute, or the Constitution. Id.
204. Id. This designation will include any activity that is prescribed in a judge's jurisdic-
tion as a duty of judicial office. Id.
205. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3 (2004).
206. Wolf, supra note 57, at 352-53.
207. See id. at 382-83.
208. See, e.g., In re Holloway, 832 So. 2d 716, 717 (Fla. 2002) (hearing in which a judge
attempted to intimidate a fellow judge who was handling his friend's case); In re Miller, 644
So. 2d 75, 79 (Fla. 1994) (writing letters to a newspaper about a case warranted public repri-
mand).
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of office [either] for personal gain" or for the benefit of others.2"9 All of
these categories, which were identified by Judge Wolf, provide an opportu-
nity for useful analysis, especially when examined in the context of improper
judicial speech.21°
Again utilizing the categories identified by Judge Wolf, on the bench
conduct that will be examined consists of the following: 1) "Violating
Recusal and Disclosure Requirements;" 2) "Failing to Follow the Law While
Conducting Judicial Duties;" 3) "Inappropriately Using Contempt Power;" 4)
"Delay in Ruling;" 5) "Failing to File Required Disclosure" Documents; and
6) "Use of Intimidation. ' '211 While there is some overlap in these categories
of judicial discipline, the designation of on the bench conduct provides a
common thread for analyzing the speech and conduct.
2. Off the Bench Speech and Conduct
Determining the parameters of the off the bench judicial speech and
conduct that may be subject to discipline may be ascertained more easily.
The off the bench designation essentially includes any other speech and con-
duct that does not occur on the bench and in direct connection with judicial
duties. The aspects of speech and conduct that may be examined under
Canon 4 will be judicial activities specifically defined as: 1) "Avocational
Activities;"2 12 2) "Governmental, Civic or Charitable Activities; ' 213 3) "Fi-
nancial Activities;, 21 4 4) "Fiduciary Activities; 2 15 5) "Service as Arbitrator
or Mediator; 216 and 6) "Practice of Law.21 7 These activities govern judicial
218conduct relating to participation in non-judicial activities.
3. Political Speech and Conduct
The final analysis of judicial speech and conduct will examine political
activity.21 9 Political activity will take into account speech and conduct of
judges and judicial candidates in a judicial election.220 It will also examine
209. Wolf, supra note 57, at 353.
210. See id. at 352-53.
207. Id. at 349-50.
212. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 4B (2004).
213. Id. Canon 4C.
214. Id. Canon 4D.
215. Id. Canon 4E.
216. Id. Canon4F.
217. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 4G.
218. See id. Canon 4.
219. See id. Canon 5.
220. See id.
2007]
261
: Nova Law Review 31, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LA WREVIEW
speech and conduct within the context of the appointment process.221 Fi-
nally, it will examine speech and conduct on behalf of another candidate
within the context of an election or political appointment of a judge or any
other person.222 Political activity will include both speech and conduct be-
cause the political environment is the principal catalyst in the analysis of
misconduct.223
V. THE EXAMINATION OF JUDICIAL SPEECH AND CONDUCT
A. On the Bench Speech and Conduct
The concept of limiting judicial speech and conduct on the bench can be
easily justified since what a judge says and does can have serious ramifica-
tions for those who appear in court. A large percentage of the cases of mis-
conduct occur as a result of incivility. 24 Both speech and conduct are the
subjects of these complaints. 2 5 The consequences of improper speech can
extend further than discipline against the judge and lead to the reversal of a
conviction.226 These instances of judicial misconduct become more than
legal error because they represent a departure by the judge from the obliga-
tion to "[p]erform the [d]uties of [j]udicial [o]ffice [i]mpartially and
[d]iligently., 227 Judicial misconduct resulting in legal error has ramifications
far greater than the cost of judicial disciplinary proceedings.228
As a rule, judges should "not be disciplined for errors of judgment or er-
rors of law., 229 To allow discipline for anything less than egregious exam-
ples of misconduct may have the "tendency to chill . . .independence.23°
The disciplinary process should not be a substitute for the appellate proc-
ess.23' Conversely, failing to address legal error that is the result of inten-
221. See id.
222. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5.
223. See id.
224. Wolf, supra note 57, at 367. In Florida, complaints of incivility constitute a large
percentage of the referrals to the Judicial Qualifications Committee. Id.
225. See id. at 368.
226. See Shaman, supra note 55, at 8-9. When legal error results in the reversal of a con-
viction, a question may arise whether such grounds should be the basis for judicial discipline.
Id.
227. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3 (2004).
228. See Shaman, supra note 55, at 8.
229. In re Tucker, 501 S.E.2d 67, 71 (N.C. 1998) (citing In re Martin, 424 S.E.2d 118, 120
(N.C. 1993)).
230. Ben F. Overton, Grounds for Judicial Discipline in the Context of Judicial Discipli-
nary Commissions, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 66 (1977).
231. See Shaman, supra note 55, at 8.
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tional, repeated, or blatant misconduct does not promote confidence in the
impartiality and integrity of the court. 32 A judge presides over little, if any-
thing else, that is more solemn, decisive, or significant than a first degree
murder case in which the death penalty is being sought. 233  Therefore, the
judge whose improper speech or conduct creates legal error that causes a
reversal is significant, as evidenced in the speech of Judge Donald
McCartin.3
In a decision filed on March 6, 2006, the Supreme Court of California
reversed the death penalty imposed in a 1992 triple homicide, noting that at
several crucial instances, the trial judge made comments in front of the jury
that constituted misconduct and required reversal. 235 The judge blatantly and
repeatedly crossed the line from legal error to judicial misconduct.236 First,
during the jury selection, the judge falsely told the jury that premeditation
was a "gimme. ' , 21' He interrupted two defense expert witnesses (a pharma-
cologist and a psychologist) to ridicule their testimony. 238 He made objec-
tions and comments on behalf of the state, while repeatedly chastising the
defense attorney.239
In announcing its decision, the court noted that "[a] judge shall be pa-
tient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and
others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity.' 240  The Sturm
232. See id. at 8-9.
233. See generally id.
234. See People v. Sturm, 129 P.3d 10, 17 (Cal. 2006).
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. Id. at 18. The court noted that this comment regarding premeditation was of extreme
concern because the lack of premeditation was a central theme of the defendant's case in
mitigation. Id. The jury specifically found him guilty of felony-murder instead of premedi-
tated murder and deadlocked ten to two in favor of life instead of death during the penalty
phase. Sturm, 129 P.3d at 12.
238. See id. at 19. The judge jokingly told the pharmacology expert that his "$4 million
[in] ... federal grants ... [while at] the University of California ... [had] contributed to the
federal deficit." Id. (internal quotations omitted). He indicated that the government had
"spent too much already" on such research and that testimony about it "would be very de-
pressing and we will need cocaine." Id. (internal quotations omitted). He accused the psy-
chologist of embellishing answers and responding incorrectly to a defense question. Id. at 20.
239. See Sturm, 129 P.3d at 20-21. During the overall presentations by the state in aggra-
vation and defense in mitigation, the judge "sua sponte intervened more than 30 times during
the defense case" and the state "less than five times." Id. at 24 (emphasis added). The inter-
ruptions were generally negative and/or disparaging. Id. at 24 n.3.
240. Id. at 27 (quoting CAL. CODE OF JuD. ETHics Canon 3B(4) (2006)). The ABA Model
Code of Judicial Conduct and the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3B(4) also contain
identical provisions. Compare MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(4) (2004), with
FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(4) (2006).
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court stated that "[i]t was reasonably probable that the . . . penalty phase
jury's verdict would have been different had the trial judge exhibited the
patience, dignity, and courtesy that is expected of all judges. '24' This inci-
dence of discourteous speech is an apposite paradigm of the intemperate and
impartial speech that has been the subject of the discipline of judges and the
reversal of criminal cases.2 42 Maintaining impartiality requires a judge to act
in absence of bias or prejudice and keep an open mind.24 3 The use of the
code to overturn criminal cases provides an additional level of examination,
thereby contemplating an additional consequence of judicial misconduct.
Retrial, after fifteen years of even the penalty phase of a death penalty case,
will be difficult and costly.244 Because Judge McCartin retired in 1993, the
real cost of this judicial misconduct may never be fully realized.2 45
In 2004, Judge Faith Johnson invited the media to a party replete with a
cake and balloons for the sentencing of a defendant who absconded during
trial.246 The defendant "previously served time in prison for killing his wife.
[and] was convicted in absentia of aggravated assault" for choking his
girlfriend.247 Judge Johnson noted that each year in the United States, four
million women are physically assaulted and thirty percent of female homi-
cide victims are slain by husbands, boyfriends, or live-in partners 24 Judge
Johnson also said that "when these kinds of stats begin to shrink, then we'll
have cause to celebrate .... Until then, this man's recapture-particularly in
national domestic violence month-sends the message that the law is against
domestic violence. 249
On April 29, 2005, the Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct found
that Judge Johnson violated the judicial code by not maintaining "order and
decorum in [her] courtroom., 250 Further, they found that her actions "were
241. Sturm, 129 P.3d at 27 (citing CAL. CODE OF JuD. ETHIcs Canon 3B(4) (2006)).
242. See Wolf, supra note 57, at 366-67. Examples include "lack of decorum ... [and]
dignity... disparaging lawyers.... litigants, ... witnesses... [and court personnel] .... and
inappropriate humor or sarcasm." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
243. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Terminology (2004).
244. See Sturm, 129 P.3d at 17.
245. See Donald A. McCartin, A 'Hanging Judge's' Second Thoughts: Fairness and
Balance Aren't Possible, So Death Penalty Should Be Scrapped, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June
24, 2005, at editorial page.
246. Lisa Falkenburg, Judge Defends Courtroom Party for Prisoner, Assoc. PREss, Oct.
27, 2004, at 1.
247. Id. (emphasis added). The defendant fled during the trial proceedings. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
250. In re Johnson, No. 05-0201-DI, slip op. at 31 (Tex. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct
Apr. 29, 2005), available at http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/FY2005PUB-SANC.pdf.
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willful and cast public discredit upon the judiciary."25 ' A public admonition
was imposed against the judge, who had earlier apologized before the com-
mission.252 Similar to the misconduct in this case, many cases of judicial
misconduct deal with the judge's lack of decorum in the courtroom. 253
B. Off the Bench Speech and Conduct
Is the private expression of a bias or prejudice by a judge analogous to
an expression of bias and prejudice on the bench? Do these expressions war-
rant First Amendment protection that may not be available for on the bench
speech and conduct? Although a judge does not abdicate all constitutional
rights with assumption of the bench, some restrictions must be imposed. 54
Once bias and prejudice are expressed publicly, even if not from the bench,
the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary may be com-
promised.255 The very public nature of the judge's role may subject any
speech and conduct to scrutiny.256
Scrutiny of off the bench speech may be subject to scrutiny, with or
without discipline, but the cost may be measured in terms of the independ-
ence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary. 257 The Supreme Court of
Mississippi's five to two refusal to discipline a judge for making obviously
prejudicial comments poignantly illustrates the difficulty of addressing
speech and conduct that brings the independence, integrity, and impartiality
of a judge into question; especially where no manifestation of bias or preju-
dice has been exhibited by the judge in the execution of his or her judicial
duties.258
Judge Connie Glen Wilkerson wrote a letter to his local newspaper in
response to the enactment of legislation in California that granted same sex
partners the same rights granted to spouses and families.259 Judge Wilkerson
251. Id.at32.
252. Id. This is the least severe punishment that can be issued. See id.
253. See In re J.Q.C. (Hammill), 566 S.E.2d 310, 316 (Ga. 2002); In re Trettis, 577 So. 2d
1312, 1313 (Fla. 1991).
254. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon IA (2004).
255. See In re Stevens, 645 P.2d 99, 99 (Cal. 1982). The judge was publicly censured by
the Supreme Court of California for using racial and ethnic epithets repeatedly and consis-
tently, even though he performed his duties free from any bias and the comments were gener-
ally made from his chambers. Id.
256. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 1A cmt.
257. See Miss. Comm'n on Jud. Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d 1006, 1019 (Miss.
2004) (Carlson, J., dissenting).
258. See id.at 1016.
259. Id. at 1008.
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said that "[i]n [his] opinion, gays and lesbians should be put in some type of
mental institute instead of having a law like this passed for them.""26 He
followed up the publication of his letter with an interview on a radio show,
during which he said that his deeply religious beliefs led him to believe that
homosexuality is a mental illness that requires treatment. 26'
Can gay and lesbian litigants expect fair and impartial treatment on the
bench from a judge who makes such comments off the bench? Should a gay
parent seeking custody of a child after divorce expect the judge to be fair and
impartial in deciding custody issues? How will bias be proven? Should the
judicial discipline be delayed unless and until improper influence from bias
or prejudice is manifested in his on the bench conduct? The answer to these
questions is a resounding "yes" according to the Mississippi Commission on
Judicial Performance.262
Consider the Supreme Court of Mississippi's application of Canons
2A 263 and 4A 2 64 in addition to Canons 1,265 2,266 and 4.267 The commentary
of Canon 1 explicitly states that "[a]n independent judiciary is one free of
inappropriate outside influences. 268  An opinion, unsupported by expert
260. Id. at 1009 (quoting Connie Glen Wilkerson, Letter to the Editor, GEORGE COUNTY
TIMEs, Mar. 28, 2002).
261. Id. at 1008.
262. See Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d at 1015-16.
263. "A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." MODEL
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2A. The Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct is materially
similar to this canon of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Compare id., with Miss.
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2A (2005).
264. "A judge shall conduct all of the judge's extra-judicial activities so that they do not:
(1) cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge; (2) demean the
judicial office; or (3) interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties." MODEL CODE
OF JuD. CONDUCT Canon 4A(l)-(3). The Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct is identical to
this canon of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Compare id, with Miss. CODE OF
JuD. CONDUCT Canon 4A(l)-(3).
265. "A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary." MODEL CODE
OF JuD. CONDUCT Canon 1. The Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct is identical to this
canon of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Compare id, with MISS. CODE OF JUD.
CONDUCT Canon 1.
266. "A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the
judge's activities." MODEL CODE OF JuD. CONDUCT Canon 2. The Mississippi Code of Judi-
cial Conduct is identical to this canon of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Compare
id, with Miss. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2.
267. "A judge shall so conduct the judge's extra-judicial activities to minimize the risk of
conflict with judicial obligations." MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 4. The Mississippi
Code of Judicial Conduct is identical to this canon of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Con-
duct. Compare id., with MISS. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 4.
268. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon IA cmt..
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testimony, that homosexuality is a mental illness may be seen as an inappro-
priate outside influence, especially without a commitment to follow the
law. 269 "The test for [determining whether a judge's activities would consti-
tute the] appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in
reasonable minds a perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial
responsibilities with integrity, impartiality, and competence is impaired.,
271
".Impartiality' ... denotes [the] absence of bias or prejudice in favor of,
or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintaining an
open mind in considering issues that may come before the judge. 27' Conse-
quently, it appears clear that impartiality is impaired by the expression of
bias and prejudice off the bench. 272 As an extra-judicial activity, the judge's
speech-i.e., radio broadcast and newspaper editorial--does not "minimize
the risk of conflict" as mandated by Canon 4, for a judge sitting in a court in
which same-sex litigants may appear.273
The Supreme Court of Mississippi reasoned that a "[c]ourt clearly may
not impose sanctions for violation of a Canon where doing so would infringe
on rights guaranteed under the First Amendment, including the freedom of
speech., 274 It found that there was no compelling state interest to warrant a
requirement that judges not announce their prejudices, provided that the ap-
pearance of impartiality is intact. 275 The court noted that "the objects of ju-
dicial prejudice are entitled to seek a level playing field through recusal mo-
tions, and citizens who disagree with a judge's views are entitled to voice
their disagreement at the ballot box.
276
First, the appearance of impartiality cannot be intact since the con-
duct 2 77 would "create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge's abil-
ity to carry out judicial responsibilities ... is impaired. 2 78 Second, recusal
as a result of the "judge's extra-judicial activities ' 279 creates a certain "risk of
conflict with judicial obligations, 210 that is in direct conflict with the Canon
3A provision which states "[t]he judicial duties of a judge take precedence
269. See Miss. Comm'n on Jud. Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d 1006, 1008 (Miss.
2004).
270. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2A cmt.
271. Id.
272. See generally id.
273. Id. Canon 4.
274. Miss. Comm'n on Jud. Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d 1006, at 1010.
275. Id. at 1015.
276. Id. at 1016.
277. I.e., the bias expressed.
278. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2A cmt.
279. Id. Canon 4. I.e., the bias expressed.
280. Id.
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over all the judge's other activities., 28' Therefore, the agreement or dis-
agreement by voters about clearly improper conduct should not come into
operation if the Code of Judicial Conduct is enforced properly. 2
Canon 2A provides, inter alia, that "[a] judge ... shall act at all times
in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary., 283 There is no allowance for off the bench conduct that
erodes public confidence in the "integrity and impartiality of the judici-
ary. ' '" 2 4 Neither bias nor prejudice is proper judicial conduct and both are
expressly prohibited on the bench.2 s5 Public confidence is eroded, and not
promoted by, manifestations of bias and prejudice. 286 "A judge shall conduct
all of the judge's extra-judicial activities so that they do not: (1) cast reason-
able doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge; (2) demean
the judicial office; or (3) interfere with the proper performance of judicial
duties. 28 7 Undoubtedly, "[e]xpressions of bias or prejudice ...may cast
reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially," and must be
avoided.288
The Supreme Court of Louisiana reached a much different result regard-
ing off the bench conduct that was determined to be a manifestation of bias
and prejudice.289 Judge Timothy C. Ellender wore a black afro wig, shack-
les, an orange prison jumpsuit, and black makeup to a private Halloween
party held at a public restaurant owned by his brother-in-law. 290 There was
no further allegation of misconduct regarding the costume. 291  Though
281. Id. Canon 3A. The Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct is identical to this canon of
the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Compare id., with MISS. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT
Canon 3A.
282. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3A-B.
283. Id. Canon 2A (emphasis added).
284. Id.
285. Id. Canon 3B(5). Canon 3B(5) provides that:
A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall not, in the per-
formance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not
limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sex-
ual orientation, or socioeconomic status ....
Id. The Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct is identical in this prohibition. Compare
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(5), with MIss. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon
3B(5).
286. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 1A cmt.
287. Id. Canon 4A(1)-(3).
288. Id. Canon 4A cmt.
289. See In re Ellender, 889 So. 2d 225, 232-33 (La. 2004).
290. Id. at 227.
291. See id. at 227-28.
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charged with violations of Canons 1,292 2A,293 2B, 294 3B(5), 295 and 3E, 296
Judge Ellender entered into a stipulation and was found in violation of Can-
ons 1 and 2A.297 In affirming the recommendation of the Louisiana's Com-
mission on Judicial Conduct, the court found that the judiciary was brought
into disrepute by the judge's conduct and sentenced him to a year's suspen-
sion without pay.298 Specifically, the court considered ten factors previously
utilized by the court to determine the proper sentence it should impose.299
These factors provide a useful framework for analysis.
300
292. Id. at 228. "A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary."
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 1. "An independent and honorable judiciary is indis-
pensable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and
enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that the
integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved." Id. Canon 1A. The Louisiana
Code of Judicial Conduct is identical to this canon of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Con-
duct. Compare id. Canon 1, with LA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 1 (2006).
293. "A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." MODEL
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2A. The Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct is identical to
this canon of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Compare id, with LA. CODE OF JUD.
CONDUCT Canon 2A.
294. "A judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests
of the judge ...." MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2B. The Louisiana Code of Judi-
cial Conduct is identical to Canon 2B of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Compare
id, with LA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2B.
295. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 31B(5). "A judge shall perform judicial duties
without bias or prejudice. A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or
conduct manifest bias or prejudice ... and shall not permit staff, court officials, and others
subject to the judge's direction and control to do so." Id. Canon 3A(4) of the Louisiana Code
of Judicial Conduct is materially similar to Canon 3B(5) of the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct. Compare id, with LA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3A(4).
296. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3E.
Recusation. The judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned and shall disqualify himself or herself in a
proceeding in which disqualification is required by law or applicable Supreme Court rule. In
all other instances, a judge should not recuse himself or herself.
LA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3C. The Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct is materially
similar to Canon 3E of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Compare MODEL CODE OF
JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3E, with LA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3C.
297. In re Ellender, 889 So. 2d 225, 227 (La. 2004).
298. Id. at 231, 233, 233 n.2. The judge was also ordered to pay the costs of investigation
and prosecution. Id. at 227.
299. See id. at 232. The Supreme Court of Louisiana adopted a non-exhaustive list of ten
factors to consider in imposing discipline on a judge:
(a) whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or evidenced a pattern of conduct; (b) the
nature, extent, and frequency of occurrence of the acts of misconduct; (c) whether the miscon-
duct occurred in or out of the courtroom; (d) whether the misconduct occurred in the judge's
official capacity or in his private life; (e) whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized
that the acts occurred; (f) whether the judge has evidenced an effort to change or modify his
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The Supreme Court of Louisiana deferred six months of the one year
suspension on the condition that the judge receive racial sensitivity train-
ing.3"' In a concurring opinion, the court specifically noted that:
Those who would write off Judge Ellender's lapse in judgment as
a harmless prank requiring only a token sanction do not understand
how deeply such an act resonates throughout the African-
American community as a harsh reminder of a not too distant past.
... Requiring Judge Ellender to undergo racial sensitivity training
sends the message not only to Judge Ellender but to the rest of the
country that racial slurs and stereotyping, whether intentional or
merely thoughtless, will no longer be tolerated in Louisiana ....
[Such training] could be beneficial in preventing similar infrac-
tions of the judicial code of conduct and [in] promoting the impar-
tial administration of justice to all our citizens.30 2
It is of value to note that this court, unlike the Mississippi court and
commission, specifically found it appropriate to punish the judge in spite of
the fact that no evidence existed that the judge had been unfair and partial in
his treatment of blacks.30 3 The disparity between Mississippi's finding that
there had been no violation and Louisiana's imposition of a one-year suspen-
sion is troubling.3 4 It is important to note that both of these states reached
their diametrically opposed results using canons that essentially mirror the
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.3"5 There is no clearinghouse or na-
tional review of a state court's application and imposition of its code of judi-
cial conduct.
Some speech and conduct is so prejudicial as to warrant the kind of dis-
cipline administered in Louisiana.30 6 However, the disparity between the
Mississippi and Louisiana courts cannot be reconciled.3 7 The disparity in
disciplinary actions from state to state creates great difficulty in establishing
conduct; (g) the length of service on the bench; (h) whether there have been prior complaints
about this judge; (i) the effect the misconduct has upon the integrity of and respect for the judi-
ciary; and (j) the extent to which the judge exploited his position to satisfy his personal desires.
In re Chaisson, 549 So. 2d 259, 266 (La. 1989) (citing In re Deming, 736 P.2d 639, 659
(Wash. 1987)).
300. See Ellender, 889 So. 2d at 232.
301. Id. at 233.
302. Id. at 236 (Lombard, J., concurring).
303. Id. at 232-33.
304. Compare Miss. Comm'n on Jud. Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d 1006, 1016
(Miss. 2004), with Ellender, 889 So. 2d at 234.
305. Compare Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d at 1016, with Ellender, 889 So. 2d at 232.
306. See Ellender, 889 So. 2d at 233-34.
307. Compare Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d at 1016, with Ellender, 889 So. 2d at 233-34.
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and enforcing standards for regulating speech and conduct.3 °8 A salient dis-
tinction in the treatment of the cases may be the First Amendment issue of
regulating the speech of Judge Wilkerson versus the conduct of Judge Ellen-
der.3 ° 9 Undoubtedly, it is this kind of disparity in disciplinary actions that
erodes the public's confidence in the integrity and independence of the
bench.3"'
C. Political Speech and Conduct
The regulation of the political activity of judges invites an even greater
opportunity for disparate treatment as speech and conduct are examined.3
On May 10, 2006, the Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct issued a pub-
lic admonition to Supreme Court of Texas Justice Nathan L. Hecht regarding
comments he made to the press last year in support of the nomination of
White House Counsel Harriet Miers to the United States Supreme Court.312
Court records reveal that Justice Hecht, "by his own admission, participated
in approximately 120 media interviews concerning Miers' nomination. 313
Justice Hecht also appeared on several television and radio news and talk
shows to discuss Miers' nomination.314
The commission found that Hecht's actions constituted "persistent and
willful violations" of two canons of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct.31 5
The first violation was found based on Canon 2B which states that "[a] judge
shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of
the judge or others." '316 The second violation was found based on Canon 5(2)
which provides that "[a] judge or judicial candidate shall not authorize the
308. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (2004); Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d at 1016;
Ellender, 889 So. 2d at 233-34.
309. Compare Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d at 1016, with Ellender, 889 So. 2d at 233-34.
310. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 1.
311. See id. Canon 5.
312. In re Hecht, Nos. 06-0129-AP & 06-0130-AP, slip op. at 1, 4 (Tex. State Comm'n on
Jud. Conduct May 10, 2006), available at
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/img/05-06/0524hecht.pdf.
313. Id. at 2.
314. Id. "At that time, Hecht jokingly said to Texas Lawyer that he had been acting as a
'PR office for the White House' and had been filling in gaps about Miers' background to the
press, countering some conservatives' skepticism about her qualifications." John Council,
Commission on Judicial Conduct Admonishes Justice Hecht, TEX. LAW., May 23, 2006.
315. Hecht, Nos. 06-0129-AP & 06-0130-AP, slip op. at 4.
316. TEX. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2B (2004). The ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct is identical to the Texas canon. Compare TEX. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2B,
with MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2B (2004).
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public use of his or her name endorsing another candidate for any public
office, except that either may indicate support for a political party. 317
The commentary to Canon 2B of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
provides that "[j]udges may participate in the process of judicial selection by
cooperating with appointing authorities and screening committees seeking
names for consideration, and by responding to official inquires., 31 8 Justice
Hecht, in his defense, asserted that "I believe that my statements on matters
of national public interest did not offend canons of judicial ethics and were
fully protected by the First Amendment as core speech."31 9 Hecht further
stated that "[a]s best I can determine, the Commission's action is unprece-
dented despite many judges, over the years, providing factual information
and endorsements to the judiciary committee and the public concerning
nominees to the federal bench."32
Judges are often in the position to be able to knowingly comment on the
qualifications of a judicial candidate.321 While such comments may raise the
specter of political involvement, they are allowed nonetheless.322 Justice
Hecht's statements in his defense accurately depict allowable judicial par-
ticipation in Texas.32 3 However, the Commission identifies the public use of
the judge's name as the nature of the violation.324 Specifically, the Commis-
317. TEX. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5(2). Texas judges face partisan elections and
are allowed to participate in limited partisan activities. See generally id. Canon 5. While
there is no analogous canon in the Model Code, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct does
provides that "[a] judge or candidate subject to public election .... except as prohibited by
law, [may], when a candidate [is up] for election, publicly endorse or publicly oppose other
candidates for the same judicial office in a public election in which the judge or judicial can-
didate is running." MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(1)(b)(iv).
318. Id. Canon 2B cmt.
319. Council, supra note 314 (internal citations omitted).
320. Id. (internal citations omitted).
321. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5 cmt.
322. See id. An Oklahoma advisory opinion, in looking at the appropriateness of judicial
participation, developed five factors to be considered when determining the limitations on a
judge's participation in the selection of another judge:
1. The judge must have personal knowledge of the person being recommended; 2. The
judges' recommendation should: (a) be and appear to be directed only to the factors relevant
to performance of the judicial office; (b) be factual, evenhanded, succinct and discreet; 3. A
judge should not lend his or her name to any publicity campaign for any candidate; 4. A judge
should avoid pleading for a candidate of the judge's choosing in opposition to others under
consideration; 5. A judge should not provide a letter of endorsement for a candidate if the
judge could reasonably expect that the endorsement will be publicly announced or public dis-
tributed in support of the endorsed candidate.
Jud. Ethics Op. 2002-1, 73 P.3d 277, 278 (Ok. Jud. Ethics Advisory Panel 2002).
323. In re Hecht, Nos. 06-0129-AP, 06-0130-AP, slip op. at 4 (Tex. State Comm'n on Jud.
Conduct May 10, 2006).
324. Id.
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sion concluded that "Justice Hecht allowed his name and title to be used by
the press and the White House in support of his close friend, Harriet Miers, a
nominee for the office of United States Supreme Court Justice." 325
In addition to the cost of the misconduct to the independence, integrity,
and impartiality of the judiciary, there are obvious conflicts about what con-
stitutes misconduct affect the judge.32 6 A judge must expect scrutiny and
accept restrictions on speech and conduct with the assumption of judicial
office.3 27 The aftermath of White3 28 has been assertions that speech or con-
duct alleged as improper are a valid exercise of First Amendment rights.3 29
The Texas court, in issuing the public admonition against Justice Hecht,
focused on two issues.330 First, "'[a] judge shall not lend the prestige of ju-
dicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or others.' 331  The
second issue was that "'[a] judge or judicial candidate shall not authorize the
public use of his or her name endorsing another candidate for any public
office, except that either may indicate support for a political party.' 332
There does not appear to be a connection between the misconduct alleged
and the "announce clause" of White. 333
An additional, yet unexamined, cost of judicial misconduct is that of
criminal prosecution. Even from its inception, the code was intended and
designed to provide guidance.334 The preamble of the code specifically pro-
vides that "[i]t is not designed or intended as a basis for civil liability or
criminal prosecution." '335 Therefore, the decision by the Court of Appeals of
325. Id. at 3-4.
326. See generally Hecht, Nos. 06-0129-AP, 06-0130-AP, slip op. at 4.
327. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2A cmt. (2004).
328. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). See also Weaver v. Bon-
ner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1323 (11 th Cir. 2002) (striking down a Georgia provision of the Code of
Judicial Conduct that issued a "cease and desist request which prohibits a judicial candidate
from engaging in certain speech" on First Amendment grounds); Spargo v. N.Y. State
Comm'n Jud. Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72, 92 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
329. Post White, Texas eliminated the "announce clause" of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Council, supra note 314 (internal citations omitted).
330. Hecht, Nos. 06-0129-AP, 06-0130-AP, slip op. at 3. On October 20, 2006, a three
judge panel heard Judge Hecht's appeal of his punishment by the commission and exonerated
him of any wrongdoing. In re Hecht, 213 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. Spec. Ct of Rev. 2006).
331. Id. (citing TEX. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2B (2004)). The ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct is identical to the Texas Canon. Compare TEX. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT
Canon 2B, with MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2B (2004).
332. Hecht, Nos. 06-0129-AP, 06-0130-AP, slip op. at 3 (citing TEX. CODE OF JUD. CON-
DUCT Canon 5(2) (2004)).
333. See White, 536 U.S. at 765.
334. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT pmbl.
335. Id. This provision was intended to insure that judges remain independent and not sit
in fear. See also Lofton v. State, 944 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997).
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New York to reinstate a criminal prosecution against former Supreme Court
of New York Justice Gerald P. Garson introduces the prospect of an addi-
tional cost of judicial misconduct. 336
In 2003, Justice Garson was suspended without pay as a result of his in-
dictment on criminal charges that directly related to his judicial duties.337
Garson was charged with one count of bribery and six counts of accepting
benefits for "violation of his duty as a public servant. ' 338 The violation of
public duty alleged in the six counts was misconduct in violation of the New
York Rules of Judicial Conduct. 3 9 The nature of the six violations entailed
speech and conduct on the bench, off the bench, and during political activ-
ity. 3
40
The allegations of misconduct were based on two sections of the New
York Rules of Judicial Conduct, Part 100.3(B)(6), which provides in perti-
nent part that "[a] judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte com-
munications; ' 34' and Part 100.2(C), which provides that "[a] judge shall not
lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the
judge or others., 342 The prohibition against personal solicitations and parti-
san behavior has been upheld. 343
336. People v. Garson (Garson I1), 848 N.E.2d 1264, 1274 (N.Y. 2006).
337. In re Garson (Garson 1), 793 N.E.2d 408 (N.Y. 2003). He is no longer on the bench.
See Garson II, 848 N.E.2d at 1265.
338. Garson II, 848 N.E.2d at 1265.
339. Id.
340. See id. The first of six violations for judicial misconduct was improper ex parte
communication during a case in which the judge met with the attorney for one of the parties
and instructed him on how to proceed in order to prevail in exchange for a box of expensive
cigars. Id. at 1265-66. The second and third allegations of misconduct consisted of the judge
requesting and receiving a referral fee on behalf of his wife from a lawyer to whom clients had
been referred. Id. at 1266. The fourth, fifth, and sixth counts alleged payments to the judge
for referrals by the judge. Garson II, 848 N.E.2d at 1266-67. The sixth allegation of miscon-
duct also included an allegation that the judge instructed the attorney to "make a check out" to
the judge's wife's judicial campaign committee because she needed $25,000. Id. at 1267.
341. N.Y. RULES OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURTS, pt. 100.3(B)(6) (2006).
Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(B)(7) is identical in its prohibition. Compare N.Y.
RULES OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURTS, pt. 100.3(B)(6), with MODEL CODE OF
JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(7) (2004).
342. N.Y. RULES OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURTS, Part 100.2(C). Model
Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2B is identical in its prohibition. Compare N.Y. RULES OF
THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURTS, pt. 100.2, with MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT
Canon 2B.
343. See Garson II, 848 N.E.2d at 1274.
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VI. FLORIDA'S APPLICATION OF ITS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
The Supreme Court of Florida has been critical of the recommendations
of discipline of its Judicial Qualifications Commission, sending a clear mes-
sage that leniency sends the wrong signal to judges who violate the Code of
Judicial Conduct.3" The conduct identified and the penalties imposed pro-
vide some insight into the level of severity that is assigned to certain speech
and conduct.34 There are three basic penalties available to the Supreme
Court of Florida for judicial misconduct: 1) reprimand;346 2) suspension;347
and 3) removal.348 Each of these sanctions may be accompanied by payment
of a fine, cost of investigation, and/or cost of prosecution.349
The Supreme Court of Florida "requested that the Judicial Ethics Advi-
sory Committee . . . study the 2003 revisions" that had been made to the
Model Code and recommend appropriate amendments to be considered by
the ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Con-
duct. 350 The changes passed by the Supreme Court of Florida on January 5,
2006, embraced the desire of the Court to act further to ensure the independ-
ence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary and to ensure consistency
with existing provisions of the Model Code.35
344. Wolf, supra note 57, at 350.
345. Id.at351.
346. Id. at 354. A reprimand can be issued with or without a requirement that the judge
appear before the court. Id. A reprimand without a required court appearance is analogous to
an admonition. Id.
347. Wolf, supra note 57, at 354. A suspension may be issued with or without pay, gener-
ally depending upon the nature of the alleged misconduct. Id. Lawyer misconduct action can
also involve disciplinary sanctions. Id.
348. Id. at 353. Prior to 1996, the court was limited to reprimand or removal for judicial
misconduct. Id. at 391 (referring to FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(a)(1)).
349. Wolf, supra note 57, at 388-89.
350. In re Amend. to Code of Jud. Conduct-ABA's Model Code, 918 So. 2d 949 (Fla.
2006). In 2003, the Commission was formed by ABA President Dennis W. Archer, Jr. Id. at
949 n. 1.
351. The agenda of the ABA's Annual Meeting in Hawaii included consideration of the
proposed changes recommended by the ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct. ABA 2006 Annual Meeting of the Judicial Division, Meeting Program,
http://www.abanet.org/jd/meetings/2006annual/pdf/tableofcontents.pdf. A final report is due
for consideration by the ABA House of Delegates in February, 2007. ABA Joint Comm'n to
Evaluate the Model Code of Jud. Conduct, Report (Oct. 31, 2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/commissionreport.html.
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A. On the Bench Speech and Conduct
The concept that removal from office should occur only as a result of
speech and conduct that is "fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibili-
ties of judicial office' ' 312 is consistent with the examination of the penalties
imposed in Florida and throughout the country.353 Judge Shea of Florida was
removed after an accumulation of minor and ostensibly innocuous incidents
which created an antagonistic environment and evidenced conduct unbecom-
ing a member of the judiciary.354 A standard for removal based on a pattern
of misconduct is consistent with national trends for disciplining on the bench
bias and prejudice.35
In Florida, abuse of judicial power is as likely to lead to removal from
the bench as it was ten, twenty, or thirty years ago.356 An abuse of judicial
power on the bench that may lead to removal can include: 1) lacking judicial
temperament;3 57 2) failing to be impartial; 35' 3) engaging in ex parte commu-
nication; 359 4) failing to follow the law; 360 5) improper use of contempt
352. Wolf, supra note 57, at 384.
353. In re Shea, 759 So. 2d 631, 638-39 (Fla. 2000); In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d 744, 753
(Fla. 1997); In re Johnson, 692 So. 2d 168, 173 (Fla. 1997) (stating judge backdated and falsi-
fied court documents); In re Graham, 620 So. 2d 1273, 1274 (Fla. 1993) (ruling judge re-
moved for using position as judge "to make allegations of official misconduct and improper
criticisms against fellow judges [and] elected officials," "imposing improper sentences and
improper use of contempt power," and "[a]cting in an undignified and discourteous manner");
In re Santora (Santora 1), 592 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1992) (stating chief judge made racist and
stereotypical comments to press); In re Damron, 487 So. 2d. 1, 7 (Fla. 1985); In re Crowell,
379 So. 2d 107, 108 (Fla. 1979) (finding repeated abuse of contempt for authority and contin-
ual arrogant and arbitrary behavior).
354. Shea, 759 So. 2d at 639. Shea also intimidated two attorneys into withdrawing from
representation of a client with whom he had a conflict. Id. at 632.
355. See SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 76, §3.07.
356. In 1997, in Johnson, the Supreme Court of Florida ordered removal of the judge for
knowing and repeatedly falsifying court records by backdating pleas accepted in driving under
the influence (DUI) cases. Johnson, 692 So. 2d at 173. Removal was ordered in spite of an
otherwise unblemished judicial record. Id. 173-74 (Shaw, J., dissenting). In 1986 in In re
Damron, the Supreme Court of Florida found that removal was warranted for a pattern of
misconduct by soliciting judicial favors for judicial acts, ex parte communication, and threat-
ening litigants and others. Damron, 487 So. 2d at 7. In 1979 in Crowell, the Supreme Court
of Florida ordered removal of judge for "a pattern of conduct over a long period of time, in-
volving persistent abuse of the contempt power, which demonstrates a lack of proper judicial
temperament and a tendency to abuse authority of office." Crowell, 379 So. 2d at 110.
357. See Shea, 759 So. 2d at 638.
358. In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560, 562 (Fla. 2001).
359. Damron, 487 So. 2d at 7; In re Leon, 440 So. 2d 1267, 1268 (Fla. 1983).
360. See Johnson, 692 So. 2d at 173.
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power;36' and 6) intimidation.3 62 On the bench conduct that consists of vio-
lating recusal and disclosure requirements, as well as delays in ruling, has
generally resulted in reprimand or even more informal procedures such as a
reminder. 363
B. Off the Bench Speech and Conduct
The Supreme Court of Mississippi found that manifestations of bias and
prejudice made through off the bench speech did not warrant judicial disci-
pline and were protected by the First Amendment in the absence of bias and
prejudice on the bench.3 64 However, Florida and other states have not been
so predisposed.3 65 In In re Santora (Santora 1),366 a newspaper article in-
cluded remarks by the judge regarding interracial dating, integration, racial
inferiority, blacks on welfare and in the criminal justice system, using racial
slurs, and telling racial jokes.3 67 The Supreme Court of Florida was peti-
tioned for the removal of the judge as Chief Judge of a circuit court. 3 68 The
petition alleged that "Judge Santora's public statements have eroded public
confidence in the judiciary and cast doubt on his impartiality. They also
have caused growing social and racial turmoil in this community. These
tensions seriously threaten the effective functioning of the judiciary. 369
361. Crowell, 379 So. 2d at 110.
362. See Shea, 759 So. 2d at 632; Damron, 486 So. 2d at 4, 6 (finding threatening behav-
ior by the judge while on the bench).
363. Wolf, supra note 57, at 380-81.
364. Miss. Comm'n on Jud. Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d 1006, 1010 (Miss.
2004).
365. See In re Santora (Santora 1), 592 So. 2d 671, 671-72 (Fla. 1992); In re Cerbone, 460
N.E.2d 217, 218 (N.Y. 1984) (stating that judge was removed for announcing he was a judge
and threatening retaliation with racist remarks and profanity during bar room fight); Kuehnel
v. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct, 403 N.E.2d 167, 167-68 (N.Y. 1980) (stating that judge
was removed for using ethnic remarks during altercations and "gross lack of candor"); In re
Rabren (Ala. Ct of Judiciary Aug. 1, 1986) (unpublished opinion); see SHAMAN ET AL., supra
note 76, § 3.07 (stating that judge was removed for making racist remarks while waiting for
court to begin).
366. Santora 1, 592 So. 2d at 671-72.
367. Id. at 673-76 app. Although the Court removed Judge Santora as chief judge, it also
issued a reprimand in the disciplinary proceeding. In re Santora (Santora I1), 602 So. 2d
1269, 1270 (Fla. 1992); see also In re Bourisseau, 480 N.W.2d 270 (Mich. 1992) (stating
judge made racist remarks to press); but see In re Nakoski, 742 A.2d 260, 261 (Pa. Ct. Jud.
Discipline 1999) (refusing to discipline for judge's affirmative response to instructor's ques-
tion whether it was not against the law to be a black man).
368. Santora I, 592 So. 2d at 672.
369. Id.
The petitioners include[d] three past presidents of The Florida Bar, the current president of the
Jacksonville Bar Association, the president-elect of the Jacksonville Bar Association, six past
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While the judge was immediately removed as Chief Judge, he was permitted
to remain as a circuit judge after being reprimanded for his comments.37 °
The removal of judges for manifestations of bias and prejudice appears
to be utilized if accompanied by additional egregious behavior, such as lack
of candor during the proceeding,37' or threatening to retaliate on the bench
based on the bias expressed.37 It is difficult to justify a position that bias
and prejudice manifested from the bench cannot be "assumed ... to have an
effect on the judge's treatment of litigants and not to reflect racial bias on the
part of the judge merely because the judge does not repeat the remarks in the
presence of the litigants or in the courtroom., 37 3 However, willingness to
manifest bias and prejudice on the bench can be viewed as more noxious and
problematic, indicating a lack of fitness and a fundamental inconsistency for
service as a judge.374 Moreover, additional incidences warranting removal of
judges for off the bench speech and conduct include criminal offenses.
C. Political Speech and Conduct
The Supreme Court of Florida has been diligent in its desire to ensure
that judicial campaigns are legal and ethical.376 An extensive guide was pro-
presidents of the Jacksonville Bar Association, the current president of the Clay County Bar
Association, two members of The Board of Governors of The Florida Bar, and two members
of the Board of Governors of the Jacksonville Bar Association, among others.
Id. at 672 n.2.
370. Santora II, 602 So. 2d at 1270.
371. See Kuehnel, 403 N.E.2d at 168.
372. See In re Cerbone, 460 N.E.2d 217, 218 (N.Y. 1983).
373. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 76, §3.07.
374. See Wolf, supra note 57, at 369.
375. See In re Berkowitz, 522 So. 2d 843, 843-44 (Fla. 1988) (stating judge continued to
practice law after assuming office, and committed trust account violations that encompassed
hundreds of checking transactions, judge failed to file accurate tax returns, and judge's testi-
mony on campaign irregularities was deceptive); In re Garrett, 613 So. 2d 463, 463-65 (Fla.
1993) (stating judge was removed for shoplifting despite exemplary record of public service).
In In re Ford-Kaus, the judge was removed and disciplined by the Bar for conduct that oc-
curred prior to her election to the bench. 730 So. 2d 269, 272-77 (Fla. 1999). Specifically,
she mishandled and over-billed for a case immediately before taking the bench. Id. Based on
that, the Supreme Court of Florida found her conduct inconsistent with the responsibilities of a
judicial officer and that she is presently unfit to hold judicial office, stating that her conduct
demonstrates "a pattern of deceit and deception." Id. at 277.
376. JUDICIAL ETHIcs ADVISORY COMM., AN AID TO UNDERSTANDING CANON 7 (2006),
available at http://www.flcourts.org/gen_public/courted/bin/canon7update.pdf. Since 1976,
the Supreme Court of Florida has authorized the Judicial Ethics Advisory Commission to
write "advisory opinions to inquiring judges [and judicial candidates] concerning the propriety
of... judicial and non-judicial [speech and] conduct." Id.at 1. (quoting Petition of the Com-
mittee on Standards of Conduct for Judges, 327 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976)).
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duced, titled An Aid to Understanding Canon 7, which details acceptable
political behavior.3 77 Prior to each election cycle, the bench and bar join in
encouraging the participation of all judicial members and judicial candidates
in a forum in each circuit where there is a contested judicial election.37s
While the use of removal from office has been limited, "the [C]ourt has
stated that a candidate should not profit by their misdeeds. 379 The wide
variety in each state's method of judicial election makes regulation diffi-
cult. 38 0 The challenge is to construct a canon that adequately addresses the
issues that are unique to the various methods of judicial selection.38
The difficulty of regulation is evident at the state level as well as the na-
tional level. 382 The various types of violations have included: 1) misrepre-
sentation regarding candidate or opponent; 3 3 2) inappropriate promises;38 4 3)
campaign financial irregularities; 385 4) partisan politics; 386 and 5) endorsing
or supporting other candidates.8 7
377. See id.
378. See Running for Judge? Plan to Attend These Candidate Forums, FLA. BAR NEWS,
May 15, 2006, at 5.
379. Wolf, supra note 57, at 391.
380. See ANN. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5 (2004).
381. See id.
382. See Wolf, supra note 57, at 351 (quoting CYNTHIA GRAY, A STUDY OF JUDICIAL
DISCIPLINE SANCTIONS 1 (2002)).
383. In re Alley, 699 So. 2d 1369, 1369 (Fla. 1997) (reprimanding a judge for "misrepre-
sent[ing] her qualifications and those of her opponent" in judicial election campaign and in-
jecting party politics into nonpartisan election).
384. In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560, 562 (Fla. 2001). Removal warranted for:
(1) making explicit campaign promises to favor the State and the police in court proceedings;
(2) making explicit promises that he would side against the defense; (3) making unfounded
attacks on incumbent county judge; (4) making unfounded attacks on the local court system
and local officials; and (5) improperly presiding over a court case [despite personal] direct
conflict of interest.
Id.
385. See In re Pando, 903 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 2005) (finding that during the course of the
judge's unsuccessful 1998 election campaign and her successful 2000 election campaign, the
Judge: "(1) accepted loans from family members and friends in excess of the $500 statutory
limit; [and] (2) misrepresented the source of these loans in submitting and certifying her cam-
paign finance reports during the course of the campaigns"); In re Rodriguez, 829 So. 2d 857,
859 (Fla. 2002) (reprimanding a judge for campaign finance activities and reporting practices,
such as knowingly accepting campaign contribution loan of $200,000 from a non family
member and filing misleading campaign); McMillan, 797 So. 2d at 562-64.
386. In re Angel, 867 So. 2d 379, 383 (Fla. 2004) (holding that the partisan political activ-
ity during campaign for judicial office warranted a public reprimand).
387. In re Glickstein, 620 So. 2d 1000, 1002-03 (Fla. 1993) (writing letter endorsing
retention in office of fellow member of judiciary, where letter is written on office stationery
and identified author as member of judiciary and is published in newspapers, warrants public
reprimand).
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VII. CONCLUSION
"[P]ublic sentiment is everything. With public sentiment nothing can
fail; without it nothing can succeed., 388 -Abraham Lincoln
The real costs of judicial misconduct are measured in the way in which
the speech and conduct of judges threaten to erode the independence, integ-
rity, and impartiality of the judiciary. 389 Each act of misconduct by a judge
contributes to the public's perception about judges and their role. 39" Three
justifications arise repeatedly for limiting judicial speech and conduct. First,
limitations on judicial speech and conduct are necessary "to avoid the ap-
pearance of partiality, favoritism, or other misuse. ' 391 Second, regulation of
judicial speech and conduct promotes confidence in judiciary.392 Finally,
limiting judicial speech and conduct prevents judges from being distracted
while performing their duties.3 93 Therefore, the case for preserving the inde-
pendence and impartiality of the judiciary creates a foundation for the need
of rules regulating judicial speech and conduct.394
The model rules provide a substantive and procedural framework creat-
ing a standard for judging speech and conduct. 395 These standards provide
guidance to judges regarding improper and proper speech and conduct.396
They are "intended to establish standards for ethical conduct of judges" in
both their judicial and personal roles.397 Canons 1 and 2 of the Model Code
are clearly aspirational, but provide a standard that has been utilized for judi-
cial discipline.398 Canons 3, 4, and 5 address specific conduct both on and
off the bench and provide commentaries to provide further directions and
examples for their application.399
Ensuring the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary
must continue to be an important societal aim. The continued regulation of
judges operates to encourage judges to adhere to high ethical standards. The
388. 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 27, LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE AT
OTTAWAY (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953).
389. In re Leon, 440 So. 2d 1267, 1269 (Fla. 1983).
390. See id.
391. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 76, §10.02.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT pmbl. (2004).
395. See id.
396. See id.
397. Id.
398. See id. Canons 1-2.
399. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canons 3-5.
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proposals for revisions to the Model Code recognize the need for regulation
to ensure the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary. The
additions and amendments being proposed provide clear, concise, and con-
sistent guidance to judges. The independence, integrity, and impartiality of
the judiciary rest with continued regulation and discipline.
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